The regiment still hadn’t moved when James Dean returned from delivering General Daniel Sickles to the Littletown station. Dan was on his way to Washington to recover from the loss of his leg, but almost as importantly, to report on events surrounding his III Corps, at least as he saw them. Dan knew instinctively it was important both Lincoln and Halleck hear his versions of events firsthand, before his critics had their chance to report. Going to Washington may have been a blessing in disguise for Sickles, never mind the leg.1 When Dean arrived back in Gettysburg, the regiment was still burying the dead. A hard rain had set in a couple of days after Picket’s failed charge, making dealing with corpses even more miserable. A III Corps man in Carr’s brigade described the scene of death:
Some, with faces bloated and blackened beyond recognition, lay with glassy eyes staring up at the blazing summer sun; others, with faces downward and clenched hands filled with grass or earth, which told of the agony of the last moments.
Here a headless trunk, there a severed limb; in all the grotesque positions that unbearable pain and intense suffering contorts the human form, they lay. Upon the faces of some death had frozen a smile; some showed the trembling shadow of fear, while upon others was indelibly set the grim stamp of determination.
All around was the wreck the battlestorm leaves in its wake—broken caissons, dismounted guns, small arms bent and twisted by the storm or dropped and scattered by disabled hands; dead and bloated horses, torn and ragged equipments, and all the sorrowful wreck that the waves of battle leave at their ebb; and over all, hugging the earth like a fog, poisoning every breath, the pestilential stench of decaying humanity.2
At army headquarters George Meade was feeling pressure from Washington over the army’s apparent inactivity. Meade felt the army needed time to recover from the heavy exertions of battle, reequip itself and, most of all, move cautiously against a still dangerous foe.3 But Lincoln saw this as the perfect opportunity to pounce on Lee’s crippled army and end the war. To Lincoln, Meade was hesitating just as other commanders had done before. On July 4 Meade sent congratulations to his army for a battle well fought. The circular read: “Our task is not yet accomplished, and the commanding general looks to the army for greater efforts to drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader.”4 Reading the message Lincoln scowled and groaned in frustration, saying, “Drive the invader from our soil? My God! Is that all?”5 The president was discouraged Meade didn’t see Lee’s destruction as his primary purpose.
While Meade wrung his hands over how best to proceed and worried over the condition of his army, Robert E. Lee recognized the danger of remaining in hostile territory and made plans to return to Virginia. An opportunity to withdraw his army from Gettysburg presented itself, and he began moving on the 4th of July, under the cover of rain and darkness.6 The full extent of the Confederate evacuation was discovered the morning of the 5th, and immediately Meade ordered a meaningful pursuit using portions of the V Corps. Following an eight-mile march, Federals found the rear guard of Lee’s army posted strongly in mountain passes, effectively checking the Union chase. On July 6, Meade decided to pursue the Confederates by way of a flank movement, keeping east through Frederick and Boonesboro, Maryland, on his way south to Williamsport, Lee’s clear destination for his Potomac crossing. This was an 80-mile trip for the Yankees, while the Rebs enjoyed a more direct route that was only half that. Lee arrived at Williamsport on the 7th and found the Potomac, nearly dry a few days before, a rain-swollen torrent. Unable to cross, Lee entrenched and awaited an inevitable attack while Meade pushed the remainder of his army south.7
Few corps in Meade’s army were more shot up than III Corps, and few brigades more mangled than the Excelsiors. On July 2, William Brewster had taken 1,837 men onto the field and by the end of the action, 778 had been killed, wounded or come up missing. The 72nd was sorting itself out; Colonel Austin was wounded and officers in half the companies had been hit. Seven men had been killed outright, but by July 8 four more had succumbed to their wounds.8 Among them was young Charles Foss, the newly appointed second lieutenant in Company C. Foss died from complications resulting from amputation. Foss was among an ever dwindling breed, an original 72nd man who’d joined with Stevens and Company D in the beginning back in Dunkirk. As the war went on, the regiment was shrinking, now barely 200 men with fewer and fewer who remembered the likes of James Brown and the early hardships of Staten Island. Indeed of all who carried the true flame of the Excelsior Brigade, now Dan Sickles, its patron saint and founder was gone too.
Sickles’ successor was not an obvious choice at first, having not even served in the recent battle. The III Corps’ two divisions were ravaged and the decision was made to add a third division. This would bring the corps back to an appropriate fighting strength. There was a large division in garrison at Harpers Ferry under the command of William French. These troops would constitute the new division and French would be the new III Corps commander.9 French was 48 and born in Baltimore. He graduated in the middle of his West Point class, which included the likes of Hooker, Sedgwick, Bragg, Early and Pemberton. After stellar service in the Seminole wars he was moved briefly to Texas at the outbreak of the rebellion. After promotion to brigadier general, French commanded a brigade within II Corps on the Peninsula and a division at Antietam. In November of ’62 he was promoted to major general, and after serving at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, was placed in charge of the District of Harpers Ferry, thus missing the battle at Gettysburg.10
Andrew Humphreys, who had performed well during the battle, was now Meade’s chief of staff. Humphreys in turn was replaced by Henry Prince to lead Second Division. Prince was a career West Point man and among the oldest generals in the army. Having served with distinction against both the Seminoles and Mexicans, Prince had earlier commanded a brigade, then a division in Banks’ corps, and was captured at Cedar Mountain and held prisoner for four months.11
Commanders at all the levels were in flux. Second Division’s Second Brigade, the Excelsiors, was under new command of 42-year-old New York politician, Brigadier General Francis B. Spinola, replacing the 73rd’s Col. Brewster. Prior to commanding the Excelsiors, Spinola had taken part in minor operations in Southeast Virginia and North Carolina while at the head of several regiments of Pennsylvania militia.12 While the commander of the 72nd New York was still officially the wounded Colonel Austin, effective leadership fell to Lt. Col. Leonard.
After a couple of false starts, on July 7, the regiment received orders and marched to Mechanicstown, where they camped for the night. Leaving near 6 a.m., the men marched nearly due south to Frederick, where they arrived at 10 p.m. and spent the night. The following day Dean and the rest moved west to Middletown. There they received rations for the first time in two days and encamped on the old South Mountain battlefield. By nine o’clock on the morning of the 10th Leonard and the captains had them on the move again, crossing Antietam Creek and halting for some time on a portion of the old battlefield there. They moved again around 10 p.m. re-crossed the creek, and finally halted for the night at two the next morning. With only four hours’ sleep, Leonard and his men moved to a spot two miles away, where they remained in position until 4 p.m. At that time they re-crossed Antietam Creek and camped for the night. On the morning of July 12, Leonard moved his regiment about one mile and camped in a piece of woods.13 Here, stopped for a while, James Dean penned a quick letter to his sister assuring her that he was fine and the recent letter from her and the family had buoyed his sagging spirits: “I believe if it had not been for your prayers I might not been able to write you today and I hope you will continue your prayers for my safety.”14 Dean’s note also reflected a confident tone that mirrored the army’s: “I think we can whip the rebels if not capture nearly all Lees army and I hope we do, so the war will come to a close soon.”15
John Leonard began with the regiment as captain of Company F, raised from Newark, Jew Jersey. Leonard had served with the regular army in frontier postings in Washington State before the war and became the 72nd’s lieutenant colonel after Chancellorsville. Leonard commanded the regiment following Austin’s wounding at Gettysburg through to its dissolution in July of 1864 (Brown, History of the Third Regiment).
Meade now believed his army was in position for a meaningful attack on Lee’s flank. During two days of reconnoitering while the bulk of Meade’s army inched itself west to Williamsport, orders were issued for an assault the morning of the 14th. When the daybreak attack went forward, Meade and his men found they were too late. Lee and his army had constructed pontoon bridges from old barns and derelict houses and had escaped across the swollen Potomac River.16 President Lincoln, who had pushed Meade to close with Lee and finish the job, was livid at the news. “The fruit was so ripe, so ready for plucking that it was very hard to lose it.”17 The president went on to express his disappointment in terms so sharp Meade offered to resign command, a request Lincoln denied.18
Having made good his escape across the Potomac, Lee camped near the town of Winchester, upon some of the same ground where he had rested his army following its retreat from Antietam ten months before. With the Confederate Army locating itself on the west side of the Blue Ridge Mountains, Meade faced a choice of how best to pursue his enemy.
