For Emerson Merrell it must have seemed the digging would go on forever. Every day for two weeks he and the rest of Company I worked to improve their defensive works near the Williamsburg and Richmond Stage Road. The site was only six miles or so from Richmond, and on good days they could hear church bells from the Rebel capital.
Federal forces had settled into strong positions in front of Richmond following their victory at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks. The III Corps was stationed on the army’s left flank, and General Joe Hooker’s Second Division followed a routine that served them well. Each day, one of the division’s three brigades occupied the forwardmost trenches, while the other two enjoyed the relative comforts of camp. Camp life was preferable to the forward trenches, but many Excelsior Brigade men complained that while they rested, the other brigades allowed the enemy to advance upon their line and thus, as one Excelsior man wrote, “entail upon us the work of driving them (the enemy) back.”1 Of course the other brigades didn’t necessarily see it this way, and some concluded that the Excelsiors were overly aggressive and eager to start a fight where none was warranted.
Men worked at improving the forward defensive works every day, and they grew increasingly confident in the earthworks. Conditions, however, upon Richmond’s doorstep were poor. Swampy ground, intolerable heat, frequent rain, and constant threat of enemy attack made life in the forward trenches miserable. Life in the rear was only slightly better. The stench of unburied men and horses hung in the air, while the lack of good water kept the men wanting.2 “The water is scarce here…. I have not seen a bit of pure water since we left Yorktown. I had drank water here that I would not wash my hands in at home,”3 lamented Emerson Merrell.
Hooker’s men had built fine defensive works, so fine that they discouraged any real attempts by the under-strength Confederate Army to dislodge them. Good as the works were, McClellan’s troops remained too far from Richmond to employ the heavy siege guns Little Mac hoped to use in pounding Richmond and, by extension, the Confederacy, into surrender.4 The New Yorkers maintained their position for nearly two weeks. Though there had been many rumors of an impending push, orders finally did come. Heintzelman’s III Corps was to advance west to clear a section of woods lying mostly south of the Williamsburg and Richmond Stage Road. This preliminary attack was part of a general offensive designed to move the Army of the Potomac close enough to Richmond to employ those big guns of which McClellan was fond. Chaplain Joseph Twichell described the situation in a June 25 letter home:
Hitherto the hostile pickets have met about midway in a swampy wood affording cover to each alike and leaving to each the open ground beyond, both sides, to operate in as they pleased. If I understand it, it was regarded necessary to clear those woods of the enemy and establish our outposts in the further edge, thus giving us some jurisdiction over a wide plain beyond.5
The III Corp’s First Division had previously been detached, so Hooker’s Second Division would form the right wing of the advance while Third Division, under Phil Kearney, formed the left. Hooker had arranged his division with Sickles’ Excelsior Brigade sitting astride the Williamsburg Road. Sickles now positioned two regiments right of the road and the remaining three on its left. Colonel Taylor’s 72nd N.Y. formed the left-most regiment of the brigade, contacting Brigadier General Cuvier Grover’s First Brigade, which formed to its south. Third Brigade, temporarily under Col. Joseph Carr, comprised the reserve. Kearney’s division was then aligned south of Grover. Heintzelman’s III Corps, two divisions strong, now held a front nearly a mile-and-a-half long.6
“For half a mile to the front of our line of battle, heavy forest covered the ground and running through the middle of this was a belt of swampy soil, on each side of which was an almost impenetrable undergrowth,” wrote Hooker as he described the ground before him. The swamp was waist deep in places and had “tacitly become the dividing section between the advanced pickets of the two armies.”7 Any attempt by either side to cross the swamp would be met with a swift and strong response.8 Movement through the swamp would be slow, becoming a potential death trap for any attacking force.
