The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

governance

Governance (al-siyāsa al-shar‘iyya) refers to political and administrative policies regulating matters of public law and the public interest (maṷlaḥa) in classical Islamic thought. The term siyāsa refers broadly to executive matters associated with governance and statecraft. Shar‘iyya is the adjectival form for divine law (shari‘a), articulated by the jurists in a body of legal doctrine, called fiqh, which are rules resulting from applying particular methodologies for interpreting Islamic legal texts. For this reason, the phrase al-siyāsa al-shar‘iyya has been translated as “governance in accordance with the shari‘a.” It may also be viewed as the exposition of classical Islamic political theory, as jurists systematized doctrines of politico-legal theory primarily through writings on this topic.

After Muhammad’s death, the fledgling Muslim community needed a new leader. A portion of the community supported the leadership of the first four caliphs—Abu Bakr, ‘Umar b. al-Khattab, ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan, and ‘Ali b. Abi Talib. Later, Sunnis argued that this order reflected the caliph’s rank in excellence, for which the entire Muslim community owed them respect and reverence. (The argument was clearly in response to the Shi‘i refrain that ‘Ali was the best and most excellent candidate to assume leadership over the community immediately after the Prophet.) For support of their position, Sunnis pointed to the Qur’an’s instructions for Muslims to “obey God and his Messenger and those in authority over you” (4:59). A separate portion of the community maintained that Muhammad had designated his first cousin and son-in-law ‘Ali to lead the community, to be followed by a series of his descendants (called imams). This group came to be known as the Shi‘is, who argued that only the imams were divinely guided and thus qualified to lead the community in religious affairs. Both groups argued early on that community leaders were necessary—indeed divinely sanctioned—to carry out God’s will on behalf of the entire community. The important questions were, Who was authorized to guide the community, and what was their scope of political and religious authority?

An initially wide scope of authority narrowed over time. The first four caliphs asserted broad political and religious authority, issuing decrees on matters of governance as well as Islamic law. But this stance did not go unchallenged during the reigns of the first two dynasties, the Umayyads (661–750) and Abbasids (750–1258). From the start, the proto-Shi‘is challenged Umayyad political legitimacy and law-making authority. Many retreated to the scholarly circles of Muhammad’s family members and Companions, who increasingly taught and issued legal decisions quite independently of the circles close to the reigning caliph. Discussions in these circles intensified, and political developments fostered an enduring split between the agents of government and these scholars, who dissociated themselves from government ties, forming a “pious opposition” to Umayyad and early Abbasid rule. The scholars resisted a proposal by the Abbasid litterateur ‘Abd Allah b. al-Muqaffa‘ to permit the ruler to exercise unlimited political and legal authority. This proposal failed, and the scholars (‘ulama’) gradually formed the class of jurists (fuqahā’) that came to enjoy virtually exclusive interpretive authority over matters of law. In this context, al-siyāsa al-shar‘iyya meant political governance in accordance with Islamic law, which could not always be determined by the ruler. The ruler therefore was to consult with the jurists on many matters.

Mawardi (d. 1058) is credited as the first to propound a developed theory of al-siyāsa al-shar‘iyya in his book Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya (which means roughly “Ordinances of governance”). In his conception, only jurists who had received the requisite training were qualified to interpret Islamic law. However, the ruler enjoys considerable discretion over ostensibly legal issues by virtue of his duties to uphold and execute the law, ensure the continued existence of the Muslim community, and preserve the sanctity of the public sphere. Mawardi discussed these duties in terms of a ruler’s overarching obligation to vindicate “God’s claims” (ḥuqūq Allāh), which were public duties involving the public sphere. In contrast, private claims (ḥuqūq al-nās or ḥuqūq al-‘ibād) were readily pursued by individuals in courts or before private jurists. Mawardi outlined ten public duties for which the ruler was responsible; these included such matters as providing for public works through tax collection, ensuring public safety through policing and imposing criminal sanctions, and making appointments to public offices. In this context, the term siyāsa was used synonymously with criminal law and tax-collecting jurisdiction, among other areas of public duties.

Most jurists including Mawardi had maintained the supremacy of shari‘a by insisting that the operation and scope of political governance were restricted to the appropriate confines of government administration, as designated by the jurists. In other words, these jurists maintained that the ruler had authority only over areas that fell under the legal doctrine permitting expedient decisions in the public interest. However, jurists of the various legal schools differed regarding the definition of the public interest and its relation to shari‘a. The Maliki jurist Qarafi (d. 1285), for example, maintained that expedience is an essential part of Islamic law in line with its broad aims to ensure the well-being of the community, avert corruption, and uphold the public interest. Thus law was not to be suspended when a ruler acted expediently, giving the ruler significant discretion, nor was the ruler bound to juristic definitions of expedience. Moreover, jurists of various legal schools also differed about the qualifications of the ruler. While some, such as Juwayni (d. 1078), argued that the ruler should ideally be an expert in Islamic law (mujtahid), others, such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), rejected that requirement, insisting that it was enough that the ruler cooperate with the jurists. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) noted that such cooperation between the ruler and the jurists was necessary only in religious matters, not in political or economic matters. In sum, all maintained that political legitimacy extended from the shari‘a, which came from God, and some, such as Abu Bakr al-Baqillani (d. 1013), suggested that legitimacy also extended from the Muslim community at large through electors or “those who loosen and bind” (ahl al-ḥall wa-l-‘aqd) the ties between the community and their leaders. These electors were respected leaders and elders who pledged allegiance to the rulers on behalf of their local communities. This, along with the Qur’anic verse 4:59, set up arguments that modern-day jurists would use to find bases in the Islamic historical traditions of governance for democracy.