THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

The War of 1812 was triggered by impressment and blockade. Britain was conscripting sailors to man the Royal Navy (a process known as impressment) and blockading Continental ports to prevent merchant vessels from trading with France and its allies. Britain justified its actions as necessities in its war with Napoleonic France, a struggle for Britain’s very existence.

The United States, the largest seafaring neutral, felt the effects. It resented the interference with its trade the blockade imposed, and was angered by the Royal Navy seizing American sailors for service on British warships. Only British subjects were liable to impressment, but exactly who was “British” was frequently ambiguous. The United States and Britain shared a common language, and some British-born mariners moved to the United States and claimed American citizenship. It was also the case that American-born sailors frequently volunteered for service in the Royal Navy during its wars with France. Throw in an American belief that Britain was supporting indigenous resistance to the United States, and conditions were ripe for conflict.

The result was a war Britain, preoccupied with its struggle with France, did not want. To placate the United States, Britain rescinded the Orders in Council restricting trade two days before the United States declared war. Unfortunately, this failed to have the desired effect of preventing or ending a war with the United States.

Perhaps rescinding the Orders in Council could have defused tensions if the United States had not wanted Canada – a desire which provided the tinder to fuel the sparks created by impressment and blockade into a war over “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights.”

Impressment – the conscription of sailors from civilian ships at sea by the Royal Navy – was limited by law to British subjects. Yet Royal Navy warships often stopped US merchant vessels and seized mariners viewed as British regardless of whether they claimed US citizenship. (AC)

In 1812 Canada was still viewed as the 14th colony – the one which failed to achieve independence from Britain. The possibility Francophone and Catholic Quebec might not wish to be part of an English-speaking and largely Protestant United States was ignored. Even if Quebec proved unwilling, modern Ontario (then Upper Canada) was largely unoccupied, offering opportunity for settlers from the Western and New England states. In 1812, many inhabitants of Upper Canada already were United States citizens who had drifted into the open land of the Ontario peninsula.

If the United States ever were to take Canada, 1812 offered the best opportunity. Britain was locked in an apparently losing struggle with France, which, at the zenith of its power, occupied most of Continental Europe and was preparing to invade Russia to force it to submit to French will. Britain had few resources in Upper Canada: two sloops-of-war (the 18-gun Queen Charlotte and ten-gun General Hunter), two lightly armed schooners of the Provincial Marine (a seagoing militia on the Lakes), several hundred British Army regulars, and perhaps 1,000 local militia. The militia was scattered; assembling more than 400 at one battle was nearly impossible. The British could also call on indigenous allies from the Indian Nations occupying the Old Northwest Territory; but they were undisciplined, hard to control, and the best of their fighters had been killed at the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811.

The United States could muster nearly 10,000 United States Army regulars and 35,000 militia volunteers raised by the states. These strengths were more theoretical than actual, for the US Army regulars were scattered throughout the United States in small garrisons. On the ends of Lake Erie, the natural invasion routes for Upper Canada, the United States could field a few thousand men at each place. Nor did the United States have naval forces to match even the limited resources of the Provincial Marine. It had but one warship on Lake Erie, the brig USS Adams armed with six 6-pdr guns.

To compound the difficulties of both combatants, while Upper Canada promised to be the war’s decisive theater it was difficult for either side to reinforce. The Upper Lakes (Erie, Huron, and Michigan) were connected by navigable waterways. Choke points existed at the St. Clair and Detroit rivers (connecting Lake Erie and Lake Huron) and the Straits of Mackinac (separating Lake Huron and Lake Michigan), but a vessel could sail from Black Rock, New York (near Buffalo) to Fort Dearborn (modern Chicago) at the bottom of Lake Michigan. The problem was getting cargo to Lake Erie. Lake Erie and Lake Ontario were separated by the 167ft drop of Niagara Falls.

Detroit was just a small frontier town in 1812 but its fort, shipyard, and strategic location made it one of the keys to possession of the Michigan Territory. It was one of the last places Britain abandoned after the American Revolutionary War and one of the first occupied after the War of 1812 began. (AC)

For the British in Canada the solution lay in a 20-mile portage across the land separating Lake Erie and Lake Ontario. If they controlled Lake Erie they could then sail to their base at Amherstburg on the west end of the lake. If the United States gained mastery of Lake Erie, however, suppliers would have to use a round-about route up the Ottawa River, then portage through wilderness to Lake Nipissing which emptied into Georgian Bay on Lake Huron. Alternatively, they could move overland on unimproved roads through wilderness from Fort York to Amherstburg. Men could march overland, but moving supplies by wagon was fruitless.

