Beef, Brahmins, and Broken Men: An Annotated Critical Selection from The Untouchables

1 In a later text Ambedkar explicates precisely what he means by this ‘another revolution’. The name he gives it is ‘counter-revolution’. The text in question is the posthumously published incomplete manuscript “Revolution and Counter-Revolution” (Ambedkar 1989). In it, a clear formulation of a theory of revolution can be found. In many ways “Revolution and Counter-Revolution” sets out the generic procedures of Ambedkar’s political method, so to speak. The book presents a close reading of the influential Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita. Launching an attack on the Gita’s idea of morality, Ambedkar sets forth how exactly it was a counter-revolutionary text which was produced in the wake of the true revolutionary break in society which came from Buddhism. Ambedkar through this text explicates a ‘speculative’ and ‘partisan’ understanding of the concept of revolution. The revolutionary nature of Buddhism or the counter-revolutionary nature of the Brahmanism that followed cannot be gleaned from a neutral position as observers of history. Rather, it comes when we become subjects of politics, where a certain universal truth, that of Dalit emancipation and fight for equality becomes self-evident and makes us its partisans. For a more engaged reading of Ambedkar’s conception of revolution and counter-revolution read chapters “Caste and Debt” and “Ambedkar and Other Immortals: A Note on Comparative Politics and Incomparable Events” in Soumyabrata Choudhury (2018a), and the paper “The Ambiguous Debt of Counterrevolution to Revolution: Reply to a Vigilant Melancholic” (Choudhury 2018b). These papers expand on Ambedkar’s use of the Bhagavad Gita to construct a cogent theory of the revolution. And yet Ambedkar’s attitude towards the Gita has a meandering history which has been tracked by Aishwary Kumar (2015). In his early days, he used the figure of Arjuna to mobilize the Depressed Classes into action, spurring them on using the concept of impersonal duty. However, Ambedkar, as Kumar shows, later became more acutely aware of the caste nature of this invocation. We see how the impersonality of the dharma which Krishna invokes is precisely guided by the dharma of a particular caste, that of the Kshatriya. And that Arjun is interpellated into the act of fratricide because his morality is overridden by the dharma of his caste. Ambedkar then goes on to demonstrate that one cannot simply do away with the caste nature of the dharma given in the text because that is precisely what is at its foundation. One cannot simply pick out the logic of the Gita and infuse it into the fight for Dalit emancipation, because the ‘dharmic’ reality to which it restricts its subjects is precisely the one defined by the station of one’s birth. Here we see the unshakeable rigour of Ambedkar’s thought, and how he wasn’t simply a pragmatist (which is so often only deployed as a euphemism for opportunistic) but was constantly guided by the singular project of rendering the theory of equality consistent. Kumar also discusses how Ambedkar calls out the falseness of Gandhi’s opposition to the Gita and the violent edifice on which Gandhian satyagraha and non-violence is built. Says Ambedkar: ‘Violence meaning only killing is a very narrow approach to distinguish between violence and nonviolence. The meaning of violence includes hurt to the body or feelings of another person. Therefore, nonviolence means not to cause pain of any nature to any living being. If we apply this broader definition of nonviolence, then Mahatma Gandhi’s nonviolence also is violence in a way. Because, according to his methods even though nobody is physically hurt, it hurts the sentiments of opposite parties. […] In fact Satyagraha should adopt nonviolence as far as possible and may have to resort to violence in case of need […] that would be a practical approach’ (Kumar 2015, 147). The difference, to simplify Kumar’s conclusion, would be that while Gandhi saw in people an essential ‘unruliness’ that had to be tamed, controlled and made to submit to an external (transcendental) will, Ambedkar saw the force of truth emerging from within the configurations occupied by a people. The possibility of newness was always immanent for him even as the way to this possibility (and even the possibility of this possibility) wasn’t a given or ‘essentially’ fixed.

2 The Satapatha and Aitareya Brahmanas are two of the most important ones in the Brahmana stratum of Vedic literature. For more on the Brahmanas, see p. 166 note 10. The Aitareya Brahmana is linked to the Rig Veda and it acts as a manual of duties and explanation for the seven Hotri priests: Hotar, Maitravaruna (Prasastar), Brahmanachhamsi, Achhavaka, Potar, Nestar and Agnidhra. In particular, the Brahmana details how to carry out sacrifices which include those to Agni and Soma, the relation of the Hotri priests with the Kshatriyas, and distribution of meat after the performance of a sacrifice (Haug 1922, xl–xlviii). S.G. Sathaye (1969) juxtaposes the Aitareya Brahmana against Plato’s Republic and concludes that while the latter was a text aimed towards social reform and rejection of existent organization of society, the former is a justification of society as it exists and tries to give religious grounds for practices and rituals. Sacrifices in the Aitareya Brahmana pertain to its own specific milieu. Firstly, caste was not as rigid as it became later. The most important aspect of life appeared to be the rituals and incantations themselves. So if a Kshatriya offered the appropriate materials to a Brahmin and if the Brahmin chose to accept them, the former could then adopt aspects of the Brahmin lifestyle and his progeny could be assimilated into the Brahmin fold. Nothing however is said about the Vaishya and Shudra castes. Questions of morality aren’t dealt with in a philosophical sense, rather they are determined by sacrificial techniques and conformity to the laws relating to sacrifices. The key formula of the text is ‘What is appropriate at the sacrifice, that is successful.’ Thus important questions of ethics and sociality are reduced to mechanistic repetition which has no life in thought: ironic since the Brahmins presumed to give themselves the monopoly of thought and learning (Sathaye 1969).

3 In his book On Human Sacrifices in Ancient India (1876), Rajendralala Mitra cites several instances in the Aitareya Brahmana that demonstrate the prevalence of human sacrifices, not to speak of those of animals. Similar sanctions are also found in Satapatha and Taittiriya Brahmanas as per Mitra’s reading. Ambedkar writes in Riddles in Hinduism (Riddle No. 23): ‘The religion of the Vedic Aryans was full of barbaric and obscene observances. Human sacrifice formed a part of their religion and was called Naramedha yagna’ (Ambedkar 2016, 193–4). The Rig Veda’s Purusha Sukta hymn in which the deity Prajapati features (he is both the subject and object of sacrifice), acts as prototypical of the sacrifices that followed. The Purusha Sukta is also believed to be a later addition to the Rig Veda, after the varna system had taken definite shape (see Jamison and Brereton 2014, 58). The Prajapati sacrifice of the Purusha, the primordial being, spawns all creation including the four varnas. In the Mahabharata, the word Naramedha occurs four times. On regarding this as a self-sacrifice, see Heesterman 1987.