Captain Chadwick stepped off with his New York City men on June 25 at 8 a.m. Enemy troops were close; almost at once the whole division was engaged with the Rebel pickets. But for Sickles’ men the situation was worse. Regiments advancing left of the road faced the worst of the swamp and with the going slow, had a hard time keeping up and maintaining the line of advance. Company officers encouraged the men, but poor terrain and hidden enemy pickets slowed the advance; nevertheless, advance they did. Despite maintaining a steady hail of fire on the enemy, the Excelsiors soon found themselves lagging behind Grover’s brigade to their left.9 Hooker’s men outnumbered the enemy pickets initially, but with the fight on, Confederate commanders busily sent reinforcements to the point of the attack. With Federal and Confederate troops slugging it out at close quarters in the woods, Union artillery held their fire for fear of striking friendly troops.
With Excelsiors advancing, increasing musketry on their right alerted those in command that Sickles’ men were outnumbered and the flank was in danger. But before reinforcements could be brought up, a serious demonstration threatened to turn the brigade’s right. Sickles and 71st’s Colonel George Hall surveyed the situation, but panic gripped the regiment when someone yelled, “We are flanked, retreat.”10 As men stampeded to the rear even the color company was swept up as nearly the entire left wing of the regiment broke “in disgraceful confusion.” Only the exertions of Sickles, officers from the adjacent regiment, and members of Hooker’s staff were able to restore order and reform the wing. The episode was even more “mortifying,” wrote the narcissistic Sickles, “as it happened in the immediate presence of the brigadier-general commanding the division, who was in front throughout the day.”11
Order to the line was restored by 10 a.m. Sickles’ right was now supported by the addition of 7th New Jersey from the reserve brigade, and the advance continued “in the face of a galling fire and an obstinate resistance on the part of the enemy.”12 Taylor’s men continued to make steady progress on the brigade’s left, supported by regiments from adjoining commands.
With the fight progressing, the first of the brigade’s wounded were treated under some nearby trees and in two houses in back of the entrenchments. Eventually a hospital was established half a mile to the rear near the railroad. “Each regiment furnished its quota [of wounded] and it was not long before ambulances were in great demand,” wrote Chaplain Twichell, adding, “As before, wounds of every description were to be found, from those that were mortal in an hour to those that were a slim apology for leaving the ranks.”13
Although the fighting was heavy, by mid-morning the division and entire corps had gained ground. Despite the progress, around 11:00 orders came from McClellan to suspend operations. Sickles was in a state of disbelief and questioned the orders, but Hooker assured him further protests would be in vain and the advance would stop.14 McClellan, directing the battle from his headquarters far to the rear, had only now received messages about the panic amongst the 71st N.Y. Concluding the attack was faltering, McClellan ordered a halt, though in reality the situation at the front had already been remedied.
Pickets were reluctantly thrown out as commanders waited. The Excelsiors moved back to where they’d formed earlier that morning. Finally McClellan himself arrived on the scene around 1 p.m. and finding the situation well in hand, he ordered the attacks renewed.15
As Taylor’s men moved forward Rebels kept up their fire, especially on the right of the brigade where men had earlier broken and run. A brigade from IV Corps along with a battery of Napoleons soon arrived to lead the attack. Helped by “well directed and rapid fire”16 from the cannons, the enemy began to fall back as IV Corps men pressed the attack. On the Excelsior’s left the volume of noise increased dramatically as Kearney’s men came to close grips with the enemy.17 With pressure all along their front, around 4:30 Confederate defenders abandoned the woods Hooker had been ordered to take. Having taken his objective and stopped, Hooker’s men, especially on the right, were exposed to enemy artillery fire. Strong pickets were thrown out and as night fell, the day’s fighting drew to a close. Men from the IV Corps relieved Hooker’s division, allowing his men to return to camp. Fighting at Oak Grove had cost Hooker’s division 28 killed, 262 wounded, and 19 missing.18 Sickles’ Excelsior Brigade, already thinned to about 1,500 men, suffered 8 killed, 116 wounded, and 11 missing.19 Taylor’s New Yorkers entered the fight with near 300 men and lost 23 wounded, with 5 missing.20
