NOTES

PREFACE

1. Peter de la Billière, Looking for Trouble (London: HarperCollins, 1994), 67; see also, e.g., Andrew Salmon, To the Last Round (London: Aurum, 2009), xiii. The Imjin and the Last Stand of the Glosters were, as journalist Russell Spurr had once put it, “the story everybody knows” in Britain (Daily Express, 2 September 1953, p. 2).

2. “Out in the Cold: Australia’s Involvement in the Korean War: Kapyong – 23–24 April 1951,” www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/korea/operations/kapyong/ (accessed 27 August 2009); see also, e.g., Brad Manera, “Kapyong Captured,” Wartime 34 (2006): 33; George Odgers, Remembering Korea (Sydney: Lansdowne, 2000), 91.

3. Peter Worthington, Looking for Trouble (Toronto: Key Porter, 1984), 28.

4. The weight given to the Imjin or Kapyong is also reflected in the way in which they are highlighted on government or museum websites. On the Imjin see, e.g., www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/battles/korea/battle.htm (accessed 13 August 2007). On Kapyong see, e.g., www.forces.gc.ca/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=95 (accessed 10 July 2012); www.lermuseum.org/ler/mh/1945topresent/kapyong.html (accessed 25 September 2009); www.australiansatwar.gov.au/ko_akh.html (accessed 7 October 2009); cas.awm.gov.au/art/ART93183 (accessed 25 September 2009). On the prominence given to the Imjin battle in popular histories published in Britain see, e.g., Tim Carew, Korea (London: Cassell, 1967); Max Hastings, The Korean War (London: Michael Joseph, 1987); Bryan Perrett, Last Stand! (London: Arms and Armour, 1991); Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain (London: Macmillan, 2007), 102–103. Similar weight is given to Kapyong in many Australian and Canadian histories. See, e.g., Jack Gallaway, The Last Call of the Bugle (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1994); Victor Suthren, ed., The Oxford Book of Canadian Military Anecdotes (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989); David J. Bercuson, Blood on the Hills (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); see also Dan Bjarnason, Triumph at Kapyong (Toronto: Dundurn, 2011), 16.

5. 1RNF, for example, had an establishment of 38 officers and 945 other ranks at the time of the Korean War (see Anthony Perrins, ed., ‘A Pretty Rough Do Altogether’ [Alnwick: Fusiliers Museum of Northumberland, 2004], xvii), but infantry battalions in Korea rarely exceeded 750 men in the field (see Salmon, Last Round, 24) and in April 1951, as we shall see, leave would mean even fewer soldiers were available to fight.

6. Salmon, Last Round, xiv; see also, e.g., the opening lines of the TV documentary Forgotten Heroes, produced by Alastair Lawrence (London: BBC, 2001).

7. E. D. Harding, The Imjin Roll (Gloucester: Southgate, 1981), 95; Special Army Order No. 65, June 1951, 1, WO 32/14247, TNA.

8. Ministry of National Defense, The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War II (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1973), 623. On the British origins of this account see Michael Hickey, The Korean War (Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook, 2000), 382. See also, regarding the accepted importance of the battle, e.g., Eric Linklater, Our Men in Korea (London: HMSO, 1952), 61; Noel Monks, Eyewitness (London: Muller, 1955), 320; C. N. Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division in Korea (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1954), 67; Basil Peacock, The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (The 5th Regiment of Foot) (London: Leo Cooper, 1970), 105; Bryan Perrett, “The Chinese Counterattack,” in The Korean War, ed. David Rees (London: Orbis, 1984), 83; Forgotten Heroes, BBC.

9. See, e.g., David Scott Daniell, Cap of Honour (London: Harrap, 1951), 329; Denis Warner, Out of the Gun (London: Hutchinson, 1956), 121; Carew, Korea, 88; Perrett, Last Stand, 213; Christopher Newbould and Christine Beresford, The Glosters (Stroud: Sutton, 1992), 126–27; Marr, Modern Britain, 103; Forgotten Heroes, BBC.

10. Pierre Berton, Marching as to War (Toronto: Doubleday, 2001), 558; Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 205. On the Kapyong presidential unit citations see WO 32/14250, TNA; Michael G. McKeown, Kapyong Remembered (Ottawa: M. G. McKeown, 1976), 41.

11. Kapyong, produced by John Lewis (North Fitzroy, Vic.: Arcimedia, 2011); Dan Bjarnason, CBC The National magazine, 27 July 1999, www.archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/korean_war/clips/684 (accessed August 27, 2009); www.australiansatwar.gov/au/throughmyeyes/ko_akh.html (accessed 7 October 2009); see also, e.g., Gallaway, Last Call, 270; Bjarnason, Triumph, 16; John Melady, Korea (Toronto: Macmillan, 1983), 78; Berton, Marching, 501. On Australians conceding a role to 2PPCLI in the victory at Kapyong see, e.g., Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM. On Canadians conceding a contributory role to 3RAR see, e.g., www.army.forces.gov.ca/2PPCLI/RH-Kapyong.asp (accessed 25 September 2009).

12. Compare, e.g., Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War: Volume II (London: HMSO, 1995), 111–50; Billy C. Mossman, United States Army in the Korean War: Ebb and Flow, November 1950–July 1951 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History U.S. Army, 1990), 383–97; Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, 1950–53: Volume II (Canberra: AWM/AGPS, 1985), 131–60; Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966), 72–79.

13. Peter Firkins, The Australians in Nine Wars (London: Hale, 1972), 419.

14. A. Hutley, 18205/4, IWMDS.

15. Peter Worthington, “The Not So ‘Glorious Gloucesters,’” Toronto Sun, 7 May 2000, p. 4 (for an alternative explanation see Granatstein in Bjarnason, Triumph, 19); Robert Hepenstall, Find the Dragon (Edmonton: Four Winds, 1995), 103.

16. Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 82.

17. Ibid., 85.

18. See Salmon, Last Round, passim.

19. Bjarnason, Triumph, goes into considerable detail concerning the Canadian battle, but not that of the Australians or indeed any of the other participants.

PROLOGUE

1. René Cutforth, Korean Reporter (London: Allan Wingate, 1952), 107.

2. IBID., 61.

3. See Farrar-Hockley, The British Part, Vol. I, chapter 1; O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, Vol. I, chapters 2–6; Ian McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War, Volume I (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), chapters 8–9, 11; Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, 26–34.

4. On the British Army between 1945 and 1950 see Anthony Farrar-Hockley, “The Post-War Army 1945–1963,” in The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army, ed. David Chandler and Ian Beckett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 329–32.

5. See McGibbon, New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II (1996), 9–60; Wood, Strange Battleground, chapters 2–3; O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, chapter 1.

6. 29Bde History, p. 1, WO 308/42, TNA.

7. For an overview of 27Bde in Korea see B. A. Coad, “The Land Campaign in Korea,” The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 97 (1952): 1–11. An additional U.K. contribution came in the form of a special volunteer unit of Royal Marines which was raised in August 1950 and operated with the U.S. Navy and USMC in coastal operations along the eastern coast of North Korea starting in October 1950. See Fred Hayhurst, Green Berets in Korea (Cambridge: Vanguard, 2001); Peter Thomas, 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines: Korea – 1950 to 1952 (Portsmouth, U.K.: Royal Marines Historical Society, 1990).

8. McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 158; see also, e.g., Ben O’Dowd, In Valiant Company (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2000), 119.

9. See Andrew Salmon, Scorched Earth, Black Snow (London: Aurum, 2011), 45–46, 49–50; Salmon, Last Round, 26–31.

10. See J. M. Cowper, The King’s Own: Volume III, 1914–1950 (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1957), 468.

11. Brodie commanded 14Bde in the second Chindit campaign.

12. On Carne see H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King’s African Rifles (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1956), 621ff. On Foster see obituary, St. George’s Gazette 69 (1951): 90. On Nicholson see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 94 note. On Rickord see Salmon, Last Round, 103; and www.royal-ulsterrifles.com (accessed 10 July 2012).

13. See Salmon, Last Round, 32–33; Peter Ormrod, 09863/1, IWMDS (on Henry Huth).

14. McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 59.

15. See Hub Gray with Grania Litwin, Beyond the Danger Close (Calgary: Bunker to Bunker, 2003), 251; Shawn R. G. Brown, “The Loyal Edmonton Regiment at War, 1939–1945” (MA thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1984), 143ff.

16. Ferguson, Ian Bruce (1917–1988), www.adb.anu.edu/biography/ferguson-ian-bruce-12484 (accessed 10 July 2012).

17. On Commonwealth company commanders being combat veterans see, with reference to 3RAR, Salmon, Scorched Earth, 152–53. An important exception, as it turned out, was Wally Mills of 2PPCLI, an acting company commander in April 1951, whose only combat experience had been on the day he was captured at Dieppe. See Gray, Danger Close, xvi.

18. Ibid., 76.

19. Douglas Johnson-Charlton, 15256/6, IWMDS; John Mole, 23221/3, IWMDS; Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 61; Ellery Anderson, Banner Over Pusan (London: Evans, 1960), 41. See also Carew, Korea, 138, 157; Norman “Taff” Davies, Red Winds from the North (Knebworth: Able, 1999), 77–78; Digby Grist, Remembered With Advantage (Gloucester: The Gloucestershire Regiment, 1976), 31; Edmund Ions, A Call to Arms (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1972), 169; Lofty Large, One Man’s War in Korea (London: Kimber, 1988), 42; Michael Newcombe, Guns and the Morning Calm (Newcastle: Minden, 1999), 10, 159; Ronnie Noble, Shoot First! (London: Harrap, 1955), 175; Richard Bryson and Blane Coulcher, The West Yorkshire Gunners (Tiverton: 45 Field Regiment, 1991), 20; Salmon, Last Round, 38.

