On 17 October Hitler summoned Himmler, Hess, Bormann, Hans Frank, the ministers Lammers and Frick, Secretary of State Stuckart and OKW Commander-in-Chief Keitel to an urgent meeting at the Reich Chancellery.1 His aim was to move from military to a purely civilian administration to further his objectives, avoiding the moral scruples of the generals and their subordinates who had continued to resent and criticise the activities of the SS and police units on the ground in Poland.2 The Army should be happy to free itself of responsibility for Poland. The future General-Governor Hans Frank must be able to act independently of the Army commanders; the harsh racial struggle permitted no due process of law; ‘its methods were irreconcilable with our principles’.3 Even Keitel put two exclamation marks after his notes at this point. Affronted by not having been invited to the meeting, left in the dark as to Hitler’s plans, Brauchitsch surrendered his office as military governor of Poland to Frank. By this ‘apparently comfortable solution’4 the Wehrmacht rid itself of responsibility for ‘the devil’s work’, as Hitler himself called it, but military men such as Groscurth felt strengthened in their resistance to the regime by this decision. While a number of officers resorted to a kind of opposition of memoranda to force Brauchitsch to take some action against the war of extermination in Poland and the military response to France, Canaris used his office as Abwehr head in an increasing degree to bring individual victims of the regime and its opponents out of the firing line.
A spectacular success was accomplished at the end of September. The internationally renowned Jewish professor and Chief Rabbi Joseph Isaak Schneersohn, who had a large following in the United States, had left it too late to flee Warsaw after ensuring the safety of his students at the Rabbinical Academy, its library and art treasures. In a complicated cooperation between the Abwehr, Jewish organisations in the United States and the US State Department, Canaris succeeded, with the help of Jewish Major Ernst Bloch, leader of the Abwehr Gruppe for economic espionage, in locating Rabbi Schneersohn in Warsaw and smuggling him to safety in a neutral country.5 Previously, during his Warsaw visit Canaris had learned that the wife and children of the former Polish military attaché to Berlin, Szymanski, were in an internment camp, and was again successful in having the family transferred to neutral Switzerland; he also made possible the escape of many Polish churchmen from certain death.6 The saving of Rabbi Schneersohn and the Szymanski family was a useful diplomatic indication7 that there were people and groups in Germany with whom communication could be valuable.8
Lawyer Hans Dohnanyi had been employed at the Reich Justice Ministry in 1933, but had been unable to prove full ‘Aryan lineage’ under the new laws affecting career civil servants in the Reich. Justice Minister Gürtner had obtained permission from the Führer to resolve the problem, but in Martin Bormann, Dohnanyi had a powerful enemy who was intent that he would not be retained indefinitely as Gürtner’s assistant. Gürtner found him a new post at the Leipzig Reich Court, from where Canaris promised that he would be able to enter the Abwehr in the event of war. From March 1940 Dohnanyi was given the rank of major on the basis of his professional qualifications and appointed to the Central Department (Z) run by Oster. The Group for Information (ZB) was probably created for him,9 and Oster ensured that Dohnanyi remained where Oster or Canaris could keep an eye on him. His job was to supply reports on policy situations – a cover role behind which he could continue his work on an anti-Hitler coup. For this purpose he had contacts with civilian Resistance circles around his brother-in-law Klaus Bonhoeffer, with Otto John, Ernst von Harnack and with Social Democrats and union men such as Wilhelm Leuschner, who would support a coup by calling a General Strike.
For possible use in the future, the Abwehr opposition circle kept a political chronicle and a catalogue of crimes committed by party leaders and National Socialist organisations. These included material compiled by Dohnanyi at the Justice Ministry between 1933 and 193810 and the information system set up by Oster in 1936/37;11 these records would prove fatal.
At Canaris’s request, Dohnanyi liaised with Ernst von Weizsäcker. Officially the regular meetings were for the purpose of exchanging information between Abwehr-Foreign and the Foreign Ministry, but unofficially Dohnanyi kept von Weizsäcker informed about the actions of the opposition group at Abwehr.12 In Dohnanyi, Canaris and Oster had gained a colleague of inestimable value.