Chadwick and the rest of the Excelsiors remained in their forward camps for the next two days. The III Corps had done well, but other events along the front convinced the seemingly reluctant McClellan that his position was untenable and a redeployment of his forces toward the rear was in order. When news of the withdrawal reached Hooker, the aggressive divisional commander was livid over what he believed amounted to a retreat. Orders received by Sickles on the night of the 28th directed him to prepare to move at daylight. These instructions called for the men to have three days cooked rations in their haversacks and “employ all available means of transportation”21 to bring away entrenching tools, ammunition, food, hospital stores and other equipment. Once loaded, the supply wagons would be sent to the rear. Any gear that could not be removed was to be destroyed.22 Lucius Jones of Company H later reflected on the situation:
Following Fair Oaks was Seven Pines, a mile or more in the rear of Fair Oaks. Our forces urged the battle, in fact it was a mere continuation of the same battle, while we were masters of the situation, and probably could, by an energetic movement, have captured Richmond. Gen. McClellan, terrified by the unknown, hesitated, trembled, and, when Dame Rumor whispered the untold thousands that were pouring forth to meet him, he began the retrograde movement. The unknown element is one of the mightiest factors in all problems. McClellan was forever magnifying this element, until it was more terrible than the armies of his enemies; it unquestionably proved the ruin of the otherwise able General.23
Excelsiors broke camp early the next morning. Pioneers from the various regiments assembled under the command of Lieutenant Van Buren Bates of 70th N.Y. As the rest of the brigade marched to the forward defenses to screen the withdrawal from any Rebel interference, Bates and his men set about destroying gear that couldn’t be moved.24
With the valuable artillery safely to the rear, Hooker’s division pulled back, with Sickles forming on the left. As they moved, Lt. Bates followed as rear guard, felling timber and placing obstacles as he went.25 Captain John Leonard’s Company F from Newark deployed as pickets between the old camp and the brigade’s new position. Both Heintzelman’s III Corps and II Corps under General Edwin Sumner were assigned to protect the withdrawal of the entire army. The plan was to first move east back toward Williamsburg, then turn south on roads near Savage Station and proceed towards Harrison’s Landing, which rested on the James River.
Hoping to engage the Yankees while moving and exposed, Rebel troops wasted no time in attacking. By nine that morning of the withdrawal, Confederates under John B. Magruder hit Sumner’s rear guard around Allen’s Farm, just west of Fair Oaks. When the Southern men attacked, Heintzelman was positioned south of Sumner and south of the Richmond and York River Railroad; thus only Grover’s brigade was slightly engaged in the morning’s fight. With the Excelsiors posted south of Grover, Sickles reported only the annoyance of an occasional artillery burst, which nonetheless killed two and wounded five.26
Sickles received orders at 4:00 to deploy his brigade and move in line of battle the roughly two miles east to Savage Station. Approaching the station, Heintzelman directed the Excelsiors to countermarch and move briskly south toward the Charles City Road, across Brackett’s Ford and over White Oak Swamp.27 Rebel pursuers pressed on to the east, engaging Sumner’s II Corps and William Franklin’s VI Corps at Savage Station. Heintzelman had been in a good position to support this fight, but owing to a misunderstanding, withdrew III Corps south across White Oak swamp, leaving Sumner and Franklin to fight alone. In his haste to withdraw across the swamp and amidst the general confusion that gripped the army, Heintzelman ordered a trainload of ammunition and other stores destroyed and abandoned more than 2,000 of his wounded.28
Flankers were deployed along the line of march as Sickles crossed the swamp at sunset. The march was a trying affair for the New Yorkers, as columns were frequently harassed by Confederate troops and the boys had to share the road with an endless line of wagons that crossed White Oak Swamp at a rate of over 100 per hour.29 The Excelsiors reached the Charles City Road soon after dark. There, Sickles reported to Hooker and bivouacked with the rest of the division near Glendale.30 Chadwick, Merrell, and the rest of the regiment were now about six miles south of Savage Station and less than ten miles north of Harrison’s Landing.
Franklin and Sumner moved their men south across White Oak swamp early the next morning, destroying bridges as they passed. The destruction of the White Oak bridges frustrated Confederate pursuit from the north. But enemy troops under James Longstreet and A.P. Hill were already south of the White Oak and marching hard to intercept the Yankees from the west.
