INTRODUCTION

The Man and the Work

Mencius records the teachings of the Chinese philosopher whose surname was Meng and personal name Ke . Throughout East Asia, he is better known as Mengzi , or “Master Meng” (391–308 B.C.E.); “Mencius” is the Latinized version of this more widely used appellation. Mencius lived during the later part of the Zhou dynasty (traditional dates: 1122–249 B.C.E.), in a time known as the Warring States period (403–221 B.C.E.). This was an age in which the older feudal order of the Zhou dynasty had deteriorated. The Zhou king ruled in name only and his former empire was divided into different states, each with its own ruler, who continued to vie with the rulers of other states for supremacy. These state rulers often illegitimately claimed for themselves the title of king (wang ) in an attempt to arrogate to themselves what rightfully belonged to the now enfeebled Zhou king. These features of Mencius’s time often are reflected in the conversations he had with rulers of various states, for example his conversations with King Hui of Liang and King Xuan of Qi in the first part of book 1, about how they might realize their grand ambition to unite and rule over all of China. As readers will see from the translation, Mencius thought that only someone who possessed the moral qualities of a true king, someone worthy of the title, could successfully unify the empire, and in many of his conversations he tries to steer the attention of various state rulers from their desire for power to a concern with morality. Like Kongzi (Confucius) before him, Mencius defended the older Zhou form of life, which of course entailed the preeminence of the Zhou king, but he did so in a new, intellectually more diverse and sophisticated context. He faced a wide range of formidable challengers to the Way (dao ) Confucius had advocated—see for example 3A4, 3A5, 3B9, 6A1–6, and 7A26—and in response to their contending theories and ideas he developed innovative, powerful, and highly nuanced views about human nature, the mind, self-cultivation, politics, and Heaven that had a profound and lasting influence on the later Confucian tradition and on East Asian culture in general.

Mencius lived in Zou , a small state located at the base of what is now the Shandong Peninsula. Tradition claims that he studied under Confucius’s grandson Zisi , but it is more likely that he was a student of one of Zisi’s disciples. One piece of evidence supporting the claim of a connection to Zisi is the fact that some of Mencius’s teachings bear similarities to parts of the Doctrine of the Mean, which is traditionally ascribed to Zisi. Recently excavated texts also reveal a number of common themes, which show us more clearly the extent to which Mencius was participating in contemporary philosophical debates and helping to shape the emerging Confucian tradition.¹

The earliest information we have about Mencius’s life comes from the text that bears his name; later, this picture of his life was substantially augmented though not revised by his biography in Sima Qian’s The Grand Scribe’s Records (Shiji ), which was composed in the early part of the first century B.C.E.² In its present form, Mencius consists of seven books, each of which is divided into two parts, which are further subdivided into sections of varying length. This general structure is followed in Professor Bloom’s translation, with each book, part, and section assigned a number or letter. For example, section 7 in the first part of book 1 is 1A7, while section 15 of the second part of book 6 is 6B15. The shortest sections of the text consist of brief dicta, while the longest are quite substantial. These passages purportedly record the teachings of Mencius and conversations he had with various disciples, friends, royal patrons, and rivals. Some traditional accounts claim that Mencius himself composed the original text, others say it was compiled by his disciples with his approval and advice. In the second century C.E., Mencius underwent a significant transformation when it was edited and several “chapters” were discarded by Zhao Qi (d. 201 C.E.), who also wrote the first extant commentary on the text.

Mencius had a place, though not a commanding position, among Confucian writings until its extraordinary ascent. This began toward the end of the Tang dynasty (618–907), when thinkers such as Han Yu (768–824) and Li Ao (fl. 798) advocated Mencius as a particularly important resource for the revival of Confucianism, which had fallen into relative neglect in the face of a remarkable and rising tide of Daoist and Buddhist innovation and success.³ In the following, Song dynasty (960–1279), the inimitable Zhu Xi (1130–1200) wrote a highly influential commentary on Mencius and included the latter, along with the Analects, Great Learning, and Doctrine of the Mean, as one of the Four Books—a collection that came to serve as the gateway to Confucian learning and the all-important civil service examination. Largely as a result of these developments, in subsequent dynasties Mencius came to occupy a singularly important place in the Confucian scriptural pantheon. In 1315, the Mongol court recognized it as a classic, which secured its preeminent position within the tradition; since that time the text has enjoyed unprecedented and unmatched influence and prestige. Among current scholars, it remains one of the most highly studied Confucian classics.

