The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

masses

A number of Arabic words may be translated as “masses,” especially al-‘āmma (commoners, general populace), al-jumhūr (public, multitude), and al-sha‘b (folk, populace). More pejorative examples, usually translated as the rabble, riffraff, or mob, include dahmā’, ra‘ā‘, ghawghā’, and ṭaghām. The term unmistakably and consistently evokes class and hierarchy. The masses are the lower classes and the great majority of people, the common folk, usually workers and peasants, and sometimes soldiers and bureaucrats as well. The opposite of these terms is al-khāṣṣa, the elite, which was sometimes limited to the highest ranking political figures such as the sultan or amirs, and at others included their retinues and other important officials, judges, and religious leaders. The literal meaning of the two words is telling: al-‘āmma is “the general, undifferentiated, or common,” while al-khāṣṣa is “the distinguished, particular, or with distinction.” It is in this sense that Ira M. Lapidus describes the indistinct masses in negative terms in his book Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages: al-‘āmma did not hold office, have an education, or possess wealth. Other groups tend to be distinguished in between these two classes, such as al-a‘yān or notables, the ‘ulama’ or scholars, and local leaders who acted as intermediaries between the elite and the masses.

Philosophers, theologians, and mystics of various political and sectarian commitments generally agreed on the proper value and role of the masses in Islamic societies: the masses were sharply distinguished from the elite by their ignorance; they were decidedly inferior to the elite; and the masses were intended to be led, guided, and controlled by them. Although Imamism is a complex and variegated system of belief, one of its key features is the gulf between the imam and his followers. The divinely inspired imam has knowledge that no ordinary human being can possess, and in turn, the gulf between the imam and the Imamis is replayed between the Imamis and other Muslims. In the words of Muhammad b. ‘Ali al-Baqir (d. 743), as reported by Imami scholar Muhhammad b. al-Hasan al-Tusi (d. 1067) in al-Amali, the non-Imami masses were “created from the stinking mud of Hell.”

Muslim philosophers also maintained a distinction inherited from Neoplatonism between the erudite elite and the ignorant masses. This division, which intertwined piety with epistemological, moral, and political rank, suggested that the many were deficient by nature. Unlike the prophet-philosopher figure and the privileged classes under him who know esoteric (bāṭin) truths, the many lack reason and revelation. They can only comprehend representations of the truth transmitted in parables. Because of their lower placement along the spectrum of reason, they can only recognize the exoteric (ẓāhir) or surface meanings. With this distinction and along similar lines to those found in Islamic mystical thought, philosophers like Farabi (d. 950) suggested that religion imitates philosophy; it is instruction for the masses while philosophy is instruction for the elite. Law is necessary for the masses; members of the rational elite do not need this form of regulation. Likewise, Ghazali (d. 1111) also maintains the distinction between the elite and the masses. The masses are furthest from true knowledge and lack perception and understanding of God, as opposed to elites, who are marked by keen sight. The masses’ level of understanding prevents them from benefiting from what rulers and scholars know. Their beliefs are determined by preachers. Ghazali casts them in typical fashion as the objects of instruction, to be taught restraint and good manners.

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to say that the medieval Islamic view of the masses was utterly derogatory. While Ghazali maintains the masses-elite opposition, he derides others for casting themselves as elites on illegitimate grounds. When he lists the eight types of people who are mistakenly attracted to bāṭiniyya or esoteric doctrines, they include the stupid, the domineering, and, most relevant here, “those who seek to be part of an elite so as to distinguish themselves from the masses.” Although Ghazali is not defending the masses, he calls attention to the falseness of such self-aggrandizing differentiations. In his analysis of metaphors, the literary theorist ‘Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani (d. 1078) notes that the aphorism “Food is not right without salt” signifies that the goodness and well-being of the masses, as represented by food, requires the elite, as represented by salt. Jurjani’s explanation reflects the elites’ ideological position, for he overlooks that salt (the elite) is in some sense dependent on—and at its base even less necessary than—food (the masses).

Overall, these visions of the masses took their status and deficiencies for granted. The vast majority of Muslim political thinkers in the medieval period, like their Western counterparts, treated the hierarchy as proper, rigid, and ordained by both God and nature, taking the people’s position in it as a given and then maneuvering from within it.

Sawsan El-Messiri notes in her study of Egyptian urban masses or folk (awlād al-balad) that the term encompasses a wide range of types, from shopkeepers and artisans to outlaws and mobs, and that the general category may be divided based on ethnicity, religion, and occupation. In his book Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt, Walter Armbrust shows how the figure of ibn al-balad (son of the country) was used to represent the masses. The term does not appear often in pre-19th-century sources but thereafter signifies both the buffoon’s idiocy and the worker’s culturally authentic machismo. In the 20th century, this “diamond in the rough” was placed in a highly conventional model of the pedagogical state, wherein social reformism would educate and raise ibn al-balad from his ignorance, maintaining his better characteristics while removing the bad. The term is opposed to ibn al-dhawāt, or the aristocrat, linked to cultural inauthenticity and effeminacy. Ibn al-balad, like the term sha‘bī (popular), has nationalist overtones, and generally designates those who stand in staunch opposition to inauthentic cultural practices, foreign political agendas, exploitation, and bad character. While the modern position maintains the opposition between the elite and the masses, a key difference is the belief in the common people’s capacity to change, which lends them a different role in legitimating the political order. Typical of this modernist sentiment are proclamations that the elite would polish the masses’ language, sometimes coupled with the claim that the elite would also adapt the commoners’ sincerity and flexibility. An intermediary role is played by the intellectual, who serves to bridge the gap between the elite and the masses. Such a transformation should be understood in the context of the forces of nationalism and postcolonialism, the emergence of modern populism, the modern state’s reliance on the concept of the masses, and its attendant construction of national culture. Indeed, it is typical for modern governments to invest in projects, centers, and ministries aimed at making the common people a source of their cultural and political authenticity.