It was critical for McClellan’s men to keep the roads around Glendale open long enough for the long lines of supply wagons to continue moving south. The V Corps was located west of Glendale in position to defend against Rebel attack. Hooker’s division was sent to support the V Corps and took up positions on the left of these men. The morning of June 30, Hooker directed Sickles to reconnoiter the country in front of the Quaker Road, south toward the James River. After riding about three miles to Malvern Hill, Sickles returned to the sound of artillery fire and discovered that the Excelsiors were on the move under the command of Colonel Taylor.31
After some uncertainty about how the troops should be aligned, Sickles settled his brigade on the division’s left at 9:00 a.m. in what he considered to be a good defensible position. Two 72nd men, Private Patrick Connell of Company E and Corporal James Bowen of Co. D, were detailed to Sickles to serve as lookouts, being posted in a tall tree with a commanding view of the field.32
Following some early confusion, Confederate attacks finally got on line by afternoon. The Rebel push concentrated on the right of the Federal line against George McCall’s division of the V Corps. The Federal troops here represented a rough collection of divisions from various corps, with no one in overall command. With no well-coordinated defense, McCall fought superior numbers almost alone. Around 5:00, a strong Confederate attack pierced McCall’s lines, and his left brigade retreated in disorder.33 The Excelsior Brigade then moved to help restore the Federal line, only to be mistaken for Southern troops. Sickles reported that McCall’s men, “mistaking us for the enemy, poured several volleys into us. Our colors were promptly displayed along the line,”34 and only through the exertions of various officers, Maj. Stevens among them, and a company of Berdan’s Sharpshooters, did it happen that “these fugitives were driven back to their line.”35 Units from Sedgwick’s division and Hooker’s 16th Massachusetts helped stem the Rebel momentum and redirected their push toward Kearney’s Division, which finally stopped the Southern advance.36
Later during the battle (known also as Frayser’s Farm), Sickles sent word that his left flank was in jeopardy of being turned. As commanders in the rear decided upon what action to take, it became clear the threat had passed when a fresh message arrived from Sickles requesting permission to advance. Observing the enemy advancing nearly perpendicular to his front, Sickles requested a battery be brought forward to support the advance of his left regiments “so as to assail the enemy in the rear and on his right flank.”37 But when orders came directing him to detach the 71st New York to support General Sumner, Sickles abandoned his notion of a general advance, satisfied instead to throw forward skirmishers from Taylor’s 72nd N.Y., the 2nd N.Y., and the 11th Massachusetts, capturing at least 150 enemy men and officers.38
The heaviest of the action for Hooker’s division was over by early evening, except for some regiments of Grover’s brigade who were ordered to clear away some remaining Rebels in their front. This situation became alarming when First Massachusetts worked themselves into a pocket of enemy troops. Grover had advanced with them, and only through his skill were they able to save themselves. Second Division’s actions were not considered crucial to the battle’s outcome, but Hooker nonetheless lost 192 men.39 Col. Taylor reported three of his men captured and two wounded on the day, among them Private Connell, who injured himself severely by falling from a tree while in the service of General Sickles.40
That night, Hooker’s division held its position around Glendale as the rest of the army continued south toward Harrison’s Landing, collecting at Malvern Hill, where McClellan had decided to make his next stand in resisting the Rebel pursuit. The cries of those wounded earlier in the day burdened the air, making for a restless night. Men of the regiment and brigade rested on their arms as the enemy prowled unseen in the darkness. Twice messages came reporting that the Confederates had formed a battle line extending far beyond Sickles’ left, but the expected attacks never came.41
When word came that the wagons were safely out of reach of the enemy, the regiment moved again. In the pre-dawn darkness of July 1, Hooker’s men marched down Quaker Road. Arriving near Malvern Hill, the Excelsior Brigade halted and stood in columns of battalions, exposed to enemy artillery, which they weathered without harm for several hours. Eventually the entirety of Hooker’s division was directed to the right center of the defensive line. Kearney’s men, now re-designated as First Division of the III Corps, were on Hooker’s left, while VI Corps occupied Hooker’s right and rear. Hooker deployed his division with Grover’s First Brigade on the right and Carr’s Third on the left, with the Excelsiors placed in reserve behind Grover. All dispositions, including the placement of some artillery, were complete by 10 a.m. despite sporadic Rebel artillery fire into Grover’s ranks. Sickles placed his New Yorkers in a nearby ravine where they were protected from the cannon fire yet close enough to provide immediate support when needed.42 Despite the incredible noise and flurry of activity around them, many boys not actively engaged within the brigade, exhausted from the days of near constant marching and fighting, obeyed their bodies’ commands and slept.
