{1} L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West (London: HMSO, 1962), 499.
{2} J. Benoist-Mechin, Sixty Days that Shook the West (Oxford: Jonathan Cape, 1963), 124.
{3} W.J.R. Gardner, ed., The Evacuation from Dunkirk: 'Operation Dynamo', 26 May-4 June 1940 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 209-210.
{4} Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 3, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951), 645-659.
{5} Ellis, 8.
{6} Ibid., 8-9.
{7} Ibid., 10.
{8} CAB 106/1060: Reports on the Normandy campaign 1944 June 6-July 10, by Brigadier James Hargest, New Zealand Army Observer with 30th Corps.
{9} See Carlo D'Este’s Decision in Normandy (London: Penguin Books, 1983) and Max Hastings’ Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).
{10} Stephen T. Powers, "The Battle of Normandy: The Lingering Controversy." The Journal of Military History 56, no. 3 (July, 1993): 455-456.
{11} Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1958) Ch. 14 passim.
{12} Powers, 467.
{13} David French, "Tommy Is No Soldier: The Morale of the Second British Army in Normandy, June-August 1944." Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (December, 1996), 155.
{14} Ibid.
{15} CAB 106/1060.
{16} D'Este, 280.
{17} French, 155.
{18} CAB 106/1060. On August 12, 1944, Hargest was killed while making a farewell visit to the 50th Division.
{19} W.A.T. Synge, The Story of the Green Howards, 1939-1945 (Richmond: The Green Howards, 1952), 325.
{20} E.W. Clay, The Path of the 50th (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1950), 1.
{21} B.S. Barnes, The Sign of the Double 'T' (Kingston Upon Hull: Sentinel Press, 1999), 53.
{22} Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 141.
{23} Jonathan M. House, Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1984), 47-48.
{24} Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 90-92.
{25} House, 47-48.
{26} Kier, 89-90.
{27} Brian Bond and Williamson Murray, The British Armed Forces, 1918-39 in Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. II, The Interwar Period (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 122-123.
{28} Kier, 101.
{29} House, 48.
{30} Kier, 90.
{31} David French, Raising Churchill's Army-The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 85.
{32} Ibid., 89.
{33} Ibid., 39, 41, 87, 89.
{34} Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944 (Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), 147.
{35} Ibid., 147-151. For a detailed analysis of the Infantry—Armor coordination issue see Chapter 8 in its entirety.
{36} French, 210-211.
{37} Ibid., 170, 281.
{38} The Territorial Army was similar to the United States Army’s National Guard. Units were regionally based and consisted mainly of part-time soldiers.
{39} French, 106.
{40} E.W. Clay, The Path of the 50th (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1950), 9-10.
{41} Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Dunkirk-Fight to the Last Man (London: Viking, 2006), 147-155.
{42} David Rissik, The D.L.I. at War (Uckfield: The Naval and Military Press, 1952) 30-31.
{43} Clay, 26.
{44} French, 107.
{45} Rissik, 25.
{46} Clay, 19.
{47} The 23rd (Northumbrian) Division was a “second line” Territorial Division. Formed from a cadre of soldiers from the 50th , the 23rd deployed to France to construct defenses before finishing its training in the United Kingdom. It was still in France on May 10, 1940, and fought in the Dunkirk perimeter.
{48} Majors A.H.R. Baker and B. Rust, A Short History of the 50th Northumbrian Division (Berwick-Upon-Tweed: The Tweeddale Press LTD., 1966), 38-39.
{49} Ibid., 47.
{50} French, 272.
{51} Ibid., 6.
{52} Ibid., 215, 265, 272, 285.
{53} Ibid., 246.
{54} Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers. Edited by B.H. Liddell Hart. Translated by Paul Findlay. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1953), 330-331.
{55} Bond and Murray, 128.
{56} Place, 173. With success finally achieved at Alamein, the British army hesitated to replace successful combat units with green replacements. Furthermore, the regimental system within the army impeded an easy transfer of individual men. Units, especially the Territorials, had trained and fought together for years. Fearing a morale crisis, the army decided against individual replacements.
{57} The bocage of Normandy is characterized by woods, orchards, and small fields bordered by tall, steeply banked hedgerows and winding, sunken lanes. With limited visibility and difficult terrain, the defender clearly has the advantage in the bocage.
{58} David French, “Invading Europe: The British Army and its Preparations for the Normandy Campaign, 1942-1944.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 2 (June, 2003): 277.
