12. The Struggle to Petersburg

The men welcomed 1864 the same as the previous New Year’s. Some celebrated the passing of another hard year and looked forward to better times, while others were indifferent, both to the season and to any celebratory traditions that accompanied the new year. Camp around Brandy Station was wet and cold, typical for Virginia in winter. Most trees had long since been cut down and used up as opposing armies moved and counter-moved over this land. Mud was everywhere and the constant activity guaranteed it stayed mixed and sloppy. Despite the conditions, James Dean and the rest enjoyed the snug comfort of well-built cabins that served to keep the cold out and the heat in.¹ Cabins were trophies of war, fairly won from their Rebel foe who now resided across the river Rapidan, which separated the two armies. There was added satisfaction in the belief that the Reb builders of these fine accommodations sat shivering and damp, suffering in hastily built dwellings through which rain and cold entered at their own caprice. Army supplies were plentiful, so everyone ate well and replaced worn out horses. Among some officers whose rank was high enough to preclude question, their wives had come south to join them. This created an unusual social climate for an army camp, but despite the relative luxury of Brandy Station, the business of war continued.²

Every man in the fight from the lowliest private to Lincoln himself knew these days were coming, and now they were in sight, the discharge of whole regiments full of men. Back in ’61 thousands of men had joined hundreds of regiments, enlisting for three-year stints. Within just a few months, those enlistments would be expiring, and the government would be helpless to compel them to stay. Just as the new campaigning season of May, June and July would be in full swing, the Federal Army would start to come apart.³ Officers campaigned for weeks to keep each man in the ranks, lest there not be an army with which to fight. To help keep the men in the field, Congress passed a special act on December 10 allowing soldiers who had served two or more years to reenlist as veterans. Terms of service would be lengthened under this deal. In exchange they would receive a 35-day furlough and reenlistment bounties, which sometimes were as much as $700.⁴

Men throughout the Excelsior Brigade argued the merits of reenlisting. Some had long felt abused and wanted no part of the army or further fighting. Others pondered the question longer. Back in November an article had appeared in the New York Times with a reprinted letter purported to be from Excelsior commander Brewster. In the letter Brewster acknowledged the proud reputation of the brigade and then proceeded to extol the fact that the entire brigade had agreed to offer itself for another three years of service to the government. There were a few caveats of course, foremost of which was that they be allowed to form as a brigade of mounted infantry and then be permitted to return to New York for a period to refill their depleted ranks.⁵ Soldiers within the brigade howled with laughter upon reading it and wondered out loud where they were when this “unanimous” vote was taken.⁶ Others were intrigued by the idea of riding into battle, of continuing the fight as mounted infantry. Even if it really was Brewster’s notion, it quickly died. “There is great talk about reenlisting for three years as mounted infantry but I do not know how it will work,” wrote James Dean, “the conditions are to let the brigade come home and recruit till its ranks are filled again and each man have a furlough for 30 days to go home … but let the men get home I do not know whether they will enlist…. I would not be responsible for them, but I think it is camp rumor.”⁷ Later, in a letter to his brother, Dean added, “It is all the talk among the boys and every one is making fun of the other to see what a [gallant] fellow he will be when he gets mounted on his mule and gun and saber.”⁸ For the men of Company H, the deal the army was offering for veteran reenlistment was slightly better, since their terms of enlistment would not expire until October anyway. For Lucius Jones the thought of going home was overpowering:

The plan was simple: if regiments could reenlist a minimum of three-quarters of their men, they could keep their organization and designations; units that could not would be disbanded with men still owing time being dispersed out to other regiments.¹⁰ For two of the Excelsior units there was no question of continuing. One Hundred and Twentieth New York, which had been mustered into service in August of ’62, still had many months of service owing and would eventually receive men from the 72nd. The same was true for the 73rd New York but for different reasons. The influx of 250 or so men collected from the 163rd N.Y. upon its dissolution back in January of ’63 would mean Fourth Excelsior would carry on.¹¹

On December 24 everyone in the regiment intending to reenlist had done so, making it clear how matters would resolve themselves come early summer. Around 200 men from the 72nd would remain to go on, not enough to meet the three-quarters requirement. This meant the regiment would be disbanded. These 200 comprised all of the original Company H along with men who had joined after the October ’61 mustering and some others. Men who joined during the few recruiting surges would have time remaining to serve.¹² Men such as James Dean who had joined just before Fredericksburg and those few others who joined later still owed time. Of course a few reenlisted, either anxious to see the thing through, with no better prospects back home, or still driven from a sense of old fashioned duty. Three other Excelsior regiments would face similar dissolutions. The remaining men from First Excelsior, the 70th New York, would be transferred to the 86th N.Y. Those left in the 71st N.Y. would go to the 120th N.Y., while men with unexpired terms in the 74th N.Y. would be sent to the 40th N.Y.¹³ Thoughts of home, now even more pressing upon the minds of the men, would have to wait; there was still fighting to be done.

In early February word came for the regiment to ready itself for a move. Instinctively the men knew something wasn’t right. The time of year, the weather and the ground conditions were all wrong; spring campaigning shouldn’t be for months at least. But ready themselves they did. On February 3, Major General Benjamin Butler, who commanded 6,000 men holed up on the Virginia Peninsula at Bermuda Hundred, had won approval from Washington war planners for a surprise attack upon Richmond. Key to Butler’s plan was a diversionary attack across the Rapidan by Meade’s Army of the Potomac. Major General John Sedgwick, in temporary command of the army, strongly objected; he argued that not only were the conditions wrong for such a large attack, but also an attack now would only serve to alert Lee to weaknesses in his defenses, thus making any future attacks all the more difficult. “Uncle John,” as he was affectionately called by his men, privately believed the operation was designed more to serve Butler’s ego than any military requirement. Overruled by Halleck, Sedgwick reluctantly went forward with the attack set for February 6.¹⁴

Leading the attack at Morton’s Ford was II Corps, with portions of III Corps, including Excelsior Brigade, in support. II Corps men sloshed through knee-deep mud while crossing the still ice-choked river and assaulted the Rebel positions on the far side. Initially the Federals made good progress, but as Confederates reacted to the surprise attack, the assault stalled and was eventually pushed back. The attack cost II Corps 200 men. Making matters worse, Butler had called off his attack on Richmond after only a few hours into the operation, rendering the entire effort and its accompanying sacrifices an exercise in futility.¹⁵ One Excelsior Brigade man summed up the whole affair this way: “We was out on reconoisance [sic] to the Rapidan, our division was reserve for the Second Corps. We lay about 2 days at the river & then turned about & came back to camp. The road’s was in an awfull condition, mudd over shoe tops.”¹⁶ Uncle John’s worst fears had been realized. Now come spring, when the real push would come, Lee would be prepared.

Back in camp, Lieutenant Colonel Leonard was running the day-to-day operations of the regiment as necessitated by Colonel Austin’s nearly continuous absence that fall. By late January the sickly Austin was back in the field and anxious to take care of unfinished matters dogging him since spring. Hanging over the colonel’s head were a number of charges including embezzlement stemming from his acquisition of a horse and mule. The question was whether these animals were for his personal use or if Austin had repaid the army the cost of feeding them. Charges focused on events from late May while back in Falmouth and from September while camped near Culpepper.¹⁷ With the army stopped and in camp, Austin pressed for a resolution to these matters, which he saw as completely unfounded. In a letter to brigade commander Brewster dated January 29, Austin asked, “that a Court may be called as soon as the exigences [sic] of the Services will permit.”¹⁸ The colonel continued in the letter to accuse an unnamed “Gang of Conspirators” of working their “hellish designs” against him for the past year and said that he was “determined to settle” the matter.¹⁹ Austin left the conspirators unnamed but it is clear he considered Leonard among them. In another letter to Brewster dated the next day regarding a request from Leonard for leave, Austin stated, “He had made charges against me and it would [be] unjust to keep me awaiting his return.”²⁰ Perhaps Austin’s notion of the gang of conspirators wasn’t all in his imagination. Austin was frequently absent from the regiment and had a reputation among the rank and file as a stuffed shirt.²¹ Additionally, one charge against him included allegations that he had ordered a quartermaster lieutenant to falsify records surrounding the ownership and feeding of the mule in question. Taken together, Austin’s actions may have cultivated such a degree of resentment within the regiment as to create fertile ground enough for his “gang of conspirators” to flourish.

