. . . Easterners are justified in reproaching modern Western civilization for being exclusively material: it has developed along purely material lines only, and from whatever point of view it is considered, one is faced with the more or less direct results of this materialization. However, there is still something to be added to what we have already said about this: in the first place, we must explain the different meanings that can be given to a word such as “materialism”, for if we use it to characterize the contemporary world, people who claim to be very modern, without considering themselves in any way materialistic, will be sure to protest and will feel convinced that this is mere calumny; we must therefore begin with an explanation that will remove in advance any ambiguity that might arise on this point.
It is significant in itself that the very word “materialism” does not go any further back than the eighteenth century; it was invented by the philosopher Berkeley, who used it to designate any theory that accepted the real existence of matter; it is scarcely necessary to say that it is not this meaning of the word that concerns us here, since we are not raising the question of the existence of matter. A little later the same word took on a narrower meaning, the one in fact that it still retains: it came to denote a conception according to which nothing else exists but matter and its derivatives. It should be remarked that such a conception is something altogether new and essentially a product of the modern outlook, and therefore corre sponds to at least some of the tendencies that are inherent in this outlook.1 But we intend at present to speak of materialism mainly in another, much wider, and yet very definite sense: in this sense, materialism stands for a complete state of mind, of which the con ception that we have just described is only one manifestation among many others, and which, in itself, is independent of any philosophical theory. This state of mind is one that consists in more or less consciously putting material things, and the preoccupations arising out of them, in the first place, whether these preoccupations claim to be speculative or purely practical; and it cannot be seri ously disputed that this is the mentality of the immense majority of our contemporaries. The whole of the “profane” science that has developed in the course of recent centuries is a study of only the sensible world, is enclosed entirely within this world, and works by methods that can be applied only to this domain; these methods alone are proclaimed to be “scientific”, which amounts to rejecting any science that does not deal with material things. Among those who think in this way, and even among those who have specialized in the sciences in question, there are nevertheless many who would refuse to call themselves materialists, or accept the philosophical theory that bears this name. There are even some who gladly profess a religious faith, and whose sincerity is not in doubt; but their scien tific attitude does not differ appreciably from that of the avowed materialists. The question has often been raised whether, from the religious point of view, modern science should be denounced as atheistic or materialistic, but the question has usually been badly put: it is quite certain that this science does not explicitly profess atheism or materialism, it merely, because of its prejudices, ignores certain things, without formally denying them, as this or that phil osopher may have done; in connection with modern science, there fore, one can only speak of de facto materialism, or what might be called practical materialism; but the evil is perhaps even more seri ous, as it is deeper and more widespread. A philosophical attitude may be something very superficial, even with the “professional” philosophers; and besides, there are people whose mind would recoil from actual negation, but who have no objection to complete indifference; this is what is most to be feared, for to deny something one must think about it to some extent, however little that may be, whereas an attitude of indifference makes it possible not to think about it at all. When an exclusively material science claims to be the only science possible, and when men are accustomed to accept, as an unquestionable truth, that there can be no valid knowledge out side this science, and when all the education they receive tends to instill into them the superstition of this science—or “scientism” as it should really be called—how could these men not in fact be materi alists, or in other words, how could they fail to have all their preoc cupations turned in the direction of matter?
It seems that nothing exists for modern men beyond what can be seen and touched; or at least, even if they admit theoretically that something more may exist, they immediately declare it not merely unknown but unknowable, which absolves them from having to think about it. There are, it is true, people who try to create for themselves some idea of an “other world” but, relying as they do on nothing but their imagination, they represent it in the likeness of the terrestrial world, and endow it with all the conditions of existence that belong to this world, including space and time and even a sort of “corporeality”; we have shown elsewhere, in speaking of spiritist2 conceptions, some particularly striking examples of this kind of grossly materialized representation. But if these conceptions repre sent an extreme case, in which this trait is exaggerated to the point of caricature, it would be wrong to suppose that this sort of thing is confined to spiritism and to the sects that are more or less akin to it. Indeed, in a more general manner, the intrusion of the imagination into realms in which it can be of no service, and which should nor mally be closed to it, shows very clearly the inability of modern Westerners to rise above the sensible domain. There are many who can see no difference between “conceiving” and “imagining”, and some philosophers—such as Kant—have gone so far as to declare “inconceivable” or “unthinkable” everything that is not susceptible of representation. Likewise, what is called “spiritualism” or “idealism” is usually only a sort of transposed materialism; and this is true not only of what we have termed “neospiritualism”, but also of philo sophical spiritualism itself, even though this holds itself to be the opposite of materialism. Indeed spiritualism and materialism, in the philosophical sense of these words, cannot be understood apart from each other, being merely the two halves of the Cartesian dual ism, whose radical separation has been transformed into a sort of antagonism; since that time, the whole of philosophy has oscillated between these two terms, without being able to get beyond them. Despite its name, spiritualism has nothing in common with spiritu ality; its war with materialism cannot be of the slightest interest to those who adopt a higher point of view, and who see that these two alleged opposites are basically close to being simple equivalents, and that on many points their pretended opposition ultimately amounts to no more than a mere verbal dispute.