Choosing not to pursue directly upon Lee’s rear, Meade decided to move the Army of the Potomac down the east side of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Such a move would allow the Federals to easily resupply themselves by rail, while at the same time allowing the army to constantly threaten Lee’s flank. Meade reasoned Lee would be forced to retreat south while he pursued on a parallel march with both armies on their respective sides of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Meade also believed that when the opportunity presented itself, he could strike at the Confederate flank through many of the passes and gaps along the range. Meade now set upon the task of getting his Federal Army out of Maryland, across the Potomac and after Lee in Virginia.19
Leonard’s New Yorkers briefly camped in some abandoned enemy positions near Williamsport following the fruitless morning assault of the 14th. After spending the night, the boys trudged back, countermarching south toward Sharpsburg. Stopping in early afternoon for the night, Dean and the rest were two miles beyond the town. By six the next morning the regiment was again marching south, where it stopped for the night within three miles of Harpers Ferry at the foot of the Maryland Heights. The morning of the 17th brought a small treat for the regiment: no rush to begin the march. Instead the boys were able to linger about until 4:30 that afternoon, when they finally left their bivouac. Soon they moved across a pontoon bridge that spanned the Potomac at Harpers Ferry. Next they crossed the Shenandoah River and went on to Sweet Run, where they rested for the night, settling down about three miles beyond Harpers Ferry.20
Both armies were now in Virginia, and the movement south quickened as Meade sought to close with Lee. Since mid–June when the Federals had left Falmouth, the army had been on nearly continuous march, stopping only to fight. As men marched there was the distinctive sound of infantry on the move. Leather cartridge boxes and straps, along with canvas haversacks, creaked and groaned as gear swayed with the rhythm of their step. Tin cups and canteens clanked against rifle butts, small skillets or other personal equipment. To lighten their loads, blankets, heavy and unnecessary in the summer’s heat, were collected. They would be returned once the weather cooled. The Army of the Potomac was moving south along the west side of the Blue Ridge Mountains, paralleling the Confederates just as Meade had wished. For Hiram Stoddard the strategic situation since the battle at Gettysburg couldn’t have been more clear: “We have been after them ever since. Our army went down on one side of the mountains and Lee’s army on the other.”21
The next day Leonard led the regiment south from Sweet Run. For three days the New Yorkers moved south along the eastern base of the mountains, making better than ten miles a day. Meade’s supply situation was still in chaos. Most men’s uniforms were a collection of rags, many soldiers marching without proper shoes. But despite these conditions, on the 20th they reached Upperville, located on the road leading to Winchester and Lee’s side of the Blue Ridge. Nearly worn out, men dropped and made camp, relieved when word came they would stay for two days.
His army had ignored other mountain passes as they moved south, but Meade now learned the enemy was marching nearly opposite him. Manassas Gap was only a day’s march away. This was the opportunity Meade had planned for: to throw a column through one of these gaps and fall upon the center of Lee’s battered and unprepared army.
On July 22, III Corps’ commander French received orders to occupy the Manassas Gap, through which ran a railroad of the same name. This east–west line connected Manassas Junction with Front Royal and Strasburg as it cut through the Blue Ridge Mountains. The plan intended III Corps to lead the attack, followed by V Corps, with II Corps held in reserve. To speed their movements, both attacking corps were ordered to leave their supply trains behind, the III’s in Deplane and the V’s in Rectortown. “I was ordered to move upon Manassas Gap, to hold two divisions at Piedmont, and send forward a third to re-enforce Brigadier-General Buford, who had been directed to seize the Gap,”22 reported French. By midday the Excelsiors were well on their way from Upperville. Near 7 p.m. Leonard had gotten his boys, along with the rest of the Second and Third divisions, down to Piedmont Station, which sat on the rail line about two miles east of the gap. Here they bivouacked for the night. As for the rest of the III Corps, French reported, “The First Division, under Brigadier-General Ward, arrived at Linden Station, in the Gap, at 11 p.m. and, in conjunction with cavalry, took possession of the Gap.”23 Federals now occupied a portion of the gap, but the enemy still controlled the commanding high ground farther to the west.
In the early dark of the next morning French moved his Second and Third divisions forward. By 9 a.m. they had covered nine miles or so and reached the staging area at Linden Station. As the Excelsior Brigade arrived at the station, 120th New York was detached and sent on picket duty. This left only the five original regiments behind, reducing brigade strength to well under 1,000 rifles.24 Anticipating the fight to come, men throughout the companies prepared. Men checked their supply of cartridges while others cleaned rifles, scraping and scouring their muskets’ nipples, inside and out; this was no time for a misfire. As a finishing touch, men fired a percussion cap or two to clean out the narrow passage leading from the nipple to the barrel chamber containing the powder charge and Minié ball. Soon the sound of snapping caps floated on the air, a sure sign an attack was imminent.25 While Dean and his fellows tended their Springfields, a small battalion of skirmishers from Ward’s First Division were sent forward to “feel the enemy and to compel him to show his pickets on the heights as well as in the ravines.”26
Moving forward Ward’s skirmishers found Wright’s Brigade of Georgia troops under command of Colonel E.J. Walker. The Confederate position consisted of 3rd Georgia on the right, the 48th Georgia in the center, and the 22nd Georgia protecting their left. French correctly concluded this was “a large flank guard to delay our advance,”27 and he could see that beyond the gap were “continuous columns of Lee’s cavalry, infantry, artillery and the baggage wagons moving all day from the directions of Winchester toward Strasburg, Luray and Front Royal.”28 It was the destruction of these unprepared enemy columns that Meade wanted.
By late morning Ward’s First Division was in position for an assault against the first line of Confederates, which occupied a high, steep ridge; but French delayed giving the order to attack. Captain C.H. Andrews with the Third Georgia described the scene from his vantage: “About 11 a.m. the enemy appeared in the valley in our front in force—infantry, cavalry and artillery. About 2 p.m. they formed for an advance.”29 Urgent messages were sent to General Richard Ewell reporting the Georgians’ situation and requesting reinforcement. But on came the Union men. “The skirmishers met the enemy at various points of its extended line, and steadily drove them until the entire line of heights had been carried,”30 reported French. From below, troops moving forward in support of the attack could see the fighting above, providing them with “a magnificent scene.”31 On the rebel side both generals Ewell and Robert Rodes had appeared on the field carrying promises of more troops, but none arrived in time before Ward’s Federals had swept the Georgians off the first and highest ridge, known locally as Wapping Heights.32
By 4 p.m. the steep and rocky Wapping Heights were in Federal hands. The men of the III Corps now consolidated their position, which looked down onto a second ridge where the retreating Rebels had reformed. Confederate Colonel Walker was wounded in the fighting and command of the enemy brigade devolved to a staff officer, Captain Victor Girardey. Girardey now conducted the movements on his brigade’s left while Captain Andrews of the Third Georgia commanded the brigade’s right. “Our line now extended about 2 miles, and was very weak, as our numbers were small,”33 wrote Andrews. Federal officers from their side of the line could see they faced only about 600 enemy muskets flank to flank.
Despite commanding Wapping Heights, French hesitated to press the attack against the rallied but still outmanned Georgians. Advancing over the rough ground, a substantial gap had developed between his leading First Division and the supporting Second Division. Fearing an attack on his flank, French halted the advance and ordered Brigadier General Henry Prince to bring Second Division forward to close the worrisome gap between divisions. Prince took an hour to get into proper position, during which time many bored and hungry men of III Corps busied themselves picking berries and chasing sheep.34 Finally the order came for Prince “to send a brigade to penetrate the ravine in front and cut enemy’s line, and to drive them away.”35
Prince selected Second Brigade for this move into the ravine, but it wasn’t until around 5 o’clock that brigade commander Spinola received orders to move the Excelsiors forward. Marching over the crest where Ward’s men had formed their line, Spinola led the Excelsiors down toward the defending Georgians. “Descending the precipitous slopes of Wapping Heights, they were directed upon the valley which separated the series of knolls in our front, behind the principal of which the enemy, perceiving the object of the movement, concentrated.”36
Halting at the base of the heights, the New Yorkers formed a line of battle. Spinola rode along the line shouting encouragement. The order to “charge bayonets” ran through the brigade like an electric shock. “Though I never doubted their courage, the effect which this order had on the men by far surpassed my expectations,”37 wrote Captain Lovell Purdy of the 74th New York. “We were put into line of battle and there told what we had to do. There were no use in telling us that for, we could see what we could do,”38 wrote James Dean. “The word was given to advance.”39 General Spinola rode ahead of the boys amid the regiments’ flying colors. With his sword and pistol drawn, he urged his men forward shouting, “Now boys of the Excelsior Brigade, give them Hell.”40 As the men went forward their eyes flitted between the colors, Spinola, and their enemy’s positions.