4 The Yupa is understood as a symbol of death and killing and is closely associated with the Vedic weapon vajra. It was the god Indra who wielded the vajra, a lightning bolt sword. When Indra smote Vrtra, the serpant/dragon Asura who symbolized drought, the vajra is said to have been sundered into four forms: a wooden sword (sphya) which is used to demarcate the area within which sacrifices are conducted, a Yupa, a chariot, and arrows (Hiltebeitel 1991). According to the Aitareya Brahmana, the Yupa was the means by which the gods debarred humans from entering the celestial world. It was erected at the spot where the gods themselves had performed sacrifices to enter the sacred realm. Upon finding the Yupa, men and rishis dug it out, and turned it upside down to point to heavenwards. The sacred sacrifices were thus revealed to them and the celestial world was made known, equalizing the Brahmins with the gods (Haug 1863, 72–3).

5 [Aitareya Brahmana II, p. 72–74] The quotes from the Aitareya Brahmana that follow are taken from Martin Haug’s 1863 translation. In his preface to the text, Haug clarifies his reliance on Sayana (a fourteenth century commentator of the Aitareya Brahmana) in order to interpret difficult sections of the text. He also writes about his search for living interpreters and practitioners of the Aitareya rituals, of which only few remained during his time. There was also a considerable taboo against sharing the sacred knowledge with a foreigner like him. Eventually, he got a Marathi-speaking Brahmin to open up after paying him a sum of money, and so Haug was able to witness how some of the key sacrifices mentioned in the text were performed (Haug 1922, iii–vi).

6 The Bilva tree is one of the most referenced ones in Brahmanical literature. It finds mention in the Yajur Veda Samhita, Atharva Veda, Brahmanas, Kalpasutras, Puranas, Panini, Patanjali and even in the Ramayana and the Mahabharata. The tree is closely associated with the worship of the deity Shiva. In the Brihat Stotra Ratnakara it is claimed that the mere sight of the tree is enough to absolve one’s sins. Harshananda Swami’s A Concise Encyclopaedia of Hinduism says that the tree is so sacred that not even its leaves can be broken (Dwivedi 2012).

7 In Sanskrit, Palasa means both ‘leaf’ and ‘beauty’. Its trifoliate leaves are used to represent Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva in Hindu mythology. References to it can also be found in Buddhist texts. Queen Mahamaya is said to have grabbed a Palasa branch immediately after giving birth to Siddhartha. A staff made out of Palasa wood is also wielded by a young Brahmin while undergoing the upanayana. The Bhattra, Muria and Pengu tribes, residents of the Bastar and Raipur regions in Central India, believe that the Palasa tree has its origin in forbidden love. When the chief Chaitu Bhattra’s married daughter fell in love with a Muria boy, her husband, enraged on discovering the lovers, beat them to death with a stick. He dumped their corpses in the forest. The blood from the lovers’ bodies flowed into each other, and from this stream grew the first Palasa tree with flame-like red flowers (Sood et al. 2005).

8 [Aitareya Brahmana (Martin Haug) II, p. 74–78.] Martin Haug (1827–1876) was a German scholar of the Orient who laid the foundation of Iranian studies in the West. He taught himself Sanskrit by reading Franz Bopp’s 1919 translation of the Nala and Damyanti story from the Mahabharata. In 1859, he accepted the position of superintendent and professor of Sanskrit at the Government College of Poona, in order to acquaint himself in a deeper manner with the practices of Hindu and Zoroastrian priests. It was during this period that he produced his translation of the Aitareya Brahmana.

9 The Hotar is a Brahmin priest who specializes in the study and recitation of the Rig Veda. Hotar can also be translated as ‘pourer (of ghee)’ (Jamison and Witzel 1992, 35–7). Hermann Oldenberg (1993, 214) also contends that the Hotar corresponds with the old-Iranian Avestic Zaotar, who was the reciter of Gathas in Iranian Soma sacrifices.

10 A description of the animal to be sacrificed is also given: ‘They say: the animal to be offered to Agni–Soma must be of two colours, because it belongs to two deities. But this (precept) is not to be attended to. A fat animal is to be sacrificed; because animals are of a fat complexion, and the sacrifice (if compared with them) certainly lean. When the animal is fat, the sacrifice thrives through its marrow’ (Haug 1863, 80). Next, the reader is asked to disregard any injunctions to abstain from meat-eating. This is done by way of Indra’s example. In order to destroy the evil Vritra, he is said to have taken the help of Soma and Agni (the gods), who in turn demanded boons after the completion of the task, which was the meat of the animal that is sacrificed. Following their example, the Brahmana says, the sacrifice too mustn’t abstain from meat (ibid.).

11 [Aitareya Brahmana (Martin Haug) II, p. 84–86]

12 The Rig Veda lists seven central sacrificial priests: The Hotar, the Adhvaryu, Agnidh, Prasastar, Potar, Nestar and the Brahman (see p. 230 note 16, to see how the same seven priests are referred to in the Aitareya Brahmana). While the Hotar is the reciter of the mantras during a sacrificial offering, the Adhvaryu is the one who tends the fire and performs the physical actions necessary for the ritual. He is the chief guardian of the fire and the straw and is responsible for the purification of the tools used. The Agnidh assists the Adhvaryu in tending to the fire and deals with all the duties that are connected to its kindling and maintenance. The Prasastar is only present during animal or soma-sacrifices, and not during minor rituals. He assists the Hotar by spurring on his flow of speech and is specially related to the gods Mitra and Varuna. The Potar (purifier) and Nestar (leader) are closely related to the purifying of the Soma. Oldenberg (1993) contends that the last type, the Brahman, became an important figure only in the later Vedic period. This priest supervises the entire ritual; he does not utter a word, but piously faces the fire with his palms joined. The Brahman is the ‘physician of the sacrifice’ and his presence corrects any mistakes made by the rest of the priests during the ritual. It is contended that the Rig Vedic Brahman does not conform in stature with the priestly class who later came to be known as Brahmins (Oldenberg 1993).

13 [Aitareya Brahmana (Martin Haug) II, p. 86]

14 Sathaye (1969) claims that in the Aitareya Brahmana it is the Brahman (and not the lower order priests: Hotar, Adhvaryu etc) who gets the largest and choicest portions of the animal sacrificed.

15 [As a matter of fact the Brahmins took the whole carcass. Only one leg each was given to the sacrificer and his wife.]

