Food may have been the best part of life at Harrison’s Landing for many of the men. The local Virginia countryside offered much: tomatoes, fresh corn, potatoes, and an occasional piece of pork. Emerson Merrell and his mates took full advantage of the bounty lying just beyond the edge of camp.1 Fresh corn was a welcomed supplement to the less savory army rations that were now in abundance. Whiskey rations had been restored, and all but the most temperate men enjoyed the return of hard drink. Days were often hot, wet and miserable, but the men had fashioned a tolerable camp, complete with daily parades, cannon salutes and music played by the different regimental bands. Aside from morning and afternoon drill, the men were pretty well on their own. The health and morale of the boys was better than it had been in weeks.
Harrison’s Landing’s strong defenses were virtually unassailable, so the enemy did the only rational thing—they ignored McClellan’s army. Robert E. Lee ordered only a few cavalry units to monitor the situation while he redirected the bulk of his army elsewhere. Without threat of enemy action, commanders such as Nelson Taylor could breathe and sort things out. Arriving in early July after the near constant fighting of the so-called Seven Days Battle, many men had only the uniforms on their backs and a rifle. Since then, the regiment had been able to resupply and began looking like proper soldiers once again.
Within some of the companies, the command structure had been something of a game of musical chairs, with officers coming and going due to transfers, resignations, wounding or death. Six companies had served the same captain since the Staten Island days, but in other companies there had been changes. Company C’s Chadwick was gone, leaving the 23-year-old first lieutenant, Berend Huttmann, to run things. Huttmann began as first sergeant with the Germans over in Company A and in less than a year he moved up to first lieutenant.2 Chadwick was sent back to New York, bypassing the normal regimen of army hospitals and doctors thanks to Taylor’s largess (partially due to the fact that Chadwick’s wife was a member of Taylor’s family) and recuperating from his wounding at Malvern Hill and subsequent high fever. Company B was on its third captain since the beginning, with John Sanford running things after Williamsburg’s fight, and both Company H and E were on their second captain. The Germans in Company A must have thought their captaincy cursed that summer of ’62. After Hungarian engineer George Grecheneck, their original captain, had been killed at Williamsburg, his replacement, Charles Grossinger, resigned after only five weeks on the job, and Horatio Pennock, who came over from Co. C to command on June 23, died of disease just six weeks later on August 2. Now, Edward B. Harnett, Company A’s original second lieutenant, was the Germans’ fourth captain in three months.3
For Dan Sickles this was a critical time in his career. He had won the battle with Congress to keep his stars, to be sure, but now he was fighting to keep the command he had so painstakingly built. Excelsior Brigade was nearly worn out, and divisional commander Joe Hooker threatened consolidation. Unless Sickles could find enough new men to bring his five regiments back to strength, he’d be a general without a command. Sickles confidently assured Hooker he could find the men, and by mid–July, Dan was back home in New York drumming up badly needed levies. Dan’s itinerary included much more than recruitment rallies and speeches at county fairs—there were serious political fires that needed tending. With the success of the Excelsior Brigade, some in New York felt Sickles’ stock had risen high enough that consideration for a run for Congress was in order. Dan Sickles was nearing an important crossroads: continue as the heroic military figure, triumphant at the head of his legion, or give it up for a possible return to the halls of Congress and the accompanying power that he desperately craved.4 All of this meant Dan would be gone for weeks or months, leaving Nelson Taylor to run the brigade just as the colonel had done frequently since leaving Maryland.
Back in Washington with his army holed up at Harrison’s Landing, President Lincoln faced some tough decisions. Lincoln wasn’t ready to sack McClellan for his inactivity, but he would allow units to be taken away from him and given to a general who might use them to better advantage. Major General John Pope had recently been given command of Federal troops within the Army of Virginia and talked a good fight. Pope had been moderately successful in the west, and he vowed a vigorous campaign to smash the Confederate army on his way to taking Richmond by gathering the Federal units that his predecessor Irwin McDowell had left ineffectually scattered about northern Virginia. The frustrated Lincoln had concluded it was the aggressive sounding Pope who would be the recipient of McClellan’s idle veterans.
Third Excelsior, along with all of III Corps, received orders on August 11 to break camp and move back down the Peninsula. In Yorktown they would board steamers and sail for an eventual rendezvous with Pope. For three days everyone in the regiment organized company gear and stenciled identifying names and numbers on haversacks, backpacks and tents. Finally, on the 14th, the 72nd and the rest of the Excelsiors were on the march.
For many men, the march back down the Peninsula was a clear admission of McClellan’s failure. Others saw it as a grand redeployment that would eventually take them far onto the enemy’s flank, in position for the true final offensive. Yet for others, just being on the move somewhere—anywhere—was better than sitting swatting sand fleas at Harrison’s Landing. Moving south was a slow affair; the corps moved only about six miles per day, less than half of what could really be accomplished, “but McClellan is taking things easy though Pope is badly in want of reinforcements,”5 wrote Private Sneden, of the III Corps staff. The men plodded along many of the same roads on which they had fought and many of their comrades had died just months earlier. Excelsior Brigade chaplain Joseph Twichell wrote:
Here we are, retracing, retracing, retracing steps that cost blood and glorious young life. It almost broke my heart to go by Williamsburg again. I seemed to hear the gallant fellows calling from the woods to hail us on our way. So you see the splendid “change of base” was all poppycock…. I can’t think of the 30,000 corpses we leave behind without a bitter thought. The 30,000 corpses stand for a million sighs and tears which will not be stopped for a score of years.6
(Official losses at Williamsburg are put at around 3,200 but perhaps Twichell was referring to the entire Peninsula campaign—ed.)