But sleep would have to wait for some. To cover his position Sickles picketed two regiments, the 70th and 73rd New Yorks. Company G under Captain Bliss was deployed as scouts. Bliss soon captured two Reb soldiers, whom he sent to divisional headquarters. Both prisoners confirmed previous intelligence predicting an imminent Confederate attack on the Federal front.43
Confederate advanced guards appeared in some woods by late morning along the Quaker Road. Bringing some artillery to bear, the enemy fired several rounds that were too close for comfort. Hooker’s battery of the Second New Jersey then wheeled into position and fired on the unwelcome foe, sending them scurrying back to the protection of the woods. Other enemy guns soon appeared, and a brisk artillery duel commenced while infantrymen took turns piling undergrowth to form breastworks.44
Confederate infantry attacks finally began around five o’clock. Assaults came on the Federal left and center, where Rebels had concentrated much of their day’s cannon fire. On the other side of the line, massed Union cannons formed a slaughter pen for Lee’s men pressing up the hill. Odds were slim the enemy would pierce the defensive line, yet some Federal regiments reported being low on ammunition, so V Corps’ General Fitz-John Porter called for reinforcements on the Federal left just the same. Sickles now received orders for the Excelsiors to support this weakened part of the line with less than an hour till sunset.45
The New Yorkers moved to a field left of where Porter’s headquarters was located. Upon Sickles’ arrival, Porter was away at the front lines, leaving no one to direct the placement of Second Brigade. After some discussion with other officers present, Sickles moved to Porter’s right “at a brisk pace to that part of the field where the firing was most vigorous and sustained.”46 Still unable to find an officer to report to, Sickles halted the Excelsiors in a shallow depression that provided partial cover as he and Maj. Stevens rode off to find Porter. Within minutes, Porter arrived and directed Sickles to support two batteries of artillery positioned just right of the Quaker Road, which bisected the Federal line. But just as the Excelsiors were forming, a staff officer arrived to announce that the brigade was instead to report to General Couch, whose division held much of the center of the Union line.47
The Excelsiors were already in close proximity to Couch’s line. Sickles had difficulty at first finding General Couch, though lesser officers bearing messages requesting support soon found Dan and his men. Couch’s regiments were running out of ammunition, and they urgently needed relief.48
Colonel Taylor described the situation in his official report: “Soon several officers, representing themselves to be of General Couch’s staff, appeared, and in answer to my inquiry where to place my regiment, commenced to give a variety of directions, which were confused and conflicting.”49 Taylor eventually found an aide to General Couch who directed the regiment forward up a narrow road past a small wood and to an open field. Following orders, Taylor’s men found a portion of J.J. Abercrombie’s Brigade hotly engaged; this was the same General Abercrombie who had briefly commanded the Excelsiors six weeks earlier near Williamsburg. Captain Bliss and the rest of the regiment formed a battle line behind the 31st Pennsylvania. As the 31st Penn. moved off by the left flank, each company began firing by files as they became unmasked from right to left. With the Pennsylvanians clearing the field, Taylor moved the entire regiment forward to the ground previously held by the Keystoners, all the while maintaining a heavy fire. Taylor now saw Confederates posted on the edge of a wood to his front and right. Throwing back his two right-most companies, he formed them at an oblique angle with instructions to silence Rebel fire on his right, which was actually closer than that to his front.50 In the furious exchange of volleys, enemy bullets whipped through the ranks of Company H. Captain Doyle, at the head of his company, already hit in the arm, received a ball through his right leg, shattering the bone. He refused to be carried from the field, and another ball clipped his skull. There he died “on the field of battle, mourned by the soldiers who loved him and whom he loved.”51 With the sun low, James Hall, firing from the front rank of his Company B, was hit by a shell fragment that sent him staggering back behind the line. As Co. B continued its desperate fight, James was struck again in the head and killed. His death went unseen by any of those dearest to him, and the place of his last breath unmarked.52 With the arrival of dusk, Rebels became discernible only by the discharges of their rifles. In the fading light, Taylor yelled for his men to watch for the flashes and aim low.53
