The march back to Falmouth only took a few hours. There was a great relief that the Confederates had not pursued or shelled the river crossings as the Union corps jammed the approaches. No one had expected to return to Falmouth, so most camps had been razed before they left; now they had to be built again. The new camps were located a short distance from the old sites. Wood supplies had long been worn out, and fresh sinks were imperative. The Excelsiors welcomed their new site atop a small hill that caught refreshing, cool breezes. With spring’s warmer weather settling in, men wouldn’t need the elaborate winter-proof cabins they had built before; the lighter canvas tents would be just fine.1
James Dean and the rest were anxious to let parents know they had made it through the big Chancellorsville fight. A fourth of the regiment had been killed or become missing or wounded since just a few days before. Within ten days of the battle, Dean had already sent three letters home and was restless to get a reply. With many of Third Excelsior’s officers either killed or wounded, there commenced the great shuffling and promoting of company lieutenants and captains that had always followed other bad fights. Twenty-four-year-old Charles Foss, first sergeant of Company D, was now promoted to second lt. of Company C. New Jersey man Luke Healy, who was top sergeant with Company F, was now made second lt. of Company G. Sergeant Major John McKinley was promoted to second lt. and assigned to Company K. William E. Wheeler was promoted to captain and moved to Company D following the promotion of Casper Abell to major. With the death of Colonel Stevens, Lt. Col. John Austin was moved up to full colonel, with Major John Leonard being promoted to lieutenant colonel.2 Much of the day-to-day running of the regiment fell to Leonard, and he commanded with the common touch that Austin lacked. Immediately after their return to Falmouth, Leonard kept the drilling to a minimum, which was deeply appreciated by the men.3
For Dean, the men of Company C, and the others on the various company streets, newspaper reports of the battle had been sketchy at best. They knew they had taken a beating, as had the entire III Corps. Only Sedgwick’s VI Corps, which attacked independently from the east through Fredericksburg, had gotten it worse, but then only barely.4 Two of the III Corps’ three divisional commanders, Hiram Berry and Amiel Whipple, were dead. Most men hadn’t seen the papers but heard the conduct of the Excelsiors was reported as exemplary. “We have not seen the New York Herald since the battle, they say it runs down Hooker terrible and gives Sickles great praise,”5 commented Dean. Indeed the Herald article would go on to describe the “Valor of the Excelsior Brigade,” which “fought like tigers wherever placed,”6 clearly distinguishing the high conduct of the troops from the cowardly performance of General Revere.
Unlike Revere, the New Yorkers liked Hooker; after all, he was their old divisional commander who had led them well back on the Peninsula. Plus, he reportedly wore the white diamond corps badge of his old outfit.7 But if the Excelsiors had fully appreciated the extent of his recent failings, their opinion might have changed. The unsupported fight along Chancellorsville’s Plank Road and resulting retreat by Revere smacked of a second Williamsburg. Again, thousands of Federal troops had rested and waited without orders, within striking range of the enemy, while the Excelsiors bled. Unlike Williamsburg, where Hooker had begged superiors for help, this time it was Fighting Joe who, despite urging from his top generals, ordered withdrawal and consolidation rather than advance and exploitation. After the fight even Hooker admitted he had “lost confidence in Joe Hooker,”8 but once safely across the river it didn’t take Fighting Joe long to regain much of his old bravado. Hooker circulated a flier extolling the quality of the army’s performance and how it had “inflicted heavier blows than we have received”; he added, “We lost no honor at Chancellorsville.”9 The flier even questioned whether events of May 2 through 6 could be called a full-fledged battle at all. This blusterous tone had many who experienced the fight pondering where Hooker had been the past few days.10
Hooker’s reputation was in ruins with both the government and senior commanders. His position as head of the Army of the Potomac was on the shakiest of ground. Rumors circulated that Hooker would soon be arrested, and even Secretary Stanton had resigned over the fiasco. But for now, Hooker kept his job while the army sorted itself, especially the ravaged III Corps.
Revere had been sacked, and command of the Excelsior Brigade devolved to Colonel William R. Brewster of the 73rd New York. Brewster had been born in Connecticut and was 35 when the war broke out, working as a revenue agent in New York City. With no formal military training, he initially served with a three-month regiment, guarding bridges over the Potomac River at the time of Bull Run. Eventually he was named colonel of the 73rd New York, one of the original Excelsior Brigade units. Brewster led Fourth Excelsior in battle at Williamsburg back in May of 1862, but for reasons unexplained, he was not with the regiment later that month at the Fair Oaks battle and was still absent while the Seven Days’ Battles raged in late June and early July. Brewster was again absent for his regiment’s tribulations during Second Bull Run; the official report cryptically mentioned he “had been left in Alexandria.”11 But he rejoined it immediately after the fighting. The Connecticut colonel was present for Fredericksburg, but his regiment did not participate in any fighting, and during the recent fighting at Chancellorsville, Brewster had once again been absent. A disturbing and unflattering pattern of absenteeism was emerging.12
While the Excelsiors got used to the familiar Brewster in his new role as brigade commander, the Second Division was getting a commander entirely new to the corps. Andrew A. Humphreys was a lifelong soldier, demanding, profane and professional. After finishing in the middle of his 1831 class at West Point, Humphreys eventually made a name for himself in the Topographical Engineers, writing an important treatise about the Mississippi River. In 1861 he was assigned to McClellan’s staff, where he served until just before Antietam, when he was given command of a division in the new V Corps. Though held in reserve at Antietam, his division saw heavy action at Fredericksburg, where Humphreys grew his reputation as someone who pushed his troops hard yet always led from the front. After Chancellorsville, Humphreys’ division, made up mostly of ninety-day enlistments, disbanded. The hard-swearing general was then moved to Sickles’ III Corps and given Second Division on May 23, becoming the only West Pointer in the corps.13
Colonel Austin received via Adam’s Express a replacement stand of regimental colors just before the march north to counter Confederate moves into Pennsylvania and the resulting fight at Gettysburg (Third Excelsior Association).
In camp the men continued their routine duties. Many caught up on both reading and writing letters home. James Dean had recently received a letter containing a photograph of his beloved little sister, Maggie:
I received your kind and welcomed letter containing the stamps and likeness of little Maggie and she looks so sweet and natural that I have had the card out 50 times since I received it, I hope you will send me another…. I carry them in … the pocket of my cartridge box and never lose sight of them.14
By the end of May, regimental life around Falmouth had returned to normal. Both Yankees and Rebs stared at each other across the intervening Rappahanock. Men resumed picket duty and enjoyed both the cooling breezes of their hilltop camp and Leonard’s light drill schedule. Some did more than just stare at their enemies, however. “We have been out on picket,” wrote Dean, “and I suppose you will hardly believe that I was over and took dinner with them and they came over and took dinner with us. I had dinner with a capt. of the 9th Ala. Regiment. They are a bully lot of boys, they seem to want the war at an end.”15 While camp life and their current arrangements with the Rebels were quite satisfactory, many of the boys anticipated another movement soon, but where was a guess.