Modern persons in general cannot conceive of any other science than that of things that can be measured, counted, and weighed, in other words material things, since it is to these alone that the quantitative point of view can be applied; the claim to reduce quality to quantity is very typical of modern science. This tendency has reached the point of supposing that there can be no science, in the real meaning of the word, except where it is possible to introduce measurement, and that there can be no scientific laws except those that express quantitative relations. It is a tendency that arose with the mechanism of Descartes; since then it has become more and more pronounced, notwithstanding the rejection of Cartesian phys ics, for it is not bound up with any particular physical theory, but with a general conception of scientific knowledge. Today, attempts are made to apply measurement even in the psychological field, the very nature of which excludes such a method. The point has been reached of no longer understanding that the possibility of measure ment derives from a quality inherent in matter, that is to say from its indefinite divisibility; or else it is thought that this quality is to be found in all that exists, which comes to the same as materializing everything. As we have said before, matter is the principle of divi sion and of all that is multiplicity; the predominance given to the quantitative point of view—a predominance to be found . . . even in the social domain—is thus really materialism in the sense that we defined above; this materialism is not necessar ily connected with philosophical materialism, which, in fact, it preceded in the development of the tendencies inherent in the mod ern outlook. We will not dwell on the mistake of seeking to reduce quality to quantity, or on the inadequacy of all attempts at explanation that are more or less of the “mechanistic” type. That is not our present purpose, and we will remark only, in this connection, that even in the sensible order, a science of this kind has but little con nection with reality, the greater part of which is bound to elude it.
Speaking of “reality” leads us to mention another fact, which might easily be overlooked, but which is very significant as a sign of the state of mind we are speaking of: it is that people commonly use the word “reality” to denote exclusively reality of the sensible order. As language expresses the mentality of a people or a period, one must conclude that, for such people, everything that cannot be grasped by the senses is “unreal”, that is to say illusory or even non existent. They may not be clearly aware of it, but this negative con viction is nonetheless deeply held and, if they deny it, one can be certain that though they may not be aware of it their denial is merely the expression of something even more outward, and indeed may be no more than verbal. If anyone should be tempted to think that we are exaggerating, he has only to consider, for example, what the so-called religious convictions of many people amount to, namely a few notions learnt by heart, in a purely mechanical and schoolboy way, which they have never assimilated, to which they have never devoted serious thought, but which they store in their memory and repeat on occasion as part of a certain convention or formal attitude which is all they understand by the name of reli gion. . . . This “minimization” of religion, of which the “verbalism” in question represents one of the final stages, . . . explains why so-called “believers” in no wise fall short of “unbelievers” as regards practical materialism. We shall return to this point later, but first we must complete our description of the materialistic character of modern science, for this is a subject that requires to be treated from various angles.
We must recall once more a point that has already been mentioned: modern sciences do not possess the character of disinter ested knowledge, nor is their speculative value, even for those who believe in it, much more than a mask beneath which purely practical considerations are hidden; but this mask makes it possible to retain the illusion of a false intellectuality. Descartes himself, in working out his physics, was primarily interested in extracting from it a system of mechanics, medicine, and morality; but a still greater change was brought about by the diffusion of the influence of Anglo-Saxon empiricism. It is almost exclusively the practical results that science makes possible that gives it so much prestige in the eyes of the general public, because here again are things that can be seen and touched. We have said that pragmatism represents the outcome of all modern philosophy, and the last stage in its decline; but outside philosophy there is also, and has been for a long time, a widespread and unsystematized pragmatism that is to philosophical pragmatism what practical is to theoretical materialism, and which is really the same as what people call “common sense”. What is more, this almost instinctive utilitarianism is inseparable from the materi alist tendency, for “common sense” consists in not going beyond the things of this earth, as well as in ignoring all that does not make an immediate practical appeal. In particular, it is “common sense” that sees only the world of the senses as real, and that admits of no knowledge other than the one that comes from the senses; more over, it ascribes value to this narrow form of knowledge only insofar as it offers a possibility of satisfying either material needs or a cer tain sentimentalism, for in reality sentiment—and this must be frankly stated at the risk of shocking contemporary moralism—lies quite close to matter. In all this there remains no place for intelligence, or at most only insofar as intelligence may consent to serve for the attainment of practical ends, and to become a mere instru ment subordinated to the requirements of the lowest and most cor poreal part of the human individual—“a tool for making tools”, to quote a significant expression of Bergson: it is an utter indifference to truth that begets pragmatism in all its forms.