Conspiracy or not, the exigencies of the service were on Austin’s side, and he had his court-martial just days later on February 11. Convened in the camp of the Third Division under the supervision of Brigadier General William Morris, the court found Austin not guilty on 35 of the 37 charges and specifications leveled against him. Of the two specifications assigned guilty verdicts, both were modified, removing any criminality. In accordance with the verdicts the court concluded, “Colonel Austin is released from arrest and will return to duty.”²² What Austin’s duties were at this point weren’t exactly obvious. Though it is clear in the Brewster letter of January 30 that he still held some sway over Leonard and presumably the entire regiment, every official report from Gettysburg onward, and at every level of command, indicates Leonard as commanding the 72nd New York, with no further mention of Austin. Perhaps the reduced size of the regiment at this stage of the war was too small to necessitate command by a full colonel, hence command devolved to a lieutenant colonel. Given Austin’s sickness and frequent absences from the seat of war, it is easy to conclude he was dubbed a supernumerary and served out the rest of his service in some forgotten staff position, eventually mustering out in July of ’64 for reasons of disability.

While many of the men pondered and argued over enlistments, reenlistments, and possible discharge dates, there were big moves up north. Major General Ulysses S. Grant was summoned in early March to Washington D.C. There, the hero of the West was promoted to lieutenant general and given overall command of Federal forces, leaving his old friend William T. Sherman to command the western army. Grant determined to travel with the Army of the Potomac and concentrate on the war’s grand strategy, while daily running of this army would remain with George Meade.²³

Though Meade half expected to be removed from command for failing to wrap up the war following the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, Grant assured him his job was secure but issued succinct instructions: “Lee’s army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also.”²⁴ The destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia was the goal of Grant’s new initiative, and the method of realizing this goal was equally clear and uncomplicated. Recognizing his abundant ability to replace men lost on the field and Lee’s complete lack of manpower reserves, Grant would wear down the Rebels in a war of attrition by setting all the armies at his disposal in motion at once, effectively preventing him from shifting forces to wherever the threat was greatest. Believing Lee hadn’t army enough to fight such a war, Grant took the strategy of denying him manpower one step further by suspending the prisoner parole system, which had effectively allowed freed prisoners to return to the fight. Prisoners North and South from now on would stay in prison and wait out the war as best they could.

Anxious to carry the war to Lee, Grant made two important adjustments prior to his first offensive as general in chief. First he would bolster the size of his army by tightening up on leaves and furloughs and by bringing previously unused units into the fight. On paper his army looked massive, but many men were absent from their units and the army had done a poor job of getting them back from leave in a timely manner; this would be fixed, yielding fuller units. Grant would also get units previously held in reserve or which had served months or even years of garrison duty back into the field. Surplus teamsters, staff, and heavy artillery units who had sat idle in the defenses of Washington now found themselves packing muskets as infantry. By the time Grant was ready to move he would have nearly 120,000 men set to oppose Lee’s estimated 65,000.²⁵

The second of Grant’s adjustments would be the streamlining of the Army of the Potomac by disbanding the undermanned I and III Corps, their troops to be parceled out between the II and VI Corps.²⁶ Disbanding III Corps would serve at least two purposes. III Corps was a mere shell of its former fighting strength and its commander, William French, was seen as a liability. French was blamed for much of what had gone wrong at Mine Run, and Grant could indirectly sack the ineffective general by dissolving his command. This move would also rid Grant of the troublesome Second Division commander Henry Prince, who had marched his men in circles the previous fall back near Brandy Station. Feelings ran high among the men of the two corps slated to be disbanded. Many men made appeals to Washington, asking the corps remain intact. On March 16 the III Corps was assembled for review. All the old regiments were there. Some who had been successful in drawing in replacements looked fit and ready to fight, while still others fielded barely 200 men. Generals French and Sedgwick reviewed the men and then it was over, the last review of the III Corps.²⁷ Henri LeFevre-Brown of Company B would later write, “Orders were issued by the War Department March 23, 1864, disbanding the ‘Old Third Army Corps,’ than which there was none better; and no corps of the army had done more, or harder fighting. This fact, however, had no weight at headquarters.”²⁸ Inevitably both the First and Second divisions of the III Corps were combined and transferred to the II Corps under General Winfield S. Hancock, comprising his new Fourth Division. Hancock reviewed the new Fourth Division for the first time on April 14. As a nod to their service, these proud men of the old III Corps were allowed to continue wearing their former corps’ badges, the white and red diamonds, which they did till the war’s end.²⁹ “We belong to the 4th Div. 2nd Corp. but wear the Diamond yet and all the power in the army could [not] take that badge from us,”³⁰ declared Private Dean. Another Chautauqua man offered his perspective to the readers of the Jamestown Journal:

Grant in charge was a welcome change from the uninspired leadership of before. Grant’s reputation as an aggressive leader who knew how to win preceded him, although some men took his arrival with a dash of skepticism. “You’ve never met Bobby Lee and his boys,” was a common taunt directed toward Grant, “and mind you, Lee is just over the Rapidan.”³² James Dean concluded, “The men like General Grant well enough but they think that old Lee is more than a matter for him.”³³ Other soldiers decided to give the new man a chance. “He cannot be weaker or more inefficient than the generals who have wasted the lives of our comrade during the past three years,” wrote one man in his diary. Another Third Excelsior man penned a sardonic view of Grant for his hometown paper:

Six days after Hancock’s review, on April 20 the 72nd was presented with a new national flag. A gift from New York City, it was presented to the regiment by the Rev. Joseph T. Duyrea. “We were presented today with a new flag,”³⁵ wrote Pvt. Hiram Stoddard of Company B in a letter home:

The entirety of the revamped II Corps was held in review two days later on the 22nd. Hancock was there, of course, as corps commander, along with George Meade and U.S. Grant, plus the usual cloud of lesser nobles.³⁷ Something was definitely afoot, and the men could tell the long-awaited big move would soon begin. Wives who had adorned the camps were among the first ordered out, certainly a sure signal to snooping Confederates a move was coming. Chaplain Twichell, just back from a furlough in New York, wrote his mother, “The note of preparation sounds on every side. All superfluous persons and baggage have been sent away, the supply trains of food and ammunition are being loaded, the inspectors are busy searching out and remedying all deficiencies.”³⁸

Marching orders were received late on May 3 and by eleven that night the boys had formed on the color line. With the 72nd being detailed to guard the divisional ammunition train, the regiment and their charge finally stepped off near two on the morning of the 4th,nearly a whole day’s march behind the rest of the army.³⁹ Grant’s massive army was heading east and south from their base at Culpepper in order to skirt the Confederate pickets. The bulk of the army would cross the Rapidan River at two places: the V and VI Corps at Germanna Ford across newly built pontoon bridges, and the II Corps farther east at Ely Ford.⁴⁰

Though Hiram Stoddard, Lucius Jones and the rest found themselves in a new corps, very little else had changed. The five original regiments were still together supplemented by the 120th N.Y. Now the brigade was bolstered by the addition of two other regiments from outside New York: the 11th Massachusetts and the 84th Pennsylvania. Both were refugees from the III Corps’ First Brigade, Second Division.⁴¹ Excelsior Brigade commander Colonel William Brewster had been with them since after Chancellorsville, having also led the Second Fire Zouaves, the 73rd N.Y. The New Yorkers did have a new division commander, one with whom they weren’t totally unfamiliar: Brigadier General Gershom Mott. Mott was a 42-year-old New Jersey businessman who had been intermittent commander of the New Jersey Blues, a brigade mostly made up of New Jersey units now comprising the Third Brigade, Second Division, II Corps. This was Mott’s first divisional command.⁴²

All day of the 4th Stoddard and his mates marched with the plodding ammunition train. After an uneventful day, the parade finally bivouacked near Ely’s Ford at midnight.⁴³

Grant’s plan was straightforward: cross the Rapidan, flush out Lee’s army, which would be encamped on its south side, drive it into open ground and crush it with superior numbers. To do this, the Federal army would have to pass through a thick forest of trees and bushes known as the Wilderness. Grant’s plan was to move through the Wilderness quickly, engaging Lee on the far side. But Lee perceived fighting in this tangle as a way to offset the Federals’ superior numbers, especially in artillery.⁴⁴

Lee moved quickly to stop Grant in the Wilderness by moving two corps east under Richard Ewell and A.P. Hill. These units would slow down the advancing Yankees until the remainder of Lee’s forces could move up. On the night of May 4, after one day’s march, Union forces unwittingly helped Lee achieve his aims by camping in the Wilderness for the night, believing the Confederates were too far off to engage them in the waste. Near daybreak of May 5, lead elements of Ewell’s Confederate II Corps clashed with Gouverneur K. Warren’s V Corps on the Orange-Fredericksburg Turnpike. The battle was begun.⁴⁵