Moving at the double quick, enemy bullets whizzed past the brigade as it picked its way through a cornfield and some swampy ground. Part of the 72nd soon encountered a wide ditch. As men edged their way through, progress of the regiment slowed. Once across, they clambered up the far side where they were promptly greeted by a Rebel volley. Concentrated mostly onto Company B, men fell or went to ground. Though rocked by enemy fire, the men quickly regained the initiative. And with the weight of numbers on their side, Leonard’s boys surged forward into the fast-disintegrating Confederate position.41 “With a yell that would have done credit to a band of demons, our boys sprang to their feet and rushed the foe,”42 read the official 72nd New York report.
Organized enemy defense was collapsing as the regiment swarmed over rifle pits, driving the Southerners before them and collecting hapless prisoners. Excelsiors made liberal use of the bayonet as fleeing Rebels discarded weapons, belts, cartridge boxes and other impediments to escape. “I know that some of them was wounded with the bayonets of our men. I do not want to brag but I gave one of them an inch of steel myself,”43 Dean remembered.
On the Confederate side, Captain Andrews related the Excelsior’s attack and his own frustration: “Between 4 and 5 p.m. the enemy advanced again, and we resisted them to the utmost of human capacity; fought till our ammunition was exhausted, and, to enable us to fight at all, the ammunition was taken from the killed and wounded and distributed. Ammunition was ordered up, but failed to reach us.”44 With ammunition low and his men outnumbered, the Confederates retreated in disarray. Andrews continued, “The fight was made in open field, and at the distance of 15 paces. General Rodes sent forward a squad of 60 men … but they failed to render any service.”45
Confederate self-preservation was now the only priority, as Rebs scrambled for the rear ahead of Excelsior cold steel. “The rebels had hardly time to fire a shot at us and after we got them on the run, they had no chance to load,”46 wrote Dean.
Chasing the fleeing Georgians, Dean and the rest came to another small hill lying about 200 yards beyond the enemy’s original position, “behind which the enemy rose from his prone posture as thick as men can stand, opening a furious fire of musketry. At the same time a six-gun battery, still farther beyond, opened with shell,”47 wrote General Prince. This “furious fire” came from men of O’Neal’s Brigade, who had recently arrived to support the Georgians.48
As the Excelsiors charged toward this second hill in the face of renewed Rebel firepower, Spinola received a second, more serious wound. Shot now in both the side and heel, he was forced to relinquish command. Former brigade commander William Brewster was gone on sick leave, so command devolved to 70th New York’s Colonel J. Egbert Farnum.49
The Excelsior’s formation was becoming seriously misaligned. Having charged over three-quarters of a mile across rough ground, the unequal speed of the advancing men created gaps and malformed companies. Facing a reinforced line of Confederate infantry supported by artillery, the advance began to falter. Despite the misalignment, the Excelsiors managed to carry the second hill and scatter the enemy. “The first and second heights were carried in the face of a severe fire, when the enemy opened from the opposite hill with a four-gun battery, and the men, who were now completely exhausted, were ordered to hold the position, of which they had so gallantly taken possession,”50 read the 72nd’s official report. “Directions had been sent by me to the brigade while charging the second crest to halt upon and maintain that crest, and to restore its line there,”51 wrote General Prince, explaining further, “a farther advance without preparation would have been irregular.”52
Under orders to stop and consolidate his position, Farnum threw out strong pickets on either flank. The remainder of the brigade frantically built breastworks in their front, gathering available stones and nearby fence rails.53 Hunkered down behind the improvised earthworks, Leonard’s men traded shots with the Rebels. “We were ordered to fall back to the top of a hill and laid their [sic] in line of battle while the rebels amused themselves by throwing shell at us for time,”54 wrote Dean. Of particular concern to the men of the regiment was the accurate fire of some enemy sharpshooters, the effect of which was more than mildly exaggerated by Dean: “Our brigade of 900 muskets, we lost 150 by sharpshooters and were the most fatal wounds I ever see. There were any number of legs that had to be cut off.”55 Dean added, “They must have had quite a number of sharpshooters as every shot that is made, a fatal wound and 3 legs out of every 5 had to come off.”56
The New Yorkers settled in behind their new barricades as ineffective Rebel artillery fire flew over and around their position. Prince moved his two remaining brigades into supporting positions. The First Brigade under Brig. Gen. Joseph Carr established a second line while the Third Brigade under Col. George Burling formed his men to the right of the Excelsiors. “The enemy threw solid shot and shell at the troops of General Carr and Colonel deTrobriand [Burling] during their movements without effect,”57 reported Prince. As the division made its final dispositions, “darkness settled down and overtook us.”58 Federal troops slept on their arms in line and prepared for another push the next day. Meanwhile, the Georgians and indeed the whole of Rodes’ division began their retreat. “After dark, under orders from General Ewell, we commenced our march through Front Royal,”59 reported Captain Andrews. After making their way across the Shenandoah River, Rodes’ men pulled up the pontoon bridges behind them, finally stopping two miles beyond Front Royal, eight miles or so from Wapping Heights.
As dawn broke in the gap, the men of Prince’s Second Division awoke to discover the enemy positions abandoned. Probing the enemy line, the men found only Southern corpses. Detached from the brigade, the 70th New York advanced about three miles but with the enemy gone, soon returned. With the entire brigade back together, the Excelsiors advanced all the way to Front Royal and also found it vacant of Rebels. “Here, finding the enemy had gone, we were marched back, a distance of about 5 miles, and bivouacked for the night,”60 reported Major William Hugo of the 70th New York.
Federal high command believed the Confederate force near Front Royal was a strong line of battle protecting Lee’s main force. In reality, this was only a rear guard and Lee’s main column had been moving swiftly along roads further west. Having lost his chance to deliver a blow, Meade withdrew his men from Manassas Gap and as Harper’s Weekly described, the Northerners “marched leisurely on toward the Rappahannock.”61
The Excelsiors started marching back east on the morning of the 25th, following the railroad through the town of Salem. They stopped for the night about seven miles from Warrenton. There, the 120th New York rejoined the command after having been detached for picket duty.62
General Prince had had the entire Second Division at his disposal up on Wapping Heights, but it was the Excelsior Brigade that carried the heaviest burden this day. Confederate losses numbered somewhere near 170, while the Excelsiors lost a total of 75 men killed and wounded (half of James Deans’ understandably inflated estimate), with the greatest amount coming from the 70th New York with 32 casualties. Leonard’s command suffered only eight men wounded during the day’s fight. Company B lost one man with a leg broken above the knee that later had to be amputated.63 The twice-wounded General Spinola was sent to the rear, with his return to the brigade in serious doubt. But until a new general was found or Brewster returned, Farnum would continue to lead the New Yorkers.64
The Excelsior Brigade had deported themselves well as they chased the enemy nearly a mile, much of it in plain view of the rest of III Corps. “Everyone that looked on and saw the charge said there was nothing since the war that [would] compete with that,”65 wrote Hiram Stoddard. He added, “everywhere we go, the bystanders are whispering, ‘is that the old Ex company, are they the ones that made that charge?’”66 Purdy of the 74th N.Y. summed up the movement and fight of July 23 this way: “I may justly add that none but the often-tried heroes could have passed through the fatigues of such a march and accomplish what they subsequently did.”67
Sergeant Henri LeFevre-Brown of Company B, Stoddard, Dean, and the rest of the regiment continued their “leisurely march” south. The Excelsiors finally stopped for the night about two miles from Warrenton, on the road to Sulfur Springs, close to the Rappahannock River. It was the 26th of July, the day William H. Lovell died. Lovell was 22 years old, a Company B man, and was the last of 14 Third Excelsior men who eventually died from the Gettysburg fight.68 Of the 14 dead, only six had been killed outright on July 2. One, Sgt. Dan Bourke of Co. E, died of his chest wound later that same day, but the rest would linger; some there in Gettysburg, others in hospitals further north. Two of the oldest men in the regiment would also die: John Hilger of Co. H and Frederick Platte of Co. E; both were 42. Company E was the same company to which Sgt. Tom Horan, who had captured the Eighth Florida’s flag, belonged. With five dead, E seemed to have gotten the worst of it. Three men in B would die; George Hankin was killed outright near Emmitsburg Road, and Elliott Homer was hit in the knee and lasted till the 23rd, when he finally died in a Baltimore hospital. Last to expire was Pvt. Lovell.69 Hiram Stoddard wrote his parents about “Willie”:
Since I wrote you last Willie Lovell of Co. B has died of a wound received at Gettysburg. He was shot through the leg and had his leg amputated his sister was with him when he died. She took his remains home and has them intered [sic] by the side of his mother. He was a good soldier one that was always at his post. He received his wound fighting and refusing to yeald [sic] one inch of ground to those traitors till he was shot through the leg and was obliged to leave the field.70
The army had been on the move since the beginning of June. Except for their time in Gettysburg, they had been on the march every day. But now the pace seemed to be slowing. “Since we have started on this march we have marched over 400 miles,”71 pointed out Hiram Stoddard, with “our bedding, three days’ rations, 60 rounds and cartridges and a heavy gun.”72 But time and Lee’s army, it seemed, were slipping away from Meade. And the farther the pursuit went south into Virginia, the less likely the crushing blow Lincoln demanded would come. By early August the Federal Army had aligned itself along the north side of the northern arm of the Rappahannock River, positioned at its most important crossings. For the New Yorkers, the end of the constant marching was welcomed relief; camp meant a chance to rest and catch up on lice detail and important letter writing:
Dear Father and Mother,
I take this opportunity while it is cool to write a few lines to you to let you know that I am well and enjoying good health and fast regaining my strength for 2 months steady marching is enough to kill a horse alone men. We are now in camped near the Rappanook. The weather is verry warm and it is verry uncomfortable to move around to any extent. It is curious to see the boys with nothing on but their shirt and drawers and go down behind the woods, some stripped and busy washing them selves, some was washing their clothes others under some trees or bush with their shirts off busy looking over them to see if they can find any of the animals which bother a soldier.