20. Edward Beckerley, 10982/3, IWMDS; Preston-Bell in Salmon, Last Round, 33; Douglas Patchett, 16759/1, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Monks, Eyewitness, 322; Graham Thomas and Ronald Hutchinson, Turn by the Window (London: Cassell, 1959), 21. On the gentry manners of Phillips see Tisdall in Hastings, Korean War, 94.

21. Letter to Man, 4 April 1951, 2001-07-1187-46-19, NAM.

22. John Briton [pseud. for T. Ashley Cunningham-Booth], Shapes of War (Leamington Spa: Korvet, 1999), “One Man’s Apostasy,” n.d.

23. A. E. Younger, Blowing Our Bridges (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2004), 13.

24. Frank “Nick” Carter, 18262/1, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; Albert Hawkins, 26353/1, IWMDS; Henry Ponsford, 18456/1, IWMDS. On the backgrounds and personalities of some of the leading figures in the fighting units of 29th Brigade see Salmon, Last Round, 26–36.

25. Gray, Danger Close, 3; Johnson in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 36. On Stone as a tough disciplinarian see also Melnechuck and Munro in ibid., 38, 53, 62.

26. John R. Bishop with G. W. Stephen Brodsky, The King’s Bishop (Duncan, B.C.: Mossy Knoll, 2000), 79–80. On this incident see also Munro in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 262; James Riley Stone, SC407_SJR_198, UVic.

27. Len Opie (“hated his guts”), S02654, AWM; John Church (“hard man”), S02299, AWM; Don Beard (“drove mercilessly”), S02687, AWM. Ferguson took command of 3RAR in early November 1950. Salmon, Scorched Earth, 268.

28. Don Beard (“absolutely devoted”), S02687, AWM; Phil Bennett (“almost as if”), S02656, AWM; see also, though, David Butler, S02777, AWM; D. M. Butler et al., The Fight Leaders (Loftus, N.S.W.: Australian Military History Publications, 2002), 112, 154–55.

29. Len Opie, S02654, AWM; Gray, Danger Close, 3; see M. Servos and B. O’Dowd on Ferguson in Kapyong, produced by John Lewis (North Fitzroy, Vic.: Arcimedia, 2011). Another officer with a reputation among the other ranks for being tough but extremely professional was Anthony Farrar-Hockley, the 1GLOS adjutant. See Salmon, Last Round, 27; Henry Ponsford, 18456/1, IWMDS.

30. Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM; see also Jack Gallaway, S02651, AWM; Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM.

31. On “Cinderella Brigade” see Reginald Thompson, Cry Korea (London: Macdonald, 1951), 229. On “Rolls Royce Brigade” see Kenneth Trevor, 09784/2, IWMDS.

32. 78 Coy RASC and 11 Infantry Workshop REME did their best to keep 27Bde’s own vehicles on the road, but it was an uphill struggle and attrition took its toll. See: Report on Operations of 27BIB/BCB in Korea, 29 August 1950–31 March 1951, Appendix A, Transport, WO 308/45, TNA; John Dutton, The Forgotten Punch in the Army’s Fist (Arborfield: kenandglen. com, 2004), 41; D. J. Sutton, ed., The Story of the Royal Army Service Corps and Royal Corps of Transport, 1945–1982 (London: Leo Cooper, 1983), 216–17. During the period of advance and retreat in 1950–51, U.S. transport was essential.

33. Foulds in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 167.

34. On the M3 half-track, equipped with swivel-mounted .30 and .50 caliber machine-guns, see Steven J. Zaloga and Peter Sarson, M3 Infantry Half-Track, 1940–73 (Oxford: Osprey, 1995). On the usefulness of the fourteen M3s in 2PPCLI see Notes on Talk given by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone, 5 June 1951, p. 3, File 681.011 (D3), DHH.

35. See Eric Linklater, A Year in Space (London: Macmillan, 1953), 61; Thompson, Cry Korea, 266; G. I. Malcolm, The Argylls in Korea (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1952), 66.

36. See David Wilson, The Sum of Things (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2001), 165, 181–82; Pat Quinn, “A Rude Awakening,” www.britains-smallwars.com/korea pq.htm (accessed 7 May 2006).

37. See Julian Tunstall, I Fought in Korea (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1953), 34; Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM; Report on Operations of 27BCB, Appendix A, 9, WO 308/45, TNA.

38. See, e.g., D. F. Barrett, Korean War Diary, 29 November 1950, p. 63, 2000-08-55-4, NAM. Though some U.S. Army units and even headquarters did undoubtedly panic, it should be kept in mind that American policy called for breaking off with the enemy when retreating, rather than remaining in contact. Not knowing this, British and Commonwealth troops reacted with a mixture of puzzlement and contempt. See, e.g., CO 8RIH to DRAC, n.d. [c. 31 December 1950], sheet 2, WO 281/1142, TNA; Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Hugh Hamill, The Royal Ulster Rifles in Korea (Belfast: Mullan, 1953), 19, 22; Hawkins in Tom Hickman, The Call-Up (London: Headline, 2004), 98; D. E. Whatmore, One Road to Imjin (Chelten-ham: Dew Line, 1997), 48. The ROK Army, which at this stage in the war mostly had little in the way of training and was poorly led (see Il-Song Park, “The Dragon From the Stream: The ROK Army in transition and the Korean War, 1950–1953” [PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2002], chapter 3), also developed a “bug out” reputation. See, e.g., Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/2, IWMDS; Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Monks, Eyewitness, 318.

39. There were, for example, shortages of four-wheel-drive vehicles (see Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 15) and problems with the World War II–vintage “rebuilds” provided to 29Bde (see 29Bde History, p. 1, WO 308/42, TNA; Dutton, Forgotten Punch, 14).

40. See David Smurthwaite, Project Korea (London: NAM, 1988), 11, 18–19; H. B. Eaton, Something Extra (Durham: Pentland, 1993), 23. On the Centurion III see Simon Dunstan, Centurion Universal Tank (Oxford: Osprey, 2003), 11–20.

41. Lt. J. C. Butler, encl. 189A, WO 231/89, TNA; Olivia Fitzroy, Men of Valour (Liverpool: Tinling, 1961), 275. On the revolver as the official personal weapon of Centurion crews – only the driver possessing a submachine-gun – see, e.g., Kenneth Black, 18022/2, IWMDS. On the big and heavy Centurion not really being suited for Korean terrain see also, e.g., IWMDS; Doug Bone, 30635/6, IWMDS; Richard Napier, From Horses to Chieftains (Bognor Regis: Woodfield, 2002), 264; Eighth Army Command Report for January 1951, Book VII – Armor Section report, narrative dated 14 February 1951, p. 1, Box 1149, RG 407, NARA; Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 91. On Centurion crews learning to adapt see, e.g., William Bye, 20375/1, IWMDS.

42. Notes on lecture given by Brig T. Brodie, 9 Nov. 1951, p. 1, 681.011, DHH; see also, e.g., Lt. R. W. W. Smith, encl. 98A, Maj. C. J. Nixon, encl. 61A, WO 231/89, TNA; Jim Jacobs, “Korea Remembered,” 67, IWMDD. Bren carriers also turned out to be too small to carry the support equipment for 8RIH and had to be replaced by the more spacious and mechanically reliable M3 half-track. See Doug Bone, 30635/7, IWMDS. On the carrier’s history see David Fletcher and Tony Bryan, Universal Carrier 1936–48 (Oxford: Osprey, 2005).

43. Notes on lecture given by Brig. T. Brodie, 9 Nov. 1951, p. 1, 681.011 (D3), DHH.

44. On the vulnerability of British tracked vehicles lacking swing-mount machine-guns to close-in assault see, e.g., Frank Brodie, 19047/4, IWMDS; Mervyn McCord, 21563/4–5, IWMDS. On the Ulsters ditching their anti-tank guns and using their Oxfords to transport a special battle patrol see, e.g., Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 16; Henry O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea (Kenilworth: Henry O’Kane, 1988), 28. The Glosters also used Oxfords for patrolling. See Grist, Remembered, 18. On some members of the 1RUR battle patrol acquiring Browning machine-guns to mount on their Oxford carriers see Mervyn McCord, 20292/2, IWMDS. There is no mention of such machine-guns on Oxfords in the account of another member of the 1RUR battle patrol (see P. J. Kavanagh, The Perfect Stranger [Saint Paul, Minn.: Graywolf, 1988], 96ff.). On 1RNF Oxfords being equipped with Bren or Vickers guns see John Martin, K Force (Leamington Spa: Korvet, 1999), 39.

45. On the relative lightness of the 25-pounder shell, which became obvious during the Second World War, see David French, Raising Churchill’s Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 90. For details on the gun itself see Chris Henry and Mike Fuller, The 25-pounder Field Gun (Oxford: Osprey, 2002).

46. Such heavy U.S. supporting fire would be available at Kapyong (see Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, 105–106) but not at the Imjin (see Barry Taylor, “Open Road Barred,” Military History 7 [1991]: 50).

47. Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM. On a 17-pounder being used to kill a sniper on the Imjin, see Salmon, Last Round, 179.

48. On the splitting of 11LAA see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 118, footnote; see also, e.g., Letter of 11 April 1951, J. J. Potter Papers, IWMDD. On the Bofors being used in support of ground forces see, e.g., Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 48.