Ethical Views

Mencius’s primary ethical concern, both theoretical and practical, was moral self-cultivation; he wanted people to improve themselves and believed they could do so with the right kind of attitude and effort.⁴ Like many Confucians, he was more a teacher or therapist than a theoretician, more interested in moving people toward a certain ideal than in crafting and presenting tight and careful valid arguments. This is not to say that he does not present interesting and at times compelling arguments, only that this was not his aim or ideal. Readers should keep in mind his more practical concerns as they seek to gain a sympathetic understanding of his philosophy and life.

At the core of Mencius’s theory of self-cultivation is a belief in the innate moral qualities and inclination of human nature. He is best known for his theory that human nature is good (xing shan ), and readers will find him discussing this topic in a variety of places in the text, most notably but by no means exclusively in the opening sections of the first part of book 6. Mencius meant by this claim, first, that human beings possess certain observable and active resources for becoming good, what he calls moral “sprouts.” In more modern terms, we might describe this part of his view as the claim that human beings innately possess some measure of other-regarding desires such as compassion and altruism.⁵ In addition, Mencius argues that if human beings exercise the most important and distinctive aspects of their nature—for example, their innate moral sensibilities and their abilities to reflect and think—according to what he regards as their natural functions, this will lead them to develop their moral sprouts into full and vibrant virtues. The key to this process of development is the mind (xin ), an organ Mencius believed contained affective, cognitive, and volitional elements.⁶ Roughly, his view is that if we exercise our minds and reflect upon ourselves and our condition, we will discover not only that we do in fact care about other people, creatures, and things, but also that focusing upon our moral sprouts leads us to act morally and offers us the most profound, stable, and enduring sources of satisfaction available to creatures like us. This satisfaction or joy in moral action, along with a parallel sense of disapproval and shame in bad action, can lead us to become good, but only if we exercise our minds to reflect upon and follow the “greater part” of our nature (6A15).

There are numerous challenges one might raise to Mencius’s position as a moral view for our time. Even if one grants most of what he claims about the relationship between nature and moral development, one can still question why one should follow one’s nature. What gives normative status and power to the promptings of our nature and its development through reflection? Mencius’s most direct and explicit answer was religious in nature: Heaven granted us our nature, and coming to understand and develop our nature is the way to understand and accord with the will of Heaven. We will explore these claims and other aspects of Mencius’s religious views in the following section, but even if we set them aside, there are other possible ways to defend a version of Mencius’s position, several of which he appeals to, though does not fully develop.

One might begin a defense of Mencius’s views by noting that simply by raising the questions of why one should be moral or what morality is, one implicitly endorses the view that human beings are by nature creatures that reflect upon themselves and their actions and seek answers with their minds. This supports his claim that the natural function of the mind is to think or reflect and help us govern our lives. Mencius would further insist that not only are we reflective creatures but also that many of our reflections include evaluations and spontaneous responses to what we or others have done or are considering doing. On its own, this point seems quite uncontroversial, though of course Mencius would have to go on to show that certain kinds of responses are characteristic of normal, well-informed human beings and do indeed produce a profound and particularly valuable sense of satisfaction and joy.⁷ If one reads Mencius as offering a form of virtue ethics or a broadly construed version of consequentialism, such claims about the true character of human nature can contribute in direct and important ways to a plausible ethical theory.⁸ For if following and developing certain parts of our nature are critical for producing a stable and harmonious society of satisfied and joyful people, the value of understanding the true character and potential of human nature clearly plays a prominent and critical role in both ethical theory and practice.