{59} Robin Hastings, An Undergraduate's War (London: Bellhouse Publishing, 1997), 216.
{60} B.S. Barnes, The Sign of the Double 'T' (Kingston Upon Hull: Sentinel Press, 1999), 62.
{61} The 51st (Highland) Division also fought in France in 1940, but lost two of its three brigades. Subsequently, the division was reconstituted on August 7, 1940, by re-designating the 9th (Highland) Division as the 51st . The Highland Division did not enter combat in North Africa until October, 1942 at El Alamein. The 7th Armored Division first fought at Sidi Barrani in North Africa in December, 1940. [H.F. Joslen, Orders of Battle. 2 Vols., United Kingdom and Colonial Formations and Units in the Second World War 1939-1945 (London: HMSO, 1960).]
{62} David French, “Invading Europe: The British Army and its Preparations for the Normandy Campaign, 1942-1944.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 2 (June, 2003): 277.
{63} Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1958), 195.
{64} Major-Generals D.C. Bullen-Smith and G.W.J. Erskine, commanded 51st Highland and 7th Armored Divisions, respectively.
{65} David French, "Colonel Blimp and the British Army: British Divisional Commanders in the War against Germany, 1939-1945." The English Historical Review 111, no. 444 (November, 1996): 1182-1201. The 1st London Division was re-designated the 56th London Division on November 18, 1940.
{66} French, “Invading Europe,” 287.
{67} W.A.T. Synge, The Story of the Green Howards, 1939-1945 (Richmond: The Green Howards, 1952), 285. Many of these men were posted to training centers and schools where their combat experience proved invaluable.
{68} Malaria also affected 51st (Highland) Division. Divisional doctors in both the 50th and 51st placed many soldiers on a mepacrine regimen that lasted throughout the Normandy campaign. See David French, "Tommy Is No Soldier: The Morale of the Second British Army in Normandy, June-August 1944." Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (December, 1996): 167.
{69} Montgomery, 195; and Hastings, 212.
{70} Hastings, 212.
{71} WO 223/7: Staff College Camberley, 1947 Course Notes on D-Day Landings and Ensuing Campaigns (50 Div: Notes by Maj.-Gen. Graham, 1943 – 1944). Formed February 20, 1944, by combining three infantry battalions from two different divisions with a new brigade headquarters, 56 Brigade had no combined arms training, let alone overseas experience.
{72} Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1951), 188.
{73} WO 223/7: Testing had revealed that self propelled artillery, firing from Landing Craft, Tank (LCT), could provide accurate bombardment of shore positions during the run in to the beach. Furthermore, by being self propelled, the artillery could quickly move off the beach to support the advancing infantry.
{74} David French, Raising Churchill's Army-The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 280.
{75} Adrian R. Lewis, Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 210.
{76} Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer, "Report No. 128: The lessons of Dieppe and their influence on Operation Overlord." Directorate of History and Heritage. Available from http://www.dnd.ca/dhh/downloads/cmhq/cmhq128.pdf. Internet; accessed 21 June 2007.
{77} Canadian Military Headquarters Historical Officer, "Report No. 128.”; Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Expedition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 267-269; and Harrison, 193.
{78} WO 223/7.
{79} Ibid.
{80} Ibid.
{81} French, “Invading Europe,” 281; and Raising Churchill's Army, 203.
{82} P.J. Lewis and I.R. English. Into Battle with the Durhams: 8 D.L.I. in World War II (London: The London Stamp Exchange, Ltd., 1990), 236.
{83} WO 223/7.
{84} Ibid.
{85} Synge, 283-284; and Hastings, 216.
{86} WO 223/7.
{87} French, “Invading Europe,” 282.
{88} Brian Horrocks, Corps Commander (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), 28.
{89} Barnes, 62.
{90} Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948), 237.
{91} Montgomery, 195.
{92} David French, "Tommy Is No Soldier: The Morale of the Second British Army in Normandy, June-August 1944." Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (December, 1996): 159.
{93} Hastings, 116-117.
{94} Jeremy Taylor, The Devons: A History of the Devonshire Regiment, 1685-1945 (Bristol: The White Swan Press, 1951), 236;
{95} Lewis and English, 236; and Stephen Ashley Hart, "Montgomery, Morale, Casualty Conservation and 'Colossal Cracks': 21st Army Group's Operational Technique in North West Europe, 1944-1945." The Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (December, 1996): 137.
