The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

brotherhoods

The Sufi brotherhoods (ṭuruq, sing. ṭarīqa; lit. “path”) are the social and institutional face of Sufism (al-taṣawwuf), broadly construed as those doctrines and practices that seek to remove the mundane veils separating humanity from the divine and thereby render the transcendent immanent. The brotherhoods are often likened to Christian monastic orders, but this is misleading, for ṭarīqa refers to both the social organization of a particular group and the spiritual path that the Sufi traverses in his or her quest for the divine. In terms of social organization, Sufism can be divided into three major historical phases corresponding to three types of social organizations.

The eighth through tenth centuries mark the appearance of a group specifically identified as Sufis. This period is characterized by the predominance of individual Sufi masters and small circles of traveling disciples. Some of the most prominent teachers of this early period include Rabi‘a (d. 801), Muhasibi (d. 857), Dhu al-Nun al-Misri (d. 860), Bistami (d. 874), Sahl al-Tustari (d. 896), and Junayd (d. 910). The Sufism of this period is further distinguished by the idiosyncratic nature of its literary production. At this point, there was not a highly systematized doctrine of Sufism that had been thoroughly reconciled with particularly Sunni modes of thought and piety, as would develop during the second phase.

The period from the 11th to the 13th centuries might be called the period of systemization and is marked by two developments. First, Sufis began congregating regularly in specifically Sufi sites, known variously as zāwiya, ribāṭ, khānaqāh, or tekke. The usage of these terms to refer to physical structures in which Sufis meet to practice their devotions was not systematic in the medieval literature, and they were often used interchangeably. The second development was the analyzing and reworking of Sufi doctrine into a Sunni (and particularly Ash‘ari) discourse. Qushayri’s (d. 1074) Risala (Principles of Sufism) and Ghazali’s (d. 1111) Ihya’‘Ulum al-Din (The revival of the religious sciences) are prime examples of this genre. It was during this period that the first manuals of Sufi life were written, which provided a systematic basis for communal living. The most important of these manuals for the development of organized Sufism were Sulami’s (d. 1021) Adab al-Suhba (The rules of companionship), Abu al-Najib al-Suhrawardi’s (d. 1168) Adab al-Muridin (The rules for Sufi novices), and Abu Hafs ‘Umar al-Suhrawardi’s (d. 1234) ‘Awarif al-Ma‘arif (The attainment of true understanding). The Adab al-Muridin is of particular importance because it was the first systematic exposition meant to detail the life and daily habits of the Sufi. The combination of written manuals of discipline and a specific location where like-minded Sufis could gather and spread the doctrines of a particular teacher provided fertile ground for the growth of organized Sufism.

The 14th century to the present marks the period of brotherhoods organized around the personality and doctrines of an eponymous “founder.” Although scholars formerly assumed that each of the brotherhoods was founded deliberately by the eponymous shaykh, recent scholarship has shown that it was the second and third generation of the eponym’s disciples who performed most of the work of institutionalizing the shaykh’s doctrines and practices. Thus while most organized brotherhoods emerged in the 14th century, the eponyms of these brotherhoods were actually active during the 13th century. The most important are ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166), Ahmad b. Ibrahim al-Yasa (d. 1166), Ahmad b. ‘Ali al-Rifa‘i (d. 1182), Najm al-Din Kubra (d. 1221), Abu Hafs ‘Umar al-Suhrawardi (d. 1234), Mu‘in al-Din Chishti (d. 1236), Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhili (d. 1258), Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273), and Baha’ al-Din al-Naqshbandi (d. 1389). These represent the major ṭarīqa lines, or primary brotherhoods, which, according to Spencer Trimingham’s The Sufi Orders in Islam, are to be distinguished from the later ṭā’ifa lines. The latter are smaller Sufi sublineages that often trace their authority to one of those in the ṭarīqa lines. In the two or three generations after these teachers’ deaths, and once the basic structures of the orders were in place, Sufism began to attract widespread adherents and gain popularity among the masses as well as the religious elites.

