The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

Egypt

Located in the northeastern corner of Africa, Egypt is the most populated Arab state, with a population of over 80 million and an area slightly more than three times the size of New Mexico (385,229 square miles). The Nile River cuts through the country, linking it to the Mediterranean Sea in the north and Africa in the south. Several great civilizations developed on the banks of the Nile: the most ancient is the Pharaonic, which thrived for more than 3,000 years. Egypt’s strategic location as a trading center connecting Africa, Europe, and Asia made it attractive to invading foreign armies. It fell under the rule of the Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Mamluks, Ottomans, and British, finally to become an independent nation-state in 1954. Egypt has been part of the Muslim world since 641 and is predominantly Arab and Islamic in culture. Over 90 percent of Egypt’s population is Sunni Muslim, and the rest are mostly Coptic Christians; there are also small numbers of Shi‘is, Baha’is, Jews, and Christians of other denominations. Many Egyptians belong to Sufi orders.

Long recognized as a main cultural and Islamic center in the Arab and Muslim worlds, Egypt is home to the oldest Islamic educational institution, Azhar University, which was built by the Fatimids in 970 to propagate the Shi‘i doctrine. Under the Ayyubids, Azhar University was converted to a Sunni institution and the four legal madhhabs (schools)—Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi‘, and Hanbali—have been taught side by side for centuries, attesting to the country’s tradition of religious and cultural toleration. Egypt has produced scores of Muslim scholars that made prominent contributions to Islam such as al-Layth b. Sa‘d (713–91), Badr al-Din al-Zarkashi (1344–73), Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani (1372–1448), Shams al-Din al-Sakhawi (1428–97), and Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (ca. 1445–1505).

By the end of the 19th century, the movement of Islamic modernism emerged in Egypt, inspiring political and social reform in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Started by Afghani (1837–97) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), Islamic modernism was a revival movement that sought to rescue Islam from further decline by adopting the positive aspects of Western civilization, reinterpreting the Qur’an along modern lines, exercising ijtihād (independent reasoning), restricting the powers of the government, and achieving Muslim unity. Afghani and ‘Abduh’s message bifurcated into Islamic reformism on the one hand and secular nationalism and liberalism on the other, with Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) as the foremost exponent of the former and Sa‘d Zaghlul (1825–1927), Qasim Amin (1863–1908), Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872–1963), and Taha Hussein (1889–1973) as the main representatives of the latter. In 1928, one of Rida’s disciples, Hasan al-Banna, started a grassroots movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, that eventually became a mainstream Islamic movement and the most important opposition force in Egypt, with branches all over the Arab and Muslim worlds.

The emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood has to some extent shaped the interaction between Islam and politics in Egypt. Having assimilated the reformist precepts of Afghani, ‘Abduh, and Rida, Banna produced a reformist framework that presented Islam as a comprehensive way of life, the catalyst for social and political change, and the essential basis of the postcolonial state. Still inspired by the teachings of its founders, the Muslim Brotherhood continues to work at the individual and communal levels to reconstruct the social, political, economic, and cultural dimensions of society along Islamic lines in preparation for the eventual establishment of the Islamic state. This approach has set the organization in a collision course with various regimes. The most severe confrontation took place with Nasser’s regime (1952–70), which brutally suppressed the organization. In this context, Sayyid Qutb, a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood, produced a polarizing ideology that constituted a clear deviation from the main orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb viewed the incumbent regimes as jāhilī (un-Islamic) for not accepting the ḥākimiyya, or sovereignty, of God and for not implementing the shari‘a (Islamic way of life). Qutb’s ideas inspired future generations of young Islamic activists, particularly the al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad groups that assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981 and engaged in violent clashes with the Mubarak regime during the 1980s and mid-1990s.

Egyptian independent Islamic thinkers continue to influence Islamic political thought in the region. Religious scholars and intellectuals such as Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali (1917–96), Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), Muhammad Galal Keshk (1929–93), Tariq al-Bishri (b. 1933), and Muhammad Salim al-‘Awwa (b. 1942) have attempted to synthesize Islam and modern civic concepts and institutions. Their writings address such issues as democracy, political participation, human rights, and citizenship.