Political Views

Mencius was one of the first thinkers in the history of the world to insist that rulers and states exist to serve their people. The proper aim of a good state is the welfare of its people, and this is conceived in terms of the order, security, wealth, happiness, and education the people enjoy. Mencius believed the people are the only tangible indicator of good governance, and elite members of society must look to the people as the most reliable gauge of the quality of their rule and heed what this guide reveals. Much to the chagrin of the rulers in his own time and a number of later Chinese emperors as well, Mencius further argued that rulers who fail to serve their people lose the mandate to rule and can even be forcibly removed by those more qualified to fulfill Heaven’s plan for its people.⁹ These forceful and at times quite subtle views about the role the welfare of the people plays in justifying political rule did not include any clear correlates to Western ideas about a right to revolt or to elect those who govern. Nevertheless, Mencius’s views about the wisdom and importance of the people have the potential to significantly enrich present-day political philosophy.¹⁰

Like Confucius before him, Mencius offered nuanced and interesting ideas on what constitutes the welfare of the people. His views about the importance of family and intimate interpersonal relationships call for very different approaches to how one conceives of and seeks to ensure basic welfare. Like any Confucian, Mencius would adamantly reject the idea that simply providing for the material needs of people is in any way adequate. To treat someone in such a fashion is to treat that person as less than fully human.¹¹ Confucians also place a tremendous emphasis on education as a chief concern of the government and a primary good for the people. One can see a number of ways in which a good education, and especially one with ethical content, can contribute both directly and indirectly to a person’s welfare and to the welfare of the state as well and why it arguably should be one of the highest priorities of any decent society.

A number of current thinkers have focused on Mencius’s views about human nature as a resource for developing Confucian conceptions of human rights.¹² While one does not find an explicit discussion of rights or even clear cases of the concept of rights in the early Confucian tradition,¹³ Mencius’s belief in a common, ethically charged nature unambiguously establishes what Donald J. Munro calls natural equality among human beings.¹⁴ Throughout the early tradition, one also finds the notion that human beings all are regarded by and can appeal to Heaven to bear testimony to their moral worth, no matter how badly they might be treated by others. These ideas offer a clear and solid foundation for developing a robust conception of basic rights.

Early Confucians describe a system of moral right and wrong, good and bad largely in terms of a set of virtues and a system of rituals and norms. These function to achieve many of the same goods as a system of rights and laws. Nevertheless, Confucians emphasize being humane (ren ) rather than the modern Western notion of justice. They clearly have a concept of justice, in terms of what is due to a person given her or his social role and circumstance and simply in virtue of being a fellow human being, but their sense of justice is distinctive and needs to be carefully distinguished from its modern Western counterparts.¹⁵ As Munro has shown, early Confucians most definitely have a sense of equal human worth and dignity, clear views about the ability to make and adhere to moral choices, and to take on and assign blame, praise, and responsibility. Together, these and other ethical ideas and practices constitute a distinctively Confucian way of life that is importantly different from the modern Western liberal view. Roughly, one might say that people have dignity and moral worth because of their innate moral nature, as members of families and a larger society, and because they possess the capacity to develop themselves to be good, and so forth.¹⁶

Those who argue that Confucianism cannot develop any robust conception of rights almost certainly are wrong. To make such a case, one would have to show that the tradition is unable to adapt, develop, and change. Anyone who has made even the slightest effort to study, understand, and appreciate the rich, creative, and still vibrant history of Confucianism will find such a claim both naive and implausible; like all great traditions, Confucianism has demonstrated a remarkable ability to transform itself as well as those who participate in it. The view that Confucianism is somehow incapable of developing or accommodating any conception of rights must recognize that, for most of its history, the Western tradition lacked any robust sense of basic rights. The notions of rights, autonomy, and free will all are modern developments. Unless one can show that such developments could only take one unique route, there is no conceptual reason that prevents the Confucian tradition—or the Daoist, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions—from following its own path to a related or largely similar idea. I suggest, however, that rather than simply looking to find, develop, or apply the modern Western liberal notion of rights within the Confucian tradition, we might all best be served by working to describe an alternative Confucian foundation and conception of rights. Surely this would be better than groping for some weak conception of rights within traditional culture, as some have done, or seeking to graft onto a vital and rich tradition an alien and unfamiliar ideal. Seen in this light, the Confucian tradition, and Mencius’s philosophy in particular, have tremendous potential for contributing to and enhancing our understanding of the notion of human rights.

Mencius’s views on war also are incisive and immensely interesting. He offered clear and intriguing views about all three of the standard concerns one finds in modern Western just-war traditions: jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum.¹⁷ His views on war were deeply informed and shaped by his central concern with benevolence and the welfare of the people, which places considerable restrictions on when and how a state can go to war and what it owes its own and other people in the aftermath of war. One intriguing consequence of Mencius’s theory is described in 1B15, where he recounts the story of a king who could find no way to appease or defend against an alien aggressor and who, in response, chose to abdicate his throne and leave his state in order to avoid pointlessly harming his people.