Under such conditions, industry is no longer merely an applica tion of science, an application from which science should, in itself, remain completely independent; it has become the reason for, and justification of, science to such an extent that here too the normal relations between things have been reversed. What the modern world has striven after with all its strength, even when it has claimed in its own way to pursue science, is really nothing other than the development of industry and machinery; and in thus seeking to dominate matter and bend it to their service, men have only suc ceeded, as we said at the beginning of this book,3 in becoming its slaves. Not only have they limited their intellectual ambition—if such a term can still be used in the present state of things—to inventing and constructing machines, but they have ended by becoming in fact machines themselves. Indeed, it is not only schol ars but also technicians and even workers who have to undergo the specialization that certain sociologists praise so highly under the name of “division of labor”; and for the “workers”, it makes intelli gent work quite impossible. Very different from the craftsmen of former times, they have become mere slaves of machines with which they may be said to form part of a single body. In a purely mechanical way they have constantly to repeat certain specific movements, which are always the same and always performed in the same way, so as to avoid the slightest loss of time; such at least is required by the most modern methods which are supposed to rep resent the most advanced stage of “progress”. Indeed, the object is merely to produce as much as possible; quality matters little, it is quantity alone that is of importance, which brings us back once more to the remark we have already made in other contexts, namely, that modern civilization may truly be called a quantitative civilization, and this is merely another way of saying it is a material civilization.
Anyone who wants still further evidence of this truth can find it in the tremendous importance that economic factors take on nowa days, both in the lives of peoples and of individuals: industry, com merce, finance—these seem to be the only things that count; and this is in agreement with the fact already mentioned that the only social distinction that has survived is the one based on material wealth. Politics seem to be altogether controlled by finance, and trade competition seems to be the dominant influence in determin ing the relations between peoples; it may be that this is only so in appearance, and that these factors are really not so much causes as means of action, but the choice of such means is a clear sign of the character of the period to which they are suited. Moreover, our con temporaries are convinced that it is almost exclusively economic conditions that dictate historical events, and they even imagine that it has always been so; a theory has even been invented according to which everything is to be explained by economic factors alone, and has been named, significantly, “historical materialism”. Here also may be seen the effect of one of those suggestions to which we referred above, suggestions whose power is all the greater in that they correspond to the tendencies of the general mentality; and the result of this suggestion is that economic factors have really come to decide almost everything that occurs in the social sphere. It is true that the masses have always been led in one manner or another, and it could be said that their part in history consists primarily in allow ing themselves to be led, since they represent a merely passive ele ment, a “matter” in the Aristotelian sense of the word. But, in order to lead them today, it is sufficient to dispose of purely material means, this time in the ordinary sense of the word, and this shows clearly to what depths our age has sunk. At the same time, the masses are made to believe that they are not being led, but that they are acting spontaneously and governing themselves, and the fact that\ they believe this is a sign from which the extent of their stupid ity may be inferred.
As we are speaking of economic factors, we will take the opportunity to mention a widespread illusion on this subject, namely that of supposing that relations established in the field of commerce can serve to draw peoples closer together and bring about an under standing between them, whereas in reality they have exactly the opposite effect. Matter, as we have often pointed out, is essentially multiplicity and division, and therefore the source of struggles and conflicts; also, whether with peoples or individuals, the economic field is and can only be that of rival interests. In particular, the West cannot count on industry, any more than on the modern science that is inseparable from it, to serve as a basis for an understanding with the East; if Easterners bring themselves to accept this industry as an unpleasant and transitory necessity, it will only be as a weapon to enable them to resist the invasion of the West and to safeguard their own existence. It should be clearly understood that this is bound to be so: Easterners who bring themselves to consider eco nomic competition with the West, despite the repugnance they feel for this kind of activity, can do so only with one purpose, namely to rid themselves of a foreign domination that is based on mere brute force, and on the material power that industry itself supplies; vio lence breeds violence, but it should be recognized that it is certainly not the Easterners who have sought war in this field.