{96} Barnes, 66. In his “Reports from Normandy,” Brigadier James Hargest states that, during the pre-invasion training, AWOLs in the 50th “became very prevalent in the New Forest Area amounting to over 1,000 and there was considerable unrest” (CAB 106/1060). No other work consulted for this study independently confirms Hargest’s numbers, “considerable unrest,” or even large scale AWOLs prior to the invasion.
{97} Günther Blumentritt, “Report of the Chief of Staff’ in The German Army at D- Day, ed. David C. Isby (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2004), 27.
{98} Ibid.
{99} L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1962), 118-120.
{100} Georges Bernage, Gold, Juno, Sword (Bayeux: Editions Heimdal, 2003), 4, 62.
{101} Ibid., 61; and Tim Saunders, Gold Beach-Jig (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2002), 32.
{102} Saunders, 36-37
{103} Ibid., 34.
{104} Ibid., 36, 46-47.
{105} Ibid., 37.
{106} Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers (Edited by B.H. Liddell Hart, Translated by Paul Findlay, New York: Da Capo Press, 1953), 467-468.
{107} Williamson Murray, “British Military Effectiveness in the Second World War” in Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, ed. Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 126.
{108} 1952 letter to Sir Basil Liddell Hart cited by Patrick Delaforce in Churchill's Desert Rats: From Normandy to Berlin with the 7th Armoured Division (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing, 1994), 10.
{109} CAB 44/243: Committee of Imperial Defence, Historical Branch and Cabinet Office, Historical Section: War Histories: Draft Chapters and Narratives, Military, War of 1939-1945 (Operation “Overlord,” “D” day 1944).
{110} CAB 44/243.
{111} CAB 44/243.
{112} CAB 44/243. The 47 Royal Marines (Commando) was placed under 50th Division command during the assault phase of the invasion. 47 RM Commando landed two hours after the 231st Brigade, by passed Le Hamel, and moved towards their D-Day objective, Port-en-Bessin. Heavy casualties during both the assault and the overland movement forced the Commandos to stop for reorganization just two miles from Port-en- Bessin. The Commandos, who captured the Port-en-Bessin on June 7, did not fight as part of 50th Division during later operations in Normandy and therefore will not be further discussed in this study.
{113} Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1952), 270.
{114} A Duplex-drive tank had two propellers for propulsion while in the water and used its treads while on land. A regiment consisted of a headquarters squadron and three tank squadrons. A squadron had four troops of four tanks each (L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1962), 536-537).
{115} CAB 44/243.
{116} Wilmot, 270.
{117} WO 171/513: Allied Expeditionary Force, North West Europe (British Element): War Diaries, Second World War (50 Infantry Division, 1944 Jun-Jul).
{118} WO 223/7: Staff College Camberley, 1947 Course Notes on D-Day Landings and Ensuing Campaigns (50 Div: Notes by Maj.-Gen. Graham, 1943 – 1944); and CAB 44/243.
{119} L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1962), 176-177.
{120} Tim Saunders, Gold Beach-Jig (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2002), 96.
{121} Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1951), 321.
{122} Ibid., 321.
{123} L.F. Ellis, 174.
{124} David Scott Daniell, The Royal Hampshire Regiment, Vol. III, 1918-1954 (Eastbourne: Antony Rowe Ltd., 1955), 218-219.
{125} L.F. Ellis, 175; and Wilmot, 271.
{126} WO 223/7.
{127} WO 171/513.
{128} L.F. Ellis, 209; and Wilmot, 272.
{129} L.F. Ellis, 210-211.
{130} CAB 44/243.
{131} WO 171/513.
{132} Wilmot, 272. On typical Normandy day in early June, first light was about 4:45 A.M., with last light being about 11:15 P.M. (CAB 106/963).
{133} WO 223/31.
{134} Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 111.
{135} CAB 44/243. The weather was scattered clouds at 1,000 feet with an overcast layer at 10,000 feet. The sky was 9/10 obscured and the wind was out of the west at Force 4 (11-16 knots).
{136} WO 223/4: Staff College Camberley, 1947 Course Notes on D-Day Landings and Ensuing Campaigns (50 Div: The Artillery Story, 1943 – 1944); WO 223/31: Staff College Camberley, 1947 Course Notes on D-Day Landings and Ensuing Campaigns (6 Bn. Green Howards: account of operations, 1944 June).
{137} Wilmot, 269.
{138} CAB 44/243.