The Wilderness was providing the confusion Lee had bargained for. Early in the fight elements of the V and VI Corps engaged the Rebels in what was developing as an east–west running affair along the Orange-Fredericksburg Turnpike. Slightly further to the east, Hancock’s II Corps was not engaged as his troops followed roads south.⁴⁶ With the fight just beginning off to their west, the 72nd and the ammunition train finally moved south of the river around 9 a.m. It continued moving south until later that afternoon when it stopped to bivouac on the old Chancellorsville battlefield, the same ground they had fought over just a year before.⁴⁷

Stopped and settled, the men now wandered around the old battlefield. Recognizing ground upon which they had fought one year earlier, the men of the regiment identified a skeleton lying by a large fallen tree as of an old comrade, 18-year-old Private Henry Heyl of Company H, his initials written in a hat and scratched on a cup still by his side. While certainly the sight of a corpse, even one reduced to a skeleton, was nothing new, some took time to remember young Henry as a fine soldier and man.⁴⁸

May 5 saw both armies concentrating the fight in two areas: Federal corps under Sedgwick and Warren hammered at Ewell’s confederates along the Orange-Fredericksburg Turnpike, while further south, Hancock began his fight against A.P. Hill’s III Corps. At dawn of the second day of battle, Grant decided to concentrate his attacks against Hill by moving west along the Orange Plank Road, which somewhat paralleled the Orange-Fredericksburg Pike. Grant would reinforce Hancock’s II Corps while sending Burnside’s IX Corps between the two main battle areas in an attempt to hit Hill’s left flank.⁴⁹

The regiment was relieved as train guard at 2 a.m. on the morning of May 6 and ordered to the front to rejoin the brigade and the rest of II Corps. Before heading out the regiment broke ranks and made coffee. With coffee finished, Leonard led his regiment south and around 6 a.m. rejoined the brigade near the junction of the Orange Plank and Brock roads. It was at once deployed ahead of the breastworks as skirmishers. After advancing some distance into the dense undergrowth, Leonard halted the regiment and asked for five volunteers to go ahead of the regiment to locate the enemy. Sergeant-Major John M. Lyon led the detail with four privates from various companies. After advancing several hundred yards, the party crested a small rise and faced a “heavy rebel skirmish line, which was advancing, supported by two lines of battle.”⁵⁰ With the enemy’s first fire, the sergeant-major fell, shot through his left side. Private James Young of Company B, also among the scouting party, made it to Lyon’s side, and with enemy pressing all around, was able to move the stricken Lyon through the thick brush, effecting their escape back to the regiment. Soon after their return, sparks and embers from the ensuing battle set the woods afire at the spot where Lyon had fallen. The other men of the advance party were never seen again.⁵¹

With the sergeant-major back in the relative safety of the regiment, the battle continued to grow as Hancock’s men, with portions of other corps, worked to drive Hill’s Confederates back. Seventy-Third New York and others joined the line held by Third Excelsior as the Federal attack gained momentum. With weight of numbers on their side, Federal troops began to steadily advance against the Rebels. After pushing a brigade of Georgians nearly a mile, Rebel reinforcements brought Yankee progress to a halt. With neither side strong enough to push the other, the Excelsiors stood their ground and slugged it out.

After two hours of nearly continuous skirmishing and with the remainder of Longstreet’s Confederate I Corps now advancing, the Federal position could not be held. The weight of additional enemy troops moving into and through the maze of trees and underbrush and the increasingly disorganized state of the Union lines proved too much. Disorganized units were not exclusive to Federal troops, however. As Southern troops advanced, smoke and brush reduced visibility, and men shot at shadowy figures or mere outlines. Moving among his various units on horseback, Longstreet and his staff were particularly vulnerable to stray and ricocheting lead. In the confusion a Virginia unit fired at a group of riders; Longstreet slumped in the saddle as blood poured from his neck and shoulder. With his final orders being to press the enemy, the general was removed to the rear for urgent treatment.

Mott’s Yankee division faced fresh enemy troops on their left and rear flanks; unable to hold, they were forced back to the line they held at daybreak. Confederates pursued Brewster’s Excelsiors but were repulsed as they attacked the newly reestablished line.⁵² By 4 p.m. this line of log breastworks, “formed as they were of dry logs and brush, caught fire and soon became untenable,”⁵³ wrote Lt. Col. Michael Burns of the 73rd New York. Flames and dwindling ammunition supplies forced the Excelsior Brigade to fall back to a second line of works. Retiring yet another 300 yards to form a second line of battle, the brigade was soon resupplied with ammunition. Using a blanket as a sling, Private Henri LeFevre-Brown resupplied the regiment by carrying packages of ammunition between the various companies. Dodging enemy fire, the brave private made three trips along the line.⁵⁴ “The enemy attempted to occupy the ground so abandoned between the two lines of breastworks, but were received with such a withering fire from the troops in the second line that they were forced to retire,”⁵⁵ wrote Burns. With the fires of the first breastworks dying down, the men of Excelsior Brigade charged the staggered Rebels. Rebels scampered for the rear as the New Yorkers retook the first line of works, along with several prisoners.⁵⁶

Fighting in the Wilderness trailed off with the coming of night. The 72nd had losses of 21 men for the day. Their actions of the day earned two of their number the Medal of Honor: Private Young for his rescue of the sergeant-major and Private LeFevre-Brown for exposing himself to enemy fire as he resupplied the regiment with ammunition.⁵⁷ General Grant realized he would be unable to drive Lee’s army as he had planned, and further attacks here in this tangle would be futile; he would attempt to slide around Lee. Grant soon concluded that the town of Spotsylvania Court House would now be the objective of his army, allowing him to place his army on Lee’s flank and to disrupt the enemy’s already tenuous supply lines.⁵⁸

But Grant faced a problem. Never before had the Army of the Potomac continued south after such a severe setback as the Battle of the Wilderness. There were losses of well over 17,000 men during three days of fighting. Grant nonetheless decided to keep to his strategy of maintaining the pressure and wearing down the Confederate Army. Army of the Potomac corps and divisional commanders had grown cautious under the command of previous generals more committed to not losing the war than to winning it. Grant’s offensive spirit went contrary to this mindset held amongst those senior officers who had, after the previous three years, expected withdrawal and regrouping following a defeat rather than attack. As for the men, though they had been in a hard fight, the rank and file knew there was a change for the better when they began moving south rather than retreating north.⁵⁹

Grant began to disengage from the Rebels and shift his army south on May 7. Robert E. Lee understood the importance of Spotsylvania and immediately dispatched troops there. The first to arrive would have an advantage in the battle that was sure to follow. As the Federals moved south, the regiments of the Excelsior Brigade formed the rear guard of the army and occupied ground once held by V Corps.⁶⁰

Yankee cavalry was in the vanguard as Union troops began their march, but the task of opening the way seemed too much for the Northern mounted men. Too many untried, green troopers failed to mix well with too few veterans, causing problems with command and control. This only served to exacerbate vague and conflicting orders and sometimes stubborn Rebel resistance. So the job of clearing the way was given over to Gouverneur Warren’s V Corps infantry on the morning of the 8th. Warren’s infantry was soon pushing aside the Confederate rear guard, but progress was still painfully slow, allowing lead elements of Lee’s army to extend south first.⁶¹

By the time all troops, North and South, were in place, and the race over, Lee’s army held the key positions. It was now up to Grant’s men to dislodge them from what were fast becoming ever more formidable entrenchments north of Spotsylvania. By the morning of May 9, the Confederate position was shaped like a north-pointing V. At the apex of the V was a strong salient nicknamed the Mule Shoe, so named because of its shape. Recognizing that this prominence invited Yankee attack, Lee studded the scarcely half-mile-wide area with a formidable array of artillery. A Yankee attack here would no doubt be costly.⁶²

Grant was making the rounds to the various commands all morning. Sedgwick had established his headquarters near Warren’s V Corps and was helping to work out some command issues within that corps. After Grant’s departure Sedgwick continued to take an active role in positioning troops, despite effective and incessant Rebel sniper fire. Noticing some infantry had moved forward of the artillery line, Uncle John moved to correct the situation. When enemy bullets splattered near his position and Yankee underlings dived for cover, Sedgwick chided them and concluded, “They can’t hit an elephant at that distance.” After the sergeant in question righted himself, saluted and explained an earlier near-miss, Sedgwick relented and laughed. A moment later a bullet whined through the air, hitting with an audible thud; Sedgwick fell with a small hole beneath his left eye. Blood gushed from the wound as the general’s staff carried him to the rear; Uncle John was dead.

