The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

imamate

Although the word “imamate” may be used to denote leadership in prayer and prominence in a specific branch of knowledge or profession, it was more widely used in juristic, theological, and exegetical literature and hadith to describe a particular political, frequently religiopolitical, leadership and, in modern jargon, a government or state. The scholarly tradition across a wide Islamic spectrum referred to the imamate as supreme leadership (al-imāma al-‘uẓmā). At the core of the idea of the imamate lay the assumption that the Muslim community must have a legitimate leader who would be responsible for, as Mawardi noted, “upholding the faith and managing the affairs of the world,” including such duties as implementing laws, defending borders, leading the army, maintaining social peace, collecting and distributing revenues, and appointing administrators to undertake such responsibilities. Whether the imam also guides his subjects to salvation (as in the case of the Shi‘i imam) was a highly controversial question among various Muslim sects. Medieval Muslims discussed the imamate as the best form of leadership, although it is unclear if this meant the imamate was the only legitimate form of government. The views this entry addresses represent a consciously “religious” take on politics. This is particularly true compared to not only ideas expounded by Muslim philosophers, secretaries, and belles lettres but also dynastic laws derived from non-Islamic traditions that flourished under various Muslim dynasties as laws governing political domain.

It is fair to state that the theory of the imamate owes its development in a substantial way to intellectual responses to the caliphate, especially the patriarchal caliphate; to competing sectarian positions on politics and other doctrinal questions; to the political views of secretaries and philosophers; and finally to the existing political customs and conventions in the Near East. A wealth of opinions about the imamate was put forth in the books of theology, jurisprudence, exegesis, and hadith. Opinions reflect variations not only across different sects (Shi‘is, Sunnis, Kharijis, etc.) but also within a particular sect (e.g., Shi‘ism) for a range of doctrinal and historical reasons.

The Emergence of the Debate on the Imamate

Like the Roman Empire, the caliphate shaped how people thought about politics and statecraft. The caliphate emerged with the election of Abu Bakr (r. 632–34), a senior Companion of the Prophet Muhammad (ca. 570–632), to lead the Muslim community after the Prophet’s death. Having been elected the first caliph, Abu Bakr adopted the title “Successor of the Prophet of God.” His successor, ‘Umar b. al-Khattab (r. 634–44), is said to have used the title “Successor of the Successor of the Prophet of God,” but noticing how cumbersome this title would become in a few generations, he abbreviated the title to “caliph.” He also adopted the apparently more mundane-sounding title of “Commander of the Faithful.” The caliphs after ‘Umar followed the usage he preferred, but many did not shy away from adopting pompous new titles such as “God’s Caliph.”

Although the first three caliphs were elected by peaceful means, the period afterward was anything but peaceful. The assassination of the third caliph, ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan (r. 644–56), and the controversial reign of ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (r. 656–61) led to a civil war between the caliph and the governor of Damascus, the Umayyad Mu‘awiya, a member of the Meccan nobility and a junior Companion of the Prophet. This civil war ended with the assassination of ‘Ali (by a disillusioned supporter) and the transfer of the caliphate to Mu‘awiya (r. 661–80) and the Umayyad family (661–750). The civil war of 656–61 split the Muslim community into factions (Kharijis, ‘Uthmanis, and Shi‘at ‘Ali), which were the first to articulate views on the imamate. The supporters of ‘Ali (Shi‘at ‘Ali) repudiated ‘Uthman as illegitimate for having failed to uphold the laws and Mu‘awiya as a usurper for contesting ‘Ali. The supporters of ‘Uthman and Mu‘awiya repudiated ‘Ali as illegitimate and incompetent. The Kharijis, who initially supported ‘Ali against Mu‘awiya, rejected ‘Ali, Mu‘awiya, and ‘Uthman as illegitimate for various reasons. They withdrew from the broader society to establish their own righteous community. Growing controversies over the legitimacy of the successive Umayyad caliphs led to another civil war between 684 and 692. This civil war ended with the elimination of the non-Umayyad contenders, particularly the powerful ‘Abdallah b. al-Zubayr, and shifted the caliphate from the Sufyanid to the Marwanid branch of the Umayyad family.

