ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The idea to explore the cost of U.S. diplomacy toward rogue regimes began with a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship more than a decade ago. That opportunity, which placed me in the Pentagon working on the Iran and Iraq desk, provided an education in the formulation of policy concerning Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The generosity of the Smith Richardson Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) enabled me to conduct the broader research that underpins Dancing with the Devil.

I benefited from the assistance of many people: AEI interns—Nicholas Pugliese, Rochelle Lipsky, Soon Lee, Patrick Knapp, Emily Kangas, Tamir Haddad, Robert Fragnito, Aaron Epstein, Timothy Cramton, and Niklas Anzinger—helped track down and sift through documents and proofread drafts. Research assistants Suzanne Gershowitz and Jeffrey Azarva ably helped in the early stages. Many AEI colleagues—including Tom Donnelly, Gary Schmitt, Marc Thiessen, Ali Alfoneh, and Danielle Pletka—offered thoughtful advice on issues relating to diplomacy and intelligence. Nicholas Eberstadt provided numerous introductions and assisted me greatly with Korea issues, and Ahmad Khalid Majidyar did likewise with Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Jon Alterman, Samantha Ravich, and Ambassador John Bolton read various chapters with a critical eye, improving them considerably. The late Ambassador William L. Eagleton was patient with my numerous questions about his observations and experiences. Admiral (Ret’d) James “Ace” Lyons Jr. was likewise generous with his time. Stephen Rademaker, Abe Shulsky, Tim Morrison, Chuck Downs, Andrew Natsios, John Hannah, Vance Serchuk, Paul Wolfowitz, John Tirman, and Daniel Brumberg all participated in group discussions to flesh out ideas presented in the text. Valuable insights came from three retired generals: William Crouch, former vice chief of staff, U.S. Army; Dan Petrovsky, former commander, U.S. 8th Army; and Stephen Bradner, special advisor to the commander, United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command / U.S. Forces Korea. At the Smith-Richardson Foundation, I am grateful for the advice of Nadia Schadlow, Marin Strmecki, and Allan Song.

I am grateful to many other officials who freely offered advice and hospitality. In Afghanistan: Amrullah Saleh, former director of the National Directorate of Security; Davood Moradian of the American University in Afghanistan; Haji Din Mohammad, former governor of Kabul; and Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, former prime minister. In Pakistan: Tanver Ahmad Khan, director of the Institute of Strategic Studies; Khalid Rahman, director of the Institute for Policy Studies; Brig. Bashir Ahmad, president of the Institute of Regional Studies, and his colleagues Arshi Saleem Hashmi and Shaheen Akhtar; and Asad Durrani, the former head of Inter-Services Intelligence. In Korea: Han Seung-soo, former prime minister, foreign minister and UN ambassador; Kim Jong-ro, director, Ministry of Unification; Hyun Hong-cho, former ambassador to the United States; Lee Chung-min, dean of Yonsei University; and Lee Guen, professor at Seoul National University. Mohamed Eljahmi lent his expertise with regard to Libya.

I am most grateful to Carol Staswick for her keen editorial eye and her remarkable ability to bring order to chaos, and to Roger Kimball for his encouragement and interest in this topic, as well as the other fine staff at Encounter Books for their efficiency and professionalism.

Finally, I am grateful for the patience and support of my wife, Anna Borshchevskaya, who stood with me every step of the way.