At the time Sedgwick was being shot, Winfield Hancock’s II Corps was locating itself on the extreme right side of the Union position.⁶³ Excelsior men and the remainder of the corps built breastworks most of the day. Seventieth and 72nd New York regiments received orders around midnight to fall in with a temporary “Provisional Brigade” under Colonel John Ramsey and were on the march toward the other end of the Federal line by 3 a.m. of the 10th.⁶⁴ The rest of the Excelsior Brigade remained with Mott.

By 10 a.m. a portion of Ramsey’s ad hoc brigade, including Third Excelsior, was in motion probing the strength of the Rebel defenses in front of the V and VI Corps. This “feeling party” encountered and engaged the enemy and drove in “a heavy rebel skirmish line, which retired to a strong line of works on the second ridge.” Too weak to press further, the 72nd N.Y. and rest of the provisional brigade fell back, but not before colonel Leonard had gained important information about the terrain and enemy positions. Ramsey’s brigade continued skirmishing until being relieved around 5 p.m. when Grant’s planned main attack was scheduled to begin.⁶⁵

Grant’s design was to commence a general attack across the entire Confederate front to develop a vulnerable spot. A key to this plan, developed by Colonel Emory Upton and presented to Grant, would be a charge made by 12 veteran regiments led by Upton himself. Upton would smash into the Rebel line at the Mule Shoe on a narrow front only three regiments wide without pausing to reload. Once the breach had been made, Mott’s Division would hit near the gap, exploiting the breach, and collapse Lee’s line.⁶⁶

Almost from the start things went wrong. Warren began his V Corps’ attack on the right of the Federal line an hour early of the 5 p.m. start time and promptly got bogged down in front of strongly entrenched Rebels. Shortly after, he withdrew. Because of Warren’s miscues, Grant postponed the entire attack until after 6. Mott, still minus the 72nd, was now positioned to the left of Upton and slightly east of the Mule Shoe’s apex, but he was not informed of the change and attacked as scheduled.⁶⁷

To prevent Confederate pickets from divining the full nature of the attack, much of the positioning of both Mott’s and Upton’s men was done far to the rear of the front lines. Grant’s timetable had unfortunately not allowed all the planning needed by the typically sluggish Army of the Potomac. Both Upton and Mott had only the most general ideas of what enemy works might lie before them and only the basic notions of the best routes of attack. Still with an unclear picture of where the enemy was, Mott stepped off at the appointed time and easily overran a light enemy skirmish line. As the division exited the protection of the concealing woods, he discovered they were moving oblique to the Confederate front, in full view of enemy artillery. Mott’s division was several hundred yards from the designated point of attack, but they would never make it. Almost immediately Rebel guns began to pour fire into Mott’s advancing division. Under this hail of iron, the lead regiments soon broke for the rear, followed by most of the division, leaving officers frantically trying to urge men on and reform disintegrating companies. With enlistments of many of Mott’s men’s soon to expire, reforming for a new attack with these reluctant soldiers was futile.⁶⁸ Mott’s debut as a divisional commander had become an utter failure.

Upton, unaware of Mott’s situation, attacked at the revised, later time and met with spectacular results. His charge opened an immense hole in part of the Confederate line held by a brigade under General George Doles of Richard Ewell’s corps. The narrow front offered by Upton allowed regiments in the rear to push on beyond the first and second enemy lines. But without Motts’s supporting troops, the attack could not be sustained. Upton soon realized help would not be arriving, stranding him and his 12 regiments far ahead of the Union lines. Lee brought up reinforcements that were able to pour a galling fire into Upton’s men, driving them to ground as Yankee objectives turned from attack to survival. Upton eventually withdrew under the cover of darkness. The miscues of the day had cost Grant a superb opportunity and Upton over 1,000 men.⁶⁹

Despite the losses, Chaplain Twichell remained steadfast in his beliefs about the conflict.

Leonard’s men had fallen back during the night and joined the rest of II Corps. Around 3 a.m. the New Yorkers and much of the rest of the corps moved west about two miles and bivouacked there. At eleven that morning they moved again, this time back east to occupy rifle pits.⁷¹

Grant made plans for the next day while his men prepared breastworks throughout the 11th, anticipating the upcoming action. Hoping to seize the success that had eluded him earlier, Grant wondered, if a large brigade attacking along a narrow front could breach the enemy’s defenses, why not try it at corps strength? As for Lee, he expected Grant to move away from Spotsylvania. Lee needed to be able to follow quickly, so he moved most of his artillery to more accessible roads, roads far from the Mule Shoe, the very point of the unexpected Federal attack.⁷² Confederate artillery would be out of position just when it would be needed most.

Seventy-Second New York along with the rest of the provisional brigade moved still further to the left and to the front around 9 p.m. Here they continued to build breastworks near the spot where Upton had launched his failed assault.⁷³ The massive attack that Grant envisioned would be led by Hancock and his II Corps.⁷⁴ Ramsey’s Provisional Brigade along with Leonard’s men would be held in reserve.⁷⁵

Hancock’s II Corps stepped off early on the morning of the 12th, around 4:30 a.m., across some of the same ground that Upton had attacked. Within minutes his compact force of 20,000 had charged and then overwhelmed the defenders, capturing more than 3,000 Confederate soldiers including generals Edward Johnson and George Steuart. Despite the success of their attack, Hancock’s men became disorganized in the crowded confines of the Mule Shoe’s trenches. They had punched through a sizeable portion of the Confederate line, but the Rebel earthworks were built with breaks that ran perpendicular to the front breastwork. These breaks were placed to protect against enfilade fire should there be a breach. They now served to hinder the lateral movement of Hancock’s men and provided hard points of defense for the Southerners.⁷⁶

Lee reacted by sending in reinforcements including the previously withdrawn artillery toward the apex of his line, the point of the breach. The battle raged into ever-greater chaos and intensity as both sides poured in troops. Fighting became hand to hand in places, with troops from both sides becoming a hopeless tangle of humanity. Northern and Southern men took cover behind respective sides of the same log barricade as men reached over and fired blindly into massed enemy troops. Dead bodies hit by so much repeated cannon and musket fire were turned to unrecognizable mush.⁷⁷

The Excelsior Brigade, minus the 70th and 72nd, were heavily engaged in the midst of the fight. Three men from the 73rd New York earned the Medal of Honor for their work this day. Irish-born Christopher Wilson earned his when he picked up his unit’s flag from the wounded color-bearer and carried it as they charged the enemy works and then later captured the colors of the 56th Virginia. He carried both banners to safety.⁷⁸ Colonel Robert McAllister, commander of Mott’s other brigade, later wrote, “These massed columns pressed forward to the Salient. The Stars and Stripes and the Stars and Bars nearly touched each other across these works.”⁷⁹

Grant tried to break the stalemate by sending additional troops to breach the Rebel line.⁸⁰ Three hours after the attack started, around 8 a.m., the 72nd N.Y. was sent to an open field in support of a battery of artillery near where Mott’s division had attacked. Shortly afterward the battery was sent elsewhere, and Leonard’s boys were sent by General David Birney to help protect another section of artillery, this one composed of captured guns.

All morning the fighting had slowly moved around to the left face of the Mule Shoe and it was here, near the Bloody Angle, where the 72nd N.Y. had been sent, some distance from the balance of Mott’s Division. With the contraband guns now repositioned along a road leading into the enemy works, Yankee volunteers fired on the gun’s former owners. Exposed to Rebel return fire, the guns were quickly disabled, forcing the men of Third Excelsior to fall back to better cover. From here the regiment was repositioned closer to the enemy works and continued to fight all day. The regiment was in the front lines, while Rebels made repeated attempts to retake lost portions of the Mule Shoe. Each enemy attack was repulsed as the 72nd spent the entire night on line, keeping up a steady volume of musketry until the division pulled back the next morning.⁸¹ James Dean of Company B described the fight this way:

Lee formed a new defensive line during the middle of the day. Giving up claim to the Mule Shoe, this new line stretched across the apex of his V-shaped lines, below the Mule Shoe and Bloody Angle. Torrents of rain were washing over piles of dead bodies when part of Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps advanced near 2 p.m. against this new line and was stopped. Federal troops continued to press in and around the Mule Shoe and Bloody Angle, but the new Confederate line was too strong, Grant’s men too tired and the cost was already too high. Fighting began to trail off.⁸³

By dawn’s first light on the 13th, Grant had ceased most offensive actions; he’d now have to find a new way to get behind Lee. Grant needed to move quickly. Many men within his Army of the Potomac would be going home with their enlistments set to run out. Already many commands behaved timidly, as men questioned the value of assaults they saw as hopeless. Grant had green troops on the way, but they would need time to develop into seasoned, reliable troops. He believed Lee’s army had been badly hurt during the fighting at the Mule Shoe. Indeed, Richard Ewell’s II Corps had been nearly wrecked in the fight, but Grant also knew Lee soon would enjoy reinforcements coming from other minor fronts to make good Ewell’s losses. Grant had no time to lose in exploiting this advantage, or the carnage at the Mule Shoe would truly have been in vain.