Southern civilians, women and old men mostly, were happy to see the defeated Yankee invaders going home and shouted insults from their front porches, doorways and windows. Good Christian men such as Hiram Stoddard probably just endured the taunts as they passed, while other blue-coats no doubt hurled biting replies of their own. Nearing Williamsburg, many of the officers rode over to Fort Magruder, the former Confederate defensive strong point south of the city. Corps commander Peter Heintzelman, First Division commander Phil Kearney, Second Division commander Hooker and others were among the party. The fort’s trenches, which once had held Rebel marksmen, now brimmed with stagnant water. Thick bushes and vines mingled with graves and faded wooden markers, the names of the dead nearly obliterated by the pernicious Virginia rain and sun. Piles of the partially burned bones of horses and mules killed in the early May battle lay nearby; the previous pyres having failed to completely consume the carcasses.
Catlett Station was a point along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad that was the focus of attack by raiding Confederate cavalry, especially during the weeks leading up to Second Bull Run (Third Excelsior Association).
III Corps began boarding ships at Yorktown on August 21 for the trip north to Pope, a week after leaving Harrison’s Landing. The boys of the 72nd’s companies packed aboard the large ocean steamer Vanderbilt while other Excelsior men boarded different ships. The regiment left Yorktown the next day for the trip up the Chesapeake, and almost immediately the Vanderbilt ran aground. She languished there nearly all day before getting herself off and resuming the trip. The steamer was scheduled to land at Aquia Creek, but a change of orders had her landing 30 miles farther up the Potomac, just south of Washington at Alexandria. She arrived at noon on the 24th. The next morning Taylor’s boys and the rest of Hooker’s division marched three miles west of town and made camp at Shuter’s Hill. Here they waited to board rail cars for the rendezvous with Pope at his headquarters 40 miles or so down the line at Warrenton Junction.7
With most of McClellan’s army still encamped at Harrison’s Landing and another part being removed to bolster Pope, Confederate army commander Robert E. Lee recognized an opportunity. He now felt free to shift forces away from the Peninsula to meet Pope’s threat from north of Richmond. Pope had established a strong position on the north side of the Rapidan River, which ran west-east from the Blue Ridge Mountains to Fredericksburg. And now Pope grew even stronger with the addition of the Peninsula veterans. Lee needed to force Pope out of his prepared defensive line were he to have any chance of defeating him and pushing the Yankees out of northern Virginia. The Confederate commander decided upon a risky plan, one he hoped would pull Pope’s army northeast and away from the Rapidan. By sending Stonewall Jackson’s I Corps on a wide march around the Federal right, Jackson might then strike at the Yankee rear, forcing Pope to react. Lee knew James Longstreet’s II Corps remained opposing the Federals south of the Rapidan and would be in danger should Pope choose to attack rather than pull back as hoped. Jackson recognized the risk that either he or Longstreet could face the entirety of Pope’s army alone, but Jackson also understood such a sweep into Pope’s rear presented great possibilities for defeating small, isolated Federal commands, burning stores and bridges, and in general, creating havoc.
With corps commander Heintzelman and the rest of his blue-coated veterans now firmly established on the solid ground of northern Virginia, there was a problem: many of his senior regimental commanders were absent on leave. With little opportunity these past few months to spend their pay and even fewer opportunities for furlough, most of the corps’ colonels, majors and many captains were gone to nearby Washington or parts north, leaving junior officers in charge. Sickles was still away recruiting, and Col. Taylor commanded the Excelsiors. Taylor faced the hard fact that of his five regiments, only two were commanded by men above the rank of captain. With Lieutenant Colonel Moses and Major Stevens away, his own regiment, the 72nd New York, was now under the temporary command of 30-year-old Captain Harmon J. Bliss of Company G. Harmon didn’t know it yet, but his ability to lead would be tested like never before.
Bliss and his men would be traveling along a 40-mile or so stretch of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad that reached west and south from Alexandria to the center of Pope’s operations at Warrenton Junction. This important supply line crossed over Bull Run and through Manassas Junction, near the old battlefield and over other small creeks including Broad Run and Kettle Run. The last 10 miles of the trip, the track passed through Bristoe Station and Catlett’s Station before arriving at Warrenton Junction.
Striking camp at Shuter’s Hill, the train leaving Alexandria was eventually packed and on its way. Many aboard had an actual seat but others rode atop baggage cars fully exposed to the weather. Still more were crammed inside cattle cars, faring only slightly better than their comrades, protected from the elements by slim slatted sides. When the last of Hooker’s men arrived at their destination late into the evening of the 26th, many had endured what one Excelsior man described as a “protracted shiver.” As the New Yorkers reached Warrenton Junction, Hooker arrived back from Washington. During their trip these Peninsula veterans saw Pope’s men preparing defenses for an expected Rebel attack. Though Pope’s troops worked diligently, it was clear they were oblivious as to the direction the attack might come. These disorganized preparations were disheartening to the III Corps veterans, signaling Pope had no real plan and no real idea the location of Jackson’s Confederates.