16 In the later section of the Brahmana a total of eighteen priests are mentioned who get to partake in the sacrifice: Udgatar, Pratihartar, Hotar, Brahma, Maitravaruna (Prasastar), Brahmanachhamsi, Adhvaryu, Pratipashatar, Neshtar, Potar, Achhavaka, Agnidhara, Atreya, Sadasya, Brahmana, Gravastut, Unnetar, and Subrahmanya. The Atreya, though, has a right to a share of meat from the sacrifice, is not considered an officiating priest (Haug 1922, 301n3). The Grihapati (householder) and his wife are entitled to the backbone, the urinal bladder and the lips. If they offer the priests a feast at the end of the sacrifice, they are allotted the left and right legs of the cow.

17 [Aitareya Brahmana (Martin Haug) II, p. 86–87]

18 [Aitareya Brahmana (Martin Haug) II, p. 86-90]

19 The word ‘Adhrigu’ has been variously interpreted by scholars as: ‘one who possesses cows shut in a mountain stronghold’, ‘one who does not go disgruntled’, ‘one whose cow is generous and doesn’t hold her milk’, ‘one who is not poor’, ‘possessor of castrated bulls, and therefore wealthy’. Several scholars also attest the word to the Avestan ‘drigu’ which means poor, dependent or needy. Other interpretations of ‘drigu’ have been a meek follower of Zoroaster who is solely dependent on the god, a disciple, and a beggar, wanderer or ascetic of the Sufi order. In certain Sogdian translations of Buddhist texts drigu indicates a bhikshu. In Vedic literature the usage of Adhrigu is limited to the Rig Veda, and it is likely that authors of the later texts were not privy to the meaning of the word. Apart from referring to obscure individuals the word also describes the following gods: Indra, Agni, the Maruts, the Asvins, and Soma; notably the Adityas, Mitra or Varuna are not associated with it (Thompson 2002).

20 Though the Sanskrit term ‘apapa’ may refer to sinless or virtuous, Haug points out the play on words here: ‘apa’ also means ‘Away!’ and in the mantra its repetition is used to signify the name of the slaughterer (Haug 1863, 89n18).

21 Japa is the practice of repetitive chanting of the name of a god. It is usually performed with rosary beads. Japa is usually used as a form of atonement and it can be done in three manners, each with increasing order of effectiveness: vacika (soft murmur which is audible), upamasu (mouthing inaudibly), and manasa (mental repetition). The japa is only meant to be performed by the dwija castes who have undergone Vedic training (Klostermaier 2007).

22 [Aitareya Brahmana (Martin Haug) II, p. 87]

23 Sacrifices in Vedic literature are said to be of two orders: haviryajna and soma. The difference lies mainly in the kinds of rites that are performed. In a harivyajna animal sacrifice (pasubandha), for instance, the Brahmin offers the sacrificer a part of the food according to rituals, and leads him to stride in water that has been poured out by the priest. The soma sacrifice does not contain these rites. The soma rite is performed (as is obvious) with soma, while haviryajna is a sacrifice of milk (Thite 1970; Lidova 1994).

24 [Aitareya Brahmana (Martin Haug) II, p. 93]

25 [Manota means the deity to whom the offering is dedicated.]

26 [Aitareya Brahmana (Martin Haug) II, p. 441–42]

27 Although the Rig Veda does not have a rhyming scheme, each section is written in a specific metre. Each stanza has a fixed number of quarter verses (pada), generally three or four, and each pada has a fixed number of syllables. Usually padas in a stanza are of equal length and conform to a particular metre, but on occasion a single stanza can contain two or more kinds of metres. The anustup metre, for instance, contains four padas, each of which contains eight syllables. A single line in the anustup metre consists of two padas. The Brihati metre mentioned here consists of four padas and a total of thirty-six syllables. The first, second and fourth line contain eight syllables each and the third line contains twelve syllables. In the Aitareya Brahmana, the Brihati metre is said to be useful if someone desires wealth and glory (Griffith 1896; Haug 1863).

28 Devabhaga is one of the brothers of Vasudeva, father of Krishna in the Mahabharata.

29 The Aitareya Brahmana tries to explain away the fact that it was the human who was at the centre at this ritualistic practice. In a section which follows the rituals listed by Ambedkar, it is explicitly mentioned that the gods demanded human sacrifice. However, the ‘part’ of man which was fit for sacrifice leaves him and enters a horse. What follows is a series of exits and entries of the nothingness that is the ‘part fit for sacrifice’, which flows from horse to ox to sheep to goat to earth, from which grew rice. It is further mentioned that ‘might our animal sacrifice be performed with the sacrificial part (which is contained in the rice of the Purodasa)! Might our sacrificial part be provided with the whole sacrificial essence!’ (Haug 1922, 62). This was probably a long-winded way for the priests to ask their clients, without losing face, for rice to go with the meat.

30 [Aitareya Brahmana (Martin Haug) II, p. 80]

31 In the eighth chapter (entitled “The Cow’s Walk”) of his book The Arctic Home of the Vedas (1903), Bal Gangadhar Tilak also closely studies the cow-related rituals in the Aitareya and Taittiriya Brahmanas. He brushes past all the invocations in the text which sanction beef-consumption and instead focuses on ascertaining what the length of a year was during the writing of the Brahmanas. He concludes that during the time a year was considered to be ten months long. Because the ancient Indians shared this practice with the ancient Romans, Tilak concludes that this was a remnant of an ancient custom that both the Aryan races shared when they lived together in the circumpolar region (Tilak 1903, 173–84).

32 The following extracts have been taken from Georg Bühler’s translation, The Laws of Manu (1886, 173–7). In most of his works, including Annihilation of Caste, Ambedkar refers to Bühler’s translation and commentary published in the Sacred Books of the East series edited by Max Müller. The ones here are all taken from Chapter V, which Bühler calls “Lawful and Forbidden Food”. Ambedkar misses some of the other allowances made in the Manusmriti with regard to the consumption of meat: ‘V.22. Beasts and birds recommended (for consumption) may be slain by Brahmanas for sacrifices, and in order to feed those whom they are bound to maintain; for Agastya did this of old. V.23. For in ancient (times) the sacrificial cakes were (made of the flesh) of eatable beasts and birds at the sacrifices offered by Brahmanas and Kshatriyas’ (Bühler 1886, 172–3). This extract is of particular interest because here we see the writers acknowledge the earlier practice of meat-consumption.