49. On 29Bde and bazookas see, e.g., Gordon Potts, 23213/7, 9, IWMDS; George Connolly, 18271/1, IWMDS; Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS; David Kaye, 17468/1, IWMDS; M. G. Harvey, The War in Korea (Eggleston: Raby, 2002), 17.

50. Younger in Adrian Walker, A Barren Place (London: Leo Cooper, 1994), 39; see, e.g., George Lang, S03786, AWM. On use of the 2-inch mortar for flares see, e.g., Brent Byron Watson, “From Calgary to Kap’yong” (MA thesis, University of Victoria, 1993), 57–59.

51. App. A to HQS 3201-151/25 (Trg 5), Gen. Trg. 25CIB, Vol. 1, British Information from Korea, p. 5, 111.41 (D22), DHH; see Farrar-Hockley, “Post-War Army,” 338, 342; Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, 70. On six 3-inch mortars per battalion being insufficient see Keith Taylor, 1989-05-277-1, NAM.

52. Brent Byron Watson, Far Eastern Tour (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 44.

53. Jim Jacobs, “Korea Remembered,” 34, IWMDD; see notes on lecture given by Brig. T. Brodie, 9 Nov. 1951, p. 1, 681.011(D3), DHH.

54. On the 36 Grenade see Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 42–43. It was appreciated (see Farrar-Hockley, “Post-War Army,” 338), though not all batches manufactured in the Second World War had been properly maintained (see Melnechuck in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 52).

55. On the Vickers see, e.g., Dennis Matthews, 12729/2, IWMDS; Byron Murphy, 15338/1, IWMDS. On the need for more of them see Keith Taylor, 1989-05-277-1, NAM.

56. Gerald Gowing, www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2010); John Kelanchey, 19386/2, IWMDS; see also, e.g., David Green, Captured at the Imjin River (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003), 26; Large, One Man’s War, 46; Graham Dixon, Stuart Reitsma, www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012). On the relatively slow Bren rate of fire see French, Churchill’s Army, 87.

57. Walter Adams in Walker, Barren Place, 22; William Westwood, 19871/1, IWMDS; Roy Utting, 17568/2, IWMDS; Green, Captured, 70; see also Graham Dixon, www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 31 July 2009); Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 166. On the Sten jamming in action see, e.g., Whatmore, One Road, 72; see also Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 41; Dutton, Forgotten Punch, 162; Mike Czuboka in Bjarnason, Triumph, 59. The Sten was also disliked because, as the weapon of the platoon commander, it drew its bearer to the attention of enemy snipers. See Bishop, King’s Bishop, 39. Those who defended the Sten did so in terms of its having a better rate of fire than semi-automatic or bolt-action rifles and revolvers (see Martin, K Force, 164; Ronald Norley, 15539/2, IWMDS; George Richards, 09859/1, IWMDS) and as good a range and reliability record as any comparable weapon in Korea (see Watson, “Calgary to Kap’yong,” 65–66).

58. The burp gun – the Russian PPSh 41 or the Chinese copy, the Type 60 – got its name from the sound it made when fired, the result of its high rate of fire.

59. Campbell in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 51; see also Bjarnason, Triumph, 56. On Sten and Owen gun rounds not penetrating Chinese quilted jackets see, respectively, John Kelanchey, 19386/2, IWMDS, and Snow Dicker, “My Korean Adventure,” Wartime 9 (2000): 28.

60. The British and Canadians were equipped with the Mark IV and short pig-sticker bayonet, the Australians the Mark III and 18-inch “sword” bayonet. On the bayonets see Salmon, Scorched Earth, 211.

61. Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM. On the reliability of the Lee-Enfield in the field in Korea see, e.g., John Kelanchy, 19386/1, IWMDS; notes on talk given by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone, 5 June 1951, p. 7, 681.011(D3), DHH; see also Watson, “Calgary to Kap’yong,” 62–64.

62. Large, One Man’s War, 46; see also, e.g., Frank Carter, 18262/4, IWMDS; Richardson and Guthrie in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 166, 257. Though see also David Holdsworth, 15428/3, IWMDS; Salmon, Last Round, 194, 181, first footnote, which suggest that follow-up waves of attackers could be less well armed than Large remembered.

63. Frank Carter, 18262/4, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Pte. T. Pink, L/Cpl J. W. Riches, Pte. J. Neath, AI9/K/BRIT/392–394, A2151, KB1073/11G Part 6, NAA; Maj. C. J. Nixon, encl. 61A, WO 231/89, TNA; Adams in Walker, Barren Place, 22; Green, Captured, 105; Salmon, Last Round, 181; Hibbs in Bjarnason, Triumph, 60.

64. Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; see also, e.g., Cote in Vincent R. Courtenay, Patricias in Korea (Windsor, Ont.: North American Heritage, 1999), 206. American infantrymen had the M1 Garand and M1 Carbine, both gas-operated semi-automatic weapons.

65. Green, Captured, p. 70; Ions, Call to Arms, 177; Notes on talk given by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone, 5 June 1951, p. 7, 681.011(D3), DHH; see also, e.g., Maj. W. A. Wood, encl. 142A, WO 231/89, TNA. On the risk of M1s jamming if not kept scrupulously clean see Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 39–40.

66. Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM; see Watson, “Calgary to Kap’yong,” 67, n. 52.

67. Ibid., 67.

68. Eric Hill, 12673/3, IWMDS.

69. Large, One Man’s War, 45. On discarding helmets see, e.g., Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM; John Kelanchey, 19386/2, IWMDS; Knowles in Maurice Pears and Fred Kirkland, comps., Korea Remembered (Georges Heights, N.S.W.: Doctrine Wing, Combined Arms Training and Development Centre, 1998), 23; Kingsford in Walker, Barren Place, 4.

70. W. Oldale in Arthur W. Wilson, ed., Korean Vignettes (Portland, Oreg.: Artwork, 1996), 321; Younger, Blowing Bridges, 168; Temple in Salmon, Last Round, 100; see also, e.g., William Gibson, 16850/1, IWMDS; Czuboka in Bjarnason, Triumph, 57. On wearing a helmet being seen as a sign of extreme fear see Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM. On using helmets to hold water see John Hawkins in James Durney, The Far Side of the World (Naas: Leinster Leader, 2005), 110. On discarding helmets because of lack of enemy artillery see, e.g., Gray, Danger Close, 85. On discarding because of weight see, e.g., John Kelanchey, 19386/2, IWMDS. On carrying helmets but not wearing them, even in battle, see, e.g., John Mole, 23221/2, IWMDS.

71. Bob Walding in Walker, Barren Place, 95. On the study indicating that helmets would not have helped see Watson, “Calgary to Kap’yong,” 70.

72. Maj. C. E. B. Walwyn, encl. 29A, WO 231/89, TNA; see also, e.g., Capt. H. J. Bergin, encl. 67A, WO 231/89, TNA; Peter Maxwell, Home and Abroad (Cronulla: P. Maxwell, 2005), 35. On the battery problem see, e.g., Arthur Hutley, 18205/4, IWMDS; Report on the Operations of 27BCB, 29 Aug. 1950–31 Mar 1951, App. A, p. 16, WO 291/188, TNA. On problems with the radios see also Col. Man, “Signal Lessons from Korea,” chapter 10, p. 19, para 122, 2001-07-47-29, NAM. On 2PPCLI being forced to adopt the walkie-talkie because of battery problems see Gray, Danger Close, 109.

73. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 63; Eric Hill, 12673/3, IWMDS; Survey of the communications of 27BCB, 8 Jan. 1951, p. 4, WO 291/1886, TNA; see, e.g., Lt. H. Atkinson, encl. 154A, WO 231/89, TNA; Temple in Salmon, Last Round, 205. On the 88 and 31 Sets see Louis Meulstee, Wireless for the Warrior (Broadstone: G. C. Arnold, 1995).

74. Gordon Potts, 23213/7, IWMDS; Large, One Man’s War, 47. See also, e.g., Lt. J. Nicholson, encl. 206A, WO 231/89, TNA; Anthony Perrins, 19387/2, IWMDS, contradicting the official opinion that RNF sets worked perfectly (see CO report on the “Happy Valley” battle in Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 55).

75. Notes on talk given by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone, 5 June 1951, p. 6, 681.011(D3), DHH. There were, however, still some problems with radio communication within 2PPCLI at Kapyong (see Gray, Danger Close, 108–109)and the CO himself admitted that overall radio communication “was never good in Korea” (James Stone in Duty First 1 [1992]: 37). On the superiority of the SCR 300 see Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, 71. Even if sets operated as advertised there might be a tendency to underestimate the enemy and forsake R/T security procedure in order to communicate more easily. There are indications that the Chinese were indeed listening in to brigade-net traffic and thereby easily learning things that should have remained on the U.N. side of the lines. See, e.g., Jack Gallaway, S02651, AWM; Dan Raschen, Send Port and Pyjamas! (London: Buckland, 1987), 179. On the Chinese intercepting messages to good effect see Sung Chin-Yu in Korea: The Unknown War, produced by Michael Dorner (London/Boston: Thames Television/WGBH, 1988).

76. See, e.g., Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 103.

77. Wilson, Sum of Things, 167; R. W. Thompson, An Echo of Trumpets (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), 220; A. M. Man, The National Service Soldier in Korea, n.d., p. 1, 2001-1187-46-11, NAM.