Lincoln always placed a priority on the defense of Washington and required his commanding general do the same. This rationale was sound; if the capital were to fall, how could the government then claim legitimacy? Whatever movement the Army of the Potomac undertook, it must always maintain itself in position, ready to defend the capital. The current position of the army at Falmouth provided for this part of the strategic equation. This was a good base from which to launch a move toward Richmond. It also allowed the army to move north to interpose itself between an enemy advance and Washington. Hooker pondered the many reports that Lee was planning some sort of invasion of the north. Fighting Joe was sure the expected enemy movement would be up the Shenandoah Valley and out of the defenses they now occupied. Hooker saw this as a great opportunity to cross the river and move against Richmond. War planners back in Washington, however, were cool to such a notion for fear of leaving the capital open to attack. Hooker had other problems besides the movement of Lee. The size of his army would soon be greatly reduced through the expiration of thousands of enlistments. He now faced the prospect of fighting a major action with even less of a numerical advantage than he had had when he was whipped at Chancellorsville.16 Additionally, Hooker was in great peril for his job. Senior generals and some prominent newspapers were pounding the drum for Hooker’s head. Criticisms that Hooker had earlier heaped upon McClellan and Burnside were now being leveled back at him. Among Hookers’ many detractors was the Herald of New York. While at the same time it called for the sacking of Hooker, it praised Sickles as the only man with enough offensive spirit to lead the army.17
On June 4 the situation along the Rappahannock became clearer. Hooker had learned from observers in balloons that some of the enemy camps around Fredericksburg had been abandoned. Hooker proposed to promptly attack those Confederate troops left behind. The plan was thwarted, however, within an hour of its being telegraphed to Washington. Lincoln wired Hooker warning of the perils of an attack against a fortified enemy on the far side of the river while another enemy force of an unknown strength operated on the near side. The president concluded that such a move could result in the army’s being “entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other.”18
Frustrated and confused as to his next course of action, Hooker received information that the Confederate cavalry under Jeb Stuart was concentrating near Culpepper, about 20 miles northwest of Falmouth. Hooker sent his cavalry, now under the command of Alfred Pleasonton, to investigate. The resulting battle on June 9 near Brandy Station was the biggest cavalry battle fought in North America and helped provide another clue to Robert E. Lee’s intentions. Hooker now ordered his army to prepare to march, but the direction of that march, either south toward Richmond or north toward Washington, was yet unknown. In a letter to his brother, James Dean speculated:
We are now under marching orders and have 3 days rations in our haversack ready to move at a moments notice. We have been called upon three times and stack arms but the orders were countermanded. The Bulldog were barking the other eveing [sic] and I thought the ball had opened. I think the rebels are going to make a raid on a large scale into Maryland. I do think Hooker does not know which way to move. I hope he does not try to take the heights of Fredricksburg again.19
By the tenth, the War Department was making preparations for a possible Confederate raid into Pennsylvania by alerting outposts in northern Virginia and Maryland. Hooker was still unconvinced Lee intended to take his whole army north and believed the real Union opportunity lay in an attack against Richmond, a city that Federal commanders now believed was defended by as few as 1,500 men. Hooker reasoned that once Richmond was captured he could reverse course and march north to deal with the rest of Lee’s army, sure the defenses of Washington could hold until then. Lincoln quickly ordered Hooker not to go to Richmond, insisting the destruction of Lee’s army was to be the general’s objective. On the 11th the picture of a northward movement grew even clearer as reports came in of more and more Rebel units concentrating near Culpepper. Hooker had to act. That afternoon the Excelsiors were in the last hours of preparations to move. “We are on the wing,” wrote Chaplain Twichell, “our tents are struck, the baggage with three days rations is packed, we are only waiting for the men who went on picket this morning to return; then we will start.”20 By three the next morning the men of the 72nd and all the Excelsiors were roused. For two hours the camps were abuzz with activity as men sorted and packed gear, rolled tents, and put on leathers. By five, Captain Mann had formed his Company C and was moving it to the color line. There, they joined the other captains and companies of the regiment. William Wheeler had commanded Company D for only a month now, since Caspar Abell’s promotion to major. Over in Company G, Patrick Anderson stood with his boys, transferred there just a few days earlier after the death of Harmon Bliss.21 After the usual commotion, at 7 a.m. on the 12th, the men stepped off in pursuit of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.
A stand of new colors flew at the head of the regiment, recently arrived from New York, a gift from the Common Council of the City of New York. They had arrived a few days earlier, on the sixth, via Adam’s Express, signed for by Colonel Austin, who now proudly rode at the front of the regiment.22 Austin came to Third Excelsior as captain of Company K, one of three companies from New York City. Employed as a clerk prior to the war, Austin was active in the rough and tumble world of New York City politics, namely as a prominent member of the Empire Club. Though never seeking office himself, Austin wasn’t above getting his hands dirty in support of his favorite candidate or fellow Empire Club member. Throughout the 1840s and ’50s Austin earned the reputation as a man at ease using either a knife or pistol, ready to produce both should circumstances warrant. For his part in disrupting a Tammany Hall meeting, the local authorities granted him a three-month stay at the penitentiary on Blackwell Island. And in 1848 Austin stood trial for murder, though he was ultimately found innocent in the death of one Timothy O’Shea.23
At 44, Austin was among the oldest men to enroll in the regiment, and his time with Third Excelsior was far from exemplary. From December of 1861 to June of 1862 Austin served double duty as brigade quartermaster and as captain of Company K, presiding over a company that led the regiment in desertions.24 Whether the desertions were Austin’s fault or due to the nature of his New York City recruits is unclear, but his problems didn’t stop there. Austin’s record of attendance with the regiment had been spotty at best. He was away from the regiment recruiting in August of ’62 and then listed as sick from January to April of ’63, suffering from a long history of bladder and prostate problems. Additionally, there is no mention of him in the after-action report from Chancellorsville written by Leonard, a strong indication he was absent from this action too. Just days before the army left Falmouth to pursue the Rebels, on June 7, Austin was summoned by Brig. Gen. Joseph Carr. Austin was to stand at court-martial the following day “for the purpose of examining into the alleged absence of leave of Lieut. Col. John S. Austin.”25 But given the hectic state of affairs, it is likely the whole issue was forgotten or dismissed since there is no record of the trial’s outcome or if it was even held. Right now Austin needed to move his men; the worries of a court-martial would have to wait.