There still remained the challenge of getting goods to Lake Ontario. While Quebec could be reached by sea, men and goods had to be transferred to boats which could navigate the upper St. Lawrence River – but rapids and rocks between Montreal and Lake Ontario limited tonnage.

American logistics challenges were even more daunting than those of the British. In short, there were no water routes that did not involve long overland travel. It was 150 miles from Pittsburgh to Erie, the main United States naval base on Lake Erie, and using the Allegheny River required traveling 50 miles by road. Black Rock, on the Niagara River in New York, was the other naval base on Lake Erie. Part of the journey from New York City to Black Rock could be made via the Hudson and Mohawk rivers, but the rest was overland.

For the British, control of the Lakes allowed resupply of Upper and Lower Canada. Even with control, however, those transporting supplies often had to follow rivers and cross rapids to reach the Upper Lakes (Erie, Huron, and Michigan) and Lake Superior. (AC)

For both sides supply was seasonal: lakes and rivers froze in the winter months, making them unusable. Roads covered with deep snow were passable with sledges, but the cold meant heavy going. Campaigning froze along with the lakes. These difficulties meant few resources would be available to those men on Lake Erie except those already there or what little could be brought in. Men would have to live off the land or go short. In some ways this favored the United States. It had more manpower within marching distance of Upper Canada, and its immediate territory produced more food than Upper Canada. Control of the Lakes meant available supplies could be distributed effectively; but control was more critical for Britain.

In 1812 a combination of British initiative and United States incompetence gave Britain control of the Upper Lakes when, within days of war being declared, British Major-General Sir Isaac Brock sent a force to capture Fort Michilimackinac in the Straits of Mackinac. The United States garrison, unaware of a state of war, was taken by surprise and forced to surrender. Two armed American schooners were captured and added to the Provincial Marine. The British action cut off Lake Michigan, leaving the American force at Fort Dearborn isolated.

A strategic overview of the War of 1812 on the Lakes. This map shows the naval bases and anchorages controlled by each side and significant naval battles on the Lakes during the War of 1812. Note that Fort Detroit fell to the British in August 1812.

Thing went from bad to worse when Brigadier General William Hull invaded Canada July 12. Hull bungled the invasion, alienating the local populace through ill-advised intimidation and the conduct of ill-disciplined American militiamen. Taking counsel of his fears, he then retreated to Detroit where he surrendered his 2,000-man army to a much smaller British force on August 16. In addition to ceding the Michigan Territory, Hull also allowed Adams, the only US warship on the Upper Lakes, to fall into British hands. Recommissioned as Detroit, it was added to the Provincial Marine.

American fortunes faltered the rest of 1812. The British too suffered a few reverses. On October 8, a boat expedition commanded by the US Navy’s Lieutenant Jesse Elliott cut out the brigs Caledonia (one of the ships used to capture Fort Michilimackinac) and Detroit (formerly Adams). Detroit was destroyed to prevent recapture, but Caledonia made it to Black Rock, where it was added to the US Navy. Three civilian schooners also at Black Rock were purchased and armed, creating a small four-ship squadron.

The United States faced an even more formidable logistics challenge on Lake Erie than did the British. An example was the supply of Perry’s ships with the necessary gunpowder, which had to be moved from the Dupont mill in Philadelphia to Erie by powder wagons, as shown here. (LOC)

As 1812 drew to a close, the United States took additional steps to regain control of Lake Erie. In late fall a shipyard was established across the harbor from Erie, Pennsylvania. Four gunboats were ordered built there, but the order was later modified with the addition of two 300-ton brigs to the construction list. A master commandant (a rank equivalent to the Royal Navy’s commander), Oliver Hazard Perry, was sent to command the new squadron emerging in the Pennsylvania wilderness, along with a force of sailors and marines. The US government was determined that 1813 would have a different outcome.

Meanwhile, across the lake, British concerns about the resurgent US Navy were growing. The British built an additional sloop-of-war in 1812, a 13-gun schooner named HMS Lady Prevost, but were worried about the reported US Navy brig-sloops being built at Erie. Dependent upon food purchased from Ohio farmers, the British understood that maintaining control of Lake Erie was critical. With this in mind they began building another ship-rigged sloop-of-war, a near-sister to Queen Charlotte at Amherstburg. It would be christened Detroit.