While Grant pondered his next move, both armies took advantage of better weather and a lull in the fighting to dry out, rest, eat and tend to army business.⁸⁴ With Mott’s failure to properly support Upton’s attack, together with his poor showing in the Wilderness, the former dry goods clerk was reduced back to brigade command and his small division consolidated into the Third Division of the II Corps under Major General David B. Birney. The Excelsiors were designated Fourth Brigade, and Brewster remained in command.⁸⁵

Grant ordered an attack for the following day, certain there had to be a weak spot somewhere in Lee’s line either at or very near the Mule Shoe. The two-pronged assault started with great hesitation by the commanders charged with leading it. The assault soon bogged down thanks to poor planning, appalling terrain conditions, and effective Confederate counterattacks. Once again, at the end of the 14th, Federals sat frustrated as both sides stared at each other from secure and ever-improving earthworks.⁸⁶

Hancock’s troops were not involved in the attacks of the 14th. But Leonard’s men were up at 3 a.m. to occupy the forward line of rifle pits, where they skirmished with the Rebs all day. Foul weather ruled out any further attacks the next day by Grant, and the Union general doubted Lee would attack him given the conditions. With a break in the battle, the armies sorted themselves out. Hancock’s troops still composed the right of the Federal line, and the men spent their time improving earth works and trading shots with enemy skirmishers. Hancock’s men had extended their lines toward the Federal rear, in order to protect their own supply lines and to better address any enemy probing coming from the north. During this entire time the men of the regiment continued to dig trenches and reposition their lines as the terrain and officers dictated. With the army’s almost constant shifting, the chores of caring for the dead were left undone. “On the 15th we were on picket along part of the works,”⁸⁷ wrote Pvt. Dean, “and some of the wounded lay there moaning yet and had not been touched yet. And the smell from the dead was sickening and it is a question if they are buried yet.”⁸⁸

Increasingly Grant mulled over the idea of giving up on Spotsylvania and moving south. Such a move would only lengthen the war, and there were no guarantees he could come again to grips with Lee like he was here in the mud of Spotsylvania. But a time-consuming stalemate would only enhance the Southern situation, as more Confederate reinforcements were sure to arrive, while at the same time Federal enlistments were running out and Union troops left the front.⁹⁰

With his enemy before him Grant decided on another grand assault modeled after earlier attacks, which while proving ultimately unsuccessful, had shown spectacular initial promise. Multiple divisions, mainly from II Corps, were scheduled to crunch through the now-abandoned Mule Shoe and collapse what Grant believed was a weakened Confederate line that crossed the base of the Mule Shoe salient. Throughout the 16th and 17th troops maneuvered into position with Birney’s Division on the left and in reserve. For three days the men of the 72nd shifted from one line of trenches to another, building new breastworks as needed. “Lay still on the 17th,” remembered Henri LeFevre-Brown, “and it was the first day since May 5 that the regiment was not under fire.”⁹¹

At 3 a.m. on the 18th the regiment was called up to find the rest of the II Corps in battle array. Hour later Union artillery opened a massive pounding of the Confederate line, soon followed by advancing waves of blue infantry. But stubborn Rebel works and canister brought the Union attack to a halt. By 6 a.m. messages were streaming back to Grant’s headquarters requesting reinforcements or saying that the advance had stalled and brigade and divisional commanders were slugging it out best they could.⁹² By noon all Yankee offensive actions had been cancelled, and the rest of the day was spent withdrawing units as safely as possible.⁹³

For most of the day Leonard and his regiment occupied a line of rifle pits, and the carnage raged in front of them, but by eleven that night they returned to their bivouac from the night before.⁹⁴

Before the sun set on the 18th Grant resolved to move south and attempt to cross the North Anna River. Crossing the North Anna would place him on the same side as Richmond and avoid more difficult river crossings further south. Several roads would provide good, usable routes for his corps. There were also enough smaller rivers and creeks to help protect these corps’ flanks while moving and at their most vulnerable. As Grant mulled over this next move, he saw an opportunity to bring the Confederates out of their defenses and draw them into battle. If II Corps under Hancock could be sent ahead of the rest of the army, Lee might take the bait and move to attack it, whereby the rest of the Union hordes could descend for the kill. Grant knew there were risks to be sure, but the network of roads, together with proper use of concealment and aggressive movement, offered an opportunity the general could not decline.⁹⁵

Orders were issued and the army was put into motion late that night with instructions to conceal movement as much as possible. Hancock’s corps now held the right-most part of the Federal line north of Spotsylvania. His men would need to pull out of the line and swing far to the rear and left to clear the other corps still entrenched. Once east enough and clear of the other Federal units, Hancock would have an unimpeded march south. The 72nd N.Y. along with the rest of Birney’s Division would bring up II Corps’ rear while troops from other commands manned the trenches to cover the withdrawal, repelling any potential Rebel snooping and maintaining the appearance that Grant was still focused only on Spotsylvania.⁹⁶ By 2 a.m. on the 19th, the regiment and the rest of II Corps were on the move south.⁹⁷

With arrival of daylight, Confederates were unsure of exactly what moves the Federals had made during the night. It was thought Grant was merely extending his lines to the south, but it wasn’t clear which troops were involved. Lee and his generals increasingly believed the Union right had somehow changed but were uncertain as to how, since effective volleys from Yankee pickets kept peering Southern scouts at a distance. Lee became increasingly anxious about the disposition of Grant’s troops and ordered Ewell to send a substantial force to investigate.⁹⁸

Ewell’s II Corps had been especially hurt during the fighting at the Mule Shoe. His brigades were thinned and in many cases served under new commanders. The Rebel advance began with some hesitation. Unsure of the roads and worried about Yankee counterattack, the probe east became increasingly disorganized. Regiments advanced without clear directions, creating a situation where mutual support might be tricky should an emergency arise.⁹⁹ As Confederates groped forward, some of the Union troops facing them on this end of the line weren’t Hancock’s veteran infantry at all, but heavy artillery. These were units fresh from forts around Washington pressed into service with rifles. These “heavies” were well fed, well supplied and well armed, but certainly were not seasoned infantry. Eventually Ewell’s advancing troops looped east and south, running smack into some of these new troops posted at the extreme northern edge of the Yankee line around Harris Farm. Fighting with all the errors that bedevil green troops, the heavies were taking an awful pounding.¹⁰⁰ Alerted to the danger to his rear, Grant sent orders for Birney’s men and others to counterattack. At 7 p.m. the division, along with the 72nd N.Y., was formed and moved quickly northeast. Despite heavy losses, the artillery-turned-infantrymen were able to stop the Reb advance before the meat of Birney’s Division arrived. The addition of veteran blue infantry to the mix was more than the Confederates, already stalemated by the heavies, could take. Ewell now worried about being completely overwhelmed. As dusk settled, Rebel troops prepared for withdrawal and by nightfall were well on their way back to the defenses of the Mule Shoe.¹⁰¹ Some Federal troops engaged in a half-hearted pursuit but most, along with Third Excelsior, were back in their original positions by six the next morning.¹⁰²

Leonard and the rest of his regiment rested until 11 p.m. when they began the march south. Birney’s division was moving south to join up with the rest of the Union II Corps, which was dug in several miles south of Spotsylvania near Wright’s Tavern. Birney’s men marched all day on the 21st and crossed the Mattaponi River at dark. Third Excelsior camped there and moved into trenches with the rest of Hancock’s corps around 10 a.m. on the 22nd.¹⁰³

Hancock’s II Corps was in position, but the rest of Grant’s plan to trap Lee was going awry. The Confederates had countered Union movements much faster than Grant had anticipated by sending Ewell’s corps south. The prospect now loomed that Hancock might be attacked beyond supportive reach of other corps. Worried about Hancock and uncertain of exact Confederate intentions, Grant modified his plan so that by mid-day on the 22nd, the remainder of the army was moving south along a variety of routes. If the Rebels could be caught making a move against Hancock all the better, but Grant’s objective now was to cross south of the North Anna and catch Lee in the open. Lee was moving south too and had an advantage over Grant of several hours. Thus Lee would be in position to meet Grant at important river fords. But Lee also believed the Yankees intended to make their westward swing further south and planned accordingly.

