THE ELUSIVE UNITY
There were many twists and turns in the unity saga between ZANU and ZAPU. Amidst the many pretensions at a united front, unity between the two organisations and their respective military wings – ZANLA and ZIPRA – remained as elusive as quicksilver for the entire period of the armed liberation struggle. Neither ZANU nor ZAPU was truly engaged in the unity mode.
Both parties had dug deep and impassable trenches around two divergent positions. The strategic interests of ZAPU were anchored upon the position that fusion of the political parties must precede fusion of the respective military wings. The opposing strategic interests of ZANU emphasised the need to fuse the fighting forces first, and leave the issue of political leadership to be decided by the people once liberation was achieved. It thus became the proverbial riddle of what came first, the egg or the chicken.
Ever since the split within ZAPU that led to the formation of ZANU on 8th August 1963, the two parties consistently maintained an antagonistic and irreconcilable attitude towards each other. At the time of the split, I was aged 12 and too young to fully comprehend the internal contradictions within ZAPU that precipitated the split. But even then, one could not escape the awesome presence or popularity of the man of the moment in nationalist politics, Joshua Nkomo. He, alongside his lieutenants, notably James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, had become iconic figures to be venerated in speeches, slogans and songs. Dr Nkomo had an impressive political resumé, rich in demonstrable experience in leadership positions. He was President of the African National Council (ANC) from 1957 until it was banned in 1959; President of the National Democratic Party (NDP) from 1960 until its banning in 1961; President of ZAPU from 1961 until it too was banned in 1962. Despite its outlawing in Rhodesia, ZAPU continued its existence as a party in exile with Dr Nkomo as its President. Comrade Nkomo got the recognition at home and abroad of being the father figure of Zimbabwean politics, and was affectionately referred to as ‘Father Zimbabwe’. It was this aura of reverence, ZAPU hoped, that would stand Dr Joshua Nkomo in good stead in a leadership contest if ZANU and ZAPU were to merge into a single party.
On the other hand, Comrade Mugabe, the eloquent and fiery speaker, by comparison held junior positions in both ZAPU and ZANU (after the split). To those who associated with him closely, it was evident that he was a man of rare intelligence, unwavering principles and unparelled determination. Once he had embraced the principle of armed struggle, alongside other ZANU cadres, it became a commitment from which he could not be shaken. When Ndabaningi Sithole, the first President of ZANU, demonstrated a lack of total commitment to the execution of the armed struggle, the fighting forces (ZANLA) did not hesitate to disown him and quickly and unanimously chose Comrade Mugabe as his interim successor, pending ratification at the next Party Congress. In terms of the party’s hierarchical structure, his appointment made a lot of sense. The President (Ndabaningi Sithole) had been disowned, the Vice President (Comrade Takawira) had died in prison, and the next in the succession pyramid was the Secretary General, a post that Comrade Mugabe occupied. Never before had Comrade Mugabe taken the mantle of president of a political party.
True to expectations, Comrade Mugabe’s unflinching resolve to execute the armed struggle as the only instrument to achieve genuine freedom and independence, won him greater respect amongst ZANLA forces and propelled the struggle to phenomenal heights.
From the ZANU/ZANLA perspective, the biggest obstacle to unity was ZAPU’s reluctance to commit its forces to the battlefield, despite the fact that ZIPRA, armed with tanks, multiple rocket launchers, missiles, etc., was better equipped than ZANLA. Since this array of advanced weaponry was not being employed to engage the enemy, the belief within ZANU was that ZAPU was commited to what we defined as ‘The Zero Strategy’. By this we meant that ZAPU wanted to leave the fighting to ZANU, but when military victory was in sight, they would deploy their fresh and heavily armed forces into the capital and declare the formation of a new government.