It is not entirely clear why the brotherhoods became so appealing in the 13th and 14th centuries. Most scholars have attributed this increase in popularity to the major social upheavals of the time—the Mongol invasions in the East, Crusader activities in Egypt and the Levant, and the Black Death of the 14th century—and a corresponding desire for social stability. Another factor contributing to Sufism’s increasing social profile was undoubtedly royal patronage. The growing popularity of Sufi movements attracted notice from political powers beginning in the 11th century. The Seljuqs (1055–1194) instituted a policy of establishing and endowing khānaqāhs similar to the ways they patronized the madrasas (Muslim schools). The Abbasid caliph Nasir li-Din Allah (1180–1225) patronized Abu Hafs ‘Umar al-Suhrawardi in what seems to have been an attempt to gain control of the burgeoning social movement. The Ayyubid sultan Saladin (r. 1171–93) endowed the first khānaqāh in Egypt in 1173, which began a policy that the Mamluks (1250–1517) would continue in Egypt and Syria. Whether this royal attention spurred the public’s interest in Sufism or whether these were attempts to establish some state control over an already burgeoning movement is less important than the clear implication that by the 13th century the Sufi brotherhoods were beginning to be a political force in their own right. Sufism had taken political turns before—the early masters criticized the prevailing politics and culture of the Abbasid state—but this later development marks the beginning of a relationship between the state and Sufis that would last, in many cases, to the present day; for example, Rumi was an advisor to Seljuq rulers, Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) advised the Mughal court, and the Naqshbandi-initiated Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the prime minister of Turkey in March 2003.

The brotherhoods are, by their very nature, potentially influential political actors, as the average adherents look to a single master (shaykh) for guidance. The shaykh (pīr in Persian and Urdu) could effectively mobilize large numbers of the populace if needed, although this possibility was attenuated as it has become more acceptable after the 16th century to be affiliated with more than one ṭarīqa or ṭā’ifa, as was the case with the famous Egyptian ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha‘rani (d. 1565), who belonged to every brotherhood in 16th-century Egypt. In any case, the relationship between Sufi brotherhoods and the political sphere has taken different forms over time and cannot be generalized in any way. No single ṭarīqa has a definitive teaching on political activity. The Chishtis, for example, were quite politically disengaged during the early years of the Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526) but became more politically active during the Lodi period (1451–1526). One can, however, outline a few broad trends in the ways Sufi brotherhoods have approached political leaders or organizations. The following, while not exhaustive, is a representative description of the ways Sufi brotherhoods have engaged with the political sphere with a few examples from the Muslim world.

Nonengagement

Rarely do Sufi groups choose to completely disengage from the political sphere. By refusing to engage with political rulers, these groups are making implicit statements about, in an extreme case, the illegitimacy of a political group or actor or, in a minimalist case, the incommensurate nature of the spiritual and political spheres. The Delhi Sultanate offers an instructive case here. Both the Chishti and Suhrawardi orders appeared very early in South Asia (13th century), but their relationships to the political rulers were quite different. The Suhrawardi order cultivated close relationships with rulers in Delhi and often held governmental positions, carried official titles, and participated in the land-grant system (jāgīr). The Chishti order, by contrast, was generally opposed to political involvement. They refused governmental positions, would not accept the titles offered them, did not participate in the jāgīr system, and even refused to allow the sultans to visit their khānaqāhs. The Suhrawardi Sufis seem to have been following the model of their founder, who had advised and represented the Abbasid caliph Nasir li-Din Allah. Likewise, the Chishti Sufis were following the advice of their founder, who was quite explicit about the proper relationship between the spiritual and political spheres.

The early Bektashi order of Anatolia is another example of political quietism, although in this case their political involvement was a consequence of their numbers. In the early stages of their development, they were politically quietist while they gained in numbers. But in the years following the rise of the Ottoman Empire, their increasing number became a valuable asset to Ottoman rule, and the Bektashi order worked closely with the Ottoman rulers. The Bektashis were associated with the Jannisaries (professional soldiers) of the Ottoman realm, and when the Jannisaries were officially abolished in 1826, the Bektashis suffered a decline as well.