James Dean73
The men of the regiment were indeed enjoying their break from the hard marching of the past months. Camped near Beverly Ford, the Excelsior regiments rotated through the various picket and reconnaissance chores.74 Colonel Brewster returned from sick leave on August 10 to resume command of the brigade. The men were growing weary, and the stop was doing them some good. Hiram Stoddard, who tried to stay upbeat in letters, couldn’t help but cast a darker tone:
While we were making that charge in Monnassas Gap another of our best men was shot through the leg and had to have it amputated and has since died. His name was Slaitor [Bernard P. Slater, ed.]… Mother you wanted to know how many of the Boys that were from Busti are left…. There was 11 of us at Orlandoes that night and out of 11 there is only three left, myself, Ayres and Fip. Oh dear parents this cruel war has cut down many a blooming rose. It has clothed our dear country in deep mourning and I have to ask myself why have I not fallen.75
The boys’ enlistments weren’t up for almost a year, but already there was talk about staying longer. One idea kicked around had to do with the entire brigade’s reenlisting for another three years as a unit of mounted infantry. This idea included a 30-day furlough for enticement. For some the idea of riding into battle then fighting on foot was certainly appealing, but for others the notion of staying three more years was unthinkable. But for now it was just an idea.76 There was no question the need for more men was acute, both within the brigade and the army. To ease the shortage, men and officers from the III Corps were sent back home to recruit or at the very least return with a few draftees to help replenish the severely depleted ranks. And though the reputation of draftees was, on the whole, not a good one, for Pvt. Dean, the sorry state of the regiment was more worrisome than the potential poor character of new men:
I am in not hurry for a brush with him [Lee] for the army is not verry strong at present and we might stand a chance of getting whipped. There has been quite a number of conscripts come out for the division but none as yet for our Brigade. I wish they would send some out and get them in a state of discipline. You must know when a regiment like ours so decimated a fellow stands a poor show for his life. I saw in the Hearald that the draft had taken place in queens county. Let me know some of the fellows that have been lucky enough to draw a ticket for the ball.77
The regiment and the whole of the army were in a depleted state, but Lee’s army was in worse shape. And Meade’s strategy of pulling up behind the Rappahannock while the enemy rested, resupplied, and recuperated their numbers was a sore point in the North. In early September Lee had sent two of his divisions west to Tennessee to support hard-pressed Confederate General Braxton Bragg. This now gave the cautious Meade an opportunity. Without waiting for directions from Washington, Meade issued orders to his army on the 13th for a general move south toward Culpepper Court House.78 That night Federal troops were on the move, but for the III Corps and the men of the Excelsior Brigade the problems were just beginning. Chaplain Twichell described what happened in a letter to his sister:
We marched Tuesday night … and with a vengeance. It was a march, and nothing else. Our first destination was Fox’s Ford on the Rappahannock. This being neared, our course was changed, by order, toward Freemans Ford. Then commenced our tribulations. Through forests and morasses, through highways, byways, through hedges and ditches, we groped, huddled and floundered. Vain the splendor of the night, with crisp air and stars and thousand voices and blazing camps, consigned to abandonment and flames—vain indeed, the songs and quips and laughter of the merry rank and file…. Well, we marched and countermarched, and filed right and filed right, until the “noon of night” was past when, after half an hour in the thick woods to dense and dark that candles were necessary to light the column on its way, we emerged, not at the river crossing which was our quest, but upon the very field from which we set out, and lay down with mingled cursing and laughter to sleep in the old camps.79
The next morning division commander Prince was reportedly arrested “to account before a Court Martial for our nocturnal vagaries.”80 But evidence of any such arrest is lost to history. Despite the intrigue, the division regained its composure and set out again. With the correct route to their destination now apparently well in hand, the division set off around 7 a.m. By noon they had crossed both the Rappahannock and Hazel rivers. After stopping for their midday meal, the column continued on to Culpepper Court House, where they camped for the night. The next day LeFevre-Brown, Dean, Stoddard and the others moved three miles or so to the side of a small hill overlooking Culpepper, near the main road. Several days before, all the Rebel pickets had cleared out, allowing the movement to go on unchallenged and uneventful. The only hostile signs were the occasional cannon booms from down by the Rapidan, several miles off.81
September 1863. John Henry Ward (brigadier general), John S. Austin (colonel), John Egbert Farnum (colonel), William R. Brewster (colonel), Gershom Mott (brigadier general), Culpeper, Virginia. By September of 1863, Colonel Austin was no longer running the day-to-day operations of the 72nd N.Y. This was being done by Lt. Col. Leonard while Austin was relegated to some forgotten staff position within the division. Farnum commanded the 70th New York while Colonel Brewster commanded the Excelsior Brigade from Gettysburg onward (courtesy the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center).
By now some of the old doubts were creeping back. Having been marched in a circle by Prince only added to their sense of frustration. Many were feeling that the brigade was getting used up, and Stoddard gave voice to those frustrations in a letter home: “We expect to march evry [sic] minute. It seems to me some times as though the Old Ex had done her share of the fiting [sic] but I think there is no rest for us for we are always at the front.”82 In the face of this superior force, Lee withdrew his army south of the Rapidan River into strong defensive positions. This move placed the two opposing armies in roughly the same positions Union General John Pope had enjoyed a year ago, prior to his defeat at Second Bull Run in August of ’62.
Soon the regiment settled into the usual camp routines. Occasionally the division would move for a few days on reconnaissance, but usually without results. One day, a few of the boys went over to V Corps to watch the execution of five deserters. Though all who witnessed it were horrified by the sight, all agreed the convicted got what they deserved.83 Winter was approaching and the evenings were turning cool. Men sought relief by building fires and bundling up in whatever sheet, coat, or blanket could be had, but there was a problem. The supply situation was still not fully resolved. Marching down from Gettysburg, most of the blankets had been collected in order to lighten the men’s loads, but for many, these blankets had yet to be returned.84 Waiting, the men suffered at night as they huddled for warmth. “It is quite cold here at nights and a woolen blanket would feel verry [sic] comfortable but we have drawn no blankets or coats as yet,”85 wrote one 72nd man.
It was approaching the end of September, and it was looking as if the war in the East might pass into the next year without any more real action at all. For weeks Meade and Lincoln argued over what could and couldn’t be done against Lee’s army. In a kind of concession that things were winding down, during the last week of September Meade sent two of his corps, the XI and XII, west to support the Union armies in Tennessee. These western troops were fighting some of those same Rebels Lee had earlier sent west.86 Despite the departure of two corps, Meade still enjoyed a numerical advantage over Lee, though somewhat less overwhelming than before.