The rapid victory in Poland had enabled Hitler by mid-September to consider an offensive in the West. Germany would now seize the opportunity to end the ‘enforced’ war by defeating France and inducing Britain to negotiate peace, he told the Wehrmacht commander-in-chiefs on 27 September; he was thinking of October preferably, or at least before Christmas. The Army commander-inchief should therefore prepare plans for ‘Fall Gelb’, the attack in the West. On 6 October in a speech to the Reichstag, Hitler proposed a conference of leading nations to discuss the regulation of peace in Europe, but kept his options open by issuing on 10 October the ‘Instruction No 6 for Warfare’.13
Quartermaster-General I, von Stülpnagel, had previously warned in a memorandum of 24 September that nothing would be available for an attack within the next two years against the French and Belgian fortifications, while the panzer and motorised units worn down during the Polish campaign would not be battle-worthy. Five days later General Thomas, head of OKW military–economic Staff, advised that the Reich could not hold out in a long war from either an economic or military standpoint; Brauchitsch too was dubious when speaking to Keitel about the prospects for an offensive. Ritter von Leeb, commanding officer of Army Group ‘C’, considered Hitler’s ‘peace speech’ to the Reichstag to be ‘a fraud on the German people’ and attempted to interest the commanding generals of the other two Army Groups, Generaloberst Feder von Bock, who was also doubtful about the chances of a successful attack on France, and Generaloberst von Rundstedt, to join him in a mass resignation.14
On 9 October Canaris spoke again to Groscurth about his meetings in the East with von Rundstedt and Blaskowitz, and also von Reichenau, with whom he had discussed the undisciplined conduct of German troops in the East and Hitler’s attack plans in the West. Groscurth wrote to his wife on 10 October: ‘C. was enthusiastic about v. Rundstedt. Even Reichenau turned out better.’15 Canaris can only have meant Reichenau’s reaction to his criticism of the policy of extermination and his rejection of a Western offensive; Reichenau considered the plans for the offensive flawed for tactical reasons and too early – his Chief of Staff Friedrich Paulus even stated, however, that Hitler’s arrangements in Poland were necessary given the circumstances. On balance Canaris’s trip was disappointing but had the result at least that Reichenau, previously loyal to the regime, in a memorandum now distanced himself from the plan to attack France, and shortly afterwards he voiced his doubts to Hitler personally.16
On 13 October, von Weizsäcker advised Halder that Chamberlain had turned down Hitler’s ‘offer’. Next day, in a private talk with Brauchitsch,17 Halder no longer ruled out the need for an active intervention against Hitler and the previous day he had discussed with Weizsäcker the idea of arresting Hitler at the moment when he gave the order to attack in the West.18 Brauchitsch was unwilling to go down this road – Hitler would allow himself to be convinced by the expert arguments of esteemed generals such as von Rundstedt and Reichenau.
On 16 October he had his answer when Hitler informed Brauchitsch of his ‘unalterable decision’ to undertake the offensive – an understanding with the Western Powers was not possible. The same day, Canaris returned shaken after visiting Halder and finding him at the end of his tether; Groscurth noted: ‘Complete nervous breakdown. Brauchitsch also does not know where to turn. Führer demands attack. Firmly against all expert advice. Another rush of blood to the head . . . What a situation! These are Prussian officers. A chief of the General Staff is not supposed to collapse.’19
The ‘unwavering activists in the Abwehr, and above all Oster, Dohnanyi and Groscurth’20 now collaborated more closely with the support of Canaris and Oster.21 Groscurth played a key role in linking the opposition groups at Abwehr, the Foreign Ministry and OKH Zossen.22 A memorandum, ‘The Threatened Disaster’, was ‘hurriedly’23 composed by Groscurth, Erich Kordt and Hasso von Etzdorf, Foreign Ministry liaison official at Zossen, and given to Beck on 19 October for forwarding to Halder via Stülpnagel.24 Hitler would not allow the initiative to be wrested from himself, however, and came up with 12 November as the day for the attack.