Serving only to maximize Yankee bafflement, Jackson’s men cut the rail line at Bristoe Station only hours after Hooker’s Third Brigade passed through. Striking here was critical to Jackson’s run around Pope’s flanks and onto the Federal rear. Southern troops quickly overpowered the small garrison at Bristoe Station and began to feast upon the rich hoard of supplies. Many Rebs ate or gathered those supplies that could be carried off, while others set about the task of burning storehouses, rail cars and locomotives. Soon fires burned brilliant enough for III Corps men to see the glow from over ten miles away. Equal acts of pillage and destruction occurred further up the line at Manassas Junction as more of Jackson’s units descended there.
At Bristoe Station, Confederate troops worked to disrupt Yankee rail traffic. After building barricades across the tracks, a Yankee train bound for Alexandria soon came upon the station. Either unable or unwilling to stop, the train smashed the obstacles, scattering timbers as it pressed on through a hail of Rebel curses and musketry. Arriving at Manassas Junction and the safety of Federal troops, the shaken engineer showed off his bullet riddled locomotive, Secretary, and told his harrowing tale. Union troops telegraphed Alexandria, reporting the incident to commanders there. Little did they know this would be among the last messages sent before Jackson’s men arrived. Back at Bristoe Station, frustrated Confederate troops resolved to do better at catching trains. After reinforcing their obstacles they had soon derailed two unsuspecting locomotives. As a third northbound train approached, its sharp-eyed engineer spotted the previous wrecks, and after stopping in time, he returned to Warrenton Junction. Because of earlier sporadic raids by marauding Rebel cavalry, initial reaction to moves against Bristoe Station garnered only mild concern from senior Union commanders at both Alexandria and Warrenton Junction.
This stretch of the railroad had been subject to the attentions of Confederate raiders before, and Pope needed to know the full magnitude of the attack. After all, a commanding general wouldn’t base the movements of his great army solely on the testimony of a rattled railroad man. Only four days earlier, a large force of Rebel cavalry under Jeb Stuart had fallen upon the small garrison at Catlett’s Station. There, they helped themselves to what supplies could be carried, including one of Pope’s dress uniforms. The looting complete, enemy horsemen set fire to anything flammable, including a railroad bridge. Fortunately for the Federals, just as the Confederates began their work a heavy rain set in, extinguishing the flames and saving the vital bridge.
Well before the last of Hooker’s division arrived at Warrenton Junction and before the entirety of the Excelsior Brigade had arrived, the 72nd was on the move. Needing more information about events back up the rail line, Hooker ordered Taylor to dispatch a regiment to investigate. This chore fell to Captain Bliss and his 300 men.
Finding no rail transportation immediately available, Bliss marched the boys on the 26th around 10 p.m. along a wagon road that paralleled the tracks. Soon after their departure, though, a small train was detailed to move the regiment. Bliss countermarched his men and returned. Loaded back on the cars, Bliss and his men finally left Warrenton Junction around 2 a.m. Eventually the regiment arrived at Catlett Station, the buildings scarred by frequent skirmishes with Rebel horsemen. Here Bliss requested a detail of cavalry be assigned to join him, presumably to serve as scouts and pickets as they moved in this dark and uncertain land. He was told a group of horsemen were already in position awaiting him near the stream of Kettle Run, which lay about a mile this side of Bristoe. Bliss accepted this and moved forward.8
Bliss deployed flankers and skirmishers for the last mile of his advance, but upon crossing Kettle Run found no Federal cavalry awaiting him. Despite the lack of mounted support, Bliss pushed on, bringing his men to within half a mile of Bristoe Station. Moving forward, his troops were greeted by destroyed telegraph lines, the wires cut or ripped from their insulators, and burned rail cars, some of which were reduced to a pair of trucks sitting amidst smoldering wreckage. Discovering the station still in enemy hands, he placed the regiment into line of battle, threw out skirmishers and crept forward for a better look. It was still before dawn, but in the glow of burning cars Bliss could see and hear all “Southron” activity. Presently the Rebels became alerted to the presence of Yankee troops. Major General Richard Ewell hastily formed his three Confederate brigades, which held the station, to move against Bliss’ New Yorkers. “I saw one column file to the left, and had no doubt their purpose was to flank us and cut off my train at the Kettle Run Bridge,” reported the Chautauqua captain.9
Outnumbered by three brigades of infantry and with Reb cavalry moving on his right to block his line of withdrawal, the veteran captain paused to weigh his options. “I called Adjutant Hinman to my position to confirm my opinion and to profit by his judgment,”10 remembered Bliss, mindful of his own lack of experience in commanding such a large body as a regiment. While anxious to launch a heroic attack into the still-forming Rebel troops, Bliss thought better of it. “My pride urged me to accept the honor leading the gallant Third into battle, but my judgment rebelled against this desire … and I reluctantly gave the order to embark again.”11