In the Caucasus, the Qadiri order has been traditionally quietist for many years. During the Russian invasions of the 18th and 19th centuries, they did not participate with their Naqshbandi compatriots in the struggle for independence. Likewise, the Qadiri Sufis did not take an oppositional stance to the Bolshevik revolution and were allowed to retain their clerical positions, whereas the Naqshbandi order, having opposed the Bolsheviks, was generally outlawed.

Cooperation

In some cases, Sufi brotherhoods and political leaders have overlapping interests and participate in a mutually beneficial exchange. This seems to happen most often in situations when powerful rulers make strong claims to religious legitimacy: the Ayyubids, the Seljuqs, and the Ottomans, to name a few. Typically, influential Sufi leaders will lend their support—both human support in the form of followers and spiritual support in the form of legitimating the ruler—in exchange for royal or state patronage. This patronage is usually in the form of endowments, gifts, prestige, or a voice in governance. Sufi cooperation with the ruling powers was perhaps the most common form of political activity of the premodern brotherhoods. As mentioned earlier, the Bektashi order supported the Ottoman state in exchange for royal patronage, and the Mevlevi Sufis were likewise quite close to the power structures; not only was Rumi an advisor to the Seljuq sultans but the Ottoman sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) was himself an initiated Mevlevi.

Sufis appeared in the Balkans in the 14th century, and it was primarily dervishes of Qalandari and Bektashi affiliation who took up residence in this area and were integral in Islamicizing the population. By the 16th century, the brotherhoods were a fixture of the urban landscape and critical members of Muslim military efforts to continue to convert the population. The Khalwati shaykh Bali Efendi (d. 1553) and his successor, Muslih al-Din Nur al-Din Zada (d. 1571), both worked closely with Ottoman officials and wrote extensive reports detailing the political and religious situation in the region. Nur al-Din Zada explicitly argued that Sufis, as the clients of God, have a duty to council politicians about their decisions in order to make governance more religiously correct. In Africa, the Tijanis worked closely with the French colonialist enterprise in Senegal. This situation has led to a strong backlash against the Sufis on the part of Islamic reformers in that country today. In Pakistan, Jama‘at ‘Ali Shah (d. 1951), a Naqshbandi shaykh from the Punjab who is said to have had over one million disciples, was briefly appointed as the amīr-i-millat (head of the Muslim community) in an early attempt to unite South Asian Muslims. He was a strong supporter of the “father of Pakistan,” Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah (d. 1948), and was instrumental in gathering popular support for an independent Pakistan.

Co-optation

While the reasoning is different from case to case, some governments have found it advantageous to co-opt the brotherhoods under their jurisdiction in an attempt to control what they see as potentially antigovernmental social groups. In the case of post-1952 Egypt, the orders were co-opted by the government to some degree for their potential to offer an alternative to the Muslim Brotherhood. In order to do so, the government created the office of the shaykh mashāyikh al-ṭuruq al-ṣūfiyya—“the shaykh of shaykhs of the Sufi brotherhoods.” This has allowed the Egyptian government to exert some control over how the various brotherhoods are overseen, the nature of their celebrations, and appropriate behavior at religious festivals. The office even publishes a journal. Similarly, the Syrian state has taken over responsibility for organized forms of Sufism. Here, however, the state did not create an office for the direct coordination of the brotherhoods but rather set up a ministry of endowments that oversees all the land used for Sufi activities.

Sudan offers an especially interesting case of the government attempting to co-opt Sufi groups. In an effort to bring Sufis into the political fold, the Sudanese government sponsored a large conference for Sufis in 1993 that included hundreds of participants from other African and North African countries. In 1995, the Sudanese government established an agency to supervise the brotherhoods and provide funding for the education, welfare, and pilgrimage of Sufis. The effect (probably intended) has been to polarize the brotherhoods in the Sudan between those who support the Islamist project and those who oppose it. This is most clearly seen in the splintering of the Sudanese branch of the Tijani brotherhood since the mid-1990s into a number of subgroups divided along political lines.

Resistance

In the modern era of colonial enterprises in the Islamic world, political Sufism has most often taken the form of resistance. Because they are not state actors but localized groups with overlapping interests, the Sufi brotherhoods have been in a unique position to resist colonialism. Sufi shaykhs are often able to mobilize their disciples in large numbers by portraying the struggle against colonial powers as a struggle between Islam and unbelievers.