Taylor’s men were in a fight to be sure, but something was wrong—too many men on the right were going down. Taylor soon recognized the deadly problem; their own men were killing them. In the heat of the fight, Federal cannon had grown careless and were now firing their deadly canister rounds too low. It was these rounds wreaking havoc on his line. Two men were already dead and one wounded, probably more. Taylor threw his four right-most companies to the rear and in column and waited till the battery ceased firing. With the situation at least safe from Union artillery fire, the companies returned into line.54
Both sides fired briskly for about 45 minutes. Running low on ammunition, Taylor’s men scrounged 15 rounds each from the boxes of the 70th N.Y. in reserve nearby. The regiments in this part of the line were so low on ammunition that Sickles ordered up an additional 20,000 cartridges. Merrell and the rest used a new “patent cartridge”55 with an ignitable paper wrap. This allowed soldiers to ram the entire round down the barrel without first tearing the bullet from the powder. By skipping this time-consuming step, the New Yorkers fired more rapidly. But while early use of the patent cartridge proved successful, they were never used extensively again.56
Dead men lay where they fell, while the wounded were placed just to the rear of the line by file closers.57 Around 8 p.m. Captain Chadwick was hit and led to the rear for treatment, with his left leg and hand peppered with lead or iron fragments.58
As evening settled in, the battle wound down as Rebel fire slackened, giving Taylor and his men the impression the enemy had withdrawn. Taylor ordered his men to cease fire but to remain loaded. This order sent up a cheer from the regiment, which seemed to provoke the enemy, who in turn sent up a loud cheer and, advancing out of the woods near enough to be seen, fired a volley into the ranks of the regiment. Taylor’s men responded with a volley of their own and then a rapid steady fire, which sent the Southern men beating a hasty retreat. As the enemy retreated further into the woods, the New Yorkers were directed to fire slightly higher to reach their increasingly distant foes. Afterwards, “nothing more was heard of the enemy that night, except the slight noise of men collecting their dead and wounded,”59 reported Taylor.
The piecemeal Confederate attacks had been totally repulsed by nightfall. The Army of the Potomac still held the top of Malvern Hill, with Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia left to sort out a costly defeat. The 72nd N.Y. held its position with pickets deployed and the men lying on their arms until they were ordered to withdraw near 2 a.m.
Though Malvern Hill was a victory, many in the Army of the Potomac had grown disillusioned with its commander, George McClellan, for both his lack of offensive spirit and his battlefield management. Private Robert Knox Sneden, a map maker on Heintzelman’s staff, described the situation this way:
General McClellan was not on the ground (as usual) until the battle [Malvern Hill] was over…. McClellan had first placed the troops in position this morning before leaving…. And as there was no headquarters staff, every general did as he pleased in changing battle lines during the day. But the Army of the Potomac has fought so many battles without General McClellan’s supervision or assistance, that he is not missed when the fighting commences! His cautionary measures are so well known that the corps commanders win battles, and move troops to ensure the enemy’s defeat, and are not hampered with McClellan’s orders or presence, though McClellan gets all the credit. The fighting generals, such as Heintzelman, Sumner, Kearny, Hooker, Sedgwick, Richardson, and the others, have a profound contempt for General McClellan’s fighting qualities, and several officers high in command denounce him without stint.60