78. On some 1MX national servicemen not being psychologically prepared to fight for Korea see Tunstall, I Fought, 9–10; Hastings, Korean War, 103. On well-settled U.K. reservists or regulars not being particularly happy to be sent as replacements to 1MX in Korea see, e.g., John Shipster, Mist on the Rice Fields (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), 157; Bert Bartlett, http://www.thekoreanwar.co.uk/html/bert_bartlett.html (accessed 7 May 2006).

79. P. K. Kemp, The Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge’s Own), 1919–1952 (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1956), 349; R. C. B. Anderson, History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Edinburgh: Constable, 1956), 187–88; Shipster, Mist, 129; Andrew Wilkie Brown, A Memoir (Aberdeen, U.K.: A. W. Brown, 2001), 124.

80. See Man to Hastings, 24 Nov. 1987, A. N. Man Papers, IWMDD; A. N. Man, The National Service Soldier in Korea, n/d, p. 1, 2001-1187-46-11, NAM.

81. Alan Whicker, Within Whicker’s World (London: Elm Tree, 1982), 62; see also, e.g., Thompson, Echo of Trumpets, 215–16; Brown, Memoir, 120.

82. Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM; see also, e.g., Jack Gallaway, S02651, AWM; R. Saunders in Harry Gordon, The Embarrassing Australian (Melbourne: Lansdowne, 1962), 150. It was true that 1MX was later blamed by a U.S. combat historian for supposedly not doing its part to rescue the U.S. 2nd Division from the debacle at Kunu-ri Pass in November 1950 (Roy E. Appleman, Disaster in Korea [College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1989], 246), and that there were some in 3RAR who became prejudiced against 1MX national service types because of the unit’s failure to take a particular feature that the Australians subsequently had to take in their stead in the second week of April 1951 (Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM). There is, however, no real evidence for the former charge (see, e.g., Salmon, Scorched Earth, 299, note) while in the later case the Australians took an indirect approach, moving so fast that the Chinese panicked and fled rather than slogging it out as they had with 1MX and thereby leaving the Diggers with the impression that resistance to the 1MX attacks, which among other things had suffered from some bad luck (see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 94), had been lighter than in fact was the case (Patrick Knowles, 19388/1, IWMDS; Gallaway, Last Call, 236–37; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 147–48).

83. Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 103.

84. John Shaw, 20299/1, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Hastings, Korean War, 92; Salmon, Last Round, 39; Mervyn McCord in Forgotten Heroes, produced by Alastair Lawrence (London: BBC, 2001).

85. See, e.g., William Clark, 18459/1, IWMDS; Dennis Matthews, 12729/1, IWMDS; Ronald Wells’s narrative, p. 4, IWMDD. True volunteers from other units – or indeed from among national servicemen already in the brigade who only had to go if they signed on as regulars – put their names down for reasons that ranged from a desire to see action (e.g., Kavanagh, Perfect Stranger, 78) and exotic lands (e.g., Hawkins in Hickman, Call-Up, 75–76), especially among young officers, to a wish to escape personal problems in their home units (e.g., William Bye, 20375/1, IWMDS).

86. Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 7; 29Bde History, p. 1, WO308/42, TNA. The percentage of reservists varied between units. See, e.g., D. B. A. Grist, “The Korean Campaign as a Soldier Sees It,” The Back Badge 14, no. 12 (1952): 43; John Smith, 18525/1, IWMDS; Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 6; Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1951, p. 4.

87. The standard commitment was seven years with the colors and five in the reserves. ‘A’ men were those who had served mostly recently, ‘B’ those who had served earlier, and ‘Z’ those who had served through the Second World War. ‘C’ men were those national servicemen over nineteen years of age who volunteered for Korea. ‘K’ stood for those who volunteered to rejoin the army or transfer from other units for the Korean War. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. I, 116.

88. See, e.g., Edmund Bruford-Davies, 22347/3, IWMDS; Andrew Scott, 16855/1, IWMDS; Kavanagh, Perfect Stranger, 79; John Mason, Diplomatic Dispatches (Canberra: National Library of Australia, 1998), 60; Thomas Cushing, Soldier for Hire (London: Calder, 1962), 275–76; Bryson and Coulcher, Yorkshire Gunners, 21; Hastings, Korean War, 93; Salmon, Last Round, 29.

89. James “Sam” Forward, 16078/1, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Gray in Walker, Barren Place, 72; Walter Cleveland, 17348/3, IWMDS; Eric Ellis, 23351/1, IWMDS; Alfred Gilder, 20057/1, IWMDS; David Holdsworth, 15428/1, IWMDS; Thomas McMahon, 18819/3, IWMDS; Lawrence Moreton, 19051/2, IWMDS; Cyril Papworth, 16618/1, IWMDS; Kenneth Trevor, 09784/1, IWMDS; F. Moxam, para. 13, AI9/K/BRIT/290, KB1073/11G Part 5, A2151, NAA; Denis Whybro in Forgotten Heroes, BBC.

90. Younger, Blowing Bridges, 126. For an example of someone being let off on compassionate grounds see John Smith, 18525/1, IWMDS. Among those released on medical grounds were men found to have artificial limbs. See Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; Frank Carter memoir, p. 5, IWMDD; Younger, Blowing Bridges, 124–25.

91. Former POWs, for instance, might be judged fit for Korea: see, e.g., Green, Captured, 19; Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM. Serious bullet or shrapnel wounds dating from World War II were also not counted as a reason to demobilize reservists called up for 29th Brigade as long as they had healed sufficiently. See Len Swatton (Glosters) in Soldier, 26 March 1997, p. 18.

92. Kenneth Trevor, 09784/1, IWMDS; see also, e.g., “Notes from the 1st Batt. The Royal Ulster Rifles (83rd and 86th),” North Irish Brigade Chronicle 1, no. 4 (1952): 21 [also available in TS form as WO 308/46, f. 2, TNA].

93. Frank Carter memoir, p. 5, IW-MDD; see also, e.g., Jack Arnall, 09972/1, IWMDS; Edward Beckerley, 10982/2, IWMDS; Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; Thomas Cunningham- Booth, 19913/2, IWMDS; Davies, Red Winds, 17–18. The word “Bolshie” to describe the mood was used both by a recalled reservist in 8RIH (Denis Whybro, 20008/10, IWMDS) and a young subaltern in 1RNF (M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1-1, NAM).

94. John Mole, 23221/1, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Samuel Phillips, 17688/1, IWMDS, regarding the same problem in the Fusiliers. On indiscipline bordering on mutiny see, e.g., Hastings, Korean War, 93; William Tyler, L/Cpl Bill Tyler’s Letters from Korea (London: Labour Publishing Society, 1951), 4; Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/2, IWMDS; Frank Carter memoir, p. 5, IWMDD.

95. Frank Cottam, 21729/3, IWMDS.

96. Wear in Salmon, Last Round, 29.

97. Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 176. On the term “Old Man’s Brigade” see ibid.; on “Grandfathers’ Brigade” see James Forward, 16078/1, IWMDS.

98. See, e.g., O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 28, 52–3; Hickey, Korean War, 145; Peter Ormrod, 09863/1, IWMDS.

99. Frank Brodie, 19047/3, IWMDS; Jack Arnall, 09972/1, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Albert Hawkins, 26253/1, IWMDS; Green, Captured, 17.

100. Walter Cleveland, 17348/1, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Whatmore, One Road, 35; Jack Arnall, 09972/1, IWMDS.

101. See, e.g., Edward Beckerley, 10982/2, IWMDS; Green, Captured, 33, 34; James Cameron in Korea, T 3891 R3 C1, BLSA.

102. Mansergh to Harding, 2 February 1951, Report by Lt. Gen. Sir R. Mansergh on his visit to Korea, February–March 1951, p. 1, WO 216/836, TNA. On occasion, to be sure, fleeting cross-cultural contact could be made; see Green, Captured, 32–33. On horror at and sympathy among recalled reservists for Korean refugees on the move in winter see, e.g., John Dyer, 18474/1, IWMDS; Thomas McMahon, 18819/4, IWMDS.

103. David Holdsworth, 15428/1, IWMDS.

104. See David Kaye, 17468/1, IWMDS; see also Peter Ormrod, 09863/1, IWMDS; Gordon Potts, 23213/7, IWMDS.

105. Courts-Martial, Korea, 1950–1953, WO 93/59, TNA. At least one recalled older reservist was an incorrigible, though admiringly tolerated, troublemaker. See Cushing, Soldier for Hire, 275ff.; O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 50.

106. Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 53; see also, e.g., Fred From, S02649, AWM; Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; Gordon, Embarrassing Australian, 146; Bishop, King’s Bishop, 20; Worthington, Looking for Trouble, 40. For (rare) instances of anti-communist motivation see Linklater, Year in Space, 63–65; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 31; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 42; Patrick Weller, 12664/1, IWMDS; Ted Barris, Deadlock in Korea (Toronto: Macmillan 1999), 20.

107. On lack of knowledge of Korea see, e.g., Coad, “Land Campaign,” 1; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 42; Davies, Red Winds, 10; Green, Captured, 17; Edgar Green, 2, http://www.thekoreanwar.co.uk/html/interview.html (accessed 7 May 2006); Grist, Remembered, 7; Jack Arnall, 09972/1, IWMDS; Robin Bruford-Davies, 1989-05-163-1, NAM; William Bye, 20375/1, IWMDS; John Grosvenor, 16337/1, IWMDS; Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; John Mole, 23221/1, IWMDS; John Shaw, 20299/1, IWMDS.