Under the Umayyads, election gave way to succession, which became even more regular under the Abbasids (750–1258). Only a very few of the Abbasid caliphs had fathers who had not been caliphs. The procedure of ascending to the rule followed either some sort of election (e.g., under the first four caliphs), designation by the ruling caliph (the most common practice under the Umayyads and Abbasids), or simple force. The caliph was nonetheless expected to have certain qualifications, including Qurashi descent, intelligence, physical ability, military prowess, and moral standing, although there was no constitutional or institutional oversight to verify their fulfillment. Often, political expediency and circumstances on the ground dictated the appointment of a particular individual to the office. There was no duration to the caliph’s rule. As long as he was able, he could rule for life. In the absence of constitutional law outlining his responsibilities and privileges clearly, cultural norms, customs, and religious law, along with the power of social and political forces, provided some guidance to and restrictions on his authority.

The initial debates on the imamate came in the wake of the civil war and involved the identity, familial and social affiliation, qualifications (in particular, individual merit and seniority in Islam, prominence in a particular house, even age), and legitimacy of the caliph. The Umayyad period witnessed, alongside a more complex factional development, substantial doctrinal elaborations on the imamate, particularly on questions concerning the legitimacy and the nature of caliph’s authority. In the Umayyad period, competing groups debated such concepts as consultation versus succession and divine appointment versus communal choice. Theological arguments such as free will and predestination, nature and definition of faith, and the status of the sinner also acquired substantial political implications. During the Abbasid period, sectarian views expanded and matured thanks to the proliferating paper industry and the articulate and socially engaged scholars. By the 13th century, all major sects and groups had produced substantial literature on the subject of the imamate in a scope far wider than the initial debates.

Necessity of Imamate

Scholars made a great deal of effort to show why and for which reason the imamate was necessary. Except for a small but articulate and intellectually rigorous group of scholars among the Mu‘tazilis and the Kharijis, the great majority of Muslim sects asserted that instituting an imam was necessary. According to those scholars, the imamate was neither rationally necessary nor religiously obligatory. They reasoned that an ultimately perfect imamate was not possible. Even if it were possible it might not always be practical, and a less-than-perfect imamate might not be conducive to peaceful life. It was better for the community to have either multiple imams or no imam at all. Those who saw the imamate as necessary could not agree if it was necessary rationally by virtue of a human being’s need for social life, which requires political organization (this was the view of the Mu‘tazilis), or by virtue of God’s command. The Shi‘i theorists saw the imamate as both rationally necessary and a grace of God. They argued that reason alone could arrive at its necessity since the welfare and salvation of human beings depended on it, but nevertheless its institution and maintenance was incumbent upon God and not human beings. God simply could not leave his creatures without guidance. By and large Sunni scholars argued for the necessity of the imamate from the perspective of divine command, but they saw it as a communal duty and denied the imam the privilege of being a guide to salvation. Many jurists and theologians also tried to explain the rational need for an imam and rationalize religious arguments.

Appointing the Imam

The Sunnis, Mu‘tazilis, and Kharijis emphasized election as the sole medium of appointing the imam. They meant that the process of instituting the imam was a mundane and voluntary task that could be fulfilled only by the community’s preference for one candidate or another. While the principle of election opposed the Shi‘i concept of divine appointment (that the imam should be singled out by the previous imam upon specific and binding instructions from God), it also shaped how the non-Shi‘is thought about the nature of the imam’s authority in relation to the Muslim community. The idea of election manifested itself in the actual practice of choosing the caliph. The views about election varied widely and could range from popular consensus to nomination by a single well-qualified individual, as well as any number of practices in between: majority opinion and decision by a specific group of qualified electors, whose number fluctuated depending on circumstances. As stipulated by Ghazali (d. 1111) in the age of the sultanates, election could also take the form of acknowledgement by the holders of coercive power (i.e., sultans). The imam could also be appointed by his predecessor or could win the seat for himself through a successful military coup. In all cases, however, the consent and approval of the community was sought, even if it was merely symbolic. The Sunnis made the point that the imamate was by election and that the community was the source of legitimacy; the imamate was neither a dynastic right nor a divine appointment. Furthermore, election required a mechanism to function. The idea of an “electoral body” arose as a palpable way to represent the will of the community at large. The Sunnis therefore needed to seek certain qualifications from the members of the electoral body, such as probity, knowledge, prudence, and wisdom. It was also accepted that qualified individuals might be more available in the capital, although there was no requirement to reside in a particular region. Despite acknowledging the Umayyad and Abbasid dynastic succession practices as legitimate, the Sunnis made sure that, at least theoretically, elections remained a part of the succession process. For the Shi‘is divine appointment rather than election was the rule.

