The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

Abu Yusuf (ca. 731–98)

Abu Yusuf Ya‘qub b. Ibrahim al-Ansari, better known as Abu Yusuf, was born in Kufa and died in Baghdad. As both a religious scholar and a dynastic official, he played a pioneering role in the amalgamation of the religious sciences and governing practices of the Abbasid dynasty, which he served in Baghdad first as judge and then as chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍāt). He was the first to occupy the post of chief judge, created during the caliphate of Harun al-Rashid for the sake of greater centralization of the judiciary (i.e., appointment and supervision of all Abbasid judgeships).

Abu Yusuf studied with several of the leading scholars of his day and was most devoted to Abu Hanifa (d. 767), whose teachings he and his pupil, Muhammad al-Hasan al-Shaybani (d. 805), developed into a distinct school (madhhab) of shari‘a. According to Ibn al-Nadim (writing in the latter part of the tenth century), Abu Yusuf was first committed to the preservation of hadith (reports about the first Muslims, the Prophet Muhammad above all, as the source of religious and moral norms) but then, under the tutelage of Abu Hanifa, turned his attention to judicial reasoning (ra’y). His teachings are more grounded in prophetic traditions than those of Abu Hanifa, and one of his works, Kitab al-Athar (The book of traditions), is a collection of hadith transmitted in Kufa. His work overall, however, shows a strong interest in fiqh (i.e., comprehension and articulation of the law and not only transmission of the prophetic heritage). Two surviving works, al-Radd ‘ala Siyar al-Awza‘i (Refutation of the moral teachings of al-Awza‘i) and Ikhtilaf Abi Hanifa wa-Ibn Abi Layla (The disagreement of Abu Hanifa and Ibn Abi Layla), and two lost works, Ikhtilaf al-Amsar and al-Radd ‘ala Malik b. Anas (as reported by Ibn al-Nadim), as well as extracts from his Kitab al-Hiyal (Book of stratagems) preserved in Shaybani’s work on the subject of legal artifices, all underscore a developing interest in the nature and purpose of law. His arguments, which sometimes disagree with his master, and his opinions, which sometimes contradict themselves, have been incorporated into the legacy of the Hanafi school of shari‘a, as embodied in the legal compendium known as al-Asl (The origin), attributed to Shaybani, and al-Hidaya (The guidance), compiled by Burhan al-Din Abu l-Hasan ‘Ali Marghinani (d. 1197).

The work for which Abu Yusuf is most celebrated is Kitab al-Kharaj (The book of the land tax), in which he responds at length to 28 questions posed by the caliph Harun al-Rashid on various aspects of governance. The work is chiefly devoted to fiscal matters but encompasses a wide range of administrative concerns, including the status of non-Muslim subjects, warfare, and the punishment of crime. It does not exhibit the scope and organization of later administrative works, such as the Kitab al-Kharaj wa-Sina‘at al-Kitaba (The book of the land tax and art of administrative writing) by Qudama b. Ja‘far (d. ca. 948), but it does reflect the ongoing Abbasid interest, first seen in Risala fi al-Sahaba (Epistle on the caliph’s entourage) by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘ (d. 756), in having a single “book” (i.e., code) of administrative law, especially in matters pertaining to fiscal affairs.

Kitab al-Kharaj seeks to cull administrative and especially fiscal principles from prophetic and communal precedents; from the practices of the first Muslims, notably the Rightly Guided Caliphs; and also from Umayyad policies and the rulings and opinions of legal scholars. The introduction, set in the genre of advice literature, depicts the caliph as a figure who is entrusted by God with the just governance of His servants and who is thus mindful of the counsel of religious scholars. He can therefore expect the obedience of his subjects. The central Qur’anic theme of prosperity (ṣalāḥ) over corruption (fasād) is given political form in this work by being tied to the judgment (ra’y) of the caliph, which is understood to be the mechanism ensuring the achievement of God’s will for human society.

This notion is reflected throughout the body of the work, notably in the reiterated confirmation of the authority of the caliph to make and change laws where no clearly revealed precedent exists, especially when doing so serves the interests of Muslims. For example, Abu Yusuf demonstrates that while the status of land in Arabia has been set by prophetic precedent, the caliph is free to adjust taxes as he sees fit for the sake of the public welfare by encouraging cultivation on parcels of land granted to dynastic officials or military commanders: “Do what you judge to be of greater interest for Muslims and more generally beneficial, for both the elite and the masses.” Echoing Umayyad sentiment, Abu Yusuf posits that the caliphate, successor to the prophetic office, is indispensable for the political coherency of the abode of Islam, including its non-Muslim elements. The point is that the common good is the purpose of rule, making it worthy of religious obedience.

This early attempt to cast administrative policy as part of Islam’s religious purview had far-reaching consequences, giving administrative rulings a firmer grounding in the jurisprudence of Islam (ḥukm kitābī mardūd ilā uṣūl al-fiqh, as Qudama b. Ja‘far would put it in the seventh section of his aforementioned work). Abbasid policies, such as a system of proportional taxation (muqāsama), could henceforth be associated with the practices of ‘Umar b. al-Khattab (r. 634–44), the second of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. On a more theoretical level, it could be said that Abu Yusuf sowed the seeds for the later Hanafi view that governance in Islam is advanced by the ruler’s assessment of the public interest (maṣlaḥa), even if it cannot be tied to a particular shari‘a precedent (dalīl juz’ī). In general, then, Abu Yusuf paved the way for the idea that policy making in Islam—including the role of shari‘a in the process—is a function of principles and not only precedents.