108. Pierre Berton, My Times (Toronto: Doubleday, 1995), 71; see Stone in Bjarnason, Triumph, 41. On somewhat ineffective efforts to explain to the troops why they were going to fight in Korea – often conducted by officers who knew little themselves – see, e.g., Jack Arnall, 09972/1, IWMDS; Robin Bruford-Davies, 1989-05-163-1, NAM; Edward Beckerley, 10982/3, IWMDS; John Grosvenor, 16337/1, IWMDS; Guy Temple, 15557/1, IWMDS; Newcombe, Guns and the Morning Calm, 1–2; Tunstall, I Fought, 18; Tyler, Letters from Korea, 9.

109. Len Opie, S02654, AWM; Alfred Holdham, 12311/3, IWMDS; Martin, K Force, 2; Gordon, Embarrassing Australian, 145–46; see D. Bruce Sealy and Peter Van De Vyere, Thomas George Prince (Winnipeg: Pegius, 1981), 29; see also, e.g., Dicker in Pears and Kirkland, Korea Remembered, 243; O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 12; Melnechuck in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 13; Barris, Deadlock, 22; Five Nights, broadcast 22 April 1976, CBC Radio, http://archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/korean_war/clips/782/(accessed 27 August 2009).

110. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 20; see, e.g., Five Nights, CBC Radio. On a desire to escape dead-end manual labor in forestry, mines, and on farms see, e.g., McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 1; Gerald Gowing, Suart Reitsma, www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 31 July 2009); Cook in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 69. On having missed World War II as a motive see, e.g., McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 1; Barris, Deadlock, 19, 40; Hibbs and Czuboka in Bjarnason, Triumph, 42–43. Younger men could also be fleeing from women. “I joined the army because I was mad at my girlfriend!” a private in 2PPCLI exclaimed (“Blood on the Hills,” In Korea: With Norm Christie, produced by Paul Kilback and Peter Williamson [Toronto: Breakthrough Films and Television, 2006]).

111. David Horner, Duty First (North Sydney, N.S.W.: Allen and Unwin, 1990), 382; Len Opie, S02654, AWM; see also Stan Bombell, S03787, AWM; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 42; Patrick Knowles, 19388/1, IWMDS; Ronald Stewart, S03813, AWM. On the range of motives among the Australians see Richard Trembath, “‘But to this day I still ask myself, why did I serve in Korea?’: The Formation of K Force,” in The Korean War, 1950–53, ed. Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (Canberra: Army History Unit, Department of Defence, 2000), 104–35.

112. Gray, Danger Close, 16; Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM; see also, e.g., Five Nights, CBC Radio; Watson, Far Eastern Tour, chapter 3.

113. David Butler, S02777, AWM; see, e.g., Len Opie, S02654, AWM; Knowles and Pears in Pears and Kirkland, Korea Remembered, 24, 81; Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 22. On lying about prior experience – which seems to have affected the 3RAR signals platoon – see Jack Gallaway, S02651, AWM.

114. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 24; see also Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 65, 268; Watson, “Calgary to Kap’yong,” 24. On the PPCLI murder case involving Koreans see Chris Madsen, Another Kind of Justice (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 109–10; Munro in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 264–65. On the chaotic raising of the Special Force see Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, 41 ff.; Wood, Strange Battleground, 27–28. On the drinking problem in 2PPCLI see also, e.g., Gray, Danger Close, 14–15.

115. Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Stuart Reitsma, www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012); see also O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 31; Gallaway, Last Call, 131. On the percentage of veterans in 16FR see McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 45. For the percentage in 2PPCLI see Watson, “Calgary to Kap’yong,” 31.

116. Patrick Weller, 1664/2, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Frank Carter, 18262/1, IWMDS; Robert O. Holles, Now Thrive the Armourers (London: Harrap, 1952), 41.

117. Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/2, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Tyas in Walker, Barren Place, 28.

118. James R. Stone and Jacques Castonguay, Korea 1951 (Ottawa: CWM, 1988), 14; see, e.g., Patrick Knowles (3RAR), 19388/1, IWMDS; Cushing, Soldier for Hire, 275–76 (1RUR); Bishop, King’s Bishop, 59, 63–65 (2PPCLI); see also Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 53. In the depths of winter there were also a few cases of self-inflicted wounds in both 2PPCLI (see Bishop, King’s Bishop, 96–97; Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 81) and 3RAR (Don Beard, S02687, AWM; Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM). Some of the older Ulsters, to be sure, were said to be able to better endure conditions than some of the younger regulars. See “Notes from the 1st Batt.,” 21; but see O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 52–53.

119. Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 53–54; see also, e.g., Edmund Bruford-Davis, 22347/3, IWMDS; George Connolly, 18271/1, IWMDS; Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/2, IWMDS; Samuel Phillips, 17688/1, IWMDS; Grist, Remembered, 43; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. I, 118; Newcombe, Morning Calm, 4; Younger, Blowing Bridges, 127.

120. See, e.g., David Butler, S02777, AWM; Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM; Jim Newall, S03789, AWM; Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Ronald Stewart, S03813, AWM.

121. Cyril Papworth, 16618/1, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Eric Hill, 12673/3, IWMDS; Green, Captured, 86; Grist, Remembered, 31; Large, One Man’s War, 42. On 1GLOS as “the gloomies” – owing to relative silence rather than mood – see Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 48; Linklater, Year in Space, 106

122. 1MX, according to one former company commander, was not fully trained for war when 27Bde sailed for Korea (Hastings, Korean War, 102), a claim that was vigorously disputed by other 1MX officers (see Man to Hastings, 24 November 1987, A. N. Man Papers, IWMDD; Shipster, Mist, 157–59). On the mad dash to get 27Bde ready see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. I, 128–29. 3RAR, getting ready at top speed in Japan (see A. Argent, “A Battalion Prepares for War,” B. A. Coad Papers, IWMDD; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 2–6), also had weaknesses when it departed for Korea (see, e.g., Olwyn Green, The Name’s Still Charlie [St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1993], 251). The Canadians had longer to prepare but also more to do, since rather than expand existing battalions the decision had been taken in Ottawa to create Special Force battalions more or less from the ground up. Suffice it to say that when 2PPCLI arrived in Korea in mid-December 1950, Colonel Stone insisted on more than a month of additional fieldwork before his men were committed to battle. As he put it, “the necessary time was granted to train this motley mob as a fighting machine.” Stone and Castonguay, Korea 1951, 13; see Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, 69ff. In 29Bde much had been achieved in the way of individual and unit training, but not enough to make the brigade an entirely coherent fighting force. As the brigade chronicler admitted, “neither the group as a whole nor the units themselves had really settled down as a fighting formation at the date of sailing.” 29Bde History, p. 2, WO 308/42, TNA; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. I, 119.

123. On the operations of 27BCB see 27Bde Report on Operations, 29 August 1950 – 31 March 1951, WO 308/45, TNA; 27Bde WD, Sep. 1950 – Mar. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA. See also the war diaries of 1A&SH (WO 281/1166, TNA), 3RAR (85/4/20–27, AWM), and 2PPCLI (vols. 18317–18318, RG 24-C-3, NLAC). On the operations of 29Bde see 29Bde History, pp. 2–4, WO 308/42, TNA. See also the war diaries of 1GLOS (WO 281/1244, TNA), 1RNF (WO 281/1160, TNA), and 1RUR (WO 281/1165, TNA).

124. See Martin, K Force, 9–10; O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 17. “The British Army is used to this type of enemy on the Indian Frontier and Burma,” a widely circulated report claimed, “as a study of the Waziristan Campaign 1919–20 or any of the many other books on these campaigns will show.” Korea Notes No. 1: Reactions to the first part of Korean campaign prior to the Inchon landings, paragraph 45, WO 291/2428, TNA. This paper was sent out to Commonwealth forces. See Sitreps and Notes on Fighting in Korea, June 50/Sep. 51, Appendix A to HQS 3201–151/25 (Trg 5a), 17 Sep. 51, 314.009 (D464), DHH. Comparing the tribesmen of the Raj frontiers with the Soviet-trained and -armed forces of North Korea was, to say the least, rather misleading.

125. Gordon Potts, 23213/8, IWMDS; Younger, Blowing Bridges, 147. By contrast Tony Farrar-Hockley, adjutant of 1GLOS at the time, remembered – albeit fifty years on – being uneasy at the sheer scale of Chinese intervention. Anthony Farrar-Hockley in Forgotten Heroes, BBC.

126. Malcolm, Argylls, 14.

127. Shipster, Mist, 132; Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM. On the fights in early November see 27Bde Report on Operations, 29 August 1950–31 March 1951, Part IV, pp. 2–4, WO 308/45, TNA.

128. Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/3, IWMDS; see Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 49–55.

129. M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1-1, NAM. On the Ulsters’ battle in January 1951 see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. I, 385–92.

130. See, e.g., Richard Gale in Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 97 (1952): 14; Sitreps and Notes on Fighting in Korea, June 50/Sep. 51, Appendix A to HQS 3201–151/25 (Trg 5a), 17 Sep. 51, p. 7, 314.009 (D464), DHH.

131. Report by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone on activities of 2PPCLI in Korea, 18/23 December 1950, p. 2, 145.2 P7013 (D6), DHH. Brodie was likely making these points on the basis of a smallish attack at Sibyon-ni by North Korean soldiers on the Northumberlands at the end of November 1950. See Salmon, Last Round, 51–52. On other 2PPCLI officers developing a healthy respect for the enemy in their first encounters see, e.g., Middleton and Munro in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 75, 81. Brodie from quite early on in Korea recognized the importance of operating in the hills and not becoming road-bound. See Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 38.

