The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

Hizbullah

Hizbullah (Party of God) is a Lebanese Shi‘i political party that incorporates not only a political wing, including members of the parliament and the Lebanese cabinet, but also a military resistance wing and a broad social welfare apparatus. The party’s complex and multifaceted organization has emerged gradually since its formation in the mid-1980s.

The 1970s saw a number of political, social, and economic changes in the Lebanese Shi‘i community. Factors contributing to the origins of Hizbullah include the 1978 disappearance of Shi‘i leader Musa al-Sadr while on a visit to Libya and the subsequent disaffection of many Amal members with the organization, the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and siege of Beirut. In the wake of these events, and especially the Israeli invasion—during which tens of thousands of Lebanese were killed and nearly half a million people displaced—small, armed groups of young men organized under the banner of Islam and emerged in the south, the Beqaa Valley, and the suburbs of Beirut. Dedicated to fighting the Israeli occupation troops and trained by Iran, over time these groups coalesced into Hizbullah.

Although anti-occupation resistance operations began in 1982, it was not until February 16, 1985, that the formal existence of Hizbullah and its armed wing, the Islamic Resistance, was announced in an “Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World.” It is this initial statement that many point to as evidence of the party’s Islamic ideology. The nature of that ideology, however, must be understood in light of the party’s pragmatic actions and political program as well as changes in its relationship to Lebanon and its constituency. For example, while the “Open Letter” states, “We recognize no treaty with [Israel], no ceasefire and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated,” the party’s practices have indicated otherwise. This language reflects a time when the Israeli invasion of Lebanon had just given rise to the Islamic Resistance. As Augustus R. Norton notes, “While Hizballah’s enmity for Israel is not to be dismissed, the simple fact is that it has been tacitly negotiating with Israel for years.”

The party’s ideological platform includes a commitment to Shi‘i Islam and the imamate; support for the doctrine of wilāyat al-faqīh (guardianship of the jurist) as articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini during and following the Islamic Revolution in Iran; jihad in the spiritual and social as well as military senses; solidarity with oppressed peoples and support for resistance to oppression; and opposition to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, Zionism, and U.S. imperialism. The party draws on Islamic history and especially the Battle of Karbala in 680 and the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Imam Husayn at that battle, as models for resistance against oppression. It also draws on Islam by way of asserting moral claims in its anticorruption stances on Lebanese politics.

The 1985 “Open Letter” notes the party’s desire to establish an Islamic state, but only through the will of the people, stating explicitly, “We do not want Islam to reign in Lebanon by force.” While the party continues to be led by a seven-member religious council of prominent leaders first established in the 1980s Majlis al-Shura, two other decision-making bodies—an executive council and a politburo—were established as Hizbullah began to enter Lebanese politics toward the end of the civil war. In addition, by deciding to participate first in Lebanese elections in 1992 and later in the government itself in 2005, the party signaled its commitment to working within the existing structures of the state. In keeping with this, since 1992 Hizbullah leaders have frequently acknowledged the contingencies of Lebanon’s multiconfessional society of 18 officially recognized religious and ethnic groups and the importance of sectarian coexistence and pluralism within the country. And indeed, in November 2009, Hizbullah released a new “manifesto” (the English translation the party itself used for the “Wathiqa Siyasiyya” [literally, political document]), which highlighted coexistence within the Lebanese state and working toward the abolition of sectarianism within that state system.

Hizbullah and its Majlis al-Shura initially followed the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini and since his death officially follows his successor Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, individual supporters or party members are free to choose their source of emulation (marja‘ al-taqlīd) in personal and religious matters. Many Hizbullah supporters or party members have chosen to follow the late and prominent Lebanese marja‘ Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah since the late 1990s, and some have chosen to follow the Iraqi Ayatollah ‘Ali Sistani in Iraq.

Fadlallah is often described as “the spiritual leader” of Hizbullah. Both Fadlallah and the party have always denied that relationship. For a time, there was a rift between them over the nature of the Shi‘i Islamic institution of emulation. Fadlallah believed that religious scholars should work through multiple institutions and should not affiliate with a single political party or be involved in the affairs of a worldly government. In these views, he was closer to traditional Shi‘i jurisprudence and to the schools of Najaf, Iraq, where he studied, and more distant from the concept of wilāyat al-faqīh promulgated by Khomeini. Fadlallah’s own writings evolved over time, paralleling the changing contingencies of war and politics in Lebanon. Calls for developing Islamism in Lebanon in the 1980s gave way to calls for dialogue among and coexistence of multiple religious confessional groups in Lebanon in the 1990s. Fadlallah was also known for his relatively progressive teachings on gender, which sometimes contrast with those of Khomeini and Khamene’i. As of 1992, the political leader of Hizbullah is Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah. While he is also a religious scholar, he does not rank highly enough to be a marja‘ and instead remains a follower of Khamene’i and his powerful deputy in Lebanon.