Lee had desired to go on the offensive for some weeks, and the reduction of Meade’s army provided such an opportunity. It had taken the Confederate commander almost two weeks to confirm transfer of the two Yankee corps, but on October 9 he set his plan into motion.87 The plan was a near reprise of Stonewall Jackson’s accomplishments against Pope a year before. Lee’s army would cross both the Rapidan and Rappahannock rivers, moving west and north, then sweep around the Union right flank and into their rear areas, creating havoc near places such as Manassas Junction. If all went well, Washington itself could be threatened. To carry out his plan, one corps under A.P. Hill would march a wide, circuitous route west, intent on hitting the Yankees either in their flank or rear areas. The other corps under Richard Ewell would follow Meade’s inevitable route of retreat along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.88
When intercepted messages indicated a major Rebel move, Meade acted quickly. Union cavalry were sent in every direction from Culpepper Court House to divine the nature of the action. The Excelsiors started marching early in the morning of October 8 in support of the reconnaissance, heading west toward James City.89 The march was a short one, and the brigade stopped by 11 a.m. for dinner. While Leonard’s 72nd N.Y. and most of the brigade established their regimental bivouacs, the 120th New York was detached from the brigade and left around 3:30. Supporting Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry division, the 120th established a forward picket post four miles beyond, near Mason Court House. While some harbored concerns about the fate of their fellow New Yorkers, most Excelsiors went about the business of setting up camp.90
The next day the New Yorkers remained under arms while they waited for the cavalrymen to figure out what was going on. The camp being situated near the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains, some men took time to admire the range’s beauty. “Next morning, at daybreak, word was brought that the enemy was crossing at a neighboring ford. The division was immediately put in order of battle and the general pulse beat quick,”91 wrote Twichell. Artillery was rushed forward, and the sounds of heavy fighting could be heard in the distance. At least three brigades of Confederate horsemen under J.E.B. Stuart had descended upon Kilpatrick and the 120th. The fight was furious and desperate, but the Federals were overwhelmed and by 9 a.m. what was left of the 120th came dragging back into James City. One hundred men were now prisoners, including their dead and wounded, a number not easily spared by the brigade.92 This loss by the 120th represented about one-third the entire regiment and almost one-tenth the brigade’s strength.
Without proper authorization from above, Prince ordered his division back toward Culpepper near 1 p.m. Many men were anxious they’d need to form a line of battle at any moment and fight, but the cavalry protected the division’s rear and near midnight they safely reached the outskirts of Culpepper.93
After some initial debate whether this Confederate move was an advance or a retreat, Meade concluded it to be a Rebel offensive and immediately set his army into motion. Wishing to fight on ground of his choosing, Meade began moving the army north, along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, instead of launching into Lee below the Rappahannock. Meade thus maintained his army between the Confederates and Washington.94
Leonard moved the regiment early the next morning, his men tired and chilled. The march was an all-day affair and went well into the night. While resting in the dark woods an alarm was raised amongst the Excelsiors and “for a few minutes the panic was fearful.”95 Men flew in every direction as the tempest descended upon them as a lone pack horse, loose from its handler, charged through the brigade. Stampeding through the forest, the horse threw off forage, saddle bags, books and other treasures belonging to none other than Chaplain Twichell. As the horse disappeared into the night, men set about recovering the good chaplain’s possessions. While most were collected, some were never found and were consigned to the pursuing Rebs. As for the horse, Twichell gave up the poor beast for lost, but later in the night the nag returned to the column. A man in the 70th caught the discourteous mount and returned it to the grateful chaplain. “I received him right thankfully and almost felt as if I had had a horse given me. The rascal felt no remorse for his evil deeds, but looked perfectly lamb-like when I reproached him,”96 recounted Twichell. With everyone’s composure regained they proceeded, crossing the Rappahannock at Freeman’s Ford at 10:30 and bivouacking for the night.97
Rear guard units of Meade’s army, following behind the Excelsiors, skirmished heavily with Lee’s advancing troops. By the end of the 11th the Confederates once again held Culpepper.98
The Excelsiors started a hard, fast march north early on the 13th. Having marched all day, that night the head of the III Corps column was hit hard by attacking Rebel cavalry and artillery. Battling units serving as the corps’ headquarters guard were badly cut up, and French himself barely escaped capture or injury. The attack cost the column nearly two hours, and the New Yorkers didn’t stop until three the next morning at Gainesville, almost due west of Manassas Junction.99 The regiment rested only two hours before the order came to move again. It was another hard march, a weary march, the kind of march some men would claim they had done while asleep or in a trance-like state. The boys crossed Bull Run Creek (Union namesake and site of the war’s first major battle, over two years prior) and finally stopped, groggily forming a line of battle near 3 p.m. Not far off, A.P. Hill had attacked a portion of the Union’s II Corps, and the Excelsiors prepared for the worst. When the fighting with II Corps was over, Hill’s troops had been badly mauled and the Excelsiors had remained unengaged. With the threat passed and darkness fully upon them, the regiment dragged itself back west to Centerville, where it spent the night. The next day they marched east again to Fairfax Station and formed a line of battle near Union Mills. Dean and the rest remained in battle array all day on the 16th.100
A.P. Hill’s defeat at Bristoe Station allowed Meade to solidify his positions around Centerville. With the Yankees firmly entrenched, each side probed for an opening; finding it impossible to attack and worried about his exposure to a numerically superior force, Lee demurred and commenced his retreat on the 17th.101
For Dean and the rest, the marching and countermarching in anticipation of a battle was a terrible grind, and the cold nights provided no relief for these weary troops. Though Lee was heading south, the danger had not passed. Meade moved only cautiously, but for the boys of the Excelsior Brigade, the 17th brought a welcomed diversion, the return of their old chief.
The boys of the III Corps had been expecting the return of Dan Sickles for two days, and no expense was spared to mark his homecoming. When word finally came that Dan was near and soon to review the troops, all were excited, especially the boys in the Excelsior Brigade who had known him from the beginning and with whom he had shared his most trying hours. The officers had their companies looking as good as was possible for undersupplied and over-marched men on active campaign, but still they were satisfied the general would be pleased. With the various companies formed, Dean and the rest moved to the road upon which Sickles would proceed. For Chaplain Twichell, Colonel Leonard and the rest it was a grand sight as two divisions, the Second and Third, took their positions (First Division being detached elsewhere). The men were of course formed by regiment with each brigade massed a regiment deep, allowing all to see Dan in his mounted eminence. There was some delay, and Stoddard and LeFevre-Brown, the real veterans, the ones there at the beginning, grew especially anxious. Finally the general appeared, atop his horse like some great emperor of old followed by a cloud of mounted officers. A great cheer was sent up from the mass of men; even those who hadn’t actually seen Sickles yet cheered. As he rode down the line, his head uncovered and bowing as he went, each regiment mustered a bit more enthusiasm and volume like a great breaker rolling against the shore. Men waved and tossed their caps in the air as officers flourished their swords. Getting a full view of the general they all thought he looked well. Sickles wore his missing limb like a badge of honor, perhaps the greatest mark of devotion to country and duty a loyal soldier could give. But except for the absence of the leg, the boys thought he looked healthy and fit. Sickles’ pride showed on his face as he struggled to hold back the tears that flowed freely on other men. When he reached his beloved Excelsior Brigade the excitement and jubilation exploded: “the old Brigade strained its individual and collected lung to the utmost and the results were immense.”102
Sickles’ trip to Fairfax Station was more than just a social call on his old comrades; there was the unpleasant business of asking Meade for his old job. Even before he advanced the III Corps without orders back at Gettysburg, relations with Meade had been cool; now, after all the accusations about events on that fateful day, relations with the commanding general were downright Arctic. There was a painful politeness to the meeting: a handshake, a smile and an inquiry about Sickles’ leg. But as to getting the III Corps back, Meade held firm; his answer was no. He didn’t come out and say he didn’t trust Sickles but merely pointed out the impracticality of a one-legged general attempting to keep up with a fast-moving army while confined to carriage, unable to ride a horse except under the most sedate of conditions103; this, even though by this stage of the war, there were plenty of examples of active one-legged generals (Confederate generals Ewell and soon, Hood) and one-armed generals (Union generals Howard and Kearney). The men of the III Corps would have preferred Sickles over anyone else, carriage or no. But it was not up to the men, and Dan soon returned to Washington, a general in search of a job.
