Collective obligation (farḍ kifāya), in contrast to individual obligation (farḍ ‘ayn), is one of the two categories of moral obligation known to Islamic jurisprudence. The distinction between the two categories is at least as old as Shafi‘i’s Risala (the first work in theoretical jurisprudence, or uṣūl al-fiqh, in Islamic history), and it is accepted in both Sunni and Twelver Shi‘i jurisprudence.
The basic distinction between a collective obligation and an individual one is that in the former, one may fail to perform the obligation but still escape moral blame if someone else fulfills the obligation, whereas in an individual obligation, only the individual performance of the command is sufficient to avoid moral censure. Collective obligations can generally be thought of as issues requiring collective action, but no one specific person is legally obliged to perform them. Accordingly, unless a person is the only one capable of discharging the legal requirement, such as when only one man in town is qualified to serve as a judge, a collective obligation translates into a supererogatory command (nadb) with respect to individual Muslims. Because collective duties are only supererogatory with respect to individuals and not absolutely obligatory, their performance entails a large degree of altruism, since the discharge of the obligation benefits third parties who were not responsible for discharging the duty.
Collective obligations are found in both Islamic ritual law and the Islamic law of civil obligations (mu‘āmalāt). Examples of ritual law representing collective obligations would be such duties as performing the funeral prayer; washing, shrouding, and burying the dead; and memorizing the entirety of the Qur’an. Individual obligations, by contrast, include the familiar Five Pillars of Islam and also, for example, knowledge of al-Fatiha (the first chapter of the Qur’an) and one other short chapter of the Qur’an so that one could fulfill one’s individual obligation to perform the ritual prayer. Examples of collective obligations in the realm of civil responsibility include the duty to take possession of lost property and protect it from loss, as well as teaching and practicing agriculture, medicine, trades, and crafts.
For Sunnis, engaging in politics is a collective obligation, including the obligation to appoint a caliph, organize a judicial system, and train specialists in the law. Commanding right and forbidding wrong (al-amr bi-l-ma‘rūf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar) is also a collective obligation, as is the general obligation to preserve expertise in the religious sciences. Taking part in offensive military operations or manning the frontiers of the Islamic state, both considered part of the obligation of jihad, are also examples of collective duties. Jihad becomes an individual duty only in the circumstance of an enemy attack on Islamic territory.
Collective obligations of a secular character, such as engaging in agriculture or industry, can take on a religious character, but only if the individual subjectively intends to serve God through discharging the obligation.
See also jurisprudence; al-Shafi‘i, Muhammad b. Idris (767–820)
Further Reading
Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, 2000; Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat fi Usul al-Shari‘ah, 1991.
MOHAMMAD FADEL