The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought

Shah Waliullah (1703–62)

One of the most important religious scholars of Muslim South Asia, Shah Waliullah was a prolific writer in both Arabic and Persian. His political theory is largely found in two comprehensive works—Hujjat Allah al-Baligha (The conclusive argument from God) and al-Budur al-Bazigha (Full moon appearing on the horizon)—and in a third book about the caliphate, Izalat al-Khafa’ ‘an Khilafat al-Khulafa’ (Removing rancor in issues concerning the caliphate), written near the end of his career. Waliullah was a synthetic thinker, and his political ideas reflect the Islamic tradition of idealistic works, such as Farabi’s Virtuous City, and are based on Platonic ideas of the ideal state as well as classical Islamicate works on government, such as Mawardi’s rules for the caliph. On occasion, he offers practical observations and critiques of existing policy and governance in response to circumstances of later Mughal rule in India.

A notable and original feature is Waliullah’s formulation of human civilization as developing through four stages of sociopolitical order, for which he coined the term irtifāqāt. These progressive stages are described as (1) humans following natural and instinctive patterns in primitive groups, (2) the emergence of orderly family life and rules for social exchange in communities, (3) the rise of the division of labor and local political systems of kingship, and (4) the highest political order based on a single caliph dominating regional rulers. In Hujjat Allah, the qualifications for the caliph are initially discussed in pragmatic terms (vol. 1) and later in symbolic and religious terms (vol. 2). In Izalat al-Khafa’, Waliullah takes up the discussion of the caliphate of the first four Islamic rulers in greater detail, in part to refute Shi‘i claims, perhaps as a response to an ascendancy of Shi‘i power in his contemporary North India.

In this work Waliullah defines three categories of the caliphate in terms of language drawn from a hadith report:

The khilāfa khāṣṣa, the “elite” or special caliphate, is ultimately restricted to the period of the first four successors of the Prophet. Their rule was marked by (1) the actual presence of the caliph as the authority and (2) the achievement of complete control over the umma (community of believers). Because ‘Ali b. Abi Talib’s rule was marked by dissent, his stature is somewhat ambiguous here; in another section, a distinction is made between the first three caliphs who ruled at a time of “mercy” (raḥma), as opposed to the crisis and dissent (fitna) that emerged during ‘Ali’s rule.

The khilāfa ‘āmma, or “general” type of caliphate, either lacks the consensus of the entire Muslim community, fails to achieve its internal quality of embodiment of (tashabbuh) of the Prophet’s model in responding to people’s needs and implementing the divine mandate, or has a ruler that is deficient in his knowledge of the shari‘a. Still, external elements of establishing the religion may effectively be fulfilled by the “general” caliph, although this ruler is not at the same level in tashabbuh of the prophetic legacy that marked the initial phase. This general level of the caliphate is required for two beneficial aims (maṣāliḥ): one political, in other words, for the sake of defense and justice, and the other to enforce compliance with the shari‘a. There is also the suggestion that consensus (ijmā‘) on matters of policy and religion emerges institutionally from the ruler’s decree, with or without scholarly consultation. During this period following the tenure of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the ruler is not envisioned as coming from the ‘ulama’ (religious scholars) class, although according to certain passages in Waliullah’s works, al-Tafhimat al-Ilahiyya (Divine instructions) and Fuyud al-Haramayn (Visions received in the two holy cities), the religious scholars are the bearers of an “inner” caliphate (al-khilāfa al-bāṭina), continuing the Prophet’s teaching role in the sense of transmitting religious learning as well as moral and spiritual exhortations and authority. Meanwhile, the “external” caliphate (al-khilāfa al-ẓāhira) is fulfilled by the political ruler who exercises the aforementioned functions of defense, control, and enforcement.

The final type of caliphate, the khilāfa jābira, or “oppressive” caliphate, is undesirable, although quietism on the part of the populace is generally enjoined unless the ruler goes so far in injustice or apostasy that he must be resisted and overthrown.

Waliullah’s more practical discussions of the necessary infrastructure, policies of remuneration, fair taxation, and so on occur both in some of his political letters and in specific passages in his longer works. In his discussion of rules for kings, he draws on Islamicate advice or wisdom literature to treat topics such as the superior qualities possessed by an ideal ruler and the ruler’s need to recognize and reward competence and to weed out treachery.

Waliullah’s criticism of economic and social injustices have been seized on by thinkers such as the Pakistani scholar ‘Ubaydallah Sindhi (d. 1944), who casts Waliullah as an economic reformer promoting social justice or even a socialist agenda. Waliullah has also been construed as an incipient Islamic political activist and a progenitor of the 20th-century freedom movement in India. This latter image has been contested across Indian and Pakistani scholarship. He certainly lived in turbulent times: after the death of Aurangzeb, the last strong Mughal emperor, in 1707, a sequence of ten kings occupied the throne during the remainder of Waliullah’s life. In 1739, Delhi was sacked by the Persian Nadir Shah. When Delhi and the rest of northern India were subsequently threatened by the rise of Hindu clans known as Jats and Marathas and by the Sikhs, Waliullah tried in his letters to encourage Muslim notables to take a stand. Most successful among these were Ahmad Shah Abdali, an Afghan king, and Najib al-Dawla, the leader of a Pathan clan, the Rohillas, who joined forces to decisively defeat the Marathas at the Battle of Panipat in 1761.

Khaliq Ahmed Nizami (d. 1998) published Shah Wali Allah ki Siyasi Maktubat (Political letters of Shah Wali Allah), in which he collected the messages written by Waliullah to various Muslim rulers of his age, requesting them to come to the aid of Indian Muslims against non-Muslim forces in India. Waliullah did not address the threat from the British East India Company, although the British were to rule Delhi within a few decades of his death. Later, his son and successor, Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (d. 1823), issued two notable fatwas (religious opinions) that were accommodating to British rule. The first declared India to be dār al-ḥarb (the abode of war), since it facilitated Indian Muslims’ adapting to new rules of interest-based finance and land tenure. The second fatwa permitted Indian Muslims to work for the British.

Waliullah was a noted scholar and teacher with a wide circle of pupils, some of whom are linked directly with the establishment of the Deoband madrasa. His grandson, Shah Isma‘il Shahid (d. 1831), is known primarily for his involvement in the Mujahidin movement against the Sikhs led by Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi (d. 1831). This has led some scholars to conclude that a “Waliullahi” movement for political and religious reform inspired later Muslim nationalist and reformist trends in the subcontinent.

See also India; revival and reform