33 Prajapati, in Vedic literature, refers to the creator of the universe. There are several accounts of the creation myth. The most important one is the Purusha Sukta, in which Prajapati is described as the primordial man (purusha) who is sacrificed, and from whose parts the world arises. In later Hinduism ‘Prajapati’ was a moniker for Brahma (Lochtefeld 2002). Like the epithet ‘Manu’ refers to a plurality of persons, ‘Prajapati’ too has multiple points of reference. The Puranic Encyclopaedia (Mani 1975) entry under this head, citing the Shanti Parva of Mahabharata, pluralizes the term and says: ‘Creators of the world. With a view to making creation easy Brahma at first created twenty-one Prajapatis (creators). They are Brahma, Rudra, Manu, Daksa, Bhrgu, Dharma, Tapa, Yama, Marici, Angiras, Atri, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Vasistha, Paramesthi, Surya, Candra, Kardama, Krodha and Vikrita. Jalalul Haq (1997) charts the varying functions of the figure of Brahma and shows how the slow demotion and disempowerment of the god took place in order to elevate the status of the Brahmin caste. Another attendant term is the hyphenated ‘Visvakarma-Prajapati’, regarded as the architect of the devas who has come to be regarded as the inventor of many handicrafts and ornaments. Since the nineteenth century census operations, many artisanal communities (blacksmiths, bronze smiths, goldsmiths, carpenters and stonemasons) respectably call their jati as Viswakarma across the subcontinent; some of them even wear the janeu thread. See George Varghese (2003) and Vijaya Ramaswamy (2004).

34 In the era that preceded the writing of the Manusmriti the practice of yajna was pre-eminent. The domain of sacrifice was itself a metaphor for the realm of society, reflecting a cosmogony of creation, hierarchy and Himsa (violence). It was within the domain of the yajna that the ‘natural’ order was enacted, extolled and enforced. This was reinforced in the time of Manu by envisioning a ‘natural’ order of Himsa most explicitly in the ‘discourse concerning “food” and “eaters”’ (Doniger and Smith 1991, 17). As evidenced in Manu V.29 that Ambedkar cites, those with the power to dominate and defeat the weaker, make the latter their ‘food’. In the system where the human was able to subjugate and domesticate the other animals, the consumption of their meat was the ultimate signal of their victory. That the yajna rightfully belonged to the Brahmin and that the Chandala was outcaste from the ceremony, proves that the hierarchical order in Brahmanical society was defined by the power of Himsa, such that the upper echelons essentially ‘lived on’ the lower. It was the perseverance and preservation of this order that guided the writing of the Manusmriti. Seen thus, Manu’s exhortations against the killing of animals and use of the ‘disgusting’ flesh (see V.48) is itself a deviation from the order that had hitherto defined social relations. The ambivalent position of meat-eating in Manu—the exhortations against consuming flesh running parallel to the imperative position in the practice of yajna—reveals Manusmriti as a text representative of a shift from earlier customs, yet an embattled one that is not able to fully dissociate itself from animal sacrifice and consumption. The obvious intervening influence of Buddhism was one of the shifts in emphasis from bali (embodied in the yajna) to dana. Indeed, one of the reasons for the rise of multiple Sramana systems was the hugely exploitative system of sacrifices. The ethic of Buddhist dana, which was the acceptance of any offering without complaint, became the later bhiksha and offeratory aspects of the yajna.

35 One who has undergone the ritual samavartana, the rite that ‘bathes one in knowledge’, is known as a Snataka. The samavartana marks the end of studenthood and is a return to home. In direct contrast to the upanayana rites which are ascetic in nature, the samavartana thrusts the individual into a life of a householder (Toomey 1976, 40–5). In the Dharma Sutras, Snatakas are regarded with great respect and yet the exact meaning of the term remains unclear. In several instances Snatakas are accorded the role of householders. According to the Dharma Sutras, a graduate Snataka was supposed to choose any given path after his studies: a householder, a permanent student, a hermit or a mendicant ascetic. However, the Baud-hayana Dharma Sutra made it so that only the role of the householder was appropriate after completing one’s studenthood. The rest of the ashramas (paths) were turned into stages of life for the Brahmin, to be taken up after fulfilling his duties as a householder (Lubin 2018, 114). In the Manusmriti, a Snataka is subsumed within the larger category of a householder; yet the particularity of their position in the Mahabharata and even in Asvaghosha’s Buddhacharita (where both the Pandavas and the Buddha disguise themselves as Snatakas in order to enter a city without being questioned) point to the special status of Snataka as a particularly esteemed male principal in ancient Indian Brahmanical society (Lubin 2018, 113–24).

36 [Manu, 209] Ambedkar here mistakenly gives us the section number rather than the page number. The exact verse is as follows: (IV.209) ‘Nor food at which a cow has smelt, nor particularly that which has been offered by an invitation to all comers, nor that (given) by a multitude or by harlots, nor that which is declared to be bad by a learned (man)’ (Bühler 1886, 161). It is preceded and succeeded by injunctions against food at which a slayer of Brahmins has looked, touched by a menstruating woman, offered by a thief, musician, carpenter, usurer, performer of Srauta sacrifices, miser or one bound in fetters (ibid.). P.V. Kane (1941b, 775) cites V.128 from the Manusmriti which explicitly states that a cow is sacred in all its limbs except its mouth to explain the above injunction.

37 [Ibid., 38] Verse taken from (IV.38): ‘Let him not step over a rope to which a calf is tied, let him not run when it rains, and let him not look at his own image in water; that is a settled rule’ (Bühler 1886, 135).

38 [Ibid., 45] (IV.45): ‘Let him not eat, dressed with one garment only; let him not bathe naked; let him not void urine on a road, on ashes, or in a cow-pen’ (Bühler 1886, 136).

39 [Ibid., 48] (IV.48): ‘Let him never void faeces or urine, facing the wind, or a fire, or looking towards a Brahmana, the sun, water, or cows’ (Bühler 1886, 136).

40 [Ibid., 58] (IV.58): ‘Let him keep his right arm uncovered in a place where a sacred fire is kept, in a cow-pen, in the presence of Brahmanas, during the private recitation of the Veda, and at meals’ (Bühler 1886, 138).

41 [Ibid., 59] (IV.59): ‘Let him not interrupt a cow who is suckling (her calf), nor tell anybody of it. A wise man, if he sees a rainbow in the sky, must not point it out to anybody’ (Bühler 1886, 138).

42 [Ibid., 70] Ambedkar points to the wrong verse here. The above content is found at (IV.72): ‘Let him not wrangle; let him not wear a garland over (his hair). To ride on the back of cows (or of oxen) is anyhow a blameable act’ (Bühler 1886, 140). In the same page the following instruction for a Brahmin can be found, (IV.70): ‘…let him not do anything that is useless…’. A high achievement of subcontinental philosophy indeed.

43 [Ibid., 162] (IV.162): ‘Let him never offend the teacher who intiated him, nor him who explained the Veda, nor his father and mother, nor (any other) Guru, nor cows, nor Brahmanas, nor any men performing austerities’ (Bühler 1886, 154).

