In his report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, General Eisenhower remarked: ‘Lack of infantry was the most important cause of the enemy’s defeat in Normandy, and his failure to remedy this weakness was due primarily to the success of the Allied threats levelled against the Pas de Calais. This threat, which had already proved of so much value in misleading the enemy as to the true objectives of our invasion preparations, was maintained after 6th June, and it served most effectively to pin down the German Fifteenth Army east of the Seine while we built up our strength in the lodgment area to the west. I cannot over-emphasise the decisive value of this most successful threat, which paid enormous dividends, both at the time of the assault and during the operations of the two succeeding months. The German Fifteenth Army, which, if committed to battle in June or July, might possibly have defeated us by sheer weight of numbers, remained inoperative throughout the critical period of the campaign, and only when the breakthrough had been achieved were its infantry divisions brought west across the Seine – too late to have any effect upon the course of victory.’ This report seeks to explain why the Germans were persuaded to make such a fatal miscalculation. The interrogation of senior German commanders and the examination of captured documents have revealed with remarkable clarity the causes of our success.
FORTITUDE was the code name given to a series of deceptive operations carried out in support of the invasion. The present narrative opens with the appointment of General Morgan as Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander Designate in April 1943 and is continued until the end of the war with Germany.
A variety of methods were employed to deceive the Germans. Some succeeded, others failed. It has not been thought necessary to spend a great deal of time in examining methods which did not achieve their object. These have been studied in so far as it enables us to understand why they failed.
Where the ground has already been covered in an existing report, and this applies mainly to the technical aspects of deception, repetition has been avoided, a reference to the relevant report being given.
It is always tempting for those who set out to deceive and who see their objects fulfilled, to claim the credit for their attainment when, in fact, the motive force lay in another quarter. Every effort has been made to complete the chain of cause and effect so that the reader can judge for himself to what extent the Germans were influenced by the action of Allied deceivers and to what extent they were impelled by other considerations. At all times the writer has kept before him the boast of Æsop’s fly as he sat upon the axle-tree.
R. F. HESKETH
February 1949