132. See CO 8RIH to DRAC, n/d [c. 31 December 1950], WO 281/1142, TNA.

133. Command Report, 3d Infantry Division, April 1951, p. 1, Box 2898, RG 407, NARA; see Napier, Horses to Chieftains, 269, 271; Roland Winn, Korean Campaign Supplement to “The Crossbelts,” 1950/1, Journal of the VIII King’s Royal Irish Hussars (Luneberg: Hoppe, 1952), 6, 8.

134. “Blood on the Hills,” Breakthrough Films and Television.

135. Sebastian Mercer, 1989-5-1-1, NAM. See Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 50–51; 1GLOS WD, 16 February 1951, WO 281/1244, TNA; 29Bde History, p. 3, WO 308/42, TNA; Frank Carter memoir, pp. 18–19, IWMDD; Green, Captured, 81–85; Grist, Remembered, 36; Harvey, War in Korea, 70–71; Anthony Eagles, 12783/2, IWMDS; Byron Murphy, 15338/3, IWMDS; Ronald Norley, 15539/2, IWMDS; Guy Temple, 15557/1, IWMDS; see also Salmon, Last Round, 104–107.

136. Henry Ponsford, 18456/1, IWMDS [Carne comment]; see Gordon Potts, 23213/8, IWMDS; Younger, Blowing Bridges, 147.

137. See Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 471. Douglas Johnson-Charlton, 15256/6, IWMDS.

138. Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 33; Mervyn McCord, 20292/2, IWMDS. On the Chinese seeming to lack arms see, e.g., Fitzsimmons in Richard Doherty, The Sons of Ulster (Bel-fast: Appletree, 1992), 153; Monks, Eyewitness, 318; Len Opie, S02654, AWM.

139. On contempt for “the Gooks,” see, e.g., Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; Anderson, Banner, 44; Tunstall, I Fought, 110, passim.; Watson, Far Eastern Tour, chapter 3.

140. M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1-1, NAM; see also, e.g., Tunstall, I Fought, 106; Wilson, Sum of Things, 184.

141. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 156; Henry Ponsford, 18456/2, IWMDS; see also Malcolm, Argylls, 79. On the work of the Korean porters being appreciated and the men well liked see, e.g., M. J. P. M. Corbally, The Royal Ulster Rifles, 1793–1957 (Glasgow: Paramount, 1960), 176; Watson, Far Eastern Tour, 65; Holles, Now Thrive, 142–43; O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 57; Linklater, Year in Space, 99; Kenneth Black, 18022/4, IWMDS; J. R. M. French, 1996-05-27-1, NAM; Denis Whybro, 20008/15, IWMDS; Pat Angier in The Back Badge 3, no. 10 (1951): 145. On porters getting lost and not liking to be near the firing line see Quis Separabit 19, no. 2 (1951): 75. There might also have been a suspicion – an entirely false one in light of ROK press-gang tactics (see. e.g., Anderson, Banner, 25) – that some of the younger porters were evading military service, with consequent resentment (see Whatmore, One Road, 92). The hardships they endured might be taken for granted (see Tunstall, I Fought, 106). On units unofficially adopting stray civilians, especially children, see, e.g., Y. K. Choi, S03806, AWM; John Dyer, 18474/3, IWMDS; Cyril Papworth, 16618/1, IWMDS; Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 122–28; Holles, Now Thrive, 108; Tunstall, I Fought, 121.

142. Younger, Blowing Bridges, 186. For the “toughest” comment, see Grist, Remembered, 52. For the “wild-looking” comment, see Kavanagh, Perfect Stranger, 109. For the mortaring incident see John Mole, 23221/4, IWMDS. On the British view of the Belgians see also O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 57–58; Mervyn McCord, 21563/6, IWMDS.

143. Petra Gunst et al., Une Saison en Corée (Brussels: Racine, 1999), 146–47.

144. See Tedder in Frederick Aandahl, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, Volume VII, Part 1 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1983), 339.

145. See Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 412, 434, 440–49; Paul F. Braim, The Will to Win (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 246. On aerial reconnaissance see USAF Historical Division, Air University, United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30 June 1952 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1955), 59.

146. See 1KOSB WD, 19–24 April 1951, WO 281/478, TNA; 1A&SH WD, 19–24 April 1951, WO 281/1166, TNA. On being in reserve and reorganizing and thus not expecting – or being briefed on – serious defensive action in 27Bde see, e.g., Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM. On 6ROK patrols showing no sign of the enemy see Wood, Strange Battleground, 73. Part of the problem was enemy use of smoke screens to mask movement from aerial observers. IX Corps Command Report, Book 1, April 1951, pp. 22–23, Box 1797, RG 407, NARA.

147. Anthony Farrar-Hockley in David Scott Daniell, Cap of Honour (London: White Lion, 1975), 343. Farrar-Hockley was relieved because he knew the breadth of the brigade front. Ordinary soldiers, though, were just happy that they could live in comparative peace and quiet. See, e.g., R. S. Gill letter 62, 11 April 1951, IW-MDD; O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 57. On establishing a foothold beyond the Imjin, see A. E. Younger, “Episodes from Korea,” Royal Engineers Journal 65, no. 4 (1951): 338–43; R. S. Gill letter 60, 10 April 1951, IWMDD. On the isolated night attack on D Company on the north side of the Imjin see RUR Narrative No. 3, 27 Mar.–26 April 1951, p. 4, WO 308/46, TNA.

148. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 386; Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 458, 465. Within 29Bde it was also thought that the enemy, if he came, might strike farther east. See Green, Captured, 95–96. On the growing evidence of an enemy buildup in front of 3rd Division see Command Report, 3d Infantry Division, April 1951, pp. 3–4, Box 2898, RG 407, NARA.

149. See Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 113.

150. 70 Field Battery supported the Glosters, 116 Field Battery the Fusiliers, and 176 Field Battery the Rifles.

151. The four 4.2-in. mortars of A Troop supported the Fusiliers, B Troop the Ulsters, and C Troop the Glosters.

152. Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 471.

153. On the brigade frontage see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 89–90.

154. 45FR narrative, p. 67, WO 308/44, TNA; Digby Grist, “The Korean Campaign as a Soldier Sees It,” The Back Badge 4, no. 12 (1952): 44; see also, e.g., Davies, Red Winds, 88, 89; Green, Captured, 96; Holles, Now Thrive, 140; Linklater, Our Men, 55; Whatmore, One Road, 57. The expectation that the advance would continue was shared by the special British military representative at Ridgway’s headquarters in Tokyo, Air Vice-Marshal Cecil Bou­chier (see Bouchier to MoD, 21 April 1951, DEFE 11/211, TNA).

155. Green, Captured, 96; Anthony Farrar-Hockley in Daniell, Cap of Honour (1975), 344; Cubiss in Salmon, Last Round, 117; Holles, Now Thrive, 141; Carne to Jos­len, 24 July 1957 [see also Maj. B. J. Eastwood statement], CAB 157/23, TNA. On the river as a barrier see also Gordon Potts, 23213/6, IWMDS. On the water level dropping see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 112. On shortages of defensive stores see also Harding, Imjin Roll, 10. On the hard digging conditions and shallow defenses see Whatmore, One Road, 57; Gordon Potts, 23213/8, IWMDS; David Holds­ worth, 15428/1, IWMDS. On the better defenses prepared by the Ulsters north of the river see, e.g., John Dyer, 18474/2, IWMDS; George Hobson, 16853/1, IWMDS; John Mole, 23221/4, IWMDS. The only mines laid by the Glosters were on the south side of the Imjin at Gloster Crossing in response to a patrol contact north of the river on 22 April. Carne to Jos­ len, 24 July 1957, CAB 157/23, TNA.

156. On the deep sweeps with tanks see 8RIH WD, 14–20 April 1951, WO 281/1142, TNA; Fitzroy, Men of Valour, 273–75. On local patrolling see, e.g., 1RUR WD, 12–18 April 1951, WO 281/1165, TNA. On Brodie asking for more men see Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 182. For officers and men who suspected the Chinese would come at them on the Imjin see, e.g., 5 April 1951 letter in Mason, Diplomatic Dispatches, 70; Stowe to West, 19 Apr. 1951, E. S. Stowe Papers, IWMDD; Guy Temple, 1557/1, IWMDS.

157. Henry Ponsford, 18456/2, IWMDS; see 29Bde History, p. 5, WO 308/42, TNA; see also, e.g., Frank Carter, 18262/3, IWMDS; George Hobson, 16853/1, IWMDS; Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; John Mole, 23221/4, IWMDS; Douglas Patchett, 16759/1, IWMDS.

158. Grist, Remembered, 41; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 93; see also Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 184.

159. Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 183; see also St. George’s Gazette, 31 May 1951, p. 105.

160. On the light plane reconnaissance see J. Dargent, “Notes sur le combat de nuit: l’infiltration,” Bulletin Militaire 65 (1953): 324. On expectations that a withdrawal to Line Kansas would take place when enemy probing began see, e.g., 1RUR Narrative No. 3, p. 5, WO 308/46, TNA. On retrospective analytical surprise that Brodie allowed the Belgians to replace the Ulsters north of the Imjin see Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 146–47.

161. Peter Ormrod, 09863/2, IWMDS; Denis Whybro, 09863/2, IWMDS; Armand Philips in Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 147; Harvey, Korean War, 97; 45FR narrative, p. 68, WO 308/44, TNA; see Noble, Shoot First, 182; Large, One Man’s War, 41; Derek Kinne, The Wooden Boxes (London: Muller, 1955), 15; Salmon, Last Round, 116–17.