While Lee retreated south, much of the Federal Army pursued and harassed the Confederate’s rear guard. By the 20th most of Lee’s army had crossed the Rappahannock. The Bristoe Campaign, as it came to be called, had cost the Rebels nearly 1,400 men, while Meade placed his losses around 2,300.104 As Lee withdrew across the river, the Excelsiors remained along the Orange and Alexandria. Leaving Fairfax on the 19th, they moved to Bristoe Station. The following day they advanced slowly, camping in the field for the night, only to finish their march by arriving near Catlett’s Station around 11 a.m. on the 21st (the same Catlett’s Station from which the regiment had begun their role in the Kettle Run and Second Manassas actions back in August of ’62). Here the Excelsiors would stay to protect the rail line that Ewell’s Confederates (whom the Second Division had fought against back in ’62) had thoroughly mangled. Whereas the Federals had burned only a few bridges along the O&A, denying the enemy only immediate use of the line, the Rebels had destroyed much more. The 40 miles of wrecked track that lay in their wake looked to the infantry as if it would take weeks if not months to fix.105 Unable to feed itself, Meade’s army would be slow to regain the offensive in any meaningful way. On the 27th Dean wrote about what he saw and included a bit of technical explanation:
The rebels have destroyed the Orange and Alexandria track complete. They have torn and burn the bridges of which there’s quite a number from 50 to a hundred feet wide. I suppose you do not know in what manner they destroy the track, they first tear up the iron rail the cars run on then tear up the sleepers, that is the wooden rails that the rails are nailed to, they then pile up the wooden sleepers and put the iron rails on the wood being careful to lay the rails so that when the fire is started the rails will heat in the center and the weight of each end bends it double and in some instances they would drive a stake in the ground and run the rail around it so as it could not be of any use.106
James Dean had joined the regiment too late to have seen this part of Virginia when the Excelsiors were here a year before with Pope. After a walk to a local village named Weaverville, he was taken by the poverty of the region, especially when compared to the abundance of Pennsylvania: “I knew that they lived poorly but never thought that they were in such a destitute condition, not hardly a thing to wear. The old man has a coat patched like a bed quilt and the women the same … some corn meal, a little coarse flour and what they do for coffee I do not know. No hogs, no fowls, cows or anything.”107 One day Dean went off into the woods in search of some wild hogs he knew were there. He soon found one and shot it. The beast was only wounded and its terrible squealing soon attracted the rest. With a bounty of targets, Dean commenced to shoot another then bayonet yet another. With three hogs, the men of Company C were soon living high on fresh pork as they kept an eye out for Rebel raiders.108
Since forcing Lee back from his expedition toward Centerville, Meade and Lincoln continued to exchange telegrams; the president demanded to know why more couldn’t be done. Meade’s force was growing in strength, yet the Confederates sat and rested below the Rappahannock, seemingly unmolested by the Yankees. From October 20 through the first week of November, Lee waited for the Bluecoat army to arrive. On November 5 the Confederate commander received the news he’d long been expecting: the Federal army had been detected probing the various fords across the Rappahannock. Meade was finally on the move.109
Back up the line at Catlett’s Station, the captains and first sergeants of the 72nd rousted the men into line for the march south to rejoin the rest of the corps. Of the regiment’s captains who had begun the war, all were either promoted, gone, or dead. The two newest company commanders had gotten their promotions since Gettysburg. Henry J. McDonough had been running the show in Company B since the end of July. He had been around since the early days and had originally enlisted as John Leonard’s first sergeant in Company F out of Newark. Before making captain, Henry had served as lieutenant in both companies I and D. Over in Company F, William McConnell was now captain, having gotten his promotion on August 27. He had joined Company C as a corporal back in ’61 and served as lieutenant in companies E, C and H before coming to F.110 The captains pushed their men hard and by the end of the day had joined the rest of III Corps at Warrenton Junction.
Prince had apparently avoided any disciplinary action resulting from his star-crossed night march back in September and on November 7 had the Second Division again marching hard south.111 They reached Kelly’s Ford, a critical crossing across the Rappahannock, by 3 p.m. While on the march, III Corp’s First Division had already been hard at work, with spectacular results. Two Confederate regiments assigned to guard the crossing had been taken completely by surprise when their rifle pits, which commanded the river, were suddenly flanked by First Division troops who had waded across. Nearly 400 Rebs were killed or captured and the rest went headlong for the rear. Yankee engineers quickly erected a pontoon bridge, and First Division men soon poured across the Rappahannock while Union artillery on the north bank pounded enemy positions well into the night.112 Elsewhere, a Confederate commander had assured Lee that his two brigades were sufficient to hold their works and thus they remained on the north side of the river rather than join the main body. But when massed Union troops stormed their position, most using just the bayonet, the whole command was lost except for 600 or so Rebs who either swam the river or ran a gauntlet of musket fire as they scampered across a pontoon bridge. The swiftness and completeness of the Union attack shattered any plans Lee had for holding his line along the Rappahannock. Seventy-Second New York bivouacked that night in a cornfield where the sheaves made good beds for the men and even better forage for the horses. The next morning the brigade was roused by the sound of bugles and after a hasty breakfast pressed on. But the Confederates whom the Excelsiors had expected to encounter that day had fled, leaving only their abandoned entrenchments for inspection.113 For the next two days the two armies marched, skirmished and countermarched in the area between the Rappahannock in the north and the Rapidan to the south. November 9 seemed like the final showdown as both armies faced off, but when Meade failed to press the issue Lee withdrew the next day across the Rapidan. The next morning, the two forces occupied essentially the same positions held a month earlier before Lee’s adventure toward Bristoe Station.114 “The battle which I prophesied with such confidence did not take place, contrary to universal expectations,”115 wrote Twichell, who described:
the whole army compactly arranged, toward Brandy Station where it was thought he would make a stand…. From some points of the march the whole army could be taken in at one view—the hosts of the Union advancing in combined grandeur. The 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Corps stretched out across the plain—shoulder to shoulder—pressing on with equal step…. It was a magnificent spectacle. One’s pulses leaped with enthusiasm, pride and hope at the sight…. The Confederates had declined the proffered challenge…. They had left at 12 o’clock—the last of them—and fled beyond the Rapidan, leaving for our use their winter quarters just finished.116
The three days between the rivers had been fruitful for Meade’s army. Lee’s losses were four times the Federal’s 450, which helped to redress the balance of losses in the campaign.117 The momentum of victory seemingly being with Meade, Harper’s Weekly wrote, “It is difficult to understand why the signal advantage which had been gained was not followed up…. But the golden opportunity of falling with his [Meade’s] whole force upon a portion of the Confederate army was lost.”118
Meade was hesitant about any further moves. Repair of the railroad, so vital to his army’s resupply, was still days if not weeks away, and to undertake a move without proper provisioning would be risky.119 In the meantime Dean, Stoddard and the rest of the Excelsiors enjoyed camp near Brandy Station, a cozy camp built by their enemy hosts. “Meanwhile we are comfortably housed,” wrote one Excelsior officer, “in the cabins reared at great expense of labor by the enemy, who must gnash his teeth at the very idea…. Our regiment is making itself at home under roofs intended for the 23rd North Carolina Vols…. I would ask no better fortune than to winter in it, although it needs a little Yankee contrivance to make it perfect.”120 The boys continued a full schedule of picket and fatigue duty, but given the rigors they had endured, their health was surprisingly good. There was still talk about reenlisting, with the notion of serving on horseback as mounted infantry. “It is all the talk among the boys and every one is making fun of the other,” said Dean, “to see what a gallas [sic] fellow he will be when he gets mounted on his mule and gun and saber.”121 By November 22 James Dean was nearly positive his army was settling in to ride out the winter. “They are busy laying switches down at the station and I think the army will winter between here and Culpepper or they would not be building the switches there.”122 Across the Rapidan, Robert E. Lee had come to those same conclusions.