Moreover, apart from the question of the relations between East and West, it is easy to see that one of the most conspicuous results of industrial development is that engines of war are being con stantly perfected and their power of destruction increased at an ominous rate. This alone should be enough to shatter the “pacifist” dreams of some of the admirers of modernist “progress”; but the dreamers and idealists are incorrigible, and their gullibility seems to know no bounds. The “humanitarianism” that is so much in fashion is certainly not worth taking seriously; but it is strange that people should talk so much about ending all war at a time when the rav ages it causes are greater than they have ever been, not only because the means of destruction have been multiplied, but also because, as wars are no longer fought between comparatively small armies composed solely of professional soldiers, all the individuals on both sides are flung against each other indiscriminately, including those who are the least qualified for this kind of function. Here again is a striking example of modern confusion, and it is truly portentous, for those who care to reflect upon it, that a “mass uprising” or a “gen eral mobilization” should have come to be considered quite natural, and that with very few exceptions the minds of all should have accepted the idea of an “armed nation”. In this also can be seen an outcome of the belief in the power of numbers alone: it is in keeping with the quantitative character of modern civilization to set in motion enormous masses of combatants; and at the same time, egalitarianism also finds its expression here, as well as in systems such as “compulsory education” and “universal suffrage”. Let it be added that these generalized wars have only been made possible by another specifically modern phenomenon, that is, by the formation of “nations”—a consequence on the one hand of the destruction of the feudal system, and on the other of the disruption of the higher unity of medieval Christendom; and, without pausing over consid erations that would carry us too far afield, let us point out that mat ters have been made still worse by the non-recognition of any spiritual authority which, under normal conditions, could be an effective arbiter, standing as it does by its very nature above all con flicts of the political order. Denial of the spiritual authority is the same thing as practical materialism; and even those who in theory claim to recognize such an authority refuse in practice to allow it any real influence or power of intervention in the social domain, in exactly the same way as they fence off religion from the concerns of their every-day existence: whether in public or in private life, it is the same mental outlook that prevails.
Even if we admit that material development does have certain advantages—though, indeed, from a very relative point of view—the sight of consequences such as those just mentioned leads one to question whether they are not far outweighed by the inconveniences. We say this without referring to the many things of incom parably greater value that have been sacrificed to this one form of development—we do not speak of the higher knowledge that has been forgotten, the intellectuality that has been overthrown, and the spirituality that has disappeared. Simply taking modern civiliza tion on its merits, we affirm that, if the advantages and inconve niences of what has been brought about were set against each other, the result might well on balance prove to be negative. The inven tions, whose number is at present growing at an ever-increasing pace, are all the more dangerous in that they bring into play forces whose real nature is quite unknown to the men who utilize them; and this ignorance is the best proof of the worthlessness of modern science as an explanatory means, that is to say considered as knowl edge, even were one’s attention confined entirely to the physical realm. At the same time, the fact that such ignorance in no way interferes with practical applications proves that this science is in reality directed only to practical ends, and that it is industry that is the only real object of all its research. The danger inherent in these inventions, even in those that are not expressly created for a pur pose destructive to mankind—but which nonetheless cause just as many catastrophes, without mentioning the unsuspected distur bances that they create in the physical environment—will undoubtedly continue to grow, and that to an extent difficult to foretell, so that, as we have already shown, it is by no means improbable that it will be through these inventions that the modern world will bring about its own destruction, unless it can check its course in this direction while there is still time.