Retreating back across Kettle Run, Bliss deployed pickets to cover all lines of possible enemy advance. He ordered the telegraph operator to establish contact with Warrenton Junction and soon the telegraph wires were tapped and the operator, using his small, portable key, sent the following message addressed to Pope’s aide-de-camp, Col. T.C.H. Smith:
Have proceeded to near Bristoe Station. Find a train of cars burning and telegraph wires broken and enemy in very heavy force. Do not deem it prudent to go on without further orders. Have conductor of burned train with me, who reports there being a large force of the enemy. Have returned to this side of the Kettle Run Bridge.12
Bliss deployed three companies, ordering them to hold the bridge at all hazards, but he recognized that “it had no natural advantages for defense, in fact, they were all against us.”13 With the situation worsening and no word from headquarters other than to “wait a little,” men anxiously looked to Bliss for a decision. For 45 minutes he had watched Southern troops advance on both flanks, followed by a larger body to his front. Unable to “consent to the useless sacrifice of my brave 300 men,”14 Bliss ordered his three companies back from the bridge while the rest of the regiment loaded on the train. Rebel bullets buzzed through the air as Emerson and the rest clambered aboard the cars. Enemy skirmishers nipped at the heels of Union stragglers. With everyone aboard, Bliss ordered the engineer to move back. Ewell’s men now unmasked a cannon previously hidden behind the Confederate column and wheeled it near the bridge. With the locomotive gathering steam, the Rebel artillery opened up; its first two shots ricocheted within 30 yards of the engine. As the train collected speed and chugged into the darkness, other cannon shots flew wildly into the night. Despite the exhilaration of their narrow escape, some men found time and room enough to sleep while returning to Warrenton Junction. Bliss was finally back near 5 a.m. and reported to Taylor the night’s ordeal.15
Pope, realizing this enemy force was much more than a raiding party, saw an opportunity. Hoping to cut off Jackson, the general ordered most of III Corps to concentrate near Gainesville, about seven miles northwest of Manassas Junction. Flushing the Confederates out of Bristoe Station and restoring the railroad was assigned to Hooker’s division of three brigades with help from two and one-half regiments from Kearney’s First Division.
Lee’s bold gamble had worked. Pope abandoned his positions along the Rapidan and set out for Jackson believing he could trap and destroy this wing of the Confederate army. Pope failed to realize that by leaving his positions along the river, Longstreet would be free to move and join Jackson. In reality it was now Pope who was being stalked.
Captain Bliss and his weary New Yorkers were now back in Warrenton Junction, bringing Hooker’s division back to full strength and allowing him to move against the unwelcome foe. Hooker set out near 7 a.m. toward Bristoe and Manassas. Little in the way of supplies had arrived, and the division moved without wagons or its customary artillery. There was only ammunition enough for each man to pack about 40 rounds into his cartridge box and pockets. Pope accompanied the Second Division, and while he and Hooker rode horseback, nearly every other officer walked for lack of mounts. The day was hot as Hooker’s division marched along the same road Third Excelsior had hiked earlier. Overtaken by heat and fatigue, men throughout the division fell out. Despite conditions, the brigades made good progress. Upon reaching Catlett’s Station, two batteries of cannon joined Hooker’s force as it moved northeast.16 Near noon, the men encountered an enemy outpost and a section of Rebel artillery. Skirmishers went forward and easily brushed aside the enemy nuisance. Two hours’ march later, the division came upon Kettle Run, which ran nearly perpendicular to the tracks and their line of march. Here the Confederates were in force beyond the creek and beyond a formidable stand of woods and some other uncertain ground. Hooker ordered the division into line of battle, placing Grover’s First Brigade right of the tracks. Four regiments of Third Brigade, under temporary command of Colonel Joseph Carr, formed somewhat astride and to the left of the tracks. Carr’s other two regiments, the 6th and 7th New Jersey, went with Hooker, who advanced them and Kearney’s loaner regiments to a slight rise on the left, offering a good vantage point. Colonel Taylor and his Excelsior Brigade lined up to the left and slightly behind Carr’s main body to protect his flanks.17
As the Federals advanced into the woods, Grover’s First Brigade, moving on the right, became bogged down, while the other two brigades managed to press forward. Dismounted officers effectively pushed their men through the thick trees and undergrowth. Carr’s Third Brigade continued toward the bridge, and the Second New York were sent ahead as skirmishers. To hinder Carr’s progress, two regiments of Louisiana skirmishers deployed to the Yankee side of Kettle Run. Around 2:30 p.m. and within one-half mile of Bristoe Station, the enemy engaged Carr’s men. As one enemy regiment poured an effective fire into the struggling ranks of Third Brigade, the other set fire to the bridge. “I formed line of battle with the Second New York Volunteers and the Fifth and Eighth New Jersey Volunteers and advanced through a dense wood, when the enemy made a stand,” Carr recalled.18 As Yankees pressed the attack, the Louisiana men fell back across the stream in the face of Carr’s superior force and went into line several hundred yards ahead of Ewell’s main body.