Qualification of the Imam

Whether the imam must be the most excellent of his generation reveals a fascinating debate about the historical caliphate. By the tenth century, the Sunnis believed that the first four caliphs were the most excellent of their generations and the order of their caliphate reflected their order in merit. Part of this debate was, of course, about the legitimacy of the first four caliphs, but another part was about elaborating an ideal model to be pursued by the historical caliphate. The Sunnis required that the caliph should be the most excellent in the true imamate, but they allowed the inferior or the less excellent to be appointed to office under kingship. The Zaydis advocated the imamate of the most excellent from the family of the Prophet, while the Mu‘tazilis, though arguing for the appointment of the most excellent, allowed the imamate of a less-qualified person for practical reasons (i.e., to prevent dissention). For the Imami (Twelver) Shi‘is, no one could tell who was the most excellent except the current imam, who alone was entitled to identify and designate his successor. The Shi‘is required family affiliation for the imam, the Imamis being more restrictive than the Zaydis. The Shi‘is restricted the imamate to the descendants of ‘Ali from the line of Husayn (Imamis) or to any meritorious and politically active member of the ‘Alid house (Zaydis). Generally the Sunnis required that the candidate belong to the tribe of Quraysh, although there were strong voices (Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Jama‘a) for opening the candidacy to individuals outside Quraysh, including non-Arabic speaking people. The majority of the Kharijis and the Mu‘tazilis did not see tribal and ethnic affiliation as a condition for the imamate. They even rejected such an argument as unfair, biased, and entirely impractical.

The Sunnis added some qualifying conditions to Qurashi lineage: like the members of the electoral body, the candidate should have probity and knowledge. He should have sound vision, hearing, and speech as well as physical fitness. He should be prudent and courageous to undertake the task of governing and leading the military. Military juntas used some of these conditions as an excuse to depose the ruling caliphs in the late ninth and early tenth centuries: they blinded the caliph first, then asked the chief judge to declare him unfit for rule so that they could install another one of their liking.

One of the fundamental differences between Shi‘i and non-Shi‘i views on qualifications was the presence and absence of the imam. The Sunnis (as well as the Kharijis and the Mu‘tazilis) required that the imam must be alive, present, in charge of affairs, and reachable, while the Shi‘is allowed him to be absent and not ruling a state. In fact, only one of the Twelver Shi‘i imams ruled (‘Ali).

Religious Authority versus Temporal Authority

One of the fundamental questions about the imamate in political thought was whether the imam’s authority extended over both religious and temporal matters. In general, Sunni, Khariji, and Mu‘tazili views did not allow the imam any authority over doctrinal matters, while most of the Shi‘is (except for the Zaydis) attributed religious authority (not only as a law giver but also as a guide to salvation) to the imam regardless of whether he held an actual political office. Many modern scholars have argued that the caliphs inherited only Muhammad’s temporal authority, as prophecy ended with Muhammad while religious authority rested within the corporeal body of the community. The question of who would legitimately represent and articulate this authority led to a two-century-long competition between the caliphs (who adopted for themselves titles suggesting this prerogative, such as “God’s Caliph”) and scholars specializing in jurisprudence and hadith (‘ulama’). Other arguments suggest that the caliphate was instituted from the beginning for leadership not only in temporal governance but also in matters of salvation: the caliph was both king and priest, so to speak, following the prophetic model exercised by Muhammad. It was only with the rise of the ‘ulama’ that the caliph’s authority became a subject of contestation. In the ninth century, the caliphs had to recognize the power of the ‘ulama’ and relinquish their claims on religious authority.