Austin and the rest covered 12 miles that day as the army sorted itself out on its race north. Camped northwest of Falmouth, the regiment was moving again by 4:30 the next morning. The trek was hot and dirty as Dean and his mates breathed the rising clouds of fine dust churned up by a thousand marching feet. As the dust settled it clung to the men’s countless rivulets of sweat and penetrated their throats and lungs. The New Yorkers traveled well into the night, finally coming to a halt near Rappahannock Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Men dropped where they stood, utterly spent from their 21-mile march. The next morning the boys were rousted early as the regiment marched out several miles and placed into picket where they spent the day. Around 7:30 that evening the regiment was called in, rejoining the division to continue a night march north.26
The regiment followed the tracks of the Orange and Alexandria R.R., the same line that had formed the axis of the fighting back in the summer of ’62 when the boys fought under Pope, chased the Rebels at Kettle Run, and then suffered defeat at Second Bull Run. It was Monday morning, June 15, around seven o’clock, when the Excelsiors finally stopped after marching ten miles to Cedar Run. The morning sun was already broiling as the men slept and ate. The rest was short lived. At 1:30 p.m. the order to fall in was given and the regiment was moving again. The march went deep into the night and men fell out all along the route. “The poor fellows lay stretched all along the road choaked [sic] and panting, and many a one was sun-struck,”27 observed chaplain Twichell. So struck was Twichell by the scene of suffering that he thought it immoral to ride while so many trudged along in agony, indeed offering his mount to others, “most of the way I yielded him to some one of my parishioners feebler than myself.”28 By eleven that evening, the column finally halted at Manassas for the night. As the brigade slept, stragglers trickled into camp, so by morning there were surprisingly few still unaccounted for.
Foss, Healy, and the other new officers pushed their companies throughout the day of the 17th toward Centerville, the focal point of the Federal retreat after the Second Bull Run battle the previous August. Rain showers had been frequent, but this day had been dry and proceeding troops had “thoroughly pulverized”29 the dirt road to a depth of two or three inches. The resulting clouds of dust once again enveloped the men as they marched. A hot sun beat down heavily on the men as they panted in the choking dust. Men were covered in dust; it penetrated every seam and flap, filled their shoes and coated the contents of haversacks and backpacks. All along the route men fell out of the clanking columns and sank onto the arid field, completely spent. That night they reached Centerville and stopped. All through the night and into the next day stragglers made their way into the camps, restoring the already shrunken companies. When word came that the brigade would remain a second night, a wave of relief swept the ranks. “We rested at Centerville two nights and never was rest more grateful,”30 wrote one Excelsior man.
On June 19 the regiment and the rest of the brigade marched over to Gum Springs, about ten miles west of Centerville. Here they camped for several days as the regiments rotated through picket duties. Eventually on the morning of the 25th the division was on the move again. Six companies of the 72nd were now detailed to act as guard for the slow moving divisional wagon train, while another two were assigned elsewhere.31 By four that afternoon the brigade had covered the 13 miles north to Edward’s Ferry, which lay on the Potomac. The day’s march was going well as the men moved easily in welcome coolness. At the ferry, they trundled across a pontoon bridge, crossing into Maryland. Along this stretch of the Potomac ran the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which paralleled the Potomac for nearly 200 miles, from Washington into central Maryland. On the north side of the river, men followed a narrow tow path that ran between the two waterways. Around five a summer shower set in, soaking man and beast. The tow path used to pull canal boats was mostly clay, slippery under dry conditions, but now the rain only served to heighten the march’s difficulty. Reaching the mouth of the Monocacy River at 11 p.m. the division went into camp. But the wagon train was lagging far behind and hadn’t even reached Edward’s Ferry until 5:30 p.m. At the ferry crossing, the tardy column was then cut off from the division by the passage of the I Corps. By the time other corps had passed it was three the next morning. Eventually the wagon train made it to Point of Rocks where the six companies were relieved from guard duty and reunited with the rest of the regiment. Newly minted lieutenant Foss and the rest continued north with the column throughout the 27th, stopping about two miles south of Middletown, where they camped for the night.32
While III Corps was moving north there were great changes within the army command. Hooker, who had so disappointed planners in Washington, had been feeling particularly unsupported by Halleck, Stanton and the rest over their refusal to place certain troops in the area of operation under his direct command. In what may have been an attempt to bluff Washington into seeing things his way, on June 27 Hooker asked to be relieved of command. His bluff was called, and before the day was out, Lincoln had landed upon George Meade as his new choice to lead the army. The following morning it was made official. For Hooker, the man so beloved by the Excelsiors, the news came almost as a relief when he received word of the change and then met with Meade to discuss the transition. In contrast, to Dan Sickles, who had returned from leave in New York the same day Meade took command, the news came as a blow. Describing the change to a friend as a “misfortune to the army,” Sickles regarded it as a personal misfortune as well. Gone now were the days of amiable familiarity with the commanding general, ripened over the months from a shared offensive spirit, a mutual respect for fine liquor, cigars, and a common love for female companionship. Dan now had to deal with stuffy old Meade, a man with whom he shared little and who in turn harbored his own reservations about Sickles. Perhaps Chaplain Twichell summed up the thoughts of the average Excelsior man this way: “Poor Gen. Hooker, it seems, has finished his reign. I’m sorry for it, for I had faith in him. Gen. Meade has an excellent name among soldiers. God guide him.”33
By 3 p.m. on the 28th, Captain John Mann and his Company C were marching through Frederick. Excelsiors marched with a bounce in their step as citizens turned out to greet them with cheers, sandwiches and coffee.34 Many marched with a new sense of urgency as they neared Pennsylvania. Though they belonged to New York regiments, many men came from outside New York, many from the Keystone State of Pennsylvania. For these soldiers this was a chance to defend their home state.35 Frederick was north and slightly east of where they had camped, and before the day was out they had gone another seven miles to Walkerville where they stopped at nine that night. The next day they continued on to Taneytown. On the 30th, they moved a few miles more onto Bridgeport, near Hagerstown, just a few miles from the Pennsylvania border. The reception among the citizens here was a great change compared to their reception 18 months earlier in southern Maryland. Chaplain Twichell described the greeting of the locals in a letter to his mother:
One circumstance has operated greatly to mitigate our discomfort and revive our drooping spirits, and that is our meeting friends and receiving friendly greetings. The set Virginia sneer and frown are left behind. Here another mood prevails. The farmers as we passed had pails and tubs of fresh, clear water at their gates and the loyal kitchens of their wives yielded abundance of good bread—but better still are the smiles, and waving flags and cheers with which they meet us. At one place a bevy of country girls sang Union songs as we passed—Bless their dear hearts! It was better than their mother’s biscuits.36
The next day the regiment resumed their march north towards Emmitsburg. As III Corps marched its final leg on July 1, opposing forces already fighting in and around Gettysburg were shaping the battle and the Excelsiors’ coming role in it. The fighting of July 1 was determining the various positions to be held by the two armies come the fighting of July 2. Of utmost importance to the Federal Army would be their holding of critical high ground south of town. Though the town of Gettysburg was already lost to the Confederates, Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill were still in Union hands and Meade intended to extend his line south along the high ground of Cemetery Ridge. It was here, on this ground, that Meade hoped Lee would attack him.