Carr continued across Kettle Run with his brigade straddling the tracks. Advancing through a clover field mixed with brambles and blackberry vines, the Yankees pulled against the vegetation, which clung and tugged at their trousers.19 Carr maneuvered the Second N.Y. and Eighth N.J. left of the tracks while the Fifth N.J. remained on the right. Gen. Hooker took over command of both the Sixth and Seventh N.J. and stayed on the far left. Emerging from the woods, Carr’s exhausted men again came under heavy musket fire. Previously hidden artillery batteries were now unmasked and began pouring solid shot and canister into Third Brigade. Yankee soldiers clung to the ground as sheets of iron flew overhead. The few officers and aides on horseback galloped about the field despite the maelstrom, relaying orders and reassuring the men.20
Carr shouted orders to regimental commanders to organize and align his three regiments. Meanwhile, company officers scuttled amongst their lines, which were crouched under the terrible storm of Rebel lead. Hooker took two regiments under his command wide to the left in an effort to flank the enemy. Moving forward, color bearers uncased their regimental standards as “the Second New York Volunteers and Eighth New Jersey Volunteers advanced through the woods and charged the enemy, driving him about 200 yards into a thick woods, where they again made a stand and gave battle,” reported Carr.21 With Third Brigade now butted up against the bulk of the Confederate force, Col. Taylor brought up the Excelsiors. Finding no enemy on the extreme left of the battlefield, Taylor recognized how hotly Third Brigade was engaged and “at once brought forward the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Regiments of the brigade, and placed them in position on the left of the line formed by Colonel Carr.”22
Stalled in heavy woods, Grover’s First Brigade was unable to support Carr’s right as Confederates moved to threaten this exposed flank. “I observed a column of the enemy’s infantry file down the hill in front and take position parallel to and on the right of the railroad and to the rear of the line formed by a portion of the Third Brigade,” recalled Col. Taylor.23 Enfilading fire from the 60th Georgia Infantry ripped through the companies of Carr’s line. Responding to this danger, Taylor ordered the 70th N.Y. under Captain Charles Young and Capt. Bliss’ 72nd N.Y. to change front and advance toward the enemy. The two Excelsior regiments formed a second line behind Carr’s line and moved from the left side of the battlefield toward the right, as Southern lead tore into the New Yorkers. “Musketry from the front, artillery from the left, played furiously upon us, soon followed by a murderous fire on our right flank from behind the railway embankment,”24 reported Capt. Young, adding, “Under this terrible triple fire the First and Third Regiments were ordered forward.”25 Despite the hellish conditions these Peninsula veterans responded coolly and precisely to the orders as they moved right. Halting his two regiments within a short range of his enemy, Taylor ordered fire on his foe, who now scrambled for the protection of the track’s roadbed. Pouring round after precious round into the Georgians, the Excelsiors stood their ground, as the two regiments came under the concentrated fire of two sections of enemy cannon. The regiments were getting cut up as Rebel lead and iron ruthlessly cast about. Chaplain Twichell worked to bring off the wounded and thought it astounding he was not killed. “For a space of fifteen minutes I expected every minute to be hit. The sound of the bullets was like the humming of bees, while the roaring, crackling, shells plunged and burst on every side.”26 A cannonball cut through one of the few Yankee mounts, taking the rider’s leg with it.27 Enemy artillery played havoc on the brigades as Taylor rode off to the rear seeking “to bring forward one of our own batteries” to silence the Rebel guns.28
After finding General Grover and explaining the situation, Taylor persuaded the reluctant commander of an unengaged battery to come to the aid of his brigade. The battery moved so slowly, however, that by the time they arrived at the fight, “the necessity of his services had ceased.”29 Capt. Young described the action during Taylor’s absence: “At this time the fight raged fearfully, each contestant holding well his ground. Our comrades fell thick and fast.”30 With men dying and cartridges running low, Lt. William J. Kay of First Excelsior proposed a charge. Young and Bliss conferred, and a hearty cheer was thoughtfully substituted, though the effect on the Rebels seemed the same. “Hardly had that glorious cheer mingled with the whistling bullets ere the Rebels began to fall back before the eyes of our eager men,”31 remembered Young. With ammunition at a premium and their men already anxious to attack, both captains saw an opportunity and ordered their two regiments to advance. New York men surged forward, scattering the Georgians. Soon the regimental colors of the 70th N.Y. flew above the track. “I never have seen a handsomer sight than Sickles’ brigade charging on the car track behind which the rebels lay firing at them. One of Sickles’ regiments got their colors planted on the track and soon Johnny Rebel was skedaddling across the hill,”32 observed one of Carr’s Seventh New Jersey men. Some suggested continued pursuit, “but fearing to disarrange plans, we thought best to remain in our present position,”33 concluded Young.
Hooker deployed other artillery that began to silence Rebel guns, forcing some to limber up and retire to the far side of Broad Run, which lay about two miles beyond Kettle Run. Jackson allowed Ewell’s division to conduct a fighting retreat in face of this superior Yankee force, yet both Confederate flanks seriously faltered as they began falling back. Capt. Young wrote, “General Hooker had placed a battery in position on the left, which under his personal supervision quickly silenced the guns of the enemy. His [the enemy’s] right and left broken, we found no difficulty in piercing his center and gaining possession of the field.”34
Third and First brigades both continued their pursuit of the retreating enemy. As Taylor’s Excelsiors reformed, General Grover ordered them to hold in reserve, right of the tracks. The New York men remained here a short time but then were ordered forward a short distance and to the left of the tracks. Here, Taylor’s brigade bivouacked for the night behind a strong picket line.35
Losses among the Excelsiors were heavy, nearly one-third of Taylor’s men having been either killed or wounded. Captain William Burns of the 73rd New York reported 12 killed, 44 wounded and 3 missing out of his already weakened regiment of 99 men. The three regiments who remained on Carr’s left all suffered nominally higher casualties than the two fighting to take the tracks. Capt. Bliss reported over 20 casualties among his 72nd, with Captain John P. Sanford of Company B counted among the wounded. Losses in Capt. Young’s 70th N.Y. were only about half that number.
