The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

quietism and activism

In premodern history, both Sunni and Twelver Shi‘i attitudes toward illegitimate authorities were predominantly quietist. “Quietism” can be generally defined as passivism in politics, while its antonym, “activism,” entails active involvement in the political affairs, thus affecting political power and its policy. In the Twelver tradition, the central symbol of political thought is the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad, who was killed along with his Companions and many of the Prophet’s family members at the Battle of Karbala in 680 on order of the Umayyad caliph Yazid I (r. 680–83). This tragedy elicited profound emotions of grief and a deep conviction of historical injustice. As a result, many Shi‘is believed that a ruler could not be powerful and moral at the same time, so they chose morality and renounced all political action. Convinced that political power is beyond reform, they practiced dissimulation (taqiyya), concealing their faith for self-protection from their non-Shi‘i opponents. Government was to be accommodated, not overthrown. This attitude became consolidated in the Twelver tradition with the doctrine of the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam (ghayba). In 874 it was held that the Twelfth Imam, out of fear for his safety, had gone into occultation and could be contacted only by a representative; this came to be known as the Lesser Occultation (al-ghayba al-ṣughrā). In 941, after a series of four representatives, in what would be termed the Greater Occultation (al-ghayba al-kubrā), it was held that ordinary contact with the Twelfth Imam was no longer possible. Because the Twelfth Imam could no longer serve as a rallying point for rebellion, and because his explicit permission was held to be necessary for any uprising, the struggle to depose the illegitimate usurper of the imamate and install the rightful imam fell into abeyance.

In contrast, as the majority, Sunnis had no need to practice dissimulation. However, they also practiced a policy of quietism toward corrupt leadership. Sunnis thought that the proper response to an oppressive government was to endure it. A famous hadith of the Prophet instructed the Muslims to obey the leader, even if he were an Ethiopian slave. Another widespread maxim held that 60 years of tyranny was better than one hour of civil strife (fitna): God is the ultimate ruler of the community, and as long as guidance can be freely dispersed and practiced among the believers, which was the task of the ‘ulama’, it was more important to avoid conflict with power and keep the community together. They considered rulers to serve merely as shields for the umma (community of believers), protecting it against external enemies. An oppressive or sinful ruler was to be admonished or cajoled and ultimately could be deposed if he failed to uphold Islamic law, became physically disqualified, or lost his probity. However, there was no systematic means for deposing a ruler other than rebellion and strife. In that case, it was deemed preferable to endure the ruler’s tyranny rather than inciting civil strife in the umma. If he failed to reform, however, it was deemed preferable to endure his tyranny or iniquity rather than rebel.

In contrast, the Kharijis and Zaydi Shi‘is adopted an activist stance. Like the Twelvers, they denounced the current rulers as illegitimate, but they held that it was a fundamental obligation to remove usurpers and tyrants and to install a legitimate imam. The Kharijis were the most adamant in this regard, holding that the member of the community with superior merit should be elected to the caliphate. If someone else were in power, or even if the legitimate imam himself lost his superior status through sinful behavior, the current ruler should be removed, by open rebellion if necessary. The Zaydi view was somewhat similar, except that the legitimate imam had to be a descendant of the Prophet and learned in the religious sciences; rebellion and the establishment of a legitimate state was an absolute requirement for legitimate rule. The need to keep the community together was no reason to submit to oppressive rule. These positions had dire consequences for those who espoused them, and it is no accident that Khariji and Zaydi communities survived in remote regions, including Oman, Yemen, and the Mzab region in Algeria.

The 20th century witnessed a dramatic shift in the Shi‘i position from quietism to revolutionary activism. The historical tragedy of Imam Husayn was reinterpreted as a revolutionary symbol for the struggle against oppression. The martyrdom of Imam Husayn set an eternal role model for the suppressed Shi‘is and inspired an activist ideology that equated morality with political action, condemned the quietist tradition within Shi‘i Islam, and culminated in the Iranian Revolution (1978–79). In 1971 and afterward, Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989) set forth the political doctrine of the guardianship of the jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh), which grants the Shi‘i ‘ulama’, specifically the leading jurist (faqīh), the prerogative of the religious and political leadership roles that, according earlier Twelver doctrine, had been to a large extent restricted to the Hidden Imam. Khomeini’s activist legacy may be seen outside Iran in the Lebanese Hizbullah, which started as a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation and then became a political party and joined the Lebanese national government in 2005.

The modern period has also witnessed Islamic activism among Sunnis, but it has most commonly targeted reform rather than the overthrow of current political orders. Sunni activist movements have developed in the context of decolonization as a reaction to oppressive regimes that tend to criminalize involvement in politics and use strategies of control, co-option, and repression to curb any resistance movement. Islamic activists react by submerged or hidden networking that aims mainly to bring about a change in the social and intellectual environment of the youth. Adherents to such movements frame activism as a moral obligation and embrace an ideology that mandates participation as a moral duty. Groups such as Jama‘at-i Islami in India and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt emphasize fairness and social justice and offer an image of a moral community living in accordance with God’s rules. The Muslim Brotherhood has not openly fought the Egyptian regime and has not overturned existing relations of economic and political domination in Egypt. Rather, they accept the status quo with the hope of incremental, gradual change and focus mainly on social activities, because the latter represent a less risky alternative than directly confronting the state’s oppressive power.

The year 2011 witnessed a tremendous change in the understanding of the concept of statehood and citizenship. For the first time, we witness citizens determined to actively topple oppressive regimes and have a direct say on the affairs and destiny of their state. Millions of people from different socioeconomic and religious backgrounds protested against dictatorships through organizing campaigns of civil resistance featuring peaceful demonstrations and labor strikes. The January 25 Egyptian revolution, which endured 18 days of clashes between state oppressive forces and civilians resulting in loss of life and great casualties on the latter’s side, managed to overthrow President Husni Mubarak’s regime. The success of the Tunisian revolution in December 2010 sparked the Egyptian uprisings whose success in return sparked a series of civil protests across the Arab world against oppressive regimes in Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain. While analysts are trying to uncover the reasons behind the revolutions, the fact that they were largely driven by a majority of Arab youth who saw themselves as “agents of change” reflects the success of Islamic activists in introducing the desired change in their societies from a passive quietist culture into an active self-determined one.