Nearly all of the dead and wounded in Hooker’s entire division came from Taylor’s ranks. The regiment had taken about one-fifth casualties, with 14 killed and 47 wounded from a force of about 300.61 Captain Steven Doyle of Company H was dead, being replaced the next day by John Holmes. Death visited the companies somewhat evenly; Company E got the worst of it with four killed, yet none were killed in C, I, or K.62 The 74th New York had eight men wounded.63 This was the extent of the divisional loss, since neither First nor Third brigades were engaged. Hooker would write in his battle report of the brilliant conduct of 72nd New York by summing it up thus: “the loss sustained by that regiment is the truest index of its services.”64
James Hall’s death wasn’t confirmed to his company-mates until the next day’s light. Within days Hall’s friends and family received contradictory reports, first stating James to be dead, then safe, and then, sadly, dead. Folks back in Lowell clambered for details about their Jimmy. “It was a mile from our camp, and beyond our cavalry pickets,”65 wrote Captain Bliss of Company D, who had visited the battlefield the night of the action, in a letter to Hall’s family anxious for information about his death:
I had no trouble in finding the field and in tracing out our different positions. On the night of the battle, Sergeant Brooks of my company from Panama, saw a corpse he thought to be his. Owing to the blood on the face, and darkness, he could not be positive. He took the things from his pockets, and when light came, from the letters, there was no longer any doubt. This is all we can ever know about his death. We could have buried our dead and marked their graves, if we could have found a spade or shovel. It was painful for us to leave them as we did, and until now we feared they were still unburied. But I found they had been decently interred by the rebels…. The position of Company “D” in line, would partly designate which of the four graves Jimmy was buried in, but it would be impossible to identify his body. He sleeps with his comrades on the field of his glory. There he must rest.66
Though his victory was clear, McClellan insisted on further movement south, eight miles to Harrison’s Landing on the James River, where supplies and the protection of Navy gunboats awaited. Excelsior Brigade began its march to Harrison’s Landing during the pre-dawn darkness of July 2; the now delirious Captain Chadwick and other wounded were carried along the way. Heavy rains made the march even more miserable, and the move was a clear admission that McClellan had given up the campaign despite recent victories at Malvern Hill and Glendale. Upon reaching Harrison’s Landing, the brigade reported to Hooker that late afternoon. The entire Second Division was placed on the left-center of the Union line, the most likely point of a Rebel attack should they see fit to repeat the carnage of Malvern Hill.67
Hooker’s men finally moved into permanent camp several days after arriving at Harrison’s Landing. Defensive lines had been finished, and the duties required of the regiment’s men were light. Men throughout the regiment caught up on their correspondence and tended to the other small tasks soldiers do while in camp. The season was painfully hot, and the sand, lack of trees, and annoying flies conspired to sap both the nerve and the strength of man and beast alike.68 Men endured constant bites from infested trousers and tunics. While the more pious men like Hiram Stoddard may have prayed for relief while picking off nits, some of the harder men from Companies C and K no doubt cursed the Almighty. A nearby pond and a few wells dug for fresh drinking and cooking water offered only the slimmest relief. It was a land full of berries and wheat ready for harvest, but with most able-bodied Southern men gone for soldiers, the crop went uncollected or fell prey to opportunistic Yankee foragers such as Emerson Merrell and his mates. The various regiments and brigades eventually resumed the routine of camp life with morning parade and volleyed salutes. The men were back on normal whiskey rations, which helped buoy sagging spirits, as did the airs from the various regimental bands. Earlier McClellan had banned the playing of music during the campaign so as to not give away the position of his troops, but now music was a daily part of camp life appreciated greatly by enlisted men and officers alike. At least now Stoddard and the rest could enjoy a rollicking tune as they boiled six-legged guests from their uniforms.