Tactical delays dominated the conversations of many who were ready at the time to stage a coup. Within OKH were two Resistance groups: the Abwehr group around Oster and Groscurth, and the Halder–Stülpnagel group, which increasingly favoured the idea of a coup,25 unsuspected by the first group. The Abwehr group did not particularly trust Halder’s attitude, and kept applying pressure to OKH military leaders they believed approachable, but without success, and on 25 October Canaris and Oster failed with Stülpnagel. The mood in both camps was one of despair;26 Stülpnagel had urged Halder to act, even suggesting the arrest of Brauchitsch.
On 29 October 1939, OKH issued its second ‘Fall Gelb’ instruction to move. While Canaris seemed resigned,27 Oster, Dohnanyi and Gisevius, recalled from Switzerland, prepared another memorandum opposing the Western offensive, which General Thomas was to take to Halder, still thought to be unconvinced of the need to act. Both Stülpnagel and Halder were on visits to commanders-in-chief in the West, already convinced by the negative attitude of individual officers. Halder found only Leeb and Witzleben prepared to collaborate in a coup; Bock, von Rundstedt and General Fromm, commander-in-chief of the Reserve Army, declined.28 When Halder returned to Zossen, he was at last determined to act, and surprised the memorandum writers who were still attempting to persuade him. On the evening of 31 October he sent for Groscurth and made an astounding announcement,29 opening the one-hour talks by saying that certain people had to become ‘the victims of accidents’ – he named Ribbentrop and Goering, but not Hitler. Groscurth warned that a ‘concerted operation’ was necessary, which probably meant that a coup would not succeed if it aimed to get rid only of second-rank figures. Both men were agreed that ‘there is no man in place’,30 presumably not meaning an assassin but somebody who could take over at the top. Groscurth mentioned Beck and Goerdeler, and received from Halder the job ‘of securing Goerdeler’. Halder had at last declared himself in favour of a coup to members of the active opposition. Groscurth noted: ‘With tears in his eyes H[alder] says that for weeks he had been going to see Emil [ie Hitler] with a loaded pistol in his pocket in order eventually to gun him down.’31 Groscurth was now becoming the ‘central figure of the coup planning’ and a kind of ‘chief of Staff’ to the conspirators,32 even though Halder had stated that it was Canaris who since October had belonged amongst the most insistent advocates of a coup to remove Hitler.33
On 2 November Groscurth received from Stülpnagel instructions to prepare the ground for the coup. Groscurth was apparently planning to supply weapons, fuses and explosives for a future assassination attempt by Lahousen’s Abteilung II, which had an explosives laboratory at Quenzgut in Brandenburg. Lahousen recalled later that Oster had asked him at Abwehr headquarters if he were able to supply explosives and fuses for an attempt on Hitler’s life. Lahousen enquired if Canaris knew about this idea, Oster framing his answer ‘more or less’ in these words: ‘No, the Old Man has completely lost his nerve without adding this as well.’34 Lahousen wanted to know if Oster had an assassin, to which Oster said yes, and by this meant Erich Kordt, who had been living at his house since 1 November and had agreed ‘to throw the bomb’. Oster had told him he would have the explosives within ten days, before 11 November,35 but between now and then a lot could happen.