{139} W.A.T Synge, The Story of the Green Howards, 1939-1945 (Richmond: The Green Howards, 1952), 287.
{140} L.F. Ellis, 236.
{141} Russell A. Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 306.
{142} Robin Neillands, The Dieppe Raid: The Story of the Disastrous 1942 Expedition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 268.
{143} WO 223/31.
{144} Stephen Ashley Hart, "Montgomery, Morale, Casualty Conservation and 'Colossal Cracks': 21st Army Group's Operational Technique in North West Europe, 1944-1945." The Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (Dec 1996): 133, 150.
{145} David French, "Tommy Is No Soldier: The Morale of the Second British Army in Normandy, June-August 1944." Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (December, 1996): 132, 242.
{146} Stephen Ashley Hart, "Montgomery, Morale, Casualty Conservation...,” 139.
{147} John Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944 (New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 49-50.
{148} David French, Raising Churchill's Army-The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 243.
{149} Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 90.
{150} Stephen Ashley Hart, "Montgomery, Morale, Casualty Conservation...,” 133, 139; Quotation found in a Montgomery letter to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, November 17, 1944, as cited in Stephen Ashley Hart’s Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2007), 2.
{151} Adrian R. Lewis, Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 132.
{152} French, Raising Churchill's Army, 25.
{153} Bernard L. Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic (Germany: Printing and Stationary Service-British Army of the Rhine, 1946), 70-71.
{154} E.W. Clay, The Path of the 50th (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1950), 267-268.
{155} David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second World War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983), 331.
{156} Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1958), 227-228.
{157} Ibid., 228.
{158} While Montgomery devotes a 36 page chapter in his Memoirs to the preparation for the battle of Normandy, he allocates only a single, 13 page chapter to the battle of Normandy. Furthermore, the bulk of the Normandy chapter is not a description of the action, but a defense of his plan.
{159} Stephen Ashley Hart, "Montgomery, Morale, Casualty Conservation,” 150.
{160} Ibid.
{161} Max Hastings, 128.
{162} Fraser, 329.
{163} Wilmot, 302.
{164} CAB 106/1060: Reports on the Normandy campaign 1944 June 6-July 10, by Brigadier James Hargest, New Zealand Army Observer with 30th Corps.
{165} CAB 106/1060. Hargest is mistaken about the date of the attack in his report, stating that the action in St. Pierre occurred on June 11. The German counter-attack came on June 10, while the morning of June 11 was relatively quiet. See P.J. Lewis and I.R. English, Into Battle with the Durhams: 8 D.L.I. in World War II (London: The London Stamp Exchange, Ltd., 1990), 246-252; David Rissik, The D.L.I. at War (Uckfield: The Naval and Military Press, 1952), 242-243; and B.S. Barnes, The Sign of the Double 'T' (Kingston Upon Hull: Sentinel Press, 1999), 109-112.
{166} Lewis and English, 246-252; and Rissik, 243.
{167} CAB 106/963. Immediate Report from Normandy No. 3.
{168} WO 223/31. See Max Hastings, 136-137; and Buckley, 100.
{169} Robin Hastings, An Undergraduate's War (London: Bellhouse Publishing, 1997), 129.
{170} WO 171/651: Allied Expeditionary Force, North West Europe (British Element): War Diaries, Second World War (69 Infantry Brigade, 1944 Jun-Aug).
{171} CAB 44/247: Committee of Imperial Defence, Historical Branch and Cabinet Office, Historical Section: War Histories: Draft Chapters and Narratives, Military, War of 1939-1945 (Operations 1944 June 7-16 ("D" day plus one to "D" day plus ten).
{172} CAB 44/247.
{173} Michael Frank Reynolds, Steel Inferno: I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy (New York: Sarpedo, 1997), 89.
{174} Synge, 305-306.
{175} Quote from The First and the Last: The Story of the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards 1939-1945 by J.D.P. Stirling as cited in CAB 44/247.
{176} See French, Raising Churchill's Army, 265; Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944 (Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), 129-130; Max Hastings, 209; and Buckley, 100.
{177} CAB 106/963. Immediate Report from Normandy No. 6.
{178} Ibid.
{179} Hubert Meyer, The History of the 12. SS-Panzerdivision "Hitlerjugend", Translated by H. Harri Henschler, (Winnipeg: J.J. Federowicz Publishing Inc., 1994), 76; and Kurt Meyer, Grenadiers, Translated by Michael Mende (Winnipeg: J.J. Federowicz Publishing, 1994), 132.