The men of III Corps were on the move by 8 a.m. the morning of July 1. Though serious fighting was taking place in and around Gettysburg, General Humphreys still did not have clear instructions for the movement of his command. But this was soon to change. Humphreys reported, “On July 1, marched through Emmitsburg, and halted 1 mile out of the town, on the Waynesborough pike. While I was engaged in a careful examination of the ground in front of Emmitsburg, the division was ordered at 3 p.m. to move up to Gettysburg, 12 miles distant, where an engagement had taken place between the two corps of Generals Reynolds and Howard (the First and Eleventh Corps) and the enemy.”37
Humphreys had orders to detach his third brigade under Col. George C. Burling along with a battery of artillery to protect the Hagerstown Road. With his two remaining brigades he moved northeast towards Gettysburg. The road they used paralleled the main road but lay about two miles west of it. Unknown to Humphreys, this was some of the same country being traveled by the enemy as they rushed north to consolidate their forces. “When half-way to Gettysburg, a dispatch from General Howard to General Sickles, commanding the Third Corps, was delivered to me … which the latter general was warned to look out for his left in coming up to Gettysburg,”38 Humphreys reported. He learned at this same time that no Federal forces occupied ground west of the Emmitsburg Road. But this was the precise route Humphreys intended to take to comply with earlier orders that he form his division on the west side of Gettysburg once he arrived. With night fully upon him, the general now thought better of his situation and decided to move his men east towards the main road north. After a march of a mile and one-half, they reached the main road. Here the general relied on the instructions of a guide sent to him from Sickles, and they moved north by way of Black Horse Tavern. In this country Humphreys fully appreciated his proximity to the enemy:
Upon approaching the Black Horse Tavern, I found myself in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, who occupied that road in strong force. He was not aware of my presence, and I might have attacked him at daylight with the certainty of at least temporary success; but I was 3 mile distant from the remainder of the army, and I believed such a course would have been inconsistent with the general plan of operations of the commanding general.39
The division managed to stop only 200 yards from enemy pickets. In the darkness Humphreys quietly retraced his steps away from Black Horse Tavern. But while Humphreys groped his way at the head of the column, stragglers from the Excelsior Brigade were having their own close call. Drawn to the light from a farmhouse, a few enterprising New York men approached, anticipating a home cooked meal for their efforts. As they peered through the window, they were surprised to discover a number a Confederate artillerymen enjoying themselves. Not wishing to be made prisoners or betray their presence, the Union men skulked back in the darkness to the protection of their regiment while the Rebels made merry.40
The division finally located Federal positions around 1 a.m. James Dean and his mates bivouacked, throwing gear and themselves to the ground for a welcome rest. The division was about one mile south of Gettysburg, but more importantly, well east of Emmitsburg Road and away from the enemy.
The next morning the whole of the regiment awoke to find itself located in the middle of the lush green fields and the rolling hills of central Pennsylvania farm country. It was a beehive of activity as the various regiments and brigades positioned and then repositioned themselves along the face of a gently rising ridge. Facing west, Captain Mann could see Emmitsburg Road a few hundred yards in the distance and some woods beyond that concealed the Confederate army. The division was situated on a local landmark called Cemetery Ridge, with Gettysburg off to the north and two prominent hills, Little Round Top and Big Round Top, to the south. General Meade’s orders to the III Corps were to form with II Corps on its right while its left flank rested on Little Round Top, the northernmost of the two hills.
Active in New York City politics prior to the war, John S. Austin raised Company K of the 72nd N.Y. and served as its captain until his promotion to lieutenant colonel following the resignation of Taylor and Moses. Following the death of Col. Wm. O. Stevens at Chancellorsville, Austin took command of the regiment (Brown, History of the Third Regiment).
Burling’s Third Brigade rejoined Humphreys’ division at 9 a.m. and at noon the division was ordered into line of battle. Final adjustments were made to the entirety of the Federal line, which stretched along Cemetery Ridge from Culp’s Hill at the north to the Round Top hills at the south. Humphreys found David B. Birney’s First Division of the III Corps on his left. The right of Humphreys’ division touched the left of the II Corps’ First Division under General John C. Caldwell.41
From its assigned position in line, Sickles’ corps faced a low, tree-covered ridge. A few hundred yards beyond these woods was another ridge. Upon this ridge ran the Emmitsburg Road. On the far side of the road sat another large clump of woods where the Rebels gathered in force. Enemy troops in these far woods and others farther south worried Sickles. As the morning dragged on he received reports from probing units, which included the First United States Sharpshooters, that large bodies of Rebel troops were forming in his distant front and left.42 Lacking confidence in the defensive opportunities of his position should the enemy attack, Sickles now looked for other ground his corps might occupy. Vexing Sickles most was the area in front of his First Division, near the intersection of the Emmitsburg Road and a lane that ran east toward the Round Tops (now called Wheat Field Road). This small plot of land contained a small peach orchard and was perched on some slightly higher ground, ground Sickles was sure might soon contain Confederate artillery hurling shot and shell into his inferior position. Two months earlier at Chancellorsville, Sickles had learned firsthand what evil enemy cannons placed on high ground could wreak. Reluctantly he had obeyed orders and withdrawn from Hazel Grove’s high ground, only to have the place soon dotted with Confederate guns that proceeded to rain down shot and shell onto his corps.43 Sickles also remembered the fate of Oliver Howard’s XI Corps, which was taken by a surprise flank attack at Chancellorsville. He now fretted about how other poor ground on his left might afford the Rebels the same kind of opportunity.44
So sure was Dan of the inferiority of his position that he spent most of the morning seeking clarification and interpretation of his orders regarding what leeway he might be granted as to the dispositions of his corps. Throughout the morning, Sickles and his staff officers traveled to Meade’s headquarters, with officers from Meade’s staff in turn, including Meade’s own son, coming south to inspect the questioned ground. So frustrated was Sickles that he finally asked the chief of artillery, Brigadier General Henry Hunt, for outright permission to move his corps. Hunt acknowledged the potential threat, but he respectfully declined to grant such permission, leaving Dan to his own devices.