Mencius’s views about just war continue to play a central and vital role in current Chinese conceptions of and responses to war. When the United States launched its second war with Iraq, there was widespread condemnation in the Chinese media, especially on the Internet. The most common criticism of the American action drew upon the distinction Mencius describes in passages such as 1A5, 1B11, 7B2, and 7B4 between a campaign of justified punishment (zheng ) and acts of interstate aggression. Many Chinese regarded the first Gulf War as a case of the former but saw the second war as a clear example of the latter.

Religious Views

It is still not uncommon to find present-day scholars claiming that early Confucians such as Confucius and Mencius are agnostic or purely secular thinkers. Such claims, though, are not supported by the texts.¹⁸ As noted, Heaven plays an important role in Mencius’s ethical philosophy. Like Confucius before him, Mencius believed that Heaven has a plan for human beings, both individually and collectively, and is conscious of, interested in, and on occasion plays a part in the unfolding of human affairs. Also like Confucius, Mencius believed that Heaven had chosen him to play a special part in the realization of its grand design.

Mencius, though, changed the focus and altered the content of Confucius’s earlier views about Heaven. This is seen most clearly in Mencius’s teachings concerning human nature. He explicitly claimed that Heaven endowed human beings with a nature that both equips and inclines them toward the goals that it has in mind for them. Because human beings have such a distinctive nature, they have a direct way of coming to understand and follow Heaven. By reflecting upon their nature, people can come to understand not only themselves but also the proper role all human beings are to play in the grand plan Heaven has for the world. In 7A1, Mencius teaches that a proper understanding of human nature leads to an understanding of Heaven and that working to develop one’s nature fully is the way to serve Heaven.

Mencius’s views about Heaven place significant constraints on the nature of the human good. Human beings are to seek for satisfaction, joy, harmony, and general well-being within a natural order established by Heaven. Much, though not all, of Heaven’s plan can be known through careful reflection and study; with enough effort of the right kind, human beings can come to understand, but they must not attempt to alter or fundamentally damage the order provided by Heaven, for to do so would violate Heaven’s plan.

If one were to ignore or seek to eliminate the religious aspects of Mencius’s thought, it would alter the character of his philosophy.¹⁹ Without Heaven, Mencius’s claims about the goodness of human nature would not only lose a sense of being part of a much greater good, they would become a much more open-ended quest for what is good for creatures like us. Many would agree that greater openness on this issue should be welcomed. If, however, one eliminates all sense of a natural order and embraces efforts to alter both human nature and the world around us in fundamental ways, in a search for greater satisfaction and happiness, Mencius’s defenders might argue, and compellingly so, that one is no longer searching for the human good; rather, one is stipulating and working to manufacture a new order for oneself and the world. Such an attitude toward morality begs important questions, perhaps most important is whether morality is made for human beings or human beings are made—or, on this view, remade—for morality.

Wider Influence on Culture

Mencius’s influence on Chinese culture extends far beyond his contributions to ethical, political, and religious thought, impressive as they are. His example as a defender of Confucianism and Chinese culture in general was an important reason he and his ideas proved to have such a remarkable legacy. Mencius was the first thinker to defend Confucius’s Way against a range of articulate challengers. In so doing, he established a precedent and inspiring example that later Confucians would follow and explicitly appeal to throughout the history of the tradition. Later thinkers often invoke the trope of being forced to respond to, challenge, and oppose some new threat to the Confucian tradition and Chinese society; they thus cast themselves as latter-day versions of Mencius, who, we are told, far from being “fond of argument,” was “compelled” to engage in it in order to defend the Way (3B9).

Another reason Mencius has endured and exerted such a profound influence on Chinese culture is its remarkable literary qualities. It is one of the most elegant and accessible classical Chinese texts and abounds with memorable and clever stories, powerful and at times haunting images, and wonderful turns of phrase. It is an abundant source for the distinctive feature of the Chinese language called set phrases (cheng yu ): expressions, usually of four characters, still used in modern oral and written Chinese to invoke complex ideas in terse yet highly evocative and often amusing ways. For example, the phrase “climbing a tree in search of a fish” (yuan shu qiu yu ) is from 1A7 and is used to describe actions that are hopeless and wrongheaded; the phrase “pulling at the sprouts to help them grow” (ba miao zhu zhang ) is from 2A2 and describes actions that foolishly aim to rush a natural process and as a result harm the cause one seeks to advance. Simply by invoking these four-character expressions, speakers or authors conjure up and continue parts of the rich Mencian legacy.

