The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

North Africa

In contrast to the Mashriq (the Middle East from Egypt eastward), the Maghrib (North Africa) was neither heavily Ottomanized nor urbanized on the eve of colonialism. With the exception of the Husaynid Beylik of Tunis (Tunisia), the region was predominantly tribal and greatly influenced by the religious brotherhoods that underwent a transformation in the late 18th to early 19th centuries. This transformation is associated with Ahmad b. Idris (d. 1837) and the idea of the ṭarīqa muḥammadiyya, the Sufi equivalent of Salafism, which advocated a return to the spiritual source, Muhammad, as a means to introduce a new centralized, activist, and orthodox type of Sufi organization ideally suited to the rural Maghribi milieu and similar areas such as the Sudan. In some regions, new brotherhoods such as the Sanusi in Cyrenaica fulfilled many of the functions of a state for their followers. In others, reformed brotherhoods such as the Qadiri, Darqawi, and Wazzani-Tayyibi challenged the authority of weakening indigenous regimes such as the ‘Alawi sultans in Morocco or the Deys of Algiers and then went on to lead resistance movements conceptualized as jihads against the colonial intrusions of the French, Spanish, and Italians. Algeria’s nationalist icon, ‘Abd al-Qadir (d. 1883), emerged from this environment, as did ‘Umar al-Mukhtar (d. 1931), the best-known leader of the Sanusi resistance to the Italian occupation of Cyrenaica. These movements established a particular strain of Islamic reformism that was later challenged but also adopted and manipulated by 20th-century Islamic thinkers.

Colonial rule was particularly harsh in French Algeria and, later and more briefly, in Italian Libya. Particularly in Algeria, which was under colonial rule longer than any other country in the region, traditional political institutions were swept away, creating a political vacuum that was extremely difficult to fill. In Morocco and Tunisia, established regimes managed to hold on under the “protection” of France (and Spain in northern Morocco). However, both the ‘Alawi sultanate of Morocco and the Husayni Beylik of Tunis were greatly compromised by their subjection to an “infidel” power. In Tunisia this proved fatal and, as in Algeria, the old regime and the political discourse that accompanied it were swept away and new secular forms of political thought of a socialist but thoroughly nationalist persuasion triumphed. However, the Tunisian nationalist movement, headed by Habib Bourguiba (d. 2000), made headway only when Bourguiba started to use mosque networks, thereby implying, if not actually asserting, that Tunisian independence was an Islamic as well as a nationalist objective. In Morocco, the charismatic Muhammad V was able to use the conceptual framework developed by the ‘Alawi sultans to set the country on a path to constitutional monarchy, despite the nationalist preference for a republic.

Despite the differences within each Maghribi state, there were also commonalities in the development of modern political thought across the region. As in the Middle East, the struggle for independence from European colonialism dominated the political agenda, and the adoption of ideologies such as socialism and communism depended on their national utility. Salafism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Arabism were more appealing because they implied mutual solidarity against the colonizer and were also more deeply rooted in the existing political culture of the Maghrib. In the Maghrib there was little conflict among the movements; the only significant religious minorities were the Jews and the Ibadis (of the Mzab region of Algeria). In both Morocco and Algeria, reformist ‘ulama’, inspired by the example of Muhammad ‘Abduh in Egypt, were prominent in the nationalist movement. In Morocco, for instance, the nationalist leader ‘Allal al-Fasi (d. 1974) was a traditionally educated Salafi scholar rather than a member of the French-educated elite, although he recognized the importance of learning French in the course of his political career.

Maghribi nationalists were thus, for the most part, Pan-Arabists and Pan-Islamists in that they perceived the Maghrib as an integral part of the Arabo-Islamic world. This approach was fostered by a new triangular relationship among the Maghrib, the Mashriq, and various European metropoles where intellectuals gathered. London, Paris, Vienna, and even Oslo provided forums where Maghribis met with Mashriqis, and indeed individuals from other colonized countries, to exchange ideas and express solidarity. The League of Arab States also played an important rhetorical role in this respect. Both ‘Allal al-Fasi and Bourguiba made extensive use of such networks and understood the political futures of their respective countries to be tied to the crystallization of Arab and Islamic blocs.

The Arabo-Islamic national identity in the Maghrib was a political development that, from a historical perspective, correlated with older concepts of dār al-islām (the abode of Islam) and the Maghrib’s participation in its Arab-influenced high culture, but from a contemporary national perspective it downplayed the Berber ethnic component in Algeria and Morocco. Berber communities did not necessarily feel disadvantaged by the emphasis on the Maghrib as Arab during the struggle for independence, but hegemonic Arabization in Algeria and to a lesser extent in Morocco triggered the development of Berber cultural and political movements that sought a more pluralistic vision of national identity in the Maghrib.

This coincided with the rise of Islamism in the Maghrib in the 1980s, which appeared to privilege a hegemonic “Arab” interpretation of Islam over Berber forms of faith and culture. Islamism’s main target, however, was the postindependence states of the Maghrib and their poor socioeconomic and political performance. As in other Muslim societies, Islamists presented Islam as the panacea for a range of social, political, and economic ills. In each Maghribi country, Islamism followed a slightly different trajectory, but in general Islamists sought to invest the nation-state with greater authenticity and moral accountability rather than to replace it. In Tunisia and Morocco, Islamism remained moderate. In Morocco’s case, this reflected the religious prestige of the monarchy, although a more violent and radical minority emerged from the broader Islamist movement. In Algeria, opposition from the secular army forced a confrontation and civil war, but this was by no means an inevitable outcome based on the ideological premises of Algerian Islamism, which largely accepted modern political forms as in the rest of the Maghrib.