West of the Emmitsburg Road, the Sharpshooters’ probe to the III Corps’ left was proving successful, as they soon found the enemy in overwhelming numbers. Near noon, after a heated skirmish, the First U.S.S.S. was thrown back towards Birney’s line with losses of about 60 men.45 This threat on the left was the last straw for Dan.
“Communicating this important information to Major-General Sickles,” Birney later reported, “I was ordered by that officer to change my front to meet the attack. I did this by advancing my left 500 yards, and swinging around the right so as to rest on the Emmitsburg Road at the peach orchard.”46
First Division was now almost perpendicular to the rest of the army, with both flanks in the air, unsupported by any other units. Birney’s division ran from roughly near the base of Sugar Loaf Hill (Little Round Top) west along the Wheatfield Road to the peach orchard and then north along the Emmitsburg Road. “My line was formed with Ward [Second Brig.] on the left, resting on the mountain, De Trobriand [Third Brig.] in the center, and Graham [First Brig.] on my right in the peach orchard, with his right on the Emmitsburg road,”47 wrote Birney. Artillery batteries were scattered throughout the division’s line.
Humphreys received orders from Sickles near 1 p.m. to move Second Division forward to the west side of the small woods that stood in front of Cemetery Ridge. Humphreys now formed his division. The First Brigade under Brigadier General Joseph B. Carr made up the first line of battle. The 243 men of the 71st New York were detached from the Excelsior Brigade and formed on the left of Carr’s front line. Brewster’s Excelsiors then formed in line of battalions 200 yards to the rear of the main line, while the New Jersey men of the Third Brigade formed similarly 200 yards farther behind.48
Sickles’ orders called for Humphreys’ men to be placed on the right of First Division along the Emmitsburg Road, his intention being to extend that line north, eventually connecting with the left of Caldwell’s division of the II Corps. Humphreys reminded Sickles, however, that Caldwell had no order to advance, and if his (Humphreys’) division were to move, it would leave his flank exposed with Caldwell still on Cemetery Ridge and in Humphreys’ rear. Sickles ordered him forward anyway. Humphreys, sensing this to be only a temporary move, settled the division in advance of his original position on Cemetery Ridge but still short of Graham’s right flank on Emmitsburg Road. Second Division was now located with its front line running about 300 yards east of and parallel to the Emmitsburg Road. Second Division’s left flank rested near Trostle Lane, a road that ran back east from Emmitsburg Road to the Trostle Farm. Of this position Humphreys wrote:
The line I was directed to occupy was near the foot of the westerly slope of the ridge I have already mentioned [Cemetery Ridge], from which foot-slope the ground rose to the Emmitsburg road, which runs on the crest of a ridge nearly parallel to the Round Top ridge. This second ridge declines again immediately west of the road, at the distance of 200 or 300 yards from which the edge of a wood runs parallel to it. This wood was occupied by the enemy.49
In the middle of Humphreys’ line, about 250 distant, on the near side of the Emmitsburg Road, stood a house belonging to local shoemaker Daniel Klingle and his family. The 73rd New York was now sent to occupy the house, one of the few landmarks along the entire position. And should the enemy try to take it, the regiment was under orders hold at all hazards.50
About the same time Fourth Excelsior was moving forward, Sickles ordered Humphreys to peel off Burling’s third brigade to support Birney’s First Division. Though not yet engaged, Humphreys could anticipate the fight to come and was angry at being deprived a third of his force and his main source of reserve troops.51
With Birney’s First Division fully deployed facing southerly along the Wheatfield Road and Humphreys’ troops in supporting position, General Meade arrived to sort things out for himself. After finding Sickles, Meade surveyed the field and told Dan this was not the ground he should be holding. Sickles argued the merits of the new position and agreed to withdraw his corps should Meade wish it. Meade pondered this for a moment and responded, “You cannot hold this position, but the enemy will not let you get away without a fight and it may as well begin now as at any time.”52 With the promise of support from II and V Corps, Meade rode off.
Sickles’ order to advance was relayed by Humphreys to the two brigades now making up the division. With Carr’s brigade leading, they formed into line of battle with Brewster’s following arrayed in “battalions in mass.” No sooner had they begun their forward movement than a messenger from Gen. Meade’s staff rode up to Humphreys with new orders. General Warren had requested additional troops be sent to Little Round Top to counter the growing Confederate threat.53 Without hesitation Meade issued orders for Humphreys to move his division there. With new orders in hand, Humphreys barked the appropriate commands, and with the “simultaneousness of a single regiment,” the entire division marched by the left flank.54 Amid incoming artillery shells of First Division’s still escalating fight, Humphreys moved his force away from the Emmitsburg Road and toward the Wheatfield and Round Tops beyond. Moving away from the Emmitsburg Road, Humphreys told Meade’s messenger that he was no longer in position to support Birney’s division and that a large gap was developing between the III and II Corps. As the courier hurried off to find the commanding general, another staff officer galloped up to Humphreys. This courier had orders countermanding the current movement and directing V Corps to protect Little Round Top.
First Division’s fight was just developing, and Second Division was much to the rear, beyond Trostle Farm. Despite much cannonading, the infantry fight was just getting started. Confederate General James Longstreet’s I Corps began its move around 3:30. Not expecting any Federal troops this far forward of Cemetery Ridge, Longstreet and his commanders modified their plan of attack. A Confederate brigade under Joseph Kershaw would be among the first to encounter Sickles’ men. Intending to sweep around the left flank of Birney’s division, Kershaw’s men headed for the Wheatfield, a movement that marched them almost parallel to Birney’s battle line. When Federal artillery began to take a toll, two Southern regiments wheeled left to attack the line of guns. As the Confederate regiments closed in on overrunning the Union batteries, a misinterpretation of Kershaw’s prompted the regiments to stop short of the guns. As the Confederate men then continued on toward the Wheatfield, Federal fire played upon their ranks as they moved across the Union front.55
Humphreys now retraced his steps back towards the Emmitsburg Road, but unlike the movement of Birney’s division, the movement of Second Division was in the full view of Winfield Hancock’s II Corps, still positioned on Cemetery Ridge. This advance would later come to symbolize the movement of the entire III Corps. Major St. Clair A. Mulholland of the 116th Pennsylvania later wrote:
Soon the long lines of the Third Corps are seen advancing, and how splendidly they march. It looks like a dress parade, a review … and the dread sound of artillery comes loud and quick, shells are seen bursting in all direction along the lines. The bright colors of the regiments are conspicuous marks, and the shells burst around them in great numbers.56
William F. Fox described the scene this way for New York’s official account:
The sun shone brightly on their waving colors, and flashed in scintillating rays from their burnished arms, as with well-aligned ranks and even steps they moved proudly across the field. Away to the right, along Cemetery Ridge, the soldiers of the Second Corps, leaving their coffee and their cards, crowded to the front, where they gazed with soldierly pride and quickened pulse on the stirring scene. Conspicuous among the moving columns of this division was the old Excelsior Brigade, each one of its five regiments carrying the blue flag of New York…. They march with no other music than the rattle of the rifles on the picket line; they were inspired only with the determination to acquit themselves worthy of the State motto, which the brigade had adopted as its name.57
Humphreys’ movement back took only a few minutes, and by 4:15 he was in position. He wrote, “I moved my division forward, so that the first line ran along the Emmitsburg road a short distance behind the crest upon which that road lies.”58 As Second Division moved forward towards the Emmitsburg Road, it came under enemy artillery fire from its front and left. Though the fire had little effect, Humphreys inquired about the advisability to attack. The reply instructed him to hold his position while cannon under Lt. Seeley were brought forward, which “soon silenced the battery in our front.”59 As Carr’s brigade advanced, he detailed 100 men from the 16th Massachusetts Volunteers to relieve the 73rd New York, still occupying the Klingle house.