{180} George Forty, Villers Bocage (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing, 2004), 65-66.
{181} CAB 44/247. 50 (N) Division Operating Instruction No.8, 13 Jun 44.
{182} Rissik, 245-249; and Clay, 260-264.
{183} Rissik, 248.
{184} CAB 106/1060.
{185} Kurt Meyer, 132.
{186} John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), 380-381; and Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy (London: Penguin Books, 1983), 278.
{187} French, Raising Churchill's Army, 7.
{188} Kurt Meyer, 130.
{189} Ronald Lewin, Montgomery as Military Commander (New York: Stein and Day, 1971), 202.
{190} WO 171/513.
{191} Barnes, 124.
{192} Daniell, 224-227.
{193} WO 223/7; British Army of the Rhine, Notes on the Operations of 21 Army Group, 6 June 1944-5 May 1945, 1945; Lewin, 205; and Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, Normandy: The Real Story-How Ordinary Allied Soldiers Defeated Hitler (New York: Ballantine Books, 2000), 20.
{194} See Carlo D’Este’s Decision in Normandy, Stephen Ashley Hart’s Colossal Cracks, and Max Hastings’ Overlord.
{195} British Army of the Rhine, Morale in Battle: Analysis (Germany: Printing and Stationary Service, British Army of the Rhine, 1946), 24.
{196} French, "Tommy Is No Soldier,” 171.
{197} Stephen Ashley Hart, "Montgomery, Morale, Casualty Conservation...,” 137.
{198} Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 114.
{199} French, "Tommy Is No Soldier,” 162.
{200} Terry Copp, "Battle Exhaustion in WWII." Legion Magazine. Available from http://legionmagazine.com/features/canadianmilitaryhistory/98-01.asp. Internet; accessed 12 Mar 2007.
{201} Copp and McAndrew, 109.
{202} French, Raising Churchill's Army, 123.
{203} French, "Tommy Is No Soldier,” 166.
{204} Copp and McAndrew, 132.
{205} French, Raising Churchill's Army, 142, 172.
{206} French, "Tommy Is No Soldier,” 172-173.
{207} Ibid., 158.
{208} Ibid.
{209} D'Este, 274; and French, "Tommy Is No Soldier,” 172.
{210} Clay, 236.
{211} L.F. Ellis, 535.
{212} The 56th Brigade, a XXX Corps asset, also fought under the 7th Armored Division. George Forty, British Army Handbook: 1939-1945 (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing Limited, 1998), 165; and H.F. Joslen, Orders of Battle. Vol. 1, United Kingdom and Colonial Formations and Units in the Second World War 1939-1945 (London: HMSO, 1960), 296.
{213} French, "Tommy Is No Soldier,” 158.
{214} Buckley, 204.
{215} Stephen Ashley Hart, Colossal Cracks, 28.
{216} Ibid.
{217} Ibid., 32.
{218} French, "Tommy Is No Soldier,” 154.
{219} French, Raising Churchill's Army, 122.
{220} Victory in the West contains three references to the high morale that the troops had on the eve of D-Day (pp. 131, 145, 159).
{221} Whitaker and Whitaker, 20.
{222} WO 171/514: Allied Expeditionary Force, North West Europe (British Element): War Diaries, Second World War (50 Infantry Division, 1944 Aug).
{223} David French, “Invading Europe: The British Army and its Preparations for the Normandy Campaign, 1942-1944.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 2 (June, 2003): 285.
{224} Brigadier “Pete” Pyman, XXX Corps Staff, as quoted by French, “Invading Europe,” 289.
{225} French, “Invading Europe,” 289.
{226} Whitaker and Whitaker, 98.
{227} French, “Invading Europe,” 286; and Brian Horrocks, Corps Commander (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), 28.
{228} Horrocks, Corps Commander, 28.
{229} Brian Horrocks, A Full Life (London: Collins, 1961), 186.
{230} Delaforce, Churchill's Desert Rats, 10.
{231} French, “Invading Europe,” 279; and Raising Churchill's Army, 243.
{232} D'Este, 271-272.
{233} Whitaker and Whitaker, 98-99.
{234} Horrocks, A Full Life, 187; and Corps Commander, 28-29.
{235} Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery (New York: Random House, 1994), 303.
{236} French, “Invading Europe,” 279.
{237} D'Este, 274.
{238} French, “Invading Europe,” 290.
{239} Horrocks, A Full Life, 187
{240} Russell A Hart, 308.