44 [Ibid., 142] (IV.142): ‘A Brahmana who is impure must not touch with his hand a cow, a Brahmana, or fire; nor, being in good health, let him look at the luminaries in the sky, while he is impure’ (Bühler 1886, 151).

45 On reading the original texts which Ambedkar paraphrases in the above guidelines for the Snataka, it is clear that the conclusion he draws here, that the cow was considered impure, is a bit of a stretch. By this logic even water, fire and fellow Brahmins would have to be considered impure by a Snataka. At most, it can be said that the current understanding of ‘purity’ and ‘impurity’ could not be applied to the cow during the time of the conception of Manusmriti. Further, it seems unnecessary for Ambedkar to establish that cows were considered impure by Manu; the other evidence he gathers here points to the reactionary and uneasy relationship of Brahmanism with cows.

46 Ambedkar here renders the end of the extract (Bühler 1886, 75) as, ‘present of a cow (the honey-mixture)’, where as in the original it is given as, ‘with (the present of) a cow (and the honey-mixture).’ In the Doniger and Smith translation (1991, 43) the verse is given as: ‘When he is recognized as one who has, by fulfilling his own duties, received the legacy of the Veda from his father, he should first be seated on a couch, adorned with garlands, and honoured with (an offering made from the milk of) a cow.’ Given the differences in all three versions, it is difficult to see how beef is being offered to the honourable student. However, Smith and Doniger offer a commentary on the verse: ‘The offering made from a cow is the madhuparka, the honey-mixture, referred to in 3.119–20.’ In the verse 3.119–20, details about the contents of the Madhuparka aren’t given and instead it is mentioned that the Madhuparka should be offered during the time of a sacrifice. Given the complex history of the contents of the Madhuparka (see p. 156–7), it is not easy to completely rule out that beef is being offered to the Snataka in the above verse; perhaps there is an element of translator’s bias in ascertaining the contents of the Madhuparka.

47 From Bühler (1886, 172).

48 The verse that follows states: (V.19): ‘A twice-born man who knowingly eats mushrooms, a village-pig, garlic, a village-cock, onions, or leeks, will become an outcast’ (Bühler 1886, 172).

49 In Vedic Hinduism, mortal sins are known as a Mahapataka, whereas minor sins are called Upapataka. See p. 245–6 note 57. Sin is inextricably tied with the concept of dharma in Hinduism. In her paper, “The Dharma of Ethics, the Ethics of Dharma: Quizzing the Ideals of Hinduism”, Aarti Dhand (2002) tries to extract an ethics which is common to all people irrespective of identity, in Hindu texts. Dhand concedes that most Dharmasastra texts, which are clearly texts of moral conduct, have no guidelines in a general sense but are aimed at policing behaviour specific to identities, including caste and gender. However, she claims that it is more valuable to look at myths— the figures presented in them and the ideals they represent—in order to glean the general moral outlook of a society. She fails to mention the incredibly casteist and misogynistic nature of these myths and how the ‘Principles of Right’ that can be extracted from them are by their nature embedded in caste superiority and Brahmanical patriarchy. Needless to say, the concept of ‘sin’ for a Hindu is tied to the non-fulfilment of one’s dharma, which is necessarily dictated by one’s caste and gender.

50 Bühler 1886, 441. A similar injunction is found in (IX.235–9): ‘The slayer of a Brahmana, (a twice-born man) who drinks (the spirituous liquor called) Sura, he who steals (the gold of a Brahmana), and he who violates a Guru’s bed, must each and all be considered as men who committed mortal sins (mahapataka)./ On those four even, if they do not perform a penance, let him inflict corporal punishment and fines in accordance with the law./ For violating a Guru’s bed, (the mark of) a female part shall be (impressed on the forehead with a hot iron); for drinking (the spirituous liquor called) Sura, the sign of a tavern; for stealing (the gold of a Brahmana), a dog’s foot; for murdering a Brahmana, a headless corpse./ Excluded from all fellowship at meals, excluded from all sacrifices, excluded from instruction and from matrimonial alliances, abject and excluded from all religious duties, let them wander over (this) earth./ Such (persons) who have been branded with (indelible) marks must be cast off by their paternal and maternal relations, and receive neither compassion nor a salutation; that is the teaching of Manu’ (Bühler 1886, 383–4).

51 Ambedkar slightly alters the verse here. In the Bühler original it reads: ‘Slaying kine, sacrificing for those who are unworthy to sacrifice, adultery, selling oneself, casting off one’s teacher, mother, father, or son, giving up the (daily) study of the Veda, and neglecting the (sacred domestic) fire’ (Bühler 1886, 442). Bühler offers two interpretations of the ‘selling oneself’ in the verse; it could refer to the act of selling oneself for money into slavery, alternatively, it could mean ‘the selling of forbidden merchandise’ (ibid.).

52 Manu also offers penances suitable for minor sins which cause the loss of caste (IX.109–11): ‘He who has committed a minor offence by slaying a cow (or bull) shall drink during (the first) month (a decoction of) barley-grains; having shaved all his hair, and covering himself with the hide (of the slain cow), he must live in a cow-house./ During the two (following) months he shall eat a small (quantity of food) without any factitious salt at every fourth meal-time, and shall bathe in the urine of cows, keeping his organs under control./ During the day he shall follow the cows and, standing upright, inhale the dust (raised by their hoofs); at night, after serving and worshipping them, he shall remain in the (posture, called) virasana./ Controlling himself and free from anger, he must stand when they stand, follow them when they walk, and seat himself when they lie down./ (When a cow is) sick, or is threatened by danger from thieves, tigers, and the like, or falls, or sticks in a morass, he must relieve her by all possible means:/ In heat, in rain, or in cold, or when the wind blows violently, he must not seek to shelter himself, without (first) sheltering the cows according to his ability./ Let him not say (a word), if a cow eats (anything) in his own or another’s house or field or on the threshing-floor, or if a calf drinks (milk)./ The slayer of a cow who serves cows in this manner, removes after three months the guilt which he incurred by killing a cow’ (Bühler 1886, 453–4). Comparing this with the simple (though brutal) nature of the punishment meted out for mortal sins (p. 239 note 49) reveals the highly convoluted and bureaucratic nature of the punishment in question. It is bureaucratic in the sense that it resembles how one is bogged down by paperwork and procedures in modern society. It is worth considering whether this was to dissuade a populace, already habituated to cow-slaughter, by inconveniencing them from pursuing it; not through fear of consequences, but because of the very inconvenient and irritating nature of the punishments.