EMAD EL-DIN SHAHIN

Inspired by protests against the regime in Tunisia in the fall of 2010, a revolutionary wave of demonstrations spread throughout 2011 into other regions of the Arab world, in particular Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain. This wave of Arab awakening became known as “the Arab Spring” and received wide media attention in the Islamic world and the West. It began when thousands of Egyptians staged a peaceful demonstration on January 25, 2011, in Tahrir Square of Cairo, demanding the resignation of the Mubarak regime. (There were protests in other parts of Egypt as well, though less noticed by the media.) The movement relied on techniques of civil resistance, as well as cell phones, text messaging, and Internet technology (especially social media) for communication. It counted Muslims and Copts, as well as both men and women, among its participants, with copies of the Qur’an and Christian crosses held high in the hands of demonstrators. The uprising was spontaneous and drew its strength from the middle classes; it also was leaderless and organized on an ad hoc basis, which some observers saw as a weakness. The revolution garnered international support as it received round-the-clock coverage by the Qatar-based satellite news network Aljazeera.

The uprising, which came to be called “the Egyptian revolution,” clearly targeted state corruption, the rule of emergency law, police brutality, and the abuse of tens of thousands of political prisoners. On February 2, 2011, violent clashes occurred between anti-Mubarak and pro-Mubarak forces. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi segments of the Islamists on the extreme right of Egyptian society were apparently taken by surprise and did not play a significant role in the organization of the uprising. The revolution proved successful in bringing down President Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt since 1981 and was forced to resign on February 11, 2011. (On August 3, 2011, he went on trial together with his two sons and top police officers.) In the wake of the Egyptian developments, the autocratic regimes of ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih in Yemen and of Mu‘ammar Qaddafi in Libya were ousted as well, leading to the assassination of the latter (on October 20, 2011) and the exile of the former. In these two cases, tribal conflicts and outside involvement, including French-led NATO forces in Libya and American intelligence and drone bombing in Yemen, played a significant role—actions that were not required in Egypt, where the uprising remained both peaceful and powerful.

After Mubarak’s resignation, the military elite of the Egyptian army, led by trusted generals appointed by Mubarak, held on to power. Egyptian society, however, remained restive into the fall of 2011, when first elections took place, awarding the majority of the vote to the Muslim Brotherhood (about 40 percent) and the Salafi party (about 20 percent) with no significant counterweight organization visible in the center or on the left of the political spectrum. The leadership of the Egyptian army discounted the significance of the vote and manifested its determination to remain in power. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamist Salafis did not find a common platform. The Coptic Church supported the popular sentiment and observed a guarded caution, fearing for its survival as a non-Islamic minority. In December 2011, Muslim women took to the street for the first time in great numbers, demanding an end to military rule. A presidential election was planned for July 2012.

The general mood in Egypt in early 2012 remained tense, oscillating between fear of chaos and religious strife on one side and hope for decisive change toward democracy and a new order of freedom on the other. The political response of America and Europe to the Arab Spring and the persistent Egyptian revolution reflected both sides of the dilemma. Americans and Europeans were also concerned about the repercussions of Egyptian developments on the security of Israel and the consequences for the entire Middle East. One concern was that a Shi‘i crescent would dominate the northern rim of the Arab world, stretching from Iran, via Iraq and Syria, into Lebanon, and enter into a struggle over control of Arab oil and the Sunni core of the Arabian peninsula, including a number of smaller states clustered around Saudi Arabia. Two political frontier lines seemed possible, one cutting through the waters in the Arab/Persian Gulf and the other running along the mountains of the Turkish border with Syria and Iraq. It seemed possible that Egypt in the south and Turkey in the north might develop systems of political order that combined Islam with the ideals of freedom and democracy. To achieve such a position of sovereignty and power, Egypt would need to maintain its peaceful process of restructuring and revolution.

GERHARD BOWERING