Bristoe Station was in Federal hands as the last of Ewell’s division retreated just before sundown across Broad Run on their way to Manassas Junction. Hooker made little attempt to follow, because each man was down to just a few cartridges. During their retreat, Confederate troops successfully burned the wooden bridge over the stream, further complicating any notion of a Federal pursuit. Total losses for the attacking Federals exceeded 400, while Ewell’s Confederates suffered around 150.36
By driving the Confederates from the field, Pope believed he had won an important victory despite the losses and ordered his forces to continue movement toward Manassas Junction. Pope’s maneuvers played right into the hands of the Confederates, who sought to divert attention away from Thoroughfare Gap, 20 miles to the west, where Longstreet would soon be marching to unite with Jackson.
Emerson Merrell, the Germans of Company A, and the rest of the regiment made camp that night the best they could. With most of their gear either lost in transit from the Peninsula, back at Warrenton Junction, or worse, having been burned for fear it might fall into enemy hands, some no doubt remembered the Seven Days fight, with its constant movement, lack of rest and short supplies. But these were veteran troops who took pride in accomplishments past and future. So with confidence in their pickets, they did what all true veterans did at a time like this—they slept.
Morning broke near Bristoe Station as Captain Bliss assembled the men and prepared to march. Following the rail line, they would continue northeast toward Manassas Junction, where a larger body of Jackson’s army had earlier destroyed Union interests. From here Bliss would head west toward Centerville, where Pope was summoning his legions to concentrate.
For several days, Pope had received varied and often conflicting reports regarding the exact location of the Confederate Army. Pope was exhilarated by Hooker’s victory at Bristoe Station and desperately wanted to press his advantage, but Pope was unsure of the enemy’s location and had sent Union forces marching and countermarching in an effort to make meaningful contact. The enemy was close, but Pope was making only slightly more than an educated guess when he ordered his army to concentrate near Centerville. But before Pope could fully assemble his army, Jackson himself established contact with his Yankee foe late that afternoon.
A portion of Jackson’s corps had taken up positions in a railroad cut near the Warrenton Turnpike and near 6 p.m. launched a flank attack into Rufus King’s division of green troops from Indiana and Wisconsin as they moved north toward Centerville. A fierce fight followed, lasting into the night and costing both sides a combined 2,300 men, but the weakened King broke off the action come morning, gathered his division and continued toward Centerville.37
When word of the fighting reached Pope, the commanding general issued new orders. Instead of marshaling all available units at Centerville, the new orders called for Union troops to collect farther south, near the site of King’s fight with Jackson, close to Groveton on the old Bull Run battlefield.
All of the 28th, Colonel Taylor marched his Excelsior Brigade north, past Manassas Junction, eventually halting to bivouac on the south bank of Bull Run Creek. The following morning with new orders in hand, the New Yorkers continued their march, moving through Centerville, then southwest, reaching Pope’s new assembly point around 2 p.m. Here Captain Bliss and the rest discovered the battle against Jackson’s Confederates well under way.
Still deployed in the natural defensive position of the unfinished railroad cut, Jackson’s brigades stretched their battle line for over two miles. Jackson fully intended to make his fight in the cut, but Pope was convinced the Confederate general was attempting a withdrawal. Pope planned to launch attacks at both of Jackson’s flanks, turn those flanks and bag the entire Confederate I Corps.
During late morning, troops of Franz Sigel’s corps launched their attacks. In sometimes desperate fighting, the Rebels held their ground, but Jackson worried he might not have men enough to persevere in the ever-escalating battle. At 10 a.m. some of Jackson’s worries were eased. He learned the leading division of Longstreet’s II Corps was taking up positions on his extreme right, though Longstreet still refused to commit his troops to Jackson’s fight.
Pope was focused on Jackson’s troops while remaining ignorant that Longstreet’s Rebel troops were moving onto his left flank. Pope committed fresh troops to the fight by relieving Sigel’s Corps at 3 p.m. and beginning new attacks using men from Heintzelman’s III Corps and Reno’s IX Corps. Among III Corps men, Hooker’s First Brigade under Grover was in lead position. Carr’s Third Brigade and Taylor’s Excelsiors supported Grover. Hooker would aim his attack near the center of Jackson’s line.
Grover’s men advanced over ground upon which earlier Federal attacks had failed. Unlike these earlier attacks, Grover avoided open ground and struck the Confederates from the cover of a patch of woods adjoining Jackson’s railroad cut. First Brigade quickly came to grips with the enemy. A well-directed musket volley staggered the Confederate line as Grover’s men used the bayonet to secure the breach. “We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here occurred a short, sharp and obstinate hand-to-hand conflict with bayonets and clubbed muskets,” Grover reported. “Many of the enemy were bayoneted in their tracks, others struck down with the butts of pieces, and onward pressed our line.”38 Fighting through the enemy’s first line, Grover’s men then defeated the full weight of the Reb second line. But with their lines now seriously thinned, Grover’s men could not overcome the closed ranks of a third Confederate line and though fighting furiously, First Brigade was forced to retire.39
As Grover brawled with three lines of Confederates, Carr advanced Third Brigade toward the railroad cut just southwest of Grover. Carr’s New Jersey men fought hard for two hours after relieving troops under Gen. Sigel, but with their ammunition exhausted, Third Brigade withdrew without gaining appreciable ground.