As both armies marched south, opportunities were missed by each side to attack isolated and unsupported enemy columns. Lee’s troops were in position that night with some men north, but most south, of the North Anna River. Grant too was satisfied with the position of his corps and issued orders around 10 p.m. calculated to bring battle the next day.¹⁰⁴ Beginning at five the next morning, the various Union corps would move on “all roads to their front leading south and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is.”¹⁰⁵ The road leading south from Hancock’s position led to the Chesterfield Bridge, the southern-most of two crossings Grant planned to seize and exploit.

Lee was still confident early the next morning that Yankee moves would come further south. The ford near Jericho Mills, the most upstream crossing Grant sought, was virtually unprotected. The closest Rebel troops were posted nearly a mile away. At Chesterfield Bridge two regiments of South Carolina infantry and two batteries of artillery were dug into a small redoubt and nearby trenches that extended parallel to the river. Colonel John Henagan commanded this redoubt and it soon took his name. But Henagan’s Redoubt was never expected to repulse the Yankee host now bearing down on it.

Warren’s V Corps led the advance further upstream toward Jericho Mills. Rebel skirmishers slowed the advance, but Warren’s men fought their way across and controlled the situation. By 3 p.m. construction of a pontoon bridge capable of supporting artillery was underway.¹⁰⁶ While Warren’s men advanced on Jericho Mills, Birney’s Division of the II Corps crossed Long Creek and mistakenly reported they had crossed their objective, the North Anna. Realizing their mistake, they continued another 500 yards until coming upon Henagan’s Redoubt. Within two hours Birney’s division was arrayed for attack. II Corps artillery fired from excellent positions that brought shot and shell directly into the redoubt. Confederate artillery responded but was outclassed by Yankee gunners, who continued to fire unhindered. Rebel defenders huddled under the barrage while Birney worked two brigades into position: the First under Colonel Thomas Egan and the Second under Colonel Byron Pierce.¹⁰⁷

With 71st N.Y. and 72nd N.Y. detached from the Excelsior Brigade to support Pierce, they approached the redoubt on the right while Egan approached from the center and left. At 6:30 Pierce and Egan’s 3,000 men charged the enemy works. Sergeant James Anderson of Company F led the way as Third Excelsior’s regimental color bearer.¹⁰⁸ Close behind was Milton S. Bacon, a corporal in Company G. Bacon was one of those rare individuals, an original member of the regiment who’d reenlisted back in December, determined to see the thing through.¹⁰⁹ Pressing forward, Rebel musketry from the redoubt whistled through Union ranks. Supporting Rebel cannons shot from across the river and served to momentarily stagger the Union line, but the boys pushed on. The wave of blue was more than the Rebels could take, and shortly the 7th S.C. collapsed, its men running for the river and abandoning the supporting line of trenches. Federals swarmed the trenches and moved toward the main works. Once at the foot of the redoubt they found its walls steeper than expected. With Third Excelsior men in the van, an improvised ladder was soon fashioned using bayonets and rifles. “We had to stick our bayonets into the sides of it to climb up into it,”¹¹⁰ remembered James Dean. Samuel Bailey, who had enrolled back at Staten Island as the regiment’s sergeant-major, was now captain of Company I. With the fight swirling about him, Bailey shouted orders as Sergeant Anderson and the rest scrambled up the banks of the redoubt. Defenders rained hot lead down from the top of the works as Minié balls plowed the earth. In the frenzy, Corporal Bacon fell dead with a bullet through his head. Undaunted, the New Yorkers pressed forward. Soon Anderson and Third Excelsior’s colors were up and over the parapet; he was the first Union soldier into the works.¹¹¹

With Federal troops now swarming the position, defense of Henagan’s Redoubt collapsed as numbers of defenders threw down their muskets and were taken prisoner. Other Rebels skedaddled headlong across the Chesterfield Bridge, chased by whizzing volleys of Yankee rifle fire. Soon the only Confederates still fighting were beyond the bridge south of the river. The next line of Lee’s defenses overlooked the bridge, and Southern soldiers exchanged shots across the river with Northern troops, who quickly dug in.¹¹² Companies and regiments disorganized in the confusion of taking the redoubt were soon put right, as officers and sergeants collected wayward men and stragglers found their companies. Battle lines were formed near the river where Dean and the rest of the regiment remained all night.¹¹³ “We made another charge on the enemies [sic] works on the Banks of the South Anna River,” wrote Hiram Stoddard to his brother about the day’s work: “They were strong works but we carried them driving the Rebs into the River.”¹¹⁴

Birney’s men now held the approach to the Chesterfield Bridge, and further upstream Warren’s troops continued to consolidate their position on the far side of the river; Grant’s plan to advance across the North Anna was shaping up nicely indeed.

Federal troops had crossed the river at one point and held an important bridge at another, but Lee was not fully convinced Grant’s true objective was to cross here.¹¹⁵ Certainly the holding of a bridge presented some concern for Lee, however having an entire Union corps (Warren’s V Corps) on his side of the river required action.

Lee issued orders to attack Warren’s Corps later that day. But as the attack went forward Confederate commanders badly bungled the advance. Uncoordinated Confederate assaults, countered by quick action by Warren’s Yankees, resulted in miserable failure. The attacks cost Lee precious resources he could ill afford to squander and left Warren’s men in even stronger positions, convincing the Southern chieftain further attacks here would be futile.¹¹⁶

Lee was in a bad spot. Grant was able to move across the North Anna at two locations and could bring the entirety of his army to bear, and Lee could ill afford another Spotsylvania-style brawl. The Confederate commander believed withdrawal toward Richmond would only limit his options for future maneuver and permit Grant nearer to his objective. Lee wanted an offensive opportunity to hurt “those people,” to somehow isolate one or more of their corps and destroy it. Lee now cast about for ideas from his top commanders and staff.¹¹⁷

Confederate chief of engineers Martin Smith had a canny ability to read the terrain, and now he proposed a solution. Between Jericho Mills to the west, near the spot Warren’s corps had crossed on pontoon bridges, and the Chesterfield Bridge to the east held by Birney, lay an inverted V-shaped ridge with its apex resting on the river. Smith proposed that each wing of this inverted V could serve to block the Yankee advance: Warren on its west wing as he moved along the southern side of the river and Hancock on its east wing once he crossed the Chesterfield Bridge. If Grant attacked against both wings, his army would be split and unable to move supporting troops between the two fronts without first recrossing the North Anna, twice. Furthermore, across the open end of this wedge-shaped alignment ran a portion of the Virginia Central Railroad, which provided Lee excellent interior lines of communication, allowing him to move troops east and west between the two flanks of his army easily as threats dictated. With Grant unable to reinforce either wing of his army quickly, engineer Smith’s plan gave Lee the further option of being able to attack a Yankee corps should it become isolated with its back against the river. With little hesitation Lee ordered his army to occupy the ground proposed and then waited for Grant.¹¹⁸

Morning broke on the 24th. Grant was anxious to continue the attacks. Unsure of Lee’s true dispositions, Grant was still convinced Lee was in retreat. Warren’s men moved east along the far side of the North Anna toward Hancock’s troops, which were still crossing at the Chesterfield Bridge. Lead elements of Warren’s V Corps soon ran into a low ridge topped with freshly excavated dirt, a sure sign of newly built Rebel earth works. The ridge ran left to the river and right to a swamp that was impassible for a large army. Sure this was just the Confederate rearguard; Warren’s men attacked the ridge but were repeatedly hurled back.¹¹⁹ Messages streamed back to Grant’s headquarters and soon V Corps was halted.

Near Chesterfield Bridge enemy artillerymen started their work early. By 4 a.m. Hiram Stoddard and the rest were hunkered down under rain of shot and shell that peppered the brigade’s lines. Birney’s Division led the II Corps in starting across the bridge around 8 a.m. From prepared positions, Confederate guns showered hot iron on Yankees crossing Chesterfield Bridge. Birney’s men raced across the exposed bridge and approaches to establish themselves on the river’s south side.¹²⁰ Near 11 a.m. the Excelsiors moved to relieve First Brigade, which was beginning its move over the river. Two hours later the Excelsiors began to cross. As each regiment moved across the bridge, Rebel lead and iron unceasingly peppered their ranks.¹²¹ Arriving on the south side, the New Yorkers established their line of battle behind some crude rifle pits hastily dug by previous brigades. Grant was splitting his army just as Lee had hoped.