Carr’s brigade was not long enough to cover the entire front assigned to it, so Humphreys split up the Excelsiors to extend the battle line. Of the 266 men present for duty, Colonel Thomas Holt’s 74th New York were placed on the extreme right of Carr’s entire brigade. The two largest regiments within Excelsior Brigade, the 120th and 73rd, were placed in the rear as support, along with the 70th N.Y. The 71st New York under Colonel Potter was the smallest Excelsior regiment on the field and was placed immediately left of Carr’s men. Col. John Austin’s Third Excelsior was now positioned left of the 71st. The 305 men of the regiment were bordered by Second Excelsior on their right and Trostle Lane on their left.60 On the other side of the lane stood the men of the First Division, thus making Third Excelsior the left-most regiment of the entire division. In their front, beyond the Emmitsburg Pike, Dean, Mann, Stoddard and the rest faced a Confederate division under Lafayette McLaws, lurking in the woods, waiting to attack.
Sickles now occupied the high ground he had worried about for so long. His corps of 10,000 men defended a front nearly one and one-half miles in length, double the distance had he remained on Cemetery Ridge. Sickles did have the promise of support from two other corps. But whether such support would come quickly enough and in sufficient strength was in doubt. With the Confederate attack coming at a slight oblique to Birney’s front, there was soon fighting along the east–west length of the line. Messengers raced to the rear with desperate calls for reinforcements to shore up the ever-thinning Federal ranks. Reinforcing troops from other corps positioned on Cemetery Ridge responded, but they were not enough. Birney struggled to maintain his line as he shuffled regiments along the line, placing them wherever the threat was most immediate and dangerous.61
Moving into position, the order came almost immediately for the boys to lie down. No order was required; Henri LeFevre-Brown in Company B and Dean in Company C with the rest wasted no time in hugging the Pennsylvania soil.62 Peering up from their place on the extreme left, Henry could see enemy cannons to their left and front as Rebel shot flew horizontally in two directions. Austin sent out pickets to cover the regiment’s front, but the fire was withering and soon they were withdrawn. Dean and the rest had never seen artillery so intense, and despite the hail of iron the boys set about fortifying their position.63 Crouching and crawling, they broke down fences, gathered up nearby rocks, sticks and logs, and scooped piles of dirt, anything to fashion a serviceable wall capable of stopping an enemy ball or shell fragment. Such works had served them well back at Chancellorsville. Barricades like these would stop a bullet, and they hoped the enemy would throw themselves against the regiment’s prepared position and massed musket fire. Many remembered their retreat at Chancellorsville, and what the boys feared most was being forced, or worse, ordered from behind these works that kept Rebel iron from striking Yankee flesh and bone rather than Pennsylvania rock and dirt.
Attacking Confederate regiments did not hit the whole of the Second Division all at once. The en echelon attack rolled against them from left to right like an angry wave crashing upon the shore. Humphreys was holding his own nicely, but Graham’s position on the left, in the peach orchard itself and at the apex of the whole III Corps’ line, was beginning to weaken under a hard, no-nonsense attack of William Barksdale’s brigade of Mississippians. By six o’clock things were starting to heat up for Humphreys’ men as the fighting became more general. The situation for the III Corps was becoming desperate as the need for assistance grew dire. Humphreys received frantic messages from Sickles asking for aid, only in turn to fire off requests from other corps for help. “The demand for aid was so urgent, however, that I sent Major Burn’s Fourth Excelsior [73rd N.Y.] to General Graham’s brigade.” Humphreys added, “At the same time dispatched one of my aides, Lieutenant Christiancy, to General Hancock, commanding Second Corps with the request that he would send a brigade, if possible, to my support.”64
With no adequate support, the First Division began to give way around 6:30. It was about this time that one of the many hurtling cannonballs found its way into the rear of the III Corps’ line. Almost inaudibly the errant ball tore off the leg of Dan Sickles, leaving his horse unscathed. The general slumped in his saddle and then down to the ground. Members of his staff immediately rushed to his side as the lower part of his right leg lay dangling in shreds. Soldiers gathered up Sickles and carried him a few yards to a nearby wall of Trostle Farm. Excelsior men and the rest of the corps saw the cluster of attendants and assumed the worst. But for a man whose leg hung in rags, Sickles remained remarkably cool. And though the exact details of the next few moments varied slightly, the core elements of events were as follows. Grasping the situation, Sickles directed those around him to use part of a saddle strap to fashion and apply an improvised tourniquet. Just then Major Tremain returned from an errand. Dan calmly instructed Tremain to notify General Birney that command of III Corps had devolved to him. Just as Sickles was to be stretchered to the corps’ hospital, he was informed that a rumor of his death was sweeping through the ranks. With characteristic flair for the dramatic and an effort to bolster the spirits of his men, Dan had an aide pluck a cigar from his coat pocket. With it soon lit, Dan proceeded to nonchalantly puff as he was carried from the field.65
Gettysburg collapse of Second Division positions
The pressure upon Graham was too much, and indeed for the entire First Division. The battle was becoming an east–west facing affair, and Birney issued orders for the corps to pull back and form a new line to better face all threats. The new line would run from the First Division’s left resting at the Wheatfield, northwest to Humphreys’ right on the Emmitsburg Road, effectively forming a single, more dense line of troops by connecting the two extreme ends of III Corps line. This new line would require Humphreys to swing part of his division back and away from the road. Though Humphreys was in position to execute the order, the ever-worsening condition of First Division meant this new line would never be formed, as Graham’s brigade desperately fell back under Barksdale’s crunching attack.66
Though Graham’s brigade was being pushed from the field, the regiments from Brewster’s Excelsior Brigade nearest this action weren’t yet directly engaged by enemy infantry, suffering only from artillery fire. Pvt. Dean said, “The shells then began to come over us and they had a splendid range of us, we lay thus under the fire for 2 hours when the rebels drove in our pickets and advanced.”67 While most of the attacking Rebels continued east toward the Wheatfield, in pursuit of First Division, two of Barksdale’s regiments turned north into the now unprotected flank of the Second Division and the 72nd New York. “Up to this time we had not been engaged at all, but now the troops on our left being obliged to fall back, the enemy advanced upon us in great force, pouring into us a most terrific fire of artillery and musketry, both upon our front and left flank,”68 reported brigade commander Brewster.