Meanwhile Halder and Brauchitsch had embarked on a tour of the Army Staffs in the West. Bock and von Rundstedt remained negative, since they could not guarantee that their officers would follow them. In common with the activists amongst the conspirators, Halder had no set timetable – a fundamental error shared by both groups.36 Brauchitsch wanted to take the ‘final’ opportunity to intercede with Hitler, and upon entering the Reich Chancellery on 5 November he was resolved to challenge Hitler over his plan to attack in the West. Halder waited in the ante-room during the discussion, which lasted twenty minutes. When Brauchitsch eventually came to the point and said that a Western offensive threatened to end in disaster because of a lack of preparation, Hitler raged that the Army was not ready because it did not want to fight; he knew ‘the spirit of Zossen’ and would exorcise it. Then he slammed the door behind him as he stormed out, leaving Brauchitsch trembling and pale.37 Shortly afterwards Hitler ordered the attack for 1330hrs on 12 November 1939. This date was put back on 7 November because of bad weather, but Hitler’s threat to destroy ‘the spirit of Zossen’ made Halder panic. He hurried back to Zossen and ordered the immediate destruction of all incriminating files that had any connection to Resistance plans.38
This order was only partially carried out and would seal Canaris’s fate. Halder sent for Groscurth, who again witnessed the nervous collapse of a senior commander – this time Brauchitsch.39 Halder stated that the offensive would proceed: ‘There is nobody to take over, Volk and Army are not united,’ Groscurth wrote in his diary. Halder continued: ‘The forces that were counting on us are no longer bound together. You understand what I mean.’40 Halder told him to inform Canaris that Canaris was to act, by which Groscurth understood that Canaris was to organise the assassination of Hitler, and in indignation he refused.41 It is not agreed unanimously what Halder actually meant by his remark: Inga Haag, a close colleague of Groscurth and Canaris remembered later that Groscurth returned ‘totally distraught’ from the conversation with Halder and told her that he was faced by a riddle. Halder had declared with tears in his eyes that he could not assume the responsibility and had given Groscurth the task of putting it to Canaris ‘that he should act off his own bat’.42 Gisevius wrote in his memoirs:
There remains a doubt whether Halder was talking about plans which he would execute himself or would at least be responsible for, or if he passed on the proposal in an indiscreet way as a transfer of jurisdiction. Canaris reacted angrily and forbade Oster or me to take on the task. We regretted it but somehow we cannot say that Canaris was wrong to decline. The Admiral informed the Chief of Staff that whenever he wanted to discuss that kind of high-political subject, he should do him the favour of seeing him personally. Moreover he insisted that Halder assume responsibility unequivocally and that all possibility of a straightforward military coup had been exhausted beforehand.43
That Groscurth actually believed he had been invited to carry out the assassination is proved by his diary entry for 14 February 1940 when, on the occasion of an argument between Canaris and Halder, he wrote: ‘He [Halder] asked me to carry out a murder and maintains that he has been putting a pistol in his pocket with which to kill Hitler.’ Did Groscurth understand Halder correctly? Halder denied this after the war, but admitted that he might have said: ‘If people in the Wehrmacht want an assassination, then it is up to the admiral to arrange it.’44 This would suggest that Groscurth might have misinterpreted or misunderstood what Halder said,45 for why would Halder suggest an assassination and at the same time abandon all ideas of a coup? Groscurth knew Canaris’s attitude and it seems against this background improbable that he deliberately misunderstood and repeated Halder’s statement.46
However one looks at it, 5 November marked a turning point in the history of the preparations for a coup in the winter of 1939. It is significant that although Oster had in Erich Kordt a man prepared to carry out the assassination attempt, he did not play this ‘trump card’.47 The next day, Oster supplied Wagner and Stülpnagel with the old plan of getting the Army to move by staging a pretended coup by Goering, Himmler and the Gestapo. Groscurth wrote: ‘New proposal: occupy the Gst. But it is all too late and totally spent. These indecisive leaders make you sick.’48 Canaris had been with Hitler previously to inform him about the preparations for the Western offensive – the principle tried and tested in Poland would be repeated, and assault troops clad in enemy uniforms would be infiltrated through the frontier to occupy strategically important bridges, sections of railway or buildings before the main force invaded. Groscurth reported that Canaris returned from Hitler depressed and asked if it would not be better if he stepped down, but Gisevius was used to such outbursts from the ‘vibrating bundle of nerves’ that Canaris was. After he had spent an hour in gloomy contemplation of the prognosis, Canaris went home.49