Union forces were now bumped up against the Rebel works on both legs of Lee’s inverted V. Now began the hard work of breaking through. Grant poured more troops across the river, hoping to develop a weak spot in the enemy line. Fighting was desperate as Federals hugged the earth in search of what little cover the terrain offered. The hoped-for weak spot was proving elusive. Grant’s best corps, Hancock’s II, was now in a vulnerable position, stalled and exposed. Hancock’s men were ripe to suffer the counterattack Lee had envisioned. But Lee had been sick and resting far to the rear, unable to direct fast-developing events firsthand. Fighting in the Wilderness and Spotsylvania had taken many of his best commanders, and their replacements were proving themselves slow and tentative. Lee reluctantly concluded it was best to forgo the opportunity to descend upon Hancock rather than attempt a risky offensive maneuver, this attack perhaps being beyond the abilities of those asked to execute it.¹²²

Birney’s division continued to inch forward as the late afternoon dragged into evening. Near 9 p.m. on that first day the fighting wound down. Since crossing Chesterfield Bridge, the Excelsiors had advanced a mere quarter of a mile and established a new front line.¹²³

Hancock had made little or no progress as the morning of the 25th gave way to afternoon. Reports received by Grant suggested enemy resistance was increasing. By early evening the situation was becoming clearer to the Federal commander. Instead of a mere Rebel rearguard, Lee’s entire army arrayed against him, and Grant realized the danger of having his forces split. Grant immediately issued orders to cease offensive operations and to dig in in preparation for an enemy counterattack. Northern troops hastily threw up breastworks. As blue-coated soldiers frantically scratched the earth with their bayonets and stacked random logs and rocks, Lee’s vision of delivering a crushing blow by descending on his foe faded.¹²⁴ Leonard’s boys had waited all day in their improvised positions for the order to go forward, but now attentions turned to defense. Around 5 p.m. First Brigade took the front and the Excelsiors were moved to a second line, where they spent the night.¹²⁵ A member of the 120th N.Y. described the situation as he saw it:

Hancock’s troops were the most vulnerable to Rebel attack and spent the night digging rifle pits and erecting breastworks. With every shovelful of earth the Yankees’ moved to strengthen their positions lessened Lee’s prospects of success. By morning’s light it was clear the two armies faced another stalemate: both sides now in positions too strong to be successfully carried.¹²⁷

The Confederate Army had no option but to hold its ground. The Yankees were here, in their front, and for the time being at least, were no closer to Richmond. It was Grant who would dictate the next phase of the campaign. Realizing his way was blocked and an attack here had little hope of success, Grant made plans to withdraw his army back to the north side of the river. Realizing how lucky he’d been, Grant ordered his army to re-cross the North Anna. Under cover of darkness on the night of the 26th, all four Federal corps would withdraw using the Chesterfield Bridge, Ox Ford, and an assortment of temporary foot bridges. Once on the north side Grant could continue his attempts to move around Lee with moves south and west.¹²⁸

Leonard’s men had spent the entire day of the 26th in the second line of works waiting for orders. Shortly after midnight, the 72nd N.Y. with the rest of Birney’s division withdrew across the North Anna using the Chesterfield Bridge. Soon after crossing they went into bivouac for the night. At noon they marched and made camp at 7 p.m. near the Pamunkey River. Out of range of Rebel cannons, the boys paused to assess the past week’s action. The regiment on the whole had been lucky; despite the shelling and the desperate fight at Henagan’s Redoubt, the regiment counted only nine men wounded and only young Milt Bacon killed.¹²⁹

With the army out of immediate peril, Grant continued southward. Following the North Anna, the Federals passed where the river joined with the South Anna. From here south, the river was called the Pamunkey. Grant’s men traveled using parallel routes. Burnside’s and Warren’s corps formed the eastern-most columns, while Hancock’s and Wright’s fashioned the western column, remaining closest to the river. North of Hanovertown the Federals crossed the Pamunkey and moved southwest toward Richmond. Grant’s army was now 15 miles from Richmond, ten miles closer than at the North Anna crossing. On this line of march Grant’s men needed only to cross two remaining water obstacles, Totopotomoy Creek and the Chickahominy River on their way to the Confederate capital.¹³⁰ Stoddard reflected on this latest move in a letter to his brother:

Third Excelsior was on the move at noon on the 27th and halted for supper near 7 p.m. They bivouacked for the night near the Pamunkey. The regiment was on the move the next morning by 8 a.m. Moving slowly all day, they eventually crossed the river near Hanovertown late in the afternoon and finally halted for the night at 7 p.m.¹³²

Grant’s course of action was now clear, allowing Lee to more effectively shift his troops to meet the threat. When lead elements of Grant’s army reached the Totopotomoy on the 29th, they found Confederates firmly established on the far bank. Leonard’s men arrived near the creek around 10 a.m. and were immediately put to task digging a line of works of their own. The situation was fast developing into another North Anna–style standoff. By seven that night the regiment advanced and began building more works. Throughout the day of the 30th the two sides skirmished and probed, while the Excelsiors remained in their rifle pits. General Francis Barlow’s Federal division made an attack late in the afternoon that gained some important ground. Barlow’s push went forward with the customary increase in supporting artillery fire. A battery of the small Coehorn mortars position near the 72nd worked away during the attack, holding the attention of some fascinated boys within the regiment.

Barlow followed up his success the next morning with another attack, this time supported with additional brigades, including the Excelsiors. Seventy-Second New York was again among the leading regiments as the assault went forward. “In this charge,” reported Henri LeFevre-Brown, “the colors of the Third Regiment were the first to mount the enemy’s works; they were gallantly borne by Corporal Ovett Burr, of Company E, who was one of the first Union soldiers to reach the breastworks, and who was helped up the parapet by those with him.”¹³³ With the enemy works secured, Corporal Burr and the rest again dug in.

But the decision against remaining to slug it out had already been made by Grant. With a newly established supply base 15 miles south of Hanovertown at White House Landing, a shift south would put him closer to both Richmond and his supplies. Even while Corporal Burr was scrambling up the parapet, Grant had already initiated the next move by sending cavalry ahead to clear the way and to secure the small town of Cold Harbor. Two days of fighting followed to secure the town for Grant, and lead elements of his infantry began to arrive on the evening of the 31st.¹³⁴ Lee was now certain where the Yankee army was heading. It became another race for position. Grant needed sufficient army to flank Lee and drive onto Richmond, while Lee needed enough men to stop the attacks he knew would come.

Federal designs were clear, and leading elements were pouring into their position around Cold Harbor on June 1. Lee’s men were moving into position west of town, but the Federals had a big lead. Grant planned for an early morning attack the next day against what he knew would be undermanned Rebel positions.¹³⁵

The Federal army had been moved piecemeal in order to fix in place as much of the Rebel army as possible. The last to leave their positions along the Totopotomoy were Hancock’s II Corps and a group of cavalry. Grant intended to extend his battle line as far south as possible in hopes of overlapping Confederate defenses. Orders went to Hancock to move his corps to the south, to the left end of the Union line, a move that would take II Corps from one extreme end of the line to the other. At daybreak of the 1st, Leonard roused his men from their trenches and fell back to their positions of two days earlier. There they remained for the rest of the day. With nightfall, Third Excelsior, along with much of II Corps, moved three miles and bivouacked for the night.¹³⁶ Grant wanted to go forward with all five of his corps and set 4:30 on the morning of the 2nd as the time for the attack. But Hancock was still not in position at the designated time. Faulty directions had sent II Corps on a roundabout trek, and they failed to arrive until 6:30, two hours late, exhausted and certainly in no condition for an assault. Grant reasoned that moving the attack to five that afternoon would serve his purposes just as well. But as the day wore on, skirmishing along the line required extensive repositioning of troops, until finally Grant postponed the endeavor to 4:30 the next morning.¹³⁷

Lee’s men took full advantage of the delay as they dug, barricaded, positioned, and then repositioned both men and artillery. In many cases the officers worked to conceal the extent of the works, fearing the defenses might appear too formidable and thus discourage Yankee attack.¹³⁸

When dawn broke on the 3rd, LeFevre-Brown and the rest of the II Corps were firmly positioned on the left side of the Union line. Leonard and his men had done a lot of shifting of position, but for now at least Birney’s division was stationed in reserve.¹³⁹

By the time Grant’s attack was ready, the two opposing armies had managed to arrange themselves into roughly the shape of two parallel crescents. With the Federals forming the inside of the two crescents, their attacks would diverge from the center as they went forward, with each corps unwittingly forced to act independently, unsupported by the others. Grant and his commanders were unaware of this, and as the attacks went forward, corps commanders would blame each other for failures of proper support. Northern men on the front lines knew from past experience the coming attack would be bad. Men took time to pen farewells in their diaries and pin makeshift identification tags on their coats giving their name and regiment.¹⁴⁰