53 [Yaj. III. 227 and III 234.] It is unclear what in the Yajnavalkya Smriti Ambedkar is referring to here. The chapter he refers to here (Chapter III) mostly deals with guidelines pertaining to wedding rituals, with minimal references to the cow. In chapter VII we find the following: ‘Yajnavalkya (CLXXX): That evildoer who slays beasts unlawfully shall dwell in horrible hell as many days as there are hairs on the body of the slain beast’ (Vidyarnava 1918, 274). In chapter V, which details the duties of a householder, we find ‘lawful’ examples of meat consumption in two passages entitled “Beef-offering to the honoured guest” and “The Annual Feast on Beef”. The first one goes: ‘Let him show a learned Brahmana, a big bull or a big goat as well as good treatment, precedence, sweet food and kind speech’ (Vidyarnava 1918, 229), and the second: ‘Once a year Argha is to be given to the Snataka, the Acharya, the king, the friend and the son-in-law, again the Ritvija at each sacrifice’ (ibid.). In the translation it appears ‘sweet food’ and ‘Argha’ are used as substitutes for Madhuparka. For the contentious nature of a Madhuparka offering see p. 156–7.

54 The Vedanta Sutra (or the Brahma Sutra), along with the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, is considered a canonical text of the Vedanta school of philosophy. The Vedanta Sutra, attributed to Badarayana, was written around 200 CE, to counter the dualistic interpretations of the Upanishads, promulgated by such Sankhya philosophers. It was also opposed to the adherence to and reduction of religion to the ritualistic pronouncements of the Brahmanas by such schools as the Purva Mimamsa. Vedanta Sutra was born of the necessity of systematizing contradictory views and philosophies that rose out of varying ritualistic interpretations of the Vedas and the contradictions inherent in the Vedas themselves. The result had been, for a long time, the flourishing of pragmatic decisions on practices that dealt with ambiguities as was most appropriate for particular situations (all, of course, united by the singular aim of upholding Brahmanical supremacy). Turning away from the centrality of karma (where no other higher being can be imagined as outside the karmic cycle), Vedanta philosophy puts the ‘Brahman’, the singular principal, at the centre of being. The most popular interpretation of this theory, that of Adi Sankara, takes this Brahman as the monotheistic being (Advaita) which permeates the universe and the multiplicity of appearances that we encounter as mere manifestations of this being in various forms. Later philosophers equated this supreme being (Brahman) with existent gods from Hindu mythology: Ramanuja and Madhava termed it as Vishnu while Srikantha referred to it as Shiva (Thibaut 1890; Hiriyanna 1993).

55 The section Ambedkar refers to here (II.1.28) does not explicitly deal with sacrifices. It is titled, “For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods &c.)” and it goes thus: ‘Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self of a dreaming person, “There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads” (Br. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in gods, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity’ (Thibaut 1890, 352–3). A supplementary look at (I.1.4) makes Ambedkar’s case stronger. In this passage it is first stated that: ‘we [cannot] conclude the purport of these passages [which tell us of the nature of the Brahman] to be the intimation of the nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious duty); for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all actions, actors, and fruits’ (Thibaut 1890, 22). This tells us that the descriptions of the Brahman cannot be found in those passages of the Veda which tell us about direct experiences of agents in the world, which include sacrifices. ‘It is further known from Scripture that those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of the sun)’ (Thibaut 1890, 27). In effect, things that are termed as worldly experiences have a separation via concealment from the Brahman, even though the former is contained within the latter. The Sutra goes on to argue that the injunctive nature of the Vedas is what furnishes the reason for one to strive towards the knowledge of the Brahman; this injunctive nature is deduced from the fact that the Vedas also demand sacrificial action from their (Brahmin) subjects (Thibaut 1890, 23–4). Juxtaposing this against the passage Ambedkar picks out, it is clear that the Vedanta Sutra grants worldly actions their independence, and acts such as sacrifices which were demanded by the Vedas have no bearing on our existence as a part of the Brahman. One need not rely on the Vedanta edifice to justify sacrifices; rather one must (blindly) continue to perform them simply because that is what the Vedas demand.

56 [Kane’s Dharmasastras II. Part II. p. 776] Kane, like Ambedkar, points to the strangeness of the fact that from being a commonplace thing cow-slaughter completely vanished from Brahmanical ideology after a time. He states: ‘It appears that the causes that led on to the giving up of flesh at least by some people were many, the foremost being the metaphysical conception that one Supreme Entity pervades the whole universe, that all life was one, and that even the meanest insect was a manifestation of the divine Essence and that philosophical truths would not dawn upon the man who was not restrained, free from crude appetites and had not universal kindliness and sympathy’ (Kane 1941b, 775–6). This is the section Ambedkar refers to above. Kane goes on to give more possible explanations for the move away from cow-slaughter. He says, ‘Another motive for the insistence on ahimsa was probably the idea of defilement caused by eating flesh […] Sahkha asks people to give up flesh, wine, onions and garlic because the body is built up on the food eaten’ (ibid.). Why such defilement came to be tied with what was an important aspect of Hindu life is not offered. A weak line of argument he does provide is the fact that once the Aryans spread to Middle, East and South India climactic conditions made food plenty, resulting in no need for meat consumption. However, he categorically states that the ‘notion that the eater of flesh would be devoured by the eaten in the next birth had nothing to do with the early stages of the doctrine of ahimsa, though by Manu and others that notion was later on exploited to emphasize its importance’(ibid.). He also provides reference to the Brahadaranyaka Upanishad, which contains both references to the transmigration of the soul and to cow-sacrifices, as does Ambedkar in the passage that follows.