Now relieved, Carr conferred briefly with Taylor, who began positioning his Second Brigade. Bliss, Merrell, Stoddard and the rest were posted on the extreme right of the line. Captain Young’s 70th New York was posted just to the left of the 72nd. Moving to within 15 paces of the line formerly occupied by Carr’s men, Taylor halted and dressed his line of battle and sent skirmishers forward: “Having everything in readiness, I gave the order to advance.”40 It was then that disaster struck.
A Federal brigade under Colonel James Nagle, already heavily engaged on Taylor’s front-left, was surprised by a sudden Rebel charge. Unable to hold, Nagle’s line collapsed. Fleeing Yankees and Confederate pursuers crashed squarely into the left side of Excelsior Brigade, carrying most of the 71st New York away with them. The brigade crumbled from left to right as the human wave obliterated Taylor’s ordered ranks. “We had fairly time to reach the point designated when the rebels, with a murderous shout, accompanied by a sharp fire, broke through the brigade in front, forcing them pell-mell on our line of battle,”41 recalled Capt. Young.
Located on the far right, the 72nd boys were able to hold firm as Taylor galloped immediately to the brigade’s left, where men fought in a desperate, whirling, hand-to-hand contest. “Seeing the confusion, I rode hastily to this part of the line, accompanied by my two aides, lieutenants Tremain [Henry Tremain, 73rd N.Y.] and Dwight [Charles Dwight, 70th N.Y.], and endeavored to stay this disgraceful retreat, but it was in vain; the tide could not be stemmed.”42
The attack came from Colonel Bradley T. Johnson’s brigade of Virginians, who had been lying down, concealed, and completely unexpected. “I ordered a charge, and with a yell the Second Brigade went through them, shattering, breaking, and routing them,”43 remembered Col. Johnson. As surging Confederates completely caved in the Excelsior’s left, so transfixed were the charging men of 42nd Virginia that they neglected to pick up the prize of the fallen New York regimental colors.44
Taylor worked to salvage his position and issued orders to units still cohesive enough to comply. The 72nd turned its muskets towards the brigade’s faltering left and the Confederate attackers, but with the mixing of friend and foe, Bliss’ regiment was “powerless by the influence and presence of the disorganized troops”45 to fire upon the enemy. Rebels and broken remains of the other Federal regiments were soon amongst Bliss’ boys and in “overpowering numbers.”46 The fight was mob warfare of the worst kind. Regiments in once ordered ranks were now reduced to countless acts of single combat. Rocks and rifle butts served as clubs, the bayonet used freely as men gouged, slashed and stabbed. Opponents fired at one another from less than an arm’s length. Mounted officers were pulled from their horses as hand-to-hand fighting churned beneath their stirrups. Regimental color bearers seemed to be the particular targets of trophy-seeking Southerners. Men in the 70th N.Y. fought off repeated enemy attempts to seize their flags. Nearby, as the 71st’s color bearer was shot, his mates gathered the banner and evacuated it safely. As Rebels pressed in on the flag of the 74thNew York, the color sergeant tore it from the staff, and fighting a swirling, 360-degree battle, saved it. Aides Tremain and Dwight were soon both captured while attempting to bring order to the situation. With all organization and cohesion lost and attempts to hold position futile, Taylor called for the brigade to fall back.47
As the Federals pulled back, the Confederates continued to press forward, bolstered by the arrival of another brigade under Gen. William E. Starke. “The enemy now broke and ran, and we pursued, firing as fast as we could,”48 described Private John Worsham of the 21st Virginia. “We followed them into the woods, and drove them out on the other side, where we halted and were ordered back to the railroad.”49
Falling back 60 paces or so, the Excelsiors stopped to fire upon their Confederate foes. Rebel regiments and companies were jumbled, with men mixed, one in front of another, with no formed firing lines. For fear of hitting each other, the Confederates could not return an effective fire. Despite the Yankees’ brief stand, the Rebels continued to swarm after the retreating New Yorkers, all the while threatening Taylor’s flank and rear. The Excelsiors eventually rallied in a small wood nearly 300 yards from their original line. “After extricating the brigade from its entanglement I reformed the line,” wrote Taylor.50
After deploying skirmishers, the Excelsiors awaited the advance of the enemy. Taylor rode among the regiments, aligning formations and encouraging men just as he had done all day. Surprisingly, the expected attack failed to materialize. “The enemy had also fallen back, and seemed unwilling to improve his temporary advantage,”51 Bliss wrote later.
Returning to their original positions, the Confederates took with them two captured Federal cannons that had supported the now failed attacks. As Rebs dragged the captured guns, another Federal battery fired upon their retiring enemy. “As we returned, a Yankee battery of eight guns had full play on us in the field,”52 wrote Virginian Worsham, adding, “Our line became a little confused; we halted, every man instantly turned and faced the battery. As we did so, I heard a thud on my right, as if one had been struck with a heavy fist. Looking around I saw a man at my side standing erect, with his head off, a stream of blood spurting a foot or more from his neck.”53 The decapitated man was a captain in the 42nd V.A., one of four men killed by that single round.