The attack lasted only about eight minutes. Furious Rebel defense stopped the Union advance cold. Yankees gained some success in places, but quick Rebel counterattacks stopped each breach. A few local commanders attempted to regroup and try again or to shift a regiment here or a brigade there, but everyone on the line knew it was over and the expected slaughter had come true.¹⁴¹ Confederate commanders, reflecting on the lightness of their casualties, found it hard to believe the battle had begun in earnest, let alone was already over.¹⁴² Dead Yankees covered nearly five acres. The fighting of June 3 had cost Grant 7,000 men, most of them in those first terrible eight minutes; Lee’s army suffered only 1,500.¹⁴³

With his attack stopped, Grant desperately looked for an avenue to break through. Orders to corps commanders to probe the enemy for weak spots all came back the same; further attacks would be futile and the morning’s losses had served to severely weaken, disorganize and demoralize Northern troops.¹⁴⁴

Union men on the front lines dug in as best they could. Some were able to pull back to safer positions, while other were stranded, unable to move for fear of being shot by some unseen Southern rifleman. With the dead all around, shocked survivors were forced to endure the moans and cries of the wounded, which filled the air. But with every approach covered, the blue coats were unable to help their comrades until the arrival of nightfall.¹⁴⁵

Unit commanders begged Grant to parlay for a cease fire in order to collect the wounded, but the Federal commander, not wishing to admit defeat, sparred with Lee over the exact wording of such an agreement from June 5 till the 7th. By the time Union troops were permitted to recover their comrades, most wounded had already died from exposure or thirst.¹⁴⁶

While men in frontline divisions attempted to collect their dead and wounded, the Excelsiors enjoyed the relative safety of the rear. From the 3rd to the 8th the New Yorkers had been shifted along Birney’s line a number of times, either relieving brigades behind existing works or building new works as needed.¹⁴⁷ During the several days of action, Hiram Stoddard and the boys were either on picket, anticipating an enemy counterattack, or were hunkered down behind breastworks clear of Rebel snipers and artillery.¹⁴⁸ Since his enrollment in Company B, Stoddard had always placed his fate into the hands of God and tried to live a life of which his parents would be proud. In letters home Hiram often praised God for seeing him through another day of battle and thanked his parents for providing him with a strict and proper Christian upbringing that allowed him to endure his many trials. On June 8 he wrote:

But if Hiram ever questioned the Lord’s providential hand watching over him, the tale he relates to his parents should have removed all doubt. Behind “thin”¹⁵⁰ breastworks during the fighting of June 3, a Company C man had just been mortally wounded by a shell fragment to the head.¹⁵¹ More aware than ever of the dangers of the bursting artillery, Hiram and the other boys squirmed a little lower for cover.

Since the beginning of the Overland Campaign, Grant had been losing men at the rate of about two for every one of Lee’s. Now there was Cold Harbor, where losses were about five to one. Grant realized his army would be wrecked beyond repair if he continued this kind of fight over this kind of ground.¹⁵³

Grant had enough manpower and was practically at the gates of Richmond. With Lee’s army in front of him, Grant began again to look for ways around and on toward the Rebel capital. Union cavalry ranged far and wide looking for a spot to exploit. General Benjamin Butler’s 10,000 Federal troops had been inactive until now; at Bermuda Hundred, south of Richmond, they finally began to stir. By June 10 there were hints of opportunity for an advance, with only the time, place and method remaining for Grant to decide.¹⁵⁴

From the 8th through to the 12th of June, the regiment lay in their breastworks beyond Cold Harbor. That night around seven Leonard deployed his men as advance pickets. By 3 a.m. on the morning of the 13th the regiment was recalled and began a fast march south. The decision to pull out had been made, and the 72nd was lagging behind the rest of the brigade.¹⁵⁵

Grant had made his decision and was moving toward Petersburg, an important rail junction south of Richmond. Federal men moved quickly as they pulled out of the line and marched south and crossed the James River by boat. Grant’s lead element was Smith’s XVIII Corps. The II Corps followed later. Marching throughout the 13th, II Corps reached the James River near Wilcox Landing, where it waited out the night.¹⁵⁶

Third Excelsior caught up with the rest of the brigade by 6 a.m. By three that afternoon they crossed the Chickahominy and continued south. Much of this was the same ground the veterans of the regiment had tromped back in the days of the Peninsula Campaign with McClellan. “The march part of the way led through places familiar to many of us,”¹⁵⁷ wrote one Excelsior Brigade man, “and in one instance I noted the very spot where my tent was pitched overnight in the Spring of ’62.”¹⁵⁸ By 10 p.m. they bivouacked for the night at Charles City Court House, only a mile or so from Wilcox Landing. Soon after arriving a picket detail was formed, Lucius Jones of Company H among them:

With young Lucius and the rest still in the woods, the regiment packed up and moved the short distance to Wilcox Landing, where pontoon bridges had been established. Near 11 a.m. Leonard led his men as they tromped across the James and went into bivouac near Windmill Landing with the balance of the II Corps.¹⁶⁰ Back in the scrub beyond the courthouse, Lucius and the rest took matters into their own hands: “We struck out and marched all day. About dark we came up with the army. When we got to the regiment the boys all came to shake hands with us and said they never expected to see us again.”¹⁶¹

Luckily for Jones and the rest, the entire day of the 14th had been spent waiting for rations, allowing Lucius and his mates a chance to catch up. Not until noon of the 15th would Third Excelsior move again. The XVIII Corps had been fighting around Petersburg since the 14th and had taken the outer defenses as Lee was hurrying to reinforce his heavily outnumbered garrison.¹⁶² “Had the Second Corps continued its advance at this time Petersburg could probably have been occupied with but little opposition,”¹⁶³ recalled Henri LeFevre-Brown. “A division of colored troops of the Eighteenth Corps had captured the main line of rebel works, next the Appomattox River on the evening of the 15th, and developed the fact that there was but a small force of rebels in Petersburg at that time.”¹⁶⁴

While a concerted Federal push could have taken Petersburg, no one had informed Hancock of the urgency, and II Corps moved unhurried, not arriving until almost midnight of the 15th. Once at Petersburg, II Corps men took over some of the outer works that had previously been captured by colored troops of the XVIII Corps. Hancock’s men concluded that if colored troops could capture the works then the Rebel defenders must be weak indeed. And though fatigued from the march, they prepared for an attack. Hancock’s men waited, yet no orders came. They settled into the captured works for the night, the second without rations. In the distance was heard the sound of pick, shovel and the axe; the enemy was improving their defenses.¹⁶⁵ LeFevre-Brown later remembered the blundered move against Petersburg.

As daylight broke on the 16th it was discovered that neither pickets nor skirmishers had been placed in front of the division, but soon the entire corps was in line of battle. Though there was no general assault, breastworks were erected under a rain of Rebel artillery fire as much of the corps engaged in “severe skirmishing all day.”¹⁶⁷ That evening the regiment was able to make a small advance. Once it was determined the boys could go no further, another line of works was hastily build to help consolidate their gains. This pattern of skirmishing during the day and advancing at night continued for the next couple of days. “We were very close to the Rebels,” remembered Lucius Jones, “not over twenty rods, and in some places not that fare distant, fighting night and day.”¹⁶⁸ With enlistments in the 72nd expiring, it was probably a miracle Leonard and the other officers could get the boys to load a rifle, let alone fight, as most were going home in just a few days and no one wanted to be wounded or killed this late in the game. All were filthy and spent. Perhaps a few dozen men in the whole army had gotten to bathe back at the North Anna, but chances were it was none of these boys. They wore the same clothes as when they had stepped off from Brandy Station seven weeks earlier. But there was some consolation: by the 18th, the supply situation had been resolved and the men finally enjoyed fresh rations.¹⁶⁹ Skirmishing proceeded all day on the 19th and 20th. Stoddard wrote on the 19th to reassure his parents:

On the evening of the 20th, the 72nd was pulled out of the line and replaced by elements of the IX Corps. The New Yorkers marched nearly the entire next day, going into line of battle near the Weldon Railroad. Nothing came of the 72nd’s move to the Weldon Railroad, and as it would turn out, this was the last time the 72nd would go into line.¹⁷¹

With its term of service expired, the regiment was relieved from the front on the morning of the 22nd, going to the rear to be mustered out. Men who had reenlisted back at Brandy Station or those whose term of service had not yet expired were consolidated into Companies C, G and H. The next morning these three companies were attached to the 120th New York.¹⁷² “Then the parting came, with goodbye to all; and off the boys went, wishing us good luck, and we the same to them.”¹⁷³

From that point on the 72nd New York State Volunteers ceased to exist. All that was left was for the discharged men to be paid and get themselves home. For those left at Petersburg, Lucius Jones, James Dean, and others, the war went on.