“We remained in line of battle about two hours, under a most terrific fire of shot and shell, when we were pressed so hard on the left flank that we were obliged to fall back,”69 wrote Colonel Austin. With their flank in the air, the 72nd and 71st attempted to face the new threat by refusing the line with some of their companies.70 Amidst the shell bursts, musket fire, and screaming officers, the situation only became more confused. “The dreadful crash of battle resounded,” wrote an Excelsior man, “the rattle of musketry, the bursting of shells, the roar of cannons, mingled with cries of the wounded, and with the cheers and yells of the determined foemen.”71 As the regiment tried to maneuver, Austin was hit in the arm and side. Wounded, he remained on the field, but within minutes his horse was shot out from under him. Deciding he could not go on, Austin relinquished command to Lt. Col. Leonard and retired to the rear. Officers in both regiments shouted commands through the din of bursting artillery and crackling musketry. Efforts to establish a new line were proving to be in vain, and the regiments gave ground in bad order.72
The 120th New York, which had been posted in reserve at this end of the line, briefly held the flanking Confederates as they poured a steady volley into onrushing Rebels. But the enemy push was too much and they now threatened to overlap the 120th’s left and envelope the whole regiment. “The enemy at last broke the first line, and we advanced to meet him,” wrote Captain Abram Lockwood of the 120th N.Y., adding, “The regiment soon became hotly engaged, and held its position without flinching until it was flanked.”73 Another 120th man wrote, “All at once, our line was swept by an enfilading fire, under which no troops could remain and live, and it became necessary to fall back [beyond] the range of the deadly hail. We were losing very heavily in our regiment, but fell back in good order, contesting stubbornly every inch of ground.”74 Of the Excelsior regiments posted on the left of the line, the 120th N.Y. was performing best, its sacrifice of men keeping the division’s flank from collapse.75
Second Division’s left was in peril, but both Carr and Humphreys were unhappy with Birney’s orders to change facing. To do so now would mean moving from behind the breastwork and into the open just as three brigades from Confederate Richard Anderson’s division of A.P. Hill’s III Corps were hitting the division’s front. Carr liked his position and requested permission to charge, certain the enemy would break under a counterattack. Humphreys was also confident of his position, but vetoed the notion of a charge.76 Possibly unaware of all the events taking place around him, Humphreys felt strongly against Birney’s order to change fronts, believing that at this stage of the fight, the maneuver would cause only more casualties and disorder. But change front they did. “My infantry now engaged the enemy’s, but my left was in air (although I extended it as far as possible with my Second Brigade), and, being the only troops on the field, the enemy’s whole attention was directed to my division, which was forced back slowly, firing as they receded,”77 Humphreys later reported.
With First Division chased from the field, Birney’s plan to form the entire corps into one long line had unraveled. With the arrival of two regiments from Hancock’s II Corps sent to support his right, Humphreys received new orders. “At this time I received orders through a staff officer from General Birney to withdraw to the Round Top ridge … this order I complied with, retiring very slowly, continuing the contest with the enemy, whose fire of artillery and infantry was destructive in the extreme.”78
As the elements of the division moved back to the ridge, Carr was able to keep his First Brigade intact and conduct a fighting retreat, keeping the Rebels at a “respectful distance.”79 Brewster’s Excelsior Brigade, however, which had been parceled out along the line, was now a mix of shattered, disorganized units, some men no doubt mixed in with Carr’s regiments. Among the Excelsiors, the 120th N.Y. seemed to be in the best shape. The division withdrew in a northeasterly direction, across open fields and away from Trostle Lane, the same ones upon which they had formed earlier that morning. Austin reported afterwards that his men “were still hard pressed and obliged to fall slowly back.”80 Units were shot-up and disorganized, but the withdrawal itself was not a rout. Instead, it was a steady march to the rear with men loading on the move only to stop, turn and take steady aim before firing, and repeating the process. “We had to give way, it being too hot a place but we contested the ground inch by inch,”81 recalled Private Dean. Brewster, known previously for his absenteeism, walked calmly among his men. Making his way to the rear, the colonel gave and received orders, keeping the brigade together as best he could while carrying his horse’s bloody reins, which had been retrieved for him. Humphreys, too, circulated among the various commands. Over in the 72nd, Leonard directed his mangled regiment as best he could. Nearly a third of the command lay either dead or wounded. In Company C, Captain Mann struggled toward the rear with two wounds, one to his hip. Young Lieutenant Foss was being carried with hits to both legs. James Dean had been struck in the arm by “spent shot,”82 which although painful, was quickly only a memory.
Shortly the division and Leonard’s remaining men were back on the slopes of Cemetery Ridge, “to the crest of the hill from which the brigade started in the morning.”83 Here, on the ridge and a few hundred yards north of Trostle Lane, units of the II Corps worked to form a new line. “Upon arriving at the crest of the ridge mentioned, the remnants of my division formed on the left of General Hancock’s troops, whose artillery opened upon the enemy, about 100 yards distant,”84 wrote Humphreys.
Hancock was laboring frantically to put together a credible defense. To stymie the enemy advance he called upon the nearby First Minnesota Infantry to charge into the approaching Rebel line with orders to seize their colors. Without hesitation the Minnesotans threw themselves into the superior enemy force. Surprised, the tired and unsupported Confederates were initially rocked backwards but soon recovered. The Confederate advance now stalled as the First Minnesota withdrew. Hancock gained 15 desperately needed minutes, but the attack cost the Minnesota boys 215 of their 262-man regiment, the highest percentage loss of any Federal regiment at Gettysburg.
It was now after seven, and the thinned-down brigades of Georgians and Floridians had fought their way to the base of Cemetery Ridge, where Hancock’s infantry joined the fight in earnest. Here the Confederate advance ground to a halt.