57 The transmigration of the soul or metempsychosis is a thematic found within a variety of religious and spiritual traditions. In Vedic discourse—both philosophical and spiritual—time is considered to function cyclically, and it is governed by the conceptions of samsara, karma and moksha. It is believed that upon the death of a being, its soul does not cease to exist, but is transferred, after an appropriate time, to another entity. This is called samsara, and karma, the doings and experiences of one’s life, is said to define the station—either low or high—of the next birth. The universe, caught in such an endless cycle, is understood as one characterized by suffering, liberation from which can only be achieved in the form of moksha, a complete salvation (exit) from this material world. The Buddha rejects the very existence of the soul. As Ambedkar explains in his The Buddha and His Dhamma (1956), for the Buddha, ‘there is no such thing as a soul. That is why his theory of the soul is called Anatta, i.e., non-soul’ (Ambedkar 1992b, 262). The notion of karma is central to caste society. Karma has three underlying features: 1) the notion of causality, 2) the ethical element (that actions have their allied effects, either good or bad), and 3) rebirth. The origin of belief in karma in connection to rebirth can be traced back to pre-Vedic tribal societies, though it is difficult to ascertain with surety. In the Vedas, sacrifices were known as ‘karma’. The Brahadaranyaka Upanishad says pointedly that it is the karma which determines one’s good or evil rebirth (Doniger 1980). In The Buddha and His Dhamma, Ambedkar produces his own interpretation of the Buddhist conception of karma. Unlike in Hinduism, one’s actions do not produce an impress upon one’s soul according to Buddhism. This is because the Buddha preached about the nonexistence of the soul. Unlike in Hinduism where sin is accrued to an individual’s soul and where the individual is left to deal with this sin alone, Ambedkar produces a materialist and social reading of Buddha’s notion of transference of karma. The sin or suffering accrued from an action is the burden not of an individual’s soul but of the situation as a whole. Parents who are sinful bring the child into an environment which is sinful and thus the burden of that sin, its suffering, is felt by the child too. Not because of divine jurisprudence, but because of the imbalanced nature of the life-world into which the child has been thrust. In this case, the Buddha positions the individual in the larger context of society, where he or she is not cut off from the shared nature of ethics (or the lack of it), he or she is not on a personal quest of deliverance in the postponed life-to-come, but rather is responsible for this life, of making the now free of sin. The individual is granted agency to act on his or her situation and is not made slave to the otherworldly ‘past’ of sin. Rather he or she is thrust into a situation, which is already in sin and then is forced to confront it (Ambedkar 2014, 337–44)

58 According to the Brahadaranyaka Upanishad the quality of reincarnation is contingent on the quality of deeds commited in the previous life. By general consensus, it is the oldest of the Upanishads. This is supported by at least four pieces of evidence: its length, its lack of organization, its archaic language, and its relationship to earlier Vedic texts. The opening passage gives an extended comparison between the world and the sacrificial horse, showing clear parallels with the earlier Brahmana literature. Moreover, by its very name (literally, ‘great forest book’), the Brahadaranyaka Upanishad points to a transition from the Aranyaka (‘forest books’) literature, which followed Brahmana literature. This Upanishad first addresses many of the questions raised in later texts and is therefore an important source for the development of the tradition. Unlike most of the later Upanishads, it is written in prose rather than as poetry, with the instruction often in the form of dialogue between various speakers. See Olivelle 1998.

59 In VI.2, Svetaketa Aruneya, a recurring character throughout the Upanishads who represents a seeker of knowledge to whom wisdoms are bestowed, learns about the course of the soul and its reincarnations from Pravahana Jaibali, the king of Panchala. He compares the various worldly manifestations with the sacrificial fire. For instance, the rain-cloud is compared to the sacrificial fire, the year then is said to be its fuel, thundering clouds its smoke, lightning its flame, thunder-bolts its coals, and hailstones its sparks. In a similar vein the world, the seasons, the man and the woman too are compared to the sacrificial ritual. From the woman, purusa (man) arises and he lives and dies, and in the end is consumed by the sacrificial fire. From this flame light arises and man merges into day (which is made of light). From the day he becomes months and from there he enters the world of the gods…This cycle is shown to continue wherein man’s connection with all the various facets of the world are revealed and his existence is shown to be cyclical. However only two kinds of people are said to be able to enter into such a wondrous cycle: those who possess the knowledge of this cycle and therefore truly worship with faith, such a man is freed from the cycle and can reside in Brahma forever. Then there are the ones who by ‘sacrificial offering, charity, and austerity conquer the worlds’ (Hume 1921, 163). Such people can re-enter the cycle of life as men. The rest ‘know not these two ways, become crawling and flying insects and whatever there is here that bites’ (Hume 1921, 160–3)

60 The above sacrifice can be found at (VI.4.18) in the Brahadaranyaka Upanishad. It says: ‘Now, in case one wishes, “That a son, learned, famed, a frequenter of council-assemblies, a speaker of discourse desired to be heard, be born to me! That he be able to repeat all the Vedas! That he attain the full length of life!” they two should have rice boiled with meat and should eat it prepared with ghee. They two are likely to beget [him], with meat, either veal or beef’ (Hume 1921, 171). It is preceded by requirements to be fulfilled in order to attain a white son who is able to repeat one Veda and live a full life, a tawny son with reddish-brown eyes who can repeat two Vedas and live a full life, a swarthy son with red eyes who can repeat three Vedas and live a full life, and a learned daughter who may live a full life. For the conception of the last four kinds of offsprings the consumption of meat during the sacrifice is not required (VI.4.14–7, Hume 1921, 170–1).

61 In his essay “Revolution and Counter-Revolution”, Ambedkar writes of ‘Aryan society’ being ‘steeped in the worst kind of debauchery; social, religious, and spiritual’ (Ambedkar 1987, 153), the revolution instituted by the emergent dhamma of Gautama Buddha, and the counter-revolution unleashed by the Brahmins in order to regain their position. After the Buddha’s radical intervention turned the tide against Brahmanism, Emperor Asoka promulgated the Buddhist ethic of dhamma, and along these lines outlawed the killing of animals. The consequences for the Brahmanical practice of the yajna—since it revolved primarily around the ritual sacrifice of scores of animals—was dire. Ambedkar argues that the counter-revolution was instituted by Pushyamitra Sunga’s (185–149 BCE) usurpation of the Maurya throne, after which he carried out the Ashvamedha yajna or horse sacrifice. Ambedkar writes: ‘Indeed it is quite possible that the Manusmriti was composed at the command of Pushyamitra himself and forms the book of the philosophy of Brahmanism…the one and only object of Pushyamitra’s revolution was to destroy Buddhism and re-establish Bramhanism’ (Ambedkar 1987, 273). The Smriti was repurposed such that it divinely ordained regicide, but only by a Brahmin.

62 A point to remember is that society at the time was necessarily divided along feudal-class lines, and that hierarchy was a given. Under such conditions, in order to maintain power and rulership, it was natural that the monarchy sought out Brahmanical legitimation. Though Ambedkar labels Buddhism as revolutionary and Brahmanism as counter-revolutionary, he does not highlight the counter-revolutionary organization of ancient Indian society in general, which included the Buddhist element. Uma Chakravarti (1987) writes of the Buddha’s attempt at creating an egalitarian social order, which was restricted to his monastic sangha, an organization over which he had total purview. The sangha had a heterodox representation as far as caste was concerned, and the hierarchy of the bhikkus who comprised it was set along the lines of seniority. This experimental organization did provide an alternative to the existent structures in society, but their effectiveness and legitimate challenge to power structures has been questioned by many. Chakravarti argues that the Buddhist conception of kula (divided along the lines of Brahamanas, Khattiyas and Gahapatis) did pose an opposition to the Brahmanical four-varna order. In the Buddhist schema the Khattiyas were even considered superior to the Brahmanas (see p. 178–81 note 45). However, it can be argued that the problem of the division of labour remained untackled, thus weakening the revolutionary potential of Buddhism. See p. 223–5 note 1 for an exegesis on Ambedkar’s particular conception of revolution and counter-revolution.