The Federal lines were well entrenched, and both flanks rested on creeks. It was an excellent defensive position—too excellent in fact to be attacked, so Lee sent most of his army back to Richmond, leaving only cavalry patrols to watch the Yankee army.69
The army was at relative rest during July as Hooker contemplated his only real organizational problem: the poor condition of the Excelsior Brigade. The brigade was worn from the heavy fight at Williamsburg back in May and near-constant campaigning since, and brigade strength more closely resembled the 1,500 to 2,000 men of two regiments. Hooker recommended and received approval from Heintzelman to consolidate the brigade. McClellan concurred but felt Sickles, who was gone on recruiting duty, should be consulted. When finally asked, Sickles requested such action be postponed, certain he could raise the necessary manpower.70
Reports that Richmond was being evacuated came from Washington by month’s end. McClellan immediately chose Hooker’s division to check out such reports. “Fighting Joe” was eager for action and, sure the lightly defended Malvern Hill could be retaken, he submitted a plan to higher-ups. With the plan approved, Hooker set about regaining the offensive.71
Reinforced with a squadron of cavalry and some additional artillery, Hooker’s division set out on August 2. With the guides proving particularly incompetent and progress slow, all hope of surprise was lost, provoking Hooker to cancel the endeavor and return to camp.72 The project was tried again two days later on August 4, this time on a larger scale with a division from Sedgwick’s corps added for good measure. Sickles was still gone recruiting, so command of the Excelsiors once again fell to Colonel Taylor. With Taylor in command of the Second Brigade, 72nd New York was back in the hands of Lt. Col. Moses.
Second Division left camp near eleven that morning. The approach was a 12-mile march past the Willis Church. Merrell, Stoddard, and the rest foraged liberally on green corn, tomatoes, potatoes, and even fresh pork available along the way.73 At 11 p.m. Hooker called a halt to rest, but when Brigadier General Francis Patterson of the Third Brigade blew his bugle to halt his line, all secrecy was lost.74 The march continued just before sunrise, moving past the site of the Glendale fight of June 30. Eventually the division arrived at the rear of Malvern Hill. With complete surprise lost, Confederate pickets stirred into action as Rebel artillery became more active than hoped.75
The plan called for the First and Second brigades to make a frontal assault while the Third Brigade swung far to the right, attempting to cut off the fleeing Rebs. During the assault, the First Brigade came under heavy artillery fire from a Confederate battery directly in front of the two brigades, while Taylor’s Excelsiors contended with mounted enemy scouts on their left. Eventually the hill was taken, with fleeing Rebs leaving behind a caisson and implements for one gun.76
The attacks went forward but the ultimate prize of capturing the enemy was missed due partly to the intoxicated state of Third Brigade’s General Patterson. Despite the failure of the Third Brigade, the hill was captured, and the men of the division busied themselves building breastworks should the enemy attempt to retake the position. McClellan and his staff visited the hill around noon as guests of Hooker. Satisfied with the course of action, McClellan prepared to move more divisions out of Harrison’s Landing toward Malvern Hill. Near 6 p.m. the division formed into lines and threw out pickets to the front and right for several hundred yards. Upon hearing reports of these moves, Lee sent three divisions to check this potentially dangerous development.77
On August 6 Lee’s divisions drove in Hooker’s pickets, setting the stage for a second battle of Malvern Hill. But it was not to be. Hooker withdrew his command that night under orders from McClellan; the Excelsiors made it back to camp about daylight on the 7th. This time McClellan’s reluctance to fight was because two days earlier he had received orders from Washington to withdraw his army from the Peninsula. And though McClellan protested vigorously,78 the general had been given his chance and the War Department refused to reconsider; by the next week the great withdrawal would be underway. For Emerson Merrell, David Parker, Harmon Bliss, and the rest of the regiment, the Peninsula Campaign would soon be over.
Since its first real battle at the beginning of May, the Excelsior Brigade had been worn down to less than half its original strength; Taylor’s 72nd now counted well under 300 men. In letters home only two months before, Emerson Merrell wrote of his excited anticipation to see the spires of Richmond. Now he wrote of his disgust over this “grand skedaddle.”79 Some officers felt the brigade had been fought too hard and allowed to be used up. Indeed, for whatever the official reasons, the resignations continued. Since the beginning of June, first lieutenants Hugh J. Winters (Co. K), Wakeman Holburton (Co. C), Michael McDonald (Co. G), and second lieutenant George W. Wallace of Company E had all quit.80 Chaplain Twichell summed up the thoughts of many other New Yorkers when he wrote, “When I think of how grand our army was last winter, and of how much it has since cost in men and money, and how little it has been made to accomplish, and of its present condition…. I am persuaded that something or somebody is all wrong.”81