Lee had about 48,000 troops present for duty on November 20 but had allowed them to go into winter quarters, and to ease the difficulties of feeding his army, allowed them to be dispersed over a wide area. Meade now set to pondering. With the Confederate army dispersed as they were, a rapid advance across the river and attack into the Rebel flank less than 20 miles away seemed quite feasible. By mid-month Meade had received the reports he had been hoping for: important fords on the Confederate extreme right had been left practically unguarded. If “prompt and vigorous action”123 was used in crossing them, a large part of the Union Army could crush Ewell’s II Corps before Hill’s III Corps could come to its aid. Meade quickly formulated a plan and set November 24 as the day to move. But severe rainstorms forced a two-day delay. After the rain was gone, in the early morning darkness of Thanksgiving Day, November 26, the Federal Army moved to cross the Rapidan River.124
The plan was fairly straightforward, and rations for eight days were issued to ensure that cumbersome supply wagons wouldn’t slow the advance. The Federal II and V Corps would cross at Germanna Ford while the I, III, and VI Corps would cross a little farther west, upstream at Jacob’s Ford. The five corps would then meet near Robertson’s Tavern, which would place Meade’s army east and south of the dispersed Confederates. Once together, the combined Federal force would roll west down the Orange Plank Road and into the Confederate rear areas, destroying Rebel units piecemeal as they were encountered.125
Extensive planning had gone into this advance, but delays plagued Meade’s men from the start. Muddy roads made movement slow, but most frustrating of all, someone had incorrectly measured the width of the river, resulting in every pontoon bridge being one boat short. Fixes were made, but precious time was lost.126 It was intended that French take III Corps over the river at Jacob’s Ford first, thus putting them in the vanguard of the advance, with its Second Division leading the way. But delay seemed the order of the day for French and his men; even getting across the river seemed overly taxing. “The enemy were showing themselves in some small force on the opposite side…. It therefore became necessary to act with a due amount of caution,”127 reported French. But even after the infantry was deployed and bridges were built, the steep banks on the river’s far side were impossible for horse-drawn artillery to scale. French sent his artillery downstream to cross at Germanna Ford, where other Federal corps were crossing. The resulting traffic snarl created even more delays.128
“At 4 o’clock, however, the bridge being completed, my division crossed upon it, and advanced along the road for the purpose of giving space for the remainder of the corps and the Sixth Corps on the farther bank,”129 wrote Prince. He attempted to make room for those Union troops following close behind. Advancing down the road, Prince halted at the first fork he encountered and reconnoitered one-half mile in both directions. Encountering “a little fusillade,”130 Prince deployed the 26th Pennsylvania, who chased away a few Confederate horsemen. With dark fast approaching, Prince passed word back to Third Division commander General Joseph Carr that he intended to bivouac in the woods surrounding the road’s fork and that proper arrangements of the divisions should be made. Orders were received from French instructing Prince to establish contact with the Second Corps and to prepare to march toward them at daybreak. Though he had cavalry at his disposal, Prince thought it impossible to establish such contact at night amid the tangle of trails and woods.131 Regiments settled in for the night, which promised to be cold. Large warming fires were not allowed, though smaller ones sufficient to make coffee were. Although the men shared blankets and snuggled together for warmth, “every mother’s son of us was chilled to the heart.”132 Pickets were positioned, and Thanksgiving night passed without major incident. But it also passed without any definite directions from General French as to the division’s exact location or the location of their intended objective, the linkup with II Corps.133
Meade had hoped to reach Robertson’s Tavern on the Orange Turnpike by the end of the first day, but poor road conditions and logistical miscues left his army far short of this goal. This delay gave Lee all the warning necessary, and he immediately sent troops to meet the advance. Rebel troops began skirmishing on the morning of the 27th with men of the Federal II Corps near Robertson’s Tavern. Confederates from Jubal Early’s and Robert Rodes’ divisions grappled with the bluecoats, fighting a holding action until early afternoon. Another Rebel division was holding some key high ground until around 2:30, when it was pushed off by the newly arrived V Corps under General George Sykes. Meade ordered Sykes to hold his position and wait until the entire army was ready for the main advance down the Orange Turnpike.134
While the Federal II and V Corps had been skirmishing in and around Robertson’s Tavern, the III Corps had been on an odyssey of their own. French and his generals had gotten moving at daybreak but by 8:30 had stopped when they became uncertain as to which direction to take at a fork of the Raccoon Ford Road. General Prince had sent out scouts, but “the enemy’s cavalry kept them from examining the road.”135 The presence of Reb cavalry, combined with no clear instruction from corps commander French, resulted in a two-hour delay before the Second Division got moving again.136
French crept south around 3:00 p.m. as a Rebel division under Edward Johnson marched along the Raccoon Ford Road in search of Rode’s Division, with which it was to connect. Near Payne’s Farm, the two forces collided. Unaware he now faced an entire Federal corps, with another one, the VI, close by, the aggressive Johnson deployed his 5,300 Southerners and prepared to fight.
Finding a suitable open field, Prince deployed Blaisdell’s First Brigade. Brewster’s Second Brigade formed a second line behind Blaisdell’s men, but there was still some uncertainty as to the correctness of the road, and Prince was told to “cease all operations.”137 Prince wrote, “After some time waiting in expectation of orders, Adjutant-General Hamlin came to me from the headquarters, and informed me that the major-general commanding had announced that this was the right road, and that we were all right.”138 With only two brigades at his disposal and his left flank exposed, Prince sought help from Gen. Carr’s Third Division. Carr declined to deploy his division, citing orders that called for him only “to follow.”139 But after a flurry of dispatches between Prince, Carr, and French, things finally got straightened out and Carr eventually went into line of battle.140
Despite Carr taking pressure off the left flank, Prince and his men still faced stiff resistance in their front. As Blaisdell’s brigade of Yankees advanced, pickets were thrown ahead of the formation, “and we continued our advance for short time, when the enemy showed himself in force,”141 wrote Colonel Robert McAllister of the 11th New Jersey. As the fighting become more general, Prince sent the Excelsiors to the right of First Brigade and then fired off dispatches stating his entire reserve had been committed and he was requesting reinforcement.142
“On the 27th of November, about 3 p.m. I received an order to march my regiment to the support of Colonel Blaisdell’s brigade. Lieutenant Lockwood, of Colonel Brewster’s staff, conducted me to the right of the line, where I took position in line on the right of the Eighty-fourth Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers,”143 reported Lt. Col. Leonard. The 70th N.Y. and 71st N.Y. regiments fell in on the right of Leonard’s men. As the fight continued, individual regiments, North and South, charged and counter-charged depending on the relative advantage of their position. Units took cover in woods and behind rail fences as the opportunities allowed.144 “The rebels fell back and we advanced and skirmished nearly all the day till 3 p.m.,”145 remembered Private Dean. Chaplain Twichell, riding along the rear of the 71st line, was nearly struck by a bullet that instead hit a sergeant standing nearby in the thigh. “He was immediately placed on a stretcher and I accompanied him off the field, thanking Heaven for my narrow escape.”146 And though the sergeant’s wound proved not to be too serious, Twichell “felt under peculiar obligation to him”147 for the sacrifice.
Early in the fight, the 84th Pennsylvania (posted to the left of the 72nd) broke, “leaving a large interval on my left unprotected, and through which the enemy were moving and attempting to turn our flank,”148 recalled Leonard. The New York men concentrated their fire, but the enemy advance went unchecked. “Volley after volley given, all to no use. Then we fixed bayonets and sent up such yells and cheers and charged on them,”149 described Dean. Facing the 72nd’s wall of cold steel, the enemy advance staggered to a halt as the Rebs turned heel. Joining in the chase was at least one other Excelsior regiment, the 70th N.Y. under J. Egbert Farnum. Soon the New Yorkers had driven the enemy a half mile. Having advanced this far, Leonard believed he was exposed and beyond effective support should the tables turn. The colonel called off the pursuit and halted the regiment in an open field. A short time later he moved them back to the road.150
Distinguishing friend from foe in the thickness of the woods was not always easy. “We ran on a battery and the officers told us it belonged to our side. They soon found their mistake when the grape and canister came whistling through our ranks,”151 remembered Dean. Fire from the Rebel battery was having “little effect”152 on the regiment, but caution prevailed and the New York men fell back to the cover of a small hill.153
As the afternoon wore on, part of the line on the division’s left was in jeopardy of being turned. As the Confederates pressed Prince’s left, the division gave ground “slowly and reluctantly.”154 Noting that this movement was general, Prince did not attempt to stop it, instead allowing them to fall back until they were in line with two batteries of the Fourth U.S. Artillery. At about this same time, reinforcements from the First Division reported they were in position and awaiting orders from Prince. “At my request he marched a line of his [Ward’s] brigade by the right flank across the road so as to show it in rear of the battery. This had a magical effect, as it spoke to the eye what in the noise might not be heard. All the officers of my staff and the brigade staff suddenly disseminated my orders among the troops to halt at the battery, and they did so, restoring their formation with wonderful quickness.”155 Prince went on, “The moment the battery was unmasked by our men, it opened with the utmost rapidity, deluging the rebel ranks with double charges of canister.”156 With the threat to his flank over, Prince advanced his newly reinforced line and retook all the ground previously lost.