63 Gail Omvedt’s survey of the ancient subcontinental landscape finds that Buddhism was deeply rooted in the imperial traditions that emerged in the first millennium CE, and even earlier. In the kingdoms of Kosala and Magadha, the rulers Pasenadi, Bimbisara and Ajatasattu were all Buddhist ‘sympathizers’. The region surrounding Magadha, long held to be the ancient imperial capital of the subcontinent, ‘was considered by Brahmanic literature to be a mlechha (barbarian) land where Vedic sacrifices and Brahmanic rituals were not performed’ (Omvedt 2003, 119). The first millennium CE, then, was an ‘overwhelmingly Buddhist’ domain. The ‘Buddhist vihars, stupas, caves including caitya halls and monasteries, statues’ all predated the Brahmanic temples, which only first emerged in the time of the Guptas, the third century CE onwards (118).

64 According to Robert DeCaroli (2004), this adoption of image worship in Buddhism was a direct result of the loss of royal patronage which resulted in its having to ingratiate itself with a multiplicity of religious practices which did not fall within the pale of Brahmanism (see p. 135–6 note 23). This is surmised from archaeological evidences of statues of spirit deities: ‘the visual and textual evidence for most types of spirit-deity worship points to a widespread set of practices that centered on images or altars (benches, thrones, etc.) set in fenced enclosures to which people turned in times of need or to mark important transitions (such as the birth of a child)’ (DeCaroli 2004, 68). The influence of these diverse practices on present-day Hinduism is palpable: ‘the wide-eyed gazes seen on all the images [of spirit-deity sculptures provided by DeCaroli] may suggest a link to modern Hindu darsan (ritually seeing and being seen by the deity), which would further confirm their function as objects of ritual devotion. This link with Hindu darsan is not totally unexpected. Coomaraswamy suggested years ago that Hindu bhakti practices found their origins in the worship of spirit-deities’ (63). As Buddhism integrated itself into these religions, the role of such deities and yakshas was brought into subservience of the Buddha: they are often represented in sculptures and architectural structures as paying obeisance to the Buddha (see DeCaroli, Chapter 3: “Set in Stone”, 59–86, for a comprehensive list of all such structures). Still it is to be remembered that ‘portraying spirit-deities in sculptural form was by no means a Buddhist innovation. As we have seen, images of spirit-deities are among the oldest sculptural images found on the subcontinent. Yet by assembling these spirit-deities from across vast distances only to represent them as impositions of secondary importance, the samgha was making a bold statement that challenged the very foundations of spirit-deity worship in India’ (76).

65 Wendy Doniger (2010) claims that the first substantial cluster of Hindu temples were built around the sixth century CE under the rule of the Pallavas in Southern India. ‘Building temples may have been, in part, a response to the widespread Buddhist practice of building stupas or to the Jaina and Buddhist veneration of statues of enlightened figures. Hindus vied with Buddhists in competitive fund-raising, and financing temples or stupas became a bone of contention’ (2010, 345). This focus on temple-building led to the vision of the rulers becoming increasingly grand and ultimately culminating in temple towns and cities. It must also be noted that workers who sculpted the Buddhist Ajanta caves, emigrated southwards when the demand for Hindu architecture was high in the southern kingdoms (2010, 345).

66 Kancha Ilaiah elaborates on this point in God as Political Philosopher: Buddha’s Challenge to Brahminism (2001) arguing that the mindless need to offer cattle to yajnas came to be slowly opposed by the Sudra and Vaishya communities that not only were influenced by the Buddha but also had an agricultural and economic interest in saving cattle. The burgeoning population meant that society had to move beyond shifting cultivation and this meant cattle were needed more for agriculture than for yajnas. ‘Such a situation gave rise to conflict between the Brahmin class on the one hand and the Kshatriya and Vaisya classes on the other’ (2001, 52).

67 Ilaiah likewise argues that the Buddha’s ‘limited non-violence and his opposition to killing cattle were used to convert the Brahmanical forces to vegetarianism and he himself was co-opted into one of the dasavataras, becoming merely a manifestation of Vishnu’ (2001, 224).

68 Yuan Chwang, alternatively known as Hsuan Tsang and Xuanzang, was a Buddhist monk who travelled from China to India in the seventh century. In his sixteen years of travel across the subcontinent, he recorded descriptions of the interaction between the separate forms of Buddhism practised in India and China (Watters 1904). For the import of his work in the present context, see p. 142–4 note 33.

69 Thomas Watters (1840–1901), served in many administrative positions in British China. Apart from producing a commentary and translation of Hsuan Tsang’s travelogue, he also translated Lao Tzu, Confucius and several other Chinese texts.

70 [Yuan Chwang (1904) Vol. I p. 55] Thomas Watters’ On Yuan Chwang’s Travels in India 629–645 was edited by T.W. Rhys Davids and S.W. Bushell and was only published after his passing in 1904.

71 Vaisali was the capital city of the Vajjian Confederacy of Mithila, one of the sixteen Mahajanapadas of the ancient Indian subcontinent (in the sixth to fourth centuries BCE). The Jain Tirthankara, Mahavira, is said to have been born and raised in Vaisali. It was also here that the Buddha delivered his last sermon in 483 BCE, and where, a hundred years thereafter, the Second Buddhist Council was convened (383 BCE). Vaisali is considered an important location in Jain and Buddhist traditions.

72 The Ssu-fen-lu or the Shi-bun-ritsu is a translation of the Dharmagupta Vinaya by Buddhayasas, a Sramana from present-day Kabul, and Choh-fo-nien in 405 CE. It was a central Vinaya text studied in China and Japan, and it gained prominence through its adoption by the Kai Ritsu school established by Dosen Risshi in eighth-century Japan (Petzold 1995). Vinayas are rulebooks based on the Buddha’s teachings which are meant to be guides to live an ethical Buddhist life. The numerous splits and cultural differences owing to Buddhism’s vast geographical reach led to the creation of several Vinaya texts. The Dharmagupta school too arose from a split in the Mahasaka tradition; it was founded in the third century BCE by Dharmagupta who was a follower of the Buddha’s disciple Maudgalyayana. The Dharmagupta Vinaya presently only exists in the form of Chinese translations (Heirman 2002).