It is not enough however to withhold approval of modern inventions on the grounds of their dangerous side alone; there is more than this to the affair. One hears of the “benefits” claimed for what men have agreed to call “progress”, and that one might even consent so to call, provided one take care to make it clear that there is no question of any but a purely material progress; but are not these “benefits”, of which people are so proud, very largely illusory? Our contemporaries claim they increase their “welfare” by this means; in our opinion, the end they set themselves, even if it were really attained, is hardly worth the expenditure of so much effort; but what is more, it seems a very debatable question whether they do attain it. In the first place, the fact should be taken into account that not all men have the same tastes or the same needs, and that there are still some who would wish to avoid modern commotion and the craving for speed, but who can no longer do so. Could anyone presume to maintain that it is a “benefit” to these people to have thrust on them what is most contrary to their nature? It will be said in reply that there are few such men today, and this is considered a justification for treating them as a negligible quantity; in this, as in the field of politics, the majority arrogates to itself the right to crush minorities, which, in its eyes, evidently have no right to exist, since their very existence defies the egalitarian mania for uniformity. But if the whole of mankind be taken into consideration, instead of merely the Western world, the question bears a different aspect: the majority we have just spoken of then becomes a minority. A different argument is therefore used in this case, and by a strange contradiction it is in the name of their “superiority” that these “egalitarians” seek to impose their civilization on the rest of the world, and that they bring trouble to people who have never asked them for anything; and, since this “superiority” exists only from the material point of view, it is quite natural that the most brutal means are used to assert it. Let there be no confusion on this point: if the general public accepts the pretext of “civilization” in all good faith, there are those for whom it is no more than mere moralistic hypocrisy, serving as a mask for designs of conquest or economic ambitions. It is really an extraordinary epoch in which so many men can be made to believe that a people is being given happiness by being reduced to subjec tion, by being robbed of all that is most precious to it, that is to say of its own civilization, by being forced to adopt manners and insti tutions that were made for a different race, and by being constrained to the most distasteful kinds of work, in order to make it acquire things for which it has not the slightest use. For that is what is taking place: the modern West cannot tolerate that men should prefer to work less and be content to live on little; as it is only quantity that counts, and as everything that escapes the senses is held to be non existent, it is taken for granted that anyone who is not in a state of agitation and who does not produce much in a material way must be “lazy”. In evidence of this and without speaking of the opinions commonly expressed about Eastern peoples, it is enough to note how the contemplative orders are viewed, even in circles that con sider themselves religious. In such a world, there is no longer any place for intelligence, or anything else that is purely inward, for these are things that can neither be seen nor touched, that can nei ther be counted nor weighed; there is a place only for outward action in all its forms, even those that are the most completely meaningless. For this reason it should not be a matter for surprise that the Anglo-Saxon mania for sport gains ground day by day: the ideal of the modern world is the “human animal” who has developed his muscular strength to the highest pitch; its heroes are athletes, even though they be mere brutes; it is they who awaken popular enthusiasm, and it is their exploits that command the passionate interest of the crowd. A world in which such things are seen has indeed sunk low and seems near its end.
However, let us consider things for a moment from the stand point of those whose ideal is material “welfare”, and who therefore rejoice at all the improvements to life furnished by modern “progress”; are they quite sure they are not being duped? Is it true that, because they dispose of swifter means of communication and other things of the kind, and because of their more agitated and complicated manner of life, men are happier today than they were formerly? The very opposite seems to us to be true: disequilibrium cannot be a condition of real happiness. Moreover, the more needs a man has, the greater the likelihood that he will lack something, and thereby be unhappy; modern civilization aims at creating more and more artificial needs, and as we have already said, it will always create more needs than it can satisfy, for once one has started on this path, it is very hard to stop, and, indeed, there is no reason for stopping at any particular point. It was no hardship for men to do without things that did not exist and of which they had never dreamed; now, on the contrary, they are bound to suffer if they lack these things, since they have become accustomed to consider them as necessities, with the result that they have, in fact, really become necessary to them. Therefore men struggle in every possible way to obtain the means of procuring material satisfactions, the only ones that they are capable of appreciating: they are interested only in “making money”, because it is money that enables them to obtain these things, the more of which they have, the more they wish to have, as they go on discovering fresh needs; and this passion becomes for them the sole end in life. Hence the savage competition certain evolutionists have raised to the dignity of a scientific law under the name of “the struggle for existence”, whose logical consequence is that only the strongest, in the narrowly material sense of the word, have a right to exist. Hence also the envy and even hatred felt toward those who possess wealth by those who do not; how could men to whom egalitarian theories have been preached fail to revolt when they see all around them inequality in the most material order of things, the order to which they are bound to be the most sensi tive? If modern civilization should some day be destroyed by the disordered appetites that it has awakened in the masses, one would have to be very blind not to see in this the just punishment of its basic vice—or, without resorting to the language of morality, the repercussion of its own action in the same domain in which this action has taken place. The Gospel says “all they that take the sword shall perish by the sword”; those who unchain the brute forces of matter will perish, crushed by these same forces, of which they will no longer be masters; having once imprudently set them in motion, they cannot hope to hold back indefinitely their fatal course. It is of little consequence whether it be the forces of nature or the forces of the human mob, or both together; in any case it is the laws of matter that are called into play, and that will inexorably destroy him who has aspired to dominate them without raising himself above matter. The Gospel also says: “If a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand”; this saying also applies fully to the modern world with its material civilization, which cannot fail, by its very nature, to cause strife and division everywhere. The conclusion is obvious and, even without appealing to other considerations, it is possible to predict with all certainty that this world will come to a tragic end, unless a change as radical as to amount to a complete reversal of direction should intervene, and that very soon.