Stories about Mencius’s mother have added wisdom and luster to his reputation as well.²⁰ Such stories fill out a picture, whether historically accurate or not, that has influenced people’s image of and admiration for not only his mother but Mencius as well. Most of the stories describe Mencius’s mother displaying her remarkable wisdom and virtue through a variety of actions and advice. Most famous is the story of how “Mencius’s mother moved three times” (Meng mu san qian ), which is captured in another set phrase, known to people throughout East Asia. The story goes that Mencius’s mother, a young widow left to raise her son, changed their residence three times. They first lived next to a cemetery, but she was not pleased to see her son mimic the actions of those performing funeral rituals. So she moved near a market, but then was not wholly satisfied when young Mencius would imitate the actions and words of those hawking goods. Determined to find the best possible environment for her son, she moved a third time, settling down and finding contentment near a school, where her son intoned the lessons of teachers and followed their example of diligent study. This is but one of several highly memorable stories about the insight and determination of Mencius’s mother and how she guided and shaped her son’s education and moral development. These tales offer powerful ideals and vivid images—which often have been depicted in popular illustrations—that inspire many “education mothers” throughout East Asian civilization and beyond; they represent another important facet of Mencius’s influence upon and enduring legacy within Chinese and East Asian culture.

A final and more amorphous influence is no less real or important, and that is the powerful current of humanity running throughout Chinese culture. Mencius’s view of human nature and its potential for good has penetrated deeply and resides in the marrow and bones of the Chinese people; it finds expression in a wide range of cultural phenomena. There is an often unexpressed imperative echoing down through Chinese history calling on every person, from the most powerful to the most humble, to cultivate and manifest fundamental decency, kindness, and ethical nobility.²¹ Whereas people in Western culture tend to reserve the worst approbation for those who are unjust, the Chinese reserve such condemnation for those who are uncaring or unfeeling, and there is something to their preference. The latter ideal is more within any person’s ability, and failing on this standard may well show a more fundamental lack of one of the most basic and cherished qualities of human beings. We in the West seem to share something like this view as well, at least in our more popular appraisals—think of the character Scrooge—and after all, we use the word humanity both to designate ourselves as a species and to describe one of our best qualities. In any event, Mencius was the first to sound this call and illustrate it with moving parables such as King Xuan sparing the ox (1A7), the story of the child and the well (2A6), and the desolation of Ox Mountain (6A8).

Mencius’s irrepressibly optimistic appraisal of human nature and his endorsement of the human spirit are perhaps the greatest legacy of his philosophy; the fact that most Chinese people and many scholars of Chinese culture would simply call these ideas Confucian or Chinese only testifies to the degree to which his ideas have permeated this magnificent civilization and East Asian cultures more generally. With the publication of works like this translation by Irene Bloom, the Mencian legacy continues to grow and spread beyond China and East Asia, to find sympathetic readers in the English-speaking world. This is only fitting, for Mencius did not write just for the Chinese but for all human beings; his message was never aimed at any single person, people, or state; it was intended and belongs to what he called all-under-Heaven (tian xia ).

Philip J. Ivanhoe

Notes

1. For an excellent introduction to this material that carefully traces some of the most important connections to Mencius’s philosophy, see Mark Csikszentmihalyi, Material Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early China (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

2. For an account of Mencius’s early life and sources describing his life, see the “Life of Mencius” section of the “Prolegomena” in James Legge, trans., The Works of Mencius (repr., New York: Dover, 1970), 14–38; and appendixes 1 and 2 in D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (London: Penguin, 1970), 205–19.

3. The degree to which later Confucians altered Mencius’s philosophy, knowingly or unknowingly, and the ways in which his thought informed neo-Confucian reflection constitute a complex and controversial matter. For a study that focuses on the appropriation of Mencius’s philosophy by a highly influential Ming-dynasty philosopher, see Philip J. Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yangming, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002).