By the end of the day Rebels fighting around Payne’s Farm and Locust Grove had taken the worst of it. Despite their losses they had protected their division’s flank and kept French’s III Corps four miles short of a link-up with the remainder of Meade’s army. Meade refused to advance piecemeal, so the action at Payne’s Farm and Locust Grove had effectively halted the entire Federal offensive. Meade’s army was still effectively divided; the “right road”157 chosen by French for his III Corps was in fact the much longer of two routes to Robertson’s Tavern. French’s failure to link up with and unify the army had cost the Union army important time and initiative. Stalled, the bulk of the Federal Army camped on the ground they held at the end of the day’s fight, far short of the hoped for objectives.158
James Dean stood watch during the night. “It being my turn I had to go out on picket and had to stand all night without anything but a jacket.”159 In the darkness, Dean could hear the distinct rattling of leaves to his front. “I got behind a tree and pressed my finger on the triker [sic] of my gun and cocked.”160 With the intruder three feet from him, he “put the bayonet to his breast and ordered him to halt.” Asking the stranger what regiment he belonged to, the reply came back, the Sixth Maryland. Dean asked what corps, and he responded, “the Second.”161 Instantly knowing this was the wrong corps, Dean grabbed the intruder’s musket and ordered his surrender, “or I would blow his brains out.”162 Dean then delivered his unexpected catch to Colonel Brewster. After an interrogation by the colonel it was discovered the Rebel sergeant belonged to George Dole’s brigade of Georgians, some of the same boys the Excelsiors had a couple of months earlier pushed off Wapping Heights.163 The fighting now over, doctors, orderlies, chaplains and regular soldiers collected the wounded and brought them in. With the ground picked over and unable to find any more wounded, the boys settled in for the night. In the camp of the 71st, the 72nd’s chaplain, William Eastman, called on his old college classmate. Twichell was eager to host his old friend and they bedded down for the night, no doubt exchanging tales of their long and harrowing day.164
As morning broke on the 28th, the various wings of the Federal Army quickly established communication. During the night the Rebels had withdrawn, yielding the field to their Yankee foe. Confederate general Early’s report illustrated the untenable Confederate situation: “The enemy had the whole or the greater part of his force in my front and on my flanks. I therefore determined to fall back across Mine Run, as the position I then held was very unfavorable either for attack or defense.”165 Matters were made worse for the Yankees as Lee moved troops to support Early and others along Mine Run.166 Meade’s bold plan to quickly crush the Confederate flank had failed.
Prince’s division moved during the remainder of the 28th toward the eastern bank of Mine Run, which ran roughly north–south and perpendicular to the Orange Turnpike. Leonard led his men on a hard slog over wet roads churned into muddy morasses by hooves and the wheels of the artillery’s guns and caissons. As guns stuck fast up to their hubs, the regiment and entire column halted until each piece was freed.167 Some of the boys of Company B shared the duty of carrying a stretcher with the body of their beloved, respected, and recently promoted Captain McDonough, who’d been killed the day before. The boys struggled along, anxious to have his body embalmed and sent home for burial. The cold weather helped to preserve McDonough and thus, as one man described, aided “their loving purpose.”168 Once in position the division joined other elements of Meade’s army, which had moved from near Robertson’s Tavern, west to Mine Run, and settled in for the night. As things were shaping up, the two armies were massing on opposite banks of Mine Run, stretched over a six-mile front.
“On the 29th, the division received orders to be in readiness at daybreak to proceed on a reconnaissance. In the course of the day it reconnoitered the east bank of Mine Run to the plank road and drove all the pickets of the enemy,”169 reported Prince. The Federal Army continued to maneuver and probe, settling on an alignment with General Gouverneur Warren’s II Corps on the left, French’s III in the middle, and General John Sedgwick’s VI Corps on the right.170
Meade held a counsel of war during the night of the 29th. Of the three corps commanders holding the front line on Mine Run, only French, whose corps held the center, advised against attack. Both Warren and Sedgwick saw opportunity for feasible attacks on their fronts. So confident, in fact, was Warren that he assured the assemblage he would encounter little if any resistance as he rolled up the Confederate flank. It was decided that come morning both Sedgwick and Warren would launch attacks on their respective fronts. Warren’s attack was to be bolstered by the Second and Third divisions of the III Corps, giving him a force of 26,000 men.171
By 4 a.m. the Excelsiors were on the move, placing themselves in position about two miles south of the turnpike. The divisions were massed by columns of brigades, providing for an attack along a narrower front. There was a dense fog surrounding the brigades and the boys murmured amongst themselves, sure no one could maintain proper direction or alignment in such a soup. There was a foreboding amongst the troops as men exchanged forlorn looks as if this would be the last they’d see of one another. Men collected their letters along with what little money they had and gave it for safe keeping to the chaplains and surgeons, those men most likely to live through the day.172 After a while word came that the attack would be postponed because of the fog. A collective sense of relief swept the ranks, but most knew their stay was only temporary. To the rear, many could see General Warren riding here and there, and as the hours ticked by with still no attack the men began to wonder. By mid-afternoon the men in the ranks had their answer. There would be no attack this day. As dawn had broken, Sedgwick opened the attack as planned with a thunderous artillery bombardment. But just as he was to send in the infantry, an aid arrived with a dispatch from General Warren stating he was suspending his attack. Lee had gotten wind of the attack plan and with time to bring up additional reserves, had bolstered both flanks with formidable earthworks and fresh troops. Sedgwick reported to Meade that indeed the area in his front had also been reinforced and suspending the attack was best advised. Only David Birney, commanding the First Division of III Corps, which had started a strong demonstration in the middle, was surprised to hear that the attacks were called off.173 To many of the men throughout the army who could see the entrenched enemy in their front and who envisioned another murderous repeat of Fredericksburg, the order to cancel the attack came as salvation. As evening set in, the Excelsiors withdrew to join the rest of the corps for the night. “We moved off with an unutterable feeling of relief,” wrote Twichell, “for the men had all day been creeping to the top of a little hill in front and looking at the works they had to take, and all now felt that they had experienced a great deliverance.”174
Warren lobbied Meade to maintain position and probe further west, attempting to turn the enemy’s flank where there wouldn’t be time to entrench. But with dwindling supplies and worsening weather, Meade recognized the limits of the endeavor and ordered a withdrawal.175 The next day, the Army of the Potomac moved back across the Rapidan, returning to their former positions. “At 6 p.m. on the 1st of December, left the bivouac and marched by newly made route to the plank road, and thence to Culpeper Mine ford, where we crossed the Rapidan and bivouacked,”176 reported Prince. The 72nd New York served as guard for the divisional ammunition train and didn’t cross the river till three in the morning of the 2nd. By 6 p.m. the New Yorkers arrived at their old camp near Brandy Station, where they prepared to camp for the winter.177 The weeklong endeavor had cost the Second Division 27 men and officers killed, 135 wounded and 26 missing; 58 of those were from the Excelsior Brigade. The 72nd New York suffered 20 men killed and wounded.
The army was done campaigning for the year, but it was not done with General William French. Meade demanded French provide “a full explanation” as to the movement of his corps and “its failure to reach the point designated for it near Robertson’s Tavern.”178 On December 14, French submitted a second report of the campaign. This report was intended to be the “full explanation”179 demanded by Meade, but also was sculpted to cast French in the best possible light. Extolling the “prowess of the corps beyond any terms which it is in my power to express,”180 French nevertheless tried casting the blame onto bad roads, poor intelligence and the hapless Prince by referring to the great “embarrassments of the general commanding the leading division.”181
By mid–January it was clear Meade was still unsatisfied with French’s version of events. Though French wouldn’t be sacked outright, his failure at Mine Run and his inability to exploit an earlier opportunity to hurt Lee at Manassas Gap meant his days as a corps commander and Prince’s with Second Division were numbered.
Dean and the rest of the regiment settled into their Confederate-built camp to ride out winter. On December 13, James penned a letter home: “I am well and sitting by a comfortable fire in my log shantie … and I am happy to tell you that we have splendid quarters and the duty is quite light, and we enjoy our selves pleasantly for since I have been transferred to company B I have had good time of it for they are all a nice lot of boys, and like a lot of brothers.”182 He ended by adding a note of confidence about the spring campaign, predicting, “We will make the Johnnies fly around livelyer than they have been accustomed to.”183