{241} The official British history of the campaign, Victory in the West, only mentions the changes of command for XXX Corps and the 7th Armored Division on August 4, 1944, and offers no insight as to why the commanders were relieved (p. 402).
{242} Clay, 272.
{243} WO 223/31; The Panzer Lehr Division was fully mechanized—the only Panzer division so equipped. See Russell A. Hart, 307.
{244} Wilmot, 320.
{245} Stephen Ashley Hart, Colossal Cracks, 31.
{246} British Army of the Rhine, Notes on the Operations of 21 Army Group, 6 June 1944-5 May 1945, 1945.
{247} D'Este, 278.
{248} WO 171/651.
{249} Brian Horrocks, A Full Life (London: Collins, 1961), 187.
{250} Ibid.
{251} E.W. Clay, The Path of the 50th (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1950), 272.
{252} WO 216/101: Infantry requirements of 21 Army Group and the effect on India: reduction of 50 Infantry Division to training cadres. Message from D.C.I.G.S to C.I.G.S., November 2, 1944.
{253} WO 216/101. Message to the Prime Minister, November 3, 1944. Montgomery was promoted from General to Field-Marshal on September 1, 1944. That same day, Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed command of all Allied ground forces in northwest Europe. Montgomery retained command of the 21st Army Group, which contained the British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army (L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1962), 476).
{254} WO 216/101. Message from D.C.I.G.S to C.I.G.S., November 2, 1944
{255} WO 216/101. Prime Minister’s Personal Minute, December 3, 1944.
{256} WO 216/101. Personal telegram, Prime Minister to Field-Marshal Montgomery, December 12, 1944.
{257} Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 48.
{258} Robin Hastings, An Undergraduate's War (London: Bellhouse Publishing, 1997), 134.
{259} Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy (London: Penguin Books, 1983), 277-281.
{260} Stephen Ashley Hart, Colossal Cracks: Montgomery's 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945 (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2007), 29, 31.
{261} David French, “Invading Europe: The British Army and its Preparations for the Normandy Campaign, 1942-1944.” Diplomacy and Statecraft 14, no. 2 (June, 2003): 277-279; and "Tommy Is No Soldier: The Morale of the Second British Army in Normandy, June-August 1944." Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 4 (December, 1996): 154-178.
{262} French, “Invading Europe,” 279.
{263} The 50th Division suffered 1,718 casualties from September to November, 1944 (Clay, 313).
{264} See D'Este, Chapter 16; Max Hastings, 162-163; Russell A. Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 308; and French, "Tommy Is No Soldier,” 166.
{265} John Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944 (New York: Frank Cass, 2004), 204-205.
{266} David French, Raising Churchill's Army-The British Army and the War Against Germany 1919-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 11.
{267} George Forty, Villers Bocage (Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing, 2004), 107-108.
{268} Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944 (Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), 75; and French, “Invading Europe,” 282.
{269} David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them: The British Army in the Second World War (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983), 329; and French, Raising Churchill's Army, 281.
{270} CAB 106/1060: Reports on the Normandy campaign 1944 June 6-July 10, by Brigadier James Hargest, New Zealand Army Observer with 30th Corps.
{271} Fraser, 331.
{272} WO 223/31: Staff College Camberley, 1947 Course Notes on D-Day Landings and Ensuing Campaigns (6 Bn. Green Howards: account of operations, 1944 June); and Ronald W. Andidora, Home by Christmas: The Illusion of Victory in 1944 (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2001), 51-52.
{273} Place, 172.
{274} R.G. Gill’s Club Route in Europe: The story of 30 Corps in the European campaign (Hanover: W. Degener (1946)) provides a very broad narrative of the corps’ operations from Normandy to V-E Day. Due to the size of the document, the XXX Corps’ War Diary, presently held at The National Archives of the United Kingdom, was unavailable for thesis.
{275} L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1962), 528.
{276} Major Generals Charles H. Gerhardt (29th Infantry Division), Clarence R. Huebner (1st Infantry Division), and Raymond O. Barton (4th Infantry Division) are referenced six, four, and six times, respectively, in the index. See Gordon A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1951).
{277} Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1958), 228-229.
{278} John Ellis, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), 377.
{279} British Army of the Rhine, Notes on the Operations of 21 Army Group, 6 June 1944-5 May 1945 (1945), 13.
{280} U.S. Army, FM-1 The Army (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 14 June 2005), Paragraph 4-11.