After Oster was told of Halder’s alleged remark that he was ready, but without von Witzleben commanding i.Armee in the West he was powerless,50 he decided to visit von Witzleben at his Bad Kreuznach headquarters. Since he required a written approval and an order to do this, which he did not think Canaris was likely to issue in his present frame of mind, Groscurth rang von Witzleben and suggested he should telephone Canaris asking him to send Oster. When Witzleben rang, Canaris was wary, but finally acceded, enabling Oster and Gisevius to meet Witzleben on 7 November.51
It was a sobering session, for Witzleben commenced by telling them that he no longer believed the offensive could be stopped. He was particularly unhappy about the younger officers’ attitude, which he described as ‘infatuated with Hitler’. The only possibility he could see was if all three Army Group commanders-in-chief refused to carry out the attack order. He was subjected to a long period of persuasive talk before agreeing to speak to Halder, and in addition Witzleben wanted the approval of his commander-in-chief, Ritter von Leeb, whose headquarters was in Frankfurt; Oster should make an intermediate stop there to prepare Leeb. At the end of their conversation, Witzleben lost his temper when Oster brought from his pocket copies of the two appeals that Beck was to make to the German people and the Wehrmacht: ‘What? You had that on you in the car? Then I will not receive you again,’ he is alleged to have said to Oster.52
At Frankfurt Oster spoke to Oberst Vicenz Müller, whom Witzleben had recommended. Müller listened attentively before warning that the circle of accomplices must be kept as small as possible, and asked whether Oster was carrying any incriminating papers on his person, making him burn them at once in a large ashtray. Although Müller promised to speak to Witzleben again, Oster took his leave knowing that he had failed. In the officers’ mess at Frankfurt Oster and Gisevius began drinking heavily and Oster had to be taken out into a side-room for safety once he began to speak out volubly against the regime. There he left copies of Beck’s appeal, which he had failed to burn at Müller’s request, and a list with the names of the members of a provisional government. These were discovered by a well-disposed officer.53
Next morning Gisevius was the first to learn the sensational news – ‘Hey! They tried to bump Emil off yesterday!’54 The previous evening a lone assassin, Georg Elser, attempted to kill Hitler by leaving a home-made bomb at the Bmgerbraukeller in Munich, but Hitler had left the hall immediately after delivering his speech, ten minutes before the bomb exploded. The official version accused the British secret service of the attempt. In the framework of an SD operation led by Walter Schellenberg, successor to SS-Brigadeführer Best as head of the Polizei-Abwehr, RHSA Amtsgruppe IV, the British SIS agents Major R H Stevens and Captain S P Best were captured next day in no-man’s land in a café between the German and Dutch borders at Venlo; the Propaganda Ministry used this coup to support their version of events at Munich.55
Gisevius feared that the attempt on Hitler’s life might have been staged in order to strike against the Resistance, upon his arrival in Berlin, he discovered that the Abwehr had no knowledge of the background nor the culprits. Canaris was increasingly more nervous and urged his circle to be more cautious. Gisevius and Oster wrote another memorandum for Halder, accompanied by a personal letter from Groscurth. Halder passed it to Brauchitsch and gave vent to his annoyance at Gisevius’s hectic activities, particularly the endless conferences with Beck, Schacht, Helldorf and Goerdeler. Canaris had become more wary for the same reason and warned against close contact with Gisevius.56 Additionally Witzleben had passed to Halder through Oberst Müller his concerns about Oster’s behaviour on 7 November; Halder was beside himself with rage and advised Groscurth to report the matter to Canaris officially, but Groscurth would not do this because Oster was a friend.57 Oster escaped with a reprimand from Halder, but by now Canaris had had enough of the game and forbade all further conspiratorial activities, and now, without the dynamic Oster, the circle of plotters threatened to break up, since he had told Gisevius that ‘he would definitely not do any more’.58
Leeb’s meeting with the three Army Group commanders-in-chief bore no fruit, and Leeb resigned.59 Stülpnagel paid a last visit to Witzleben and learned of the refusal of the Army Group commanders-in-chief to resign en masse. Groscurth noted: ‘No more talk of resistance,’60 and one day later, he wrote: ‘Generals therefore will do nothing.’61