In speaking as we have done of the materialism of modern civilization, we are aware that some will reproach us for having overlooked certain elements that seem at least to alleviate this materialism; and indeed, if there were none such, one could truly say that this civilization would most probably have already perished miserably. We do not, therefore, in the least dispute that there are such elements, but on the other hand there should be no illusions on this subject: in the first place, the various philosophical movements that assume labels such as “spiritualism” and “idealism” are not to be counted among them, any more than are the contemporary tendencies that take the form of moralism and sentimentalism. We have already explained the reasons for this, and wish merely to recall that for us these points of view are no less “profane” than theoretical or practical materialism, and far less remote from it in reality than in appearance. In the second place, if there are still remnants of real spiritual ity, it is in spite of the modern outlook and in opposition to it that they have persisted. Such remnants of spirituality, insofar as they are really Western, are to be found only in religion; but we have already remarked how shrunken religion is today, what a narrow and mediocre conception of it even believers hold, and to what point it has been deprived of intellectuality, which is one with true spirituality; under such conditions, if certain possibilities still remain, it is merely in a latent state, and their effective influence amounts to very little. It is nonetheless remarkable to see the vitality of a religious tradition that, even though sunk thus into a sort of virtual state, still endures despite all the attempts made in the course of several centuries to crush and destroy it. Those who are capable of reflection must see in this resistance signs of a more than human power; but we must repeat once more that this tradition does not belong to the modern world, nor is it one of its component elements, but is the direct opposite of its tendencies and aspirations. This should be admitted frankly, instead of seeking for a vain con ciliation: there can be nothing but antagonism between the religious spirit, in the true sense of the word, and the modern mentality, and any compromise is bound to weaken the former and favor the latter, whose hostility moreover will not be placated thereby, since it can only aim at the utter destruction of everything that reflects in mankind a reality higher than the human.
The modern West is said to be Christian, but this is untrue: the modern outlook is anti-Christian, because it is essentially anti-religious; and it is anti-religious because, still more generally, it is anti traditional; this is its distinguishing characteristic and this is what makes it what it is. Undoubtedly, something of Christianity has passed even into the anti-Christian civilization of our time, even the most “advanced” of whose representatives, to use their own jargon, cannot help, involuntarily and perhaps unconsciously, having undergone and still undergoing a certain Christian influence, though an indirect one; however radical a breach with the past may be, it can never be quite complete and such as to break all continu ity. More than this: we even assert that everything of value that there may be in the modern world has come to it from Christianity, or at any rate through Christianity, for Christianity has brought with it the whole heritage of former traditions, has kept this heri tage alive so far as the state of things in the West made it possible, and still contains its latent possibilities. But is there anyone today, even among those calling themselves Christians, who has any real consciousness of these possibilities? Where are to be found, even in Catholicism, the men who know the deeper meaning of the doc trine that they profess outwardly, and who, not content with “believing” in a more or less superficial way—and more through sentiment than intelligence—really “know” the truth of the tradition they hold to be theirs? We would wish to see proof that there are at least a few such men, for this would be the greatest and perhaps the sole hope of salvation for the West; but we have to admit that, up to the present, we have not encountered any: is one to suppose that they live in hiding, like certain Eastern sages, in some almost inac cessible retreat, or must this last hope be definitely abandoned? The West was Christian in the Middle Ages, but is so no longer; if any one should reply that it may again become so, we will rejoinder that no one desires this more than we do, and may it come about sooner than all we see round about us would lead us to expect. But let no one delude himself on this point: if this should happen, the modern world will have lived its day.
1 Prior to the eighteenth century there were “mechanistic” theories, from Greek atomism down to Cartesian physics, but mechanism should not be confused with materialism, despite certain affinities that may have subsequently brought about a kind of fellowship between them.
2 For a detailed exposition of “spiritism”, see the author’s The Spiritist Fallacy. ED
3 Crisis of the Modern World. ED