The inactivity of the ZIPRA forces was forcefully brought home by Comrade Mugabe in his letter of 27 August 1978 to Colonel Mengishtu Haile Mariam,* in which he stated,’Who, dear brother, does not know that without ZANU there would be no war in Zimbabwe, none whatsoever? Who dear brother, does not know that ZANU single-handedly has borne the brunt of our liberation struggle? We alone have, therefore, made meaningful sacrifices. Yet, it is because of our preparedness to sacrifice that we have destroyed the base of colonialist power in Zimbabwe and laid a base for people’s power. The enemy is now facing sure defeat because we of ZANU have never sagged in our morale nor wavered in our courage and revolutionary commitment. At no time have we ever allowed opportunism to neutralise our principles, or connived and plotted with the enemy. We deserve, so we sincerely believe, the total support of all our revolutionary brothers in Africa, and more so of revolutionary Ethiopia.’
Because of ZANU’s uncontested dominance of the war front, any unity of the fighting forces would tend to favour ZANU and its President, Comrade Mugabe. ZANLA forces were engaged in an unprecedented political and mobilisation programme of the masses in its operational areas in order to guarantee that any political choices in future would favour President Mugabe and his party.
The message amongst ZANLA forces was unambiguously clear – unity was a tactical inconvenience that should be left to the political leadership to handle. In the words of the late Chief of Defence for ZANU, Comrade Josiah Magama Tongogara, ‘if your gun is provided by ZANU, you move the ZANU way and you talk the ZANU way. There is no Patriotic Front.’ Both ZAPU and ZANU knew that unity was an illusion, a mirage only visible to expectant external supporters. When our audience was the Fronline States or the OAU we would sing songs glorifying our ‘unity’, but in our camps we would express outright condemnation of unity with ZAPU. ZAPU also harboured the same sentiments, as evidenced by their attempt to assassinate me.
There were many unsuccessful attempts aimed at achieving unity between ZANU and ZAPU or their military wings, ZANLA and ZIPRA. In the majority of these cases, the half-hearted attempts at unity were in response to external pressures, especially from the Frontline States that provided the essential staging ground for guerrilla operations against the colonial regime in Rhodesia.
On the political side, the unity that was more enduring was that of the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front (PF) was created in Maputo in 1976, the fruition of negotiations begun by Comrade Mugabe of ZANU and Comrade Jason Moyo of ZAPU in early October 1976. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) recognised the Patriotic Front as the sole and legitimate representative of the Zimbabwean people at its annual summit of Heads of State held in Gabon in July 1977. This development was of paramount significance because it meant that only the Patriotic Front became the recognised political voice of the people of Zimbabwe. In the eyes of the OAU or any other international forum, neither ZANU nor ZAPU, in their unitary form, had the legitimacy to negotiate for transfer of political power outside the ambit of the Patriotic Front. Thus, starting with the Geneva Conference held from 28 October, 1976, and all subsequent conferences up to independence in 1980, the Patriotic Front became the sole and legitimate mouthpiece of the fighting forces.
For ZANU, this was a requisite provision to rein in Dr Nkomo who had shown a propensity to cut clandestine deals with the Smith regime. There had been talk of secret diplomatic contacts involving, among others, Dr Joshua Nkomo, Dr Kaunda of Zambia, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith, and South African President Vorster. One of ZANU’s concerns had always been the possibility of ZAPU independently reaching an accord with the Rhodesian government. If such accord brought Dr Nkomo into power, the possibility was that such government could be recognized by the OAU, thereby dealing a serious blow to the continuation of the struggle. The basic parameters guiding the Patriotic Front were that no party could pursue negotiations for power transfer independent of the other and that the armed struggle we were waging was, ultimately, against British colonialism and not its extension, the Smith regime. The Patriotic Front was vindicated when, after the Lancaster House Conference, the British government agreed to assume their colonial responsibility and to exorcise the colonial demon through supervision of a transitional process that brought to power the first black government elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage.
As for ZAPU, they saw the formation of the Patriotic Front as a transitional stage towards a unified party in which, because of seniority, Dr Nkomo would emerge the undisputed leader. Throughout the struggle, ZAPU never gave up the desire for ZANU and ZAPU to merge into one party. Even at the eleventh hour, after the Lancaster House Conference had ended, ZAPU had wanted the two parties to contest the elections as a single party.