The Portuguese incursions into Morocco in the 15th and 16th centuries led to their control of most of the Mediterranean ports of the region. It was the Jazulis (named for the rural saint Muhammad b. Sulayman al-Jazuli [d. 1465]) who were instrumental in driving them out. Muhammad Jazuli advocated a socially conscious form of Sufi activism that lent itself particularly well to resistance, and the Jazulis were instrumental in fighting the Portuguese encampments. By the mid-16th century, the jihad was successful and the Portuguese were driven out. Similarly, in Algeria, resistance against the French was led by the Sufi ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri (d. 1883) and his followers. The Sanusi brotherhood consistently resisted colonial rule in Africa and was a major force of opposition in Chad, Libya, and the Sudan.

In the Caucasus, most of the Muslim population were Sufis by the 18th century. In the wake of Russian incursions in the 18th and 19th centuries, it was the Naqshbandi order that led the resistance. Between 1824 and 1859, Imam (‘Ali) Shamil (d. 1871)—a Daghestani Naqshbandi—commanded an Islamic state in the area that was the center of anti-Russian struggle. While Shamil was not the Naqshbandi shaykh, his followers saw him as their temporal guide and would chant the dhikr (remembrance of God’s name) in their marches into battle. The cumulative effect of this political involvement and agitation when the Russians eventually gained control of the area was the deportation of thousands of Naqshbandis to Siberia. Thousands more fled to Ottoman-controlled territories, and many of those remaining joined the Qadiri order, which had been politically quiet during the Caucasian War. Some Naqshbandis, however, by virtue of having gone underground, were able to infiltrate and occupy offices in the Soviet government and ensure the continuation of Islamic life in the North Caucasus. In the Russian invasions of the 18th and 19th centuries and the subsequent Bolshevik revolution, the Naqshbandis were visible antagonists, while the Qadiris, as mentioned, remained quietist.

Revolution

It is not often that Sufi resistance calls for the outright upheaval of the political realm and the installation of a new political order. The most salient example of a politicized Sufism with imperial designs is the Safavid order of Central Asia. Named for the shaykh Safi al-Din Ardabili (d. 1334), the Safavids began as a Sufi (Sunni) brotherhood in Gilan (in the northwest of present-day Iran) and quickly expanded their interests to proselytizing in Azerbaijan and Anatolia. By the time of the fourth shaykh of the order, Isma‘il Abu al-Muzaffar Safawi (d. 1524), they had become quite powerful. Isma‘il declared that the Safavids were Ithna ‘Ashari (Twelver) Shi‘is, and in 1501 he was crowned king in Tabriz and declared Twelver Shi‘ism the religion of the state. In a fascinating twist, fearing the power of other Sufi brotherhoods, Isma‘il ordered the disbanding of all the brotherhoods under his geographical control. The only brotherhood spared was the Ni‘matullahi, who had declared themselves Shi‘i and aligned themselves with the Safavids. Such governmental suspicion of organized Sufi brotherhoods persists to the present day in Iran.

The Sammani order played a similar role in the founding of the Mahdist state in Sudan led by Muhammad Ahmad b. ‘Abdallah (d. 1885). He was given authority in 1861 to initiate others into the Sammani brotherhood and began attracting followers. He declared himself the Mahdi (savior) in 1881 and launched a successful offensive against the Egyptian occupation of Sudan. The Khatmi brotherhood, by contrast, disavowed the claims of the Mahdi and his political aspirations, and their shaykh was forced into exile in Egypt.

It is clear that the relationship between Sufism and the political sphere is heterogeneous and unstable, even within the same brotherhood. These political relationships are determined less by the particular teachings of any certain brotherhood than by historical circumstances and charismatic individuals. It would be more accurate to describe the Sufi brotherhoods as a latent political force—complete with a hierarchical social organization—that can be deployed in certain circumstances by powerful personalities. Political rulers have often been aware of this latent potential and attempted to use the brotherhoods to their own advantage in a number of ways.

See also shaykh, pīr; Sufism