4. There are a number of works and anthologies dedicated to Mencius’s philosophy; among the most helpful are Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997); Liu Xiusheng and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds., Essays on Mencius’s Moral Philosophy (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002); and Alan K. L. Chan, ed., Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2002).

5. For a critical defense of this aspect of Mencius’s view from the perspective of evolutionary biology, see Donald J. Munro, A Chinese Ethics for the New Century (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2005), 47–87.

6. These features of the xin have led a number of modern-day authors to translate the term as “heart-mind” or “heart-and-mind.” I follow Professor Bloom’s choice of “mind” in this introduction.

7. The most plausible version of such an argument would employ counter-factual and not merely empirical appeals.

8. For a revealing, current exploration of these issues, see Bryan W. van norden, Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

9. Emperor Hong Wu (1368–1398) was so displeased by these aspects of Mencius’s philosophy that he had passages dealing with these themes excised from the text. The Japanese court was not only unhappy but outraged by these parts of Mencius. For a discussion of these responses to Mencius’s political views, see Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition, 176, n. 36.

10. For a splendid discussion of Mencius’s views about the role of the people in legitimating rule, see Justin Tiwald, “A Right of Rebellion in the Mengzi?” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 7, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 269–82.

11. For an excellent modern treatment of Confucian views on welfare, see Joseph Chan, “Giving Priority to the Worst-Off: A Confucian Perspective on Social Welfare,” in Confucianism for the Modern World, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong, 236–53 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). For an account of how Confucian values place limits on property rights, see Daniel A. Bell, “Confucian Constraints on Property Rights,” in ibid., 218–35.

12. A seminal work on this topic is Irene T. Bloom, “Fundamental Intuitions and Consensus Statements: Mencian Confucianism and Human Rights,” in Confucianism and Human Rights, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, 94–116 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). For a defense of the resources within the Chinese tradition for developing and defending a conception of rights, see Wm. Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). For a historically informed comparative study, see Stephen C. Angle, Human Rights and Chinese Thought: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For a collection of original material focused on the topic of rights, see Stephen C. Angle and Marina Svensson, eds., The Chinese Human Rights Reader: Documents and Commentary (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).

13. See Tiwald’s article, cited in n. 10, for a careful study that illustrates the need to work through the texts with care and philosophical sophistication.

14. Donald J. Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969), 1–22. Munro very helpfully distinguishes this “natural equality” from “evaluative equality,” which concerns equal achievement of moral character in contrast to a shared natural endowment.

15. For an insightful and revealing exploration of the distinctive concept and sense of justice one finds in the Analects of Confucius, see Erin M. Cline, “Two Senses of Justice: Confucianism, Rawls, and Comparative Political Philosophy,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 6, no. 4 (winter 2007): 361–81.

16. If one conceives of our moral nature in terms of general ethical abilities and qualities, together with things like a capacity for moral improvement, one can begin to craft a picture of human beings as fundamentally worthy of special moral status and consideration. Such a view could be sketched in ways that avoid filling in the details of a substantive ethical view about the good and so might well function as the basis for a conception of human rights.

17. For a revealing comparative discussion of Mencius’s views on war, see Daniel A. Bell, Beyond Liberal Democracy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), 23–51. See also Julia Ching, “Confucianism and WMD,” in Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven P. Lee, 246–69 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Heaven’s Mandate and the Concept of War,” in ibid., 270–76.

18. For a defense of the religious quality of the philosophies of Confucius and Mencius, see Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Heaven as a Source for Ethical Warrant in Early Confucianism,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 6, no. 3 (2007): 211–20. Xunzi, the third major Confucian of the pre-Qin period, is an exception to the claims defended in this essay.

19. Munro argues that the religious elements of Mencius’s philosophy should be eliminated in order to make it more palatable for the twenty-first century. (“Mencius and an Ethics of the New Century,” in Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, 305–15, reprinted in Chinese Ethics for the New Century, 61–70). I have argued for the value of the more religious dimensions of Mencius’s thought in a short review of Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, which appeared in the Journal of Chinese Religions 31 (2003): 215–16.

20. For a study that explores these stories as well as a wide range of accounts about women’s virtue in traditional China, see Lisa A. Raphals, Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998).

21. For this idea especially in regard to elite members of society, see Wm. Theodore de Bary, Nobility and Civility: Asian Ideals of Leadership and the Common Good (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).