162. Stowe to West, 10 Apr. 1951, E. S. Stowe Papers, IWMDD.

163. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 118.

164. Odgers, Remembering Korea, 82.

165. O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 57; Cut-forth, Korean Reporter, 177–78; see also S. Mercer, http://www.youtube.com watch?v=RzOrI2MU-A0 (accessed 27 August 2009); Holles, Now Thrive, 141–42; Frank Carter, 18262/3, IWMDS. A dissenting note had been struck by a Catholic reservist in the Glosters who refused point-blank to go back into the line in March when the brigade had finished its turn in reserve. “He said that he’d had a vision that the regiment would be cut off and massacred,” one of the soldiers guarding him while he awaited court-martial remembered. Anthony Eagles, 12783/2, IWMDS.

166. Samuel Philips, 17688/2, IWMDS. On freshly dug trenches, etc., see Sebastian Mercer, 12605/4, IWMDS; David Sharp, 17929/3, IWMDS. On missing the significance of food caches see William Westwood, 19871/1, IWMDS. On shooting at wildlife see Cyril Papworth, 16618/2, IWMDS. On a feeling of being watched see Peter Ormrod, 09863/2, IWMDS. The Chinese were in fact very good at concealing themselves when they wanted to. See, e.g., Maj. R. Leith -Macgregor, p. 2, encl. 102A, WO 231/89, TNA; Younger, “Episodes from Korea,” 344; Napier, Horses to Chieftains, 272. According to Kenneth Trevor, the brigade major, a solitary prisoner was taken during the 20th April sweep who reputedly remarked: “I’m surprised you attacked us, I thought we were going to attack you.” This was not taken to mean that Trevor should postpone his plans to go on leave. Kenneth Trevor, 09784/2, IWMDS.

167. Ward in Hastings, Korean War, 251, 253; see also S. Mercer in Korea: The Unknown War, Thames Television/WGBH. On the imminent rotation of the Ulsters and Northumberlands see, e.g., CSM Sean Fitzsimmons in Doherty, Sons of Ulster, 156. On the withdrawal of the U.S. artillery liaison officer and the consequences see Barry Taylor, “Open Road Barred,” 50. On the brigade major, Kenneth Trevor, being on leave see Kenneth Trevor, 09784/2, IWMDS. On the difficulties this created see Peter Ormrod, 09863/2, IWMDS. On the CO of the Ulsters going on leave because he thought this was a quiet period see North Irish Brigade Chronicle 1, no. 4 (1952): 28. On “Lakri” Wood of D Coy, 1GLOS being on leave see Holles, Now Thrive, 148. On aerial reconnaissance reports suggesting the Chinese were far off see 29Bde History, App. G, pp. 1–2, WO 308/42, TNA.

168. Anthony Eagles, 17283/3, IWMDS; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 112–13; Harding, Imjin Roll, 11. On things being quiet on 21 April along the I Corps front see Robertson to Slim, 17 May 1951, Impressions of the British Commonwealth Part in the CCF Offensive on 22–26 April 1951 as seen by Lieutenant-General Sir H.C.H. Robertson, p. 1, WO 216/345, TNA.

1. IMJIN: THE FIRST DAY

1. Droogmans in Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 168.

2. Allen in Carew, Korea, 185.

3. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 109. On the objectives of the Fifth Phase offensive see also Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 146–48.

4. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, chapter 8; Gordon L. Rottman, Korean Order of Battle (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 174–75. On the limitations of Chinese artillery support in the first year of the war see Kevin Mahony, Formidable Enemies (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 2001), 64.

5. Ronald Norley, 15539/2, IWMDS; see, e.g., John Dyer in Forgotten Heroes, BBC.

6. Large, One Man’s War, 47. On other noises see, e.g., Herbert Spraggs, 11910/2, IWMDS.

7. See, e.g., John Dyer, 18474/3, IWMDS; Sebastian Mercer, 12605/5, IWMDS; M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1-1, NAM. Though there were persistent stories that troops did indeed get drunk on Kaoling brandy – see Jurgen Domes, Peng Te-huai (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985), 62 – Lofty Large was probably correct in arguing against Chinese drug use: “For a start I’m quite sure there wouldn’t have been enough dope to go around.” Large, One Man’s War, 73. On the soccer crowd analogy see Swatton quoted in Richard Lloyd Parry, “Forgotten heroes return to valley of nightmares,” The Independent, 21 April 1997 (“It was like Wembley”); James Forward, 16078/3, IWMDS. On the film theater analogy see also Mervyn McCord, 21563/5, IWMDS.

8. Large, One Man’s War, 72. On the prevalence of automatic weapons among the Chinese at the Imjin see also, e.g., S. J. Davies, In Spite of Dungeons (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954), 28; Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Edge of the Sword (Stroud: Sutton, 1993), 7; Frank Carter memoir, 28, IWMDD (though see also David Holds­ worth, 15428/3, IWMDS).

9. Kavanagh, Perfect Stranger, 93–94. The CofE chaplain, Sam Davies, certainly had no sense of an imminent battle. See Davies, In Spite, 16–17; Stanley Davies, 15475/1, IWMDS. On the Fusiliers preparing for St. George’s Day see, e.g., Charles Mitchell letter, 22 April 1951, in Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 112; Peacock, Northumberland Fusiliers, 103. On the Ulsters and the film show see, e.g., Albert Tyas, 18439/1, IWMDS.

10. Samuel Phillips, 17688/2, IWMDS.

11. 3d Infantry Division, Command Report, Narrative, p. 4, Box. 2898, RG 407, NARA. On British contacts see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 113; Barclay, First Commonwealth, 60–61; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 64; 29Bde History, App. G, p. 30, WO 308/42, TNA; 1RNF WD, 22 April 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; Crahay narrative, p. 7, WO 308/49, TNA; 45FR narrative, p. 68, WO 308/44, TNA.

12. Patrick Weller, 12664/1, IWMDS; Large, One Man’s War, 47; Cyril Papworth [in conversation with Pat Angier], 16618/3, TNA; Davies, In Spite, 15.

13. Carew, Korea, 182; Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 184. On expectations concerning the Chinese see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 113–14; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 64; Barclay, First Commonwealth, 61; Bryson and Coulcher, Yorkshire Gunners, 48; Harvey, War in Korea, 98.

14. T. V. Fisher-Hoch, “170 Independent Mortar Battery, R.A., in Korea,” Journal of the Royal Artillery 78, no. 4 (1951): 250. On the Chinese having already identified their targets see, e.g., Robertson to Slim, 17 May 1951, Impression of the British Commonwealth part in the CCF Offensive on 22–26 April 1951 as seen by Lieutenant-General Sir H. C. H. Robertson, p. 1, WO 216/345, TNA.

15. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 114–15.

16. Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 116; 1RNF WD, 22 April 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA. A sentry going on night duty elsewhere in the Northumberland sector had dismissed the reports of his predecessor (“‘somebody moving about there,’ he said, ‘and not squaddies’”) as mere jumpiness (“‘Oh, behave yourself,’ I said, ‘you’re panicking’”). Denis Prout, 18775/2, IWMDS.

17. Major Farrar-Hockley of the Gloucesters and the Imjin River Offensive, http://www.thekoreanwar.co.uk/html [URL inactive] (accessed 11 August 2007); see Guy Temple, 15557/1, IWMDS. On Carne worrying that the enemy force might be bigger than intelligence sources anticipated see Harvey, War in Korea, 98; Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 17. As one officer put it, “I think at this stage we weren’t quite sure whether it was just a reconnaissance in force on their part or what it was.” Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM.

18. Guy Temple, 15557/1–2, IWMDS; see Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 17–22; Carew, Korea, 184–85; Salmon, Last Round, 2–6.

19. David Holdsworth, 15428/2, IWMDS; Len Swatton in Richard Lloyd Parry, “Forgotten heroes return to valley of nightmares,” The Independent, 21 April 1997; see Harvey, War in Korea, 99.

20. Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 159; Crahay narrative, p. 7, WO 308/49, TNA.

21. Pauwels in Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 172; see ibid., 159ff.

22. 1RNF WD, 22 April 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 116.

23. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 116.

24. Albert Tyas, 18439/1, IWMDS; M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1-1, NAM.

25. 1RUR WD, 22 April 1951, WO 281/1165, TNA; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 64.

26. On the ambush see the account of the 2 i/c in Kavanagh, Perfect Stranger, 95– 107; see also Quis Separabit 19, no. 2 (1951): 77; Salmon, Last Round, 140–41. On Craig’s escape see his account in Philip D. Chinnery, Korean Atrocity! (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 2000), 144–45. On Craig losing his mind as a result of the ambush, see M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1-1, NAM.

27. De Kerpel in Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 178; see ibid., 162ff.; Crahay narrative, pp. 8–9, WO 308/49, TNA.

28. Cubiss in Salmon, Last Round, 145; Kinne, Wooden Boxes, 16–18; see M. D. Young in St. George’s Gazette 69 (1951): 105; 1RNF WD, 23 April 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA.

29. Roy Rees, 19854/1, IWMDS; Andrew Scott, 16855/1, IWMDS; Kinne, Wooden Boxes, 20; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 117; 1RNF WD, 23 April 1951, 281/1160, TNA; Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 116.

30. Salmon, Last Round, 148–49.

31. See Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 25–27; 29Bde History, App. G, p. 2, WO 308/42, TNA; Carew, Korea, 186–88.