With Rebels pulling back to the railroad cut, Taylor and his men held their position until the arrival of General Phil Kearney’s division, which promptly went into formation and engaged the enemy. After Kearney’s advance, and with his brigade out of immediate danger, Taylor called in the skirmishers. With Kearney committed and Taylor’s brigade safe for the moment, Hooker ordered the battered Excelsiors to an open field farther to the rear. Here the men of the five regiments bivouacked for the night. Bliss had lost six men wounded and four captured in the day’s fight. The combined brigade losses were 63 killed, wounded or missing; nearly half this number came from the 71st N.Y., who had borne the brunt of the Confederate charge and ensuing melee.54
Come the morning of the 30th, Pope still believed he could “bag” the entirety of Jackson’s Corps. Recognizing that the previous day’s attacks had gone forward in a piecemeal fashion, the offensively minded Pope ordered large, coordinated and well-supported assaults. Attacks would press along the whole enemy line, eventually breaking what surely must be a weakened enemy. Whether Pope fully understood the danger or just chose to ignore it is uncertain, but nearly all of Longstreet’s II Corps was now positioned on his left flank and an attack solely against Jackson would present a tempting target.
Hooker’s Division would be held in reserve on this day. The emaciated regiments that made up the three brigades of this smallish division would best be used in support. By afternoon, Bliss’ men and the rest of the brigade had broken camp and were under arms. Hiram Stoddard and the rest of his mates of Company I, and indeed the entire brigade, had repacked their backpacks with the little gear they had. Cleaning their muskets, the sound of popping caps filled the air as they readied weapons and themselves for battle. With orders in hand, the Excelsiors stood prepared to march in pursuit of an enemy Pope was sure would soon be in rout.
After some preliminary probes into Jackson’s line, Pope launched his grand attack at around 3 p.m. sure that the weight of numbers alone would smash his stubborn opponent. Jackson recognized the danger and urgently asked Lee to send him more men. Lee passed the request along to Longstreet, who, instead of sending men, answered with an artillery barrage directed into the left flank of the advancing Yankees. Within ten minutes the Federal troops were retiring, their packed ranks suffering heavily from well-aimed Confederate cannon fire.
His attack thrown into some confusion by the artillery bombardment, Pope doggedly sought the initiative and pressed forward. When Confederate infantry from Longstreet’s Corps were discovered moving to assist Jackson, Pope ordered John Reynolds’ division to move in to counter this threat. Reynolds had been guarding much of the Federal left, and this was the opportunity the patient Longstreet had been awaiting. With Reynolds out of position, Longstreet launched a general attack into the whole of the Federal left. Without men enough to counter an assault into his flank, Pope’s entire attack broke down and quickly turned into a full-fledged retreat.
Federal units frantically moved about the field, desperate to establish a defensive line that would hold, but the Rebel counterattack seemed unstoppable. Bliss and the other Excelsiors were ordered here and there in preparation for meeting the enemy, sent to support this battery or that. As Bliss’ companies moved about the field, men flinched and ducked under a leaden sky screeching with the sound of solid shot and bursting shell. In each new position the regiment prepared itself, but neither orders to advance nor enemy infantry ever materialized. Though Stoddard and the rest had stood under a nearly constant hail of lead and iron, the regiment suffered no losses for the day.55
With their army in total retreat toward the protection of Centerville, the Yankees had to get across the Bull Run Creek at the Stone Bridge (the same bridge Union troops had been sent scampering across 13 months before, in the first battle here). Holding the crest of Henry Hill near the bridge was critical to covering the retreat, and by 7 p.m. the Confederate onslaught began to run out of steam. Confederates had threatened both Federal flanks, but their energies were sapped by a day of hard fighting and effective Yankee artillery fire that helped discourage two assaults against Henry Hill. Before a third attack could be made, night fell, leaving the hill in Federal hands. Under the cover of darkness, the remainder of Pope’s army made good its escape.
Private Emerson Merrell summarized the fight this way in a letter home:
We cornered old Stonewall and his crew and haunted him about a day ½ until he was reinforced by the whole of the rebel army in Virginia. The rebels threw railroad track instead of balls, the pieces would come through the air over our heads, a screeching like a jackass in a fit of nightmare. The Yankees gave them a warm reception till about 4 o’clock in the afternoon when they succeeded in turning our left flank.56
The endeavor had cost the Federal Army dearly. Pope’s offensive campaign resulted in losses of over 16,000 men against nearly 9,200 of the enemy. The Excelsior Brigade had lost 329 men since its hard fight at Kettle Run and was practically useless as a fighting force. Hooker’s entire division was a mere shell of its former self, prompting Fighting Joe to pen this report from Centerville to his III Corps commander, Peter Heintzelman, on August 31:
It is my duty to report for the information of the major-general commanding the corps that my division is in no condition to meet the enemy. This was communicated to me yesterday by my brigade commanders, and on inquiry I find their morale to be such as to warrant me in entertaining the most serious apprehension of their conduct in their present state. I ascribe this great demoralization in the men to the severe losses they have sustained in battle, both here and on the Peninsula. They are in no condition to go in to battle at this time.
Very respectfully,
Joseph Hooker57