True Imamate versus Kingship

Regardless of sectarian affiliation, medieval thinkers generally made a distinction between the true imamate and kingship. For the majority of the Imami Shi‘is, the true imamate existed only during the reign of ‘Ali. For the Zaydis, both the Umayyads and the Abbasids were certainly kings and, although legitimate, the first three caliphs after Muhammad were of lesser merit than ‘Ali, the true imam. The true imamate afterward existed only in isolated regions where Zaydi imams ruled. The Kharijis rejected all the caliphs after ‘Umar as illegitimate tyrants. For the Sunnis, the true imamate was the period of the first four caliphs, followed by kingship. They did not, however, mean by this that kingship was unlawful and that the Umayyads and Abbasids were illegitimate. On the one hand, the Sunni theorists wanted to make clear that the true imamate was possible and in fact existed under the first four caliphs, although it could not continue in perpetuity. On the other hand, the Umayyads and Abbasids were legitimate, though not ideal, caliphs since they complied with the minimum requirements of the law, keeping the Muslim community united, the transactions lawful, and the borders safe. Many of the Sunnis reasoned that, for the common good, working with the system was better than going against it. In medieval jargon, two fundamental concepts explained the Sunni attitude of acknowledging the legitimacy of the caliphate without fully endorsing it theoretically: welfare or utility and necessity.

One or Multiple Imams

Medieval scholars have generally argued for one imam at a time, except for some Mu‘tazilis and anarchists, who allowed and even advocated the appointment of more than one imam. The singularity of the imam was true also for the majority of Sunni theologians and jurists, although after the demise of the Abbasid caliphate, this argument was no longer sustainable. Even before that, the community was ruled by three competing imamates despite theoretical rejection of multiple imams: the Abbasid caliphate, the Fatimid caliphate in North Africa and Egypt, and the Spanish Umayyad caliphate in Spain. The Sunni ‘Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037) was one such theologian who read the situation pragmatically and accommodated the practice as legitimate. He stipulated that it was possible to have more than one imam if the imams ruled over regions separated from each other by a significant barrier, such as a large body of water. The Shi‘is also argued for the singularity of the imam, although they allowed the imam to be hidden.

Duties of the Imam

Generally the Sunnis, the Mu‘tazilis, and the Kharijis restricted the duties of the imam to the administration of mundane matters and to the promotion and protection of the faith. His duties comprised the guardianship of the faith, enforcing the laws, leading public acts of worship, protecting the community from outside and inside threats, dispensing legal criminal punishments, maintaining and leading the army in military activities, collecting revenues and distributing them to their appropriate places, building and maintaining public amenities and spaces, and appointing and overseeing lesser administrators. Sunni scholars guarded religious authority from the encroachment of the caliph, but they bestowed holiness on the caliph and advocated obedience to his authority as long as he did not confront the fundamental tenets of the faith. Another reason they advocated obedience was for the unity and welfare of the community. They feared that any dissention and violence would disturb order, prevent the application of law, lead to the demise of religion, and the loss of this world as well as the next. Yet the Sunnis were far from a pacifist crowd, as exemplified in a widespread norm that one should not obey anyone in matters against God’s ordinances. They did emphasize the right to remove the caliph from office for reasons of apostasy, loss of freedom or sanity, and even consistent acts of injustice. Yet they did not elaborate on how the caliph would be removed from office, nor did they propose any institutional framework to assure peaceful removal. For the Kharijis and the Mu‘tazilis, violation of the law by the caliph was a valid reason for removal by either peaceful means or force. They did not share the same sentiments with the Sunnis that one should endure injustice, oppression, and violation of the law for the sake of community’s welfare. Such actions were crimes significant enough to disturb the order itself.