Supported by men of the II Corps, Humphreys’ harried troops soon regained their composure. Among the fresh troops of II Corps was the 13th Vermont, which had yet to see battle. Hancock held reservations about allowing this untried unit to attack, but the Vermont colonel assured the general his men would fight. Hancock acquiesced, and the New Englander’s charge sent the Rebels reeling back. The 13th Vermont had been posted immediately north of the rallied remains of Humphreys’ division, and its success invigorated the III Corps men. “The enemy broke and was driven from the field, rapidly followed by Hancock’s troops and the remnants of my two brigades,”85 wrote Humphreys. Dean recalled that with “order restored we advanced under a murderous fire and drove the rebels off the ground that we lost.”86 Carr remembered his men “moved forward, driving the enemy and capturing many prisoners. I continued to advance until I again occupied the field I had but a few moments previous vacated.”87
Counterattacking Federals drove the Confederates across the fields back to Emmitsburg Road. The Excelsior Brigade was still a jumble of disorganized regiments with many men still missing when Brewster gave the order to charge. He wanted to retake several cannons left on the field when the battery’s horses were killed. As Brewster led the way, only a mere 150 of his brigade followed, with representatives from every regiment except the 70th.88 The enemy gave ground as the Excelsior surged forward. “We charged on them with the bayonet 3 or four times and retook it all again,” described James Dean, adding, “There was a rebel color bearer shot and I tried hard to capture the colors but I was too late, a sargeant [sic] of company E got it.”89 As men scrambled for the trophy, Thomas Horan eventually secured Eighth Florida’s colors and later received the Medal of Honor for his effort.90
Charging across the field, Lt. Col. Leonard along with Sgt. LeFevre-Brown and Private Luther Howard, both of Company B, were the first to reach and retake the most advanced of the abandoned Union artillery. Reaching the gun, the three loosed the reins of the disabled horses and began to turn the piece when assistance arrived.91
Rebels retreated beyond the Emmitsburg Road, and the area between Cemetery Ridge and the road was back in Federal hands, but the Yankee generals had no desire to pursue any further and a halt was ordered. Excelsior men consolidated their gains and put their collection of Confederate prisons to use hauling the retaken cannon back to the rear.92
Here in these fields and further back on the ridge, Humphreys’ regiments settled in for the night. Preparing his small camp, James Dean could count only 21 members of the regiment available for duty.93 With a bivouac established, men from each of the regiments moved out onto the battlefield to search for wounded and to identify the dead. In the bright moonlight, soldiers wandered between the ridge and Emmitsburg Road amid the moans and cries of the wounded. They collected the hurt and tried to identify friends and comrades as they turned dead bodies face up into the moon’s light.
Early the next morning, the entire division was moved to the rear for food and provisions. After eating and stocking up on ammunition, the various brigades moved into position to support II and V Corps. The ranks of Humphreys’ regiments were now somewhat replenished as stragglers returned throughout the night and early morning. The 72nd counted near 140 present for duty.94
Around this time preparations were being made to transport the wounded General Sickles to Washington. His leg had been amputated well above the knee, but the leg of a major general was too valuable to be thrown away onto a pile with the countless others, so saved it was. The nearest train station was in the hands of Confederate General Ewell, so Sickles and his leg would be transported to Littlestown, about 12 miles to the southeast. The subsequent collection of stretcher-bearers, attendants, guards, and cavalry couriers transporting Sickles to the rear cost the Federal Army the equivalent of a small regiment.95 Among the entourage was James Dean, who wrote:
The word was who would volunteer to carry General Sickles to the cars, I at once got up and volunteered. We then marched to where the general was. He had his right leg taken off with a solid shot and had it amputated about the knee. We had to carry him on a stretcher to Littletown, he appeared quite cheerful and conversed with us and smoked a cigar and read the paper and told us it would not be long before he was soldiering again.96
Shells from nearly 170 Confederate cannon began peppering the Federal lines near 1 p.m. on July 3. This was the preparatory bombardment before the attack of Gen. George Pickett’s division. Bluecoats on the front line hugged the ground while most of the shells flew over into the rear areas. Here in the rear was where regiments of the Excelsior Brigade had been posted, behind a portion of II Corps’ Second Division and a bewildering amount of Federal artillery. Despite their position in the rear, several Excelsior men were killed in the enemy barrage.
Enemy artillery fire eventually stopped as Rebel infantry began the final stage of the attack. Pickett’s graybacks pressed across the field under a hail of Federal artillery and small arms fire. By the time they hit the Union lines most of the attack’s punch had been whittled away. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting broke out at points, but the integrity of the Federal line was never in serious danger and the Rebels were soon forced to retire. The battered Excelsior Brigade remained in reserve during Pickett’s attack, which struck a few hundred yards north of their position. Because of this location, the brigade suffered only from the earlier errant artillery fire.97
The next day the worn out 72nd men acknowledged the 4th of July, Independence Day, but there was no celebrating. The day was spent instead burying the dead: in some cases men whom they had known, in most cases strangers from other units, and even a Rebel or two. For the entire day both armies did nothing but collect wounded and bury the dead. For two more days the armies waited and continued to bury the dead.98 Most Union men believed Lee’s army was ripe for destruction, but Meade chose not to attack. Finally, without interference from Meade, Lee began to move his army back toward home; there would be no continuation of the Battle of Gettysburg.
The fighting at Gettysburg had cost the men of the III Corps severely. With fewer than 12,000 troops, Sickles received the full weight of 30,000 attacking Confederates. His resulting loss was 4,211 killed, wounded, or missing. The Excelsior Brigade took nearly 1,837 men into action and lost 778.99
With 486 troops ready for duty, the 73rd New York was the largest of the brigade’s six regiments. After occupying the Klingle House during most of July 2’s early action, they were moved to support Graham’s overwhelmed brigade and suffered heavily with 51 killed, 103 wounded, and 8 men missing.100
The next largest of Brewster’s six regiments, the 120th New York, marched 383 men in to action and took losses of 204, nearly single-handedly keeping the Confederates from turning the flank of Humphreys’ Second Division.101
The 70th New York was posted in reserve and helped to defend the division’s left flank when Graham’s Brigade collapsed; of its 371 men, it lost 117.102
At the other end of the line, the 74th New York supported the right side of Carr’s Brigade during most of the battle. Fifth Excelsior reported 285 present for duty and suffered 17 killed, 69 wounded, and 3 missing.103
The smallest regiment within the brigade was the 71st New York under Col. Henry L. Potter. These troops had been posted immediately to the left of Carr’s men and were on the right of the 72nd. Of their 243 men, Second Excelsior lost a total of 91.104
For the 72ndNew York, the regiment lost 7 killed, 94 wounded, and 15 missing, of the 305 who took the field. Colonel Austin was wounded but not severely, yet his future with the regiment seemed in doubt. The regiment had been reduced by a third.105 All throughout the regiment officers commanded companies of only two dozen or so. In improvised field hospitals, wounded men waited their turn for the surgeon’s table, where such visits offered only marginal hope for survival. And men such as Lt. Charles Foss, scheduled for an amputation, hoped he’d be one of the lucky ones.
After four days of waiting, the regiment moved again.