Another spoiler in the unity saga was Bishop Abel Tondekai Muzorewa, leader of the ANC which later became the United African National Council (UANC). The ANC under Bishop Abel Muzorewa was formed in 1971 by the banned parties, primarily to mobilise people against a British government deal with Ian Smith, purportedly for a transition to majority rule in exchange for an end to sanctions imposed after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Smith in 1965. Under the acronym NIBMAR (no independence before majority African rule) Muzorewa successfully campaigned for the rejection of the deal.
Buoyed up by the successful campaign against the British/Rhodesian proposals, Muzorewa saw the opportunity to transform the ANC into a political party, independent from ZANU or ZAPU, but claiming to have influence and control over their fighting forces. He almost managed to convince some leaders about his legitimacy as leader of the fighting forces, but was discredited by the very forces he claimed to lead. In connivance with the British and Rhodesians, Muzorewa unsuccessfully tried to entice Dr Joshua Nkomo to join forces with him, to the exclusion of the man they regarded as the communist ogre, Comrade Robert Mugabe.
The Rhodesians allowed the ANC to operate in the country and even attempted to elevate Muzorewa’s political status as they saw in him and his non-violence rhetoric, a lesser evil when compared to the radical communist oriented ZANU and ZAPU. His final humiliation came at the polls leading to the formation of the first democratically elected government in Zimbabwe. Muzorewa contested the elections as Prime Minister of what had become known as Zimbabwe Rhodesia and only managed to win three seats out of the 80 reserved for blacks, with the rest being split between ZANU (57) and ZAPU (20).
On the military front, the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), formed in 1976, was the closest ZANU and ZAPU ever got to a workable military alliance. It must be remembered that at the time ZIPA was formed, most of the ZANU leadership was imprisoned, either in Zambia or in Rhodesia. The immediate period preceding its formation had seen concerted attempts involving Rhodesians, South Africans, Zambians, the British and Americans, trying to broker an agreement between ZAPU and the Smith regime. As it became clear that these clandestine manoeuvres that nearly paralysed the struggle and ushered in a period of uncertainty that we referred to as the ‘détente exercise’, were doomed to failure, the key members of the Frontline States, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, began insisting that their continued support for the guerrilla struggle against the Smith regime would be conditional upon ZANLA and ZIPRA agreeing to amalgamate their forces.
For ZANLA this was a welcome development since it tallied with its philosophy of uniting the fighting forces for the common cause of liberation, and leaving the issue of political leadership to the masses in Zimbabwe after liberation. Moreover, ZANLA had a tactical advantage in that its forces were operating in many areas in Rhodesia. For this reason, if ZIPRA were to fight side by side with ZANLA, their forces would come under the command of ZANLA operational commanders. It is precisely for this reason that ZANLA commanders occupied the most senior positions in ZIPA. (See the ZIPA leadership structure in the appendices.).
Due to a deep mistrust of each other, ZIPA had a short lifespan, but its impact was phenomenal. ZIPRA cadres who had come to join ZANLA cadres in Mozambique began fearing that they would be killed in operations inside Rhodesia if their forces teamed up with ZANLA forces. Many ZIPRA forces that had deployed at the home front, and those at the rear bases in Mozambique awaiting deployment, began fleeing back to Zambia.
Even though ZIPA did not last, its greatest achievement was to garner more support for the struggle and secure the release of ZANLA commanders in Zambian prisons. ZANLA took full advantage of the lifting by the Frontline States of restrictions they had imposed on the training and arming of guerrilla fighters, to advance the struggle. The war effort intensified during this period as a deluge of recruits crossed the now porous border with Mozambique (after Mozambique’s attainment of independence) to join the ranks of guerrilla fighters.
Although for the ordinary cadres, ZIPA was yet another tactical merger, it would seem the ZANLA component in the ZIPA leadership actually wanted it to succeed. The successes and broadening of the armed struggle under their youthful leadership brought new problems. Most of the young commanders saw the opportunity of dethroning the old guard that was released from Zambian jails, and in whose name and for whose release we had stepped up the armed struggle.
This turn of events led to the purging of the ZIPA leadership and their sympathisers by the old guard and their detention in Mozambique and release after independence. Comrade Rex Nhongo was not affected, even though he was the senior ZIPA commander, because he sided with the party leadership.
* Copy of the letter is in the author’s possession.