32. John Grosvenor, 16337/1, IWMDS; Ronald Norley, 15539/2, IWMDS; Whatmore, One Road, 69; William Clark, 18459/1, IWMDS; Frank “Nick” Carter, 18262/4, IWMDS; Walter Cleveland, 17348/3, IWMDS.

33. Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 64–65; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 117.

34. Crahay narrative, p. 9, WO 308/49, TNA; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 117.

2. IMJIN: THE SECOND DAY

1. Davies, In Spite, 15.

2. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 38–39.

3. On the Chinese actually fighting harder with the coming of daylight see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 121.

4. See, e.g., Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS.

5. Harding, Imjin Roll, 13.

6. Carew, Korea, 189. The account of the conversation recorded by the adjutant of the Glosters is less abrupt but the same in essence. See Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 27.

7. Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; see WO 32/15193, TNA; Salmon, Last Round, 155; Tim Carew, The Glorious Glosters (London: Leo Cooper, 1970), 73; Farrar-Hockley in Daniell, Cap of Honour (1975), 348; Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS; Cyril Papworth, 16618/3, IWMDS. According to a fellow junior officer, Curtis “didn’t care whether he lived or died” since his wife had recently died of tuberculosis. Geoffrey Costello in Forgotten Heroes, BBC.

8. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 29–30; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 117.

9. 29Bde History, App. H, Bde Log, 23 April 1951, WO 308/42, TNA; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 121.

10. Crahay narrative, p. 9, WO 308/49, TNA; P. Janssens in Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 185. See also ibid., 203; Jean-Pierre Gahìde, La Belgique et al guerre de Corée, 1950–1955 (Brussels: Musee Royal de l’Armee, 1991), 49–50; 29Bde History, App. H, Bde Log, 23 April 1951, WO 308/42, TNA.

11. Fus. J. Martin, AI9/K/BRIT/162, KB1073/11G Part 5, A2151, NAA.

12. Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 116, 118.

13. Fitzroy, Men of Valour, 273.

14. 29Bde History, App. H, Bde Log, 23 Apr. 1951, WO 308/42, TNA; 1RUR WD, 23 April 1951, WO 281/1165, TNA.

15. See I U.S. Corps Command Report, April 1951, Section II, Narrative of Operations, p. 123, Box 1523, RG 407, NARA.

16. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 118; 7th Infantry Command Report April 1951, Narrative, p. 4, Box 2950, RG 407, NARA. On the offensive from the division-level perspective, see Max Dolcater, ed., 3d Infantry Division in Korea (Paducah, Ky.: Turner, 1998), 196.

17. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 121.

18. Peter Ormrod, 09863/2, IWMDS; Fitzroy, Men of Valour, 276–77. On thwarted hopes for artillery and air support see Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 30.

19. Harvey, War in Korea, 102; Whatmore, One Road, 72.

20. Whatmore, One Road, 73; see Harvey, War in Korea, 102–103.

21. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 30.

22. Cyril Papworth, 16618/3, IWMDS. On A Company see also Sebastian “Sam” Mercer, 12605/4, IWMDS; William Clark, 18459/1, IWMDS.

23. Carne to Joslen, 24 July 1954, CAB 157/23, TNA.

24. Sebastian “Sam” Mercer, 12605/4, IWMDS; see Whatmore, One Road, 74–75; Harvey, War in Korea, 114–15; Farrar-Hockley in Daniell, Cap of Honour (1975), 349. The mortar battery, also coming under enemy fire, eventually withdrew as well. See citation for Capt. F. R. Wisbey, p. 56, K643, WO 373/119, TNA. It has been suggested in the VC citation for Philip Curtis that the failure to pursue A Company was also the indirect result of the Chinese having been cowed by his attack on the observation bunker. See Max Arthur, Symbol of Courage (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 2004), 542.

25. On the problems of digging in see, e.g., Owen Smith, 18441/2, IWMDS. On the Korean porters see Farrar-Hockley in Daniell, Cap of Honour (1975), 349. On the meal see Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 31. On the deployment of the companies see ibid., 32.

26. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 118; Bryson and Coulcher, Yorkshire Gunners, 51; 45FR narrative, p. 73, WO 308/44, TNA.

27. Salmon, Last Round, 171.

28. Grist, Remembered, 42–43. On other vehicle ambushes between F Echelon and Solma-ri see, e.g., Holles, Now Thrive, 152–54; 45FR narrative, p. 72, WO 308/44, TNA; Citation for 2/Lt. A. C. N. Preston, p. 58, WO 373/119, TNA; see also E. J. A. Hodgetts obituary, The Wire, October 2003, 512. Around two dozen Glosters were apparently able to make their way to safety that afternoon due to covering fire from the roving intelligence and reconnaissance platoon of the 1/7th RCT. See John C. McManus, The 7th Infantry Regiment (New York: Tom Doherty, 2008), 58–59.

29. Samuel Phillips, 17688/2, IWMDS; see Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 117–18; 1RNF WD, 23 April 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; Salmon, Last Round, 163–64.

30. Fus. Cyril Curling, p. 39, WO 71/1024, TNA.

31. 1RNF WD, 23 April 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; 8RIH WD, 23 April 1951, WO 281/1142, TNA.

32. David Sharp, 17929/3, IWMDS; see 1RNF WD, 23 April 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; Kinne, Wooden Boxes, 20–22. On 29Bde HQ losing communication with battalion HQs see, e.g., 3d Infantry Division, Command Report, 7th Infantry Regiment, April 1951, 7th Infantry Unit Journal, April 24, 1951, 05:00 hrs., Box 2950, RG 407, NARA.

33. Younger, Blowing Bridges, 199.

34. Though he did not mention the incident when interviewed by the Imperial War Museum (see 18544, IWMDS), Charles Sharpling, a lance-corporal in the Glosters during the battle, recalled in an interview with Andy Salmon that a radio conversation between Carne and Brodie took place in which Brodie seemed to question the accuracy of Carne’s account of the numbers of Chinese crossing the Imjin (Salmon, Last Round, 170).

35. See E. J. Kahn, “No One But the Glosters,” New Yorker, 26 May 1951, p. 68.

36. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 119; Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 465; I U.S.Corps, Command Report, April 1951, Section III, Narrative of Operations, p. 122, Box 1523, RG 407, NARA.

37. Gunst, Philips, and Verhaegen, Saison, 204.

38. William F. Long and Walter M. Turner, “Challenge Accepted,” Combat Forces Journal 2 (1952): 14–15; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 119; Crahay narrative, p. 11, WO 308/49, TNA; 3d Division, Command Report, Apr. 1951, p. 16, Box 2898, RG 407, NARA; 3d Infantry Division, Command Report, 7th Infantry Regiment, 1st Bn Operational Order 23 April 1951, Box 2950, RG 407, NARA; 7th Infantry Command Report Narrative, April 1951, p. 4, Box 2950, RG 407, NARA.

39. Peter Ormrod, 09863/2, IWMDS.

40. Napier, Horses to Chieftains, 273–74.

41. On RUR observers thinking the American attack on Hill 257 had failed see O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 59; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 66; see also Fitzroy, Men of Valour, 277; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 120 [in which 257 is apparently mistyped as 287]. The chronicler of the 7th Infantry, however, suggests that the hill was indeed secured. See McManus, 7th Infantry, 57. On the 1/7th attack see also Long and Turner, “Challenge Accepted,” 15–16; 3d Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Command Report Narrative, April 1951, p. 4, Box 2950, RG 407, NARA.

42. Saenen and Derom in Gunst, Philips, and Verhaegen, Saison, 205–206; see Crahay narrative, p. 12, WO 308/49, TNA; Gahide, Belgique, 50; 3d Infantry Division, Command Report, Apr. 1951, p. 18, Box 2898, RG 407, NARA; 3d Infantry Division, Command Report, 7th Infantry Regiment, April 1951, 2nd Battalion Unit Journal, April 23, 1951, Box 2950, RG 407, NARA.

43. See Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 120; Barclay, First Commonwealth, 63; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 67.

44. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 124, 119. On 10BCT in the battle on 22/23 April see Juan F. Villasanta, Dateline: Korea (Bacolod City, Philippines: Nalco, 1954), 19–23.

45. Gordon Potts, 23213/7, 9, IWMDS; see Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 66–67; 1RUR WD, 24 April 1951, WO281/1165, TNA. On the effect of bazooka rounds see also Farrell in Salmon, Last Round, 185.

46. Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 118; 1RNF WD, 24 April 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; Kinne, Wooden Boxes, 22.

47. Frank “Nick” Carter, 18262/4, IWMDS; Large, One Man’s War, 58; see Geoffrey Costello in Forgotten Heroes, BBC; see also Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 125; Holles, Now Thrive, 156; Harding, Imjin Roll, 16.

48. Green, Captured, 99–100; see David Kaye, 17468/1, IWMDS.

49. Davies, In Spite, 19; Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 39; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 125; Harding, Imjin Roll, 16. Andrew Salmon, contradicting the recollections of the adjutant, makes the case that the withdrawal of C Company was not ordered by Carne but was rather a semi-spontaneous action produced by the apparent absence of the company commander, Major Mitchell. See Salmon, Last Round, 160 footnote.

3. IMJIN: THE THIRD DAY

1. Harvey, War in Korea, 122.

2. Patrick Weller, 12664/2, IWMDS.

3. Large, One Man’s War, 62, 60.

4. Costello in The Independent, 8 July 2003; Harding in Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 125.

5. Frank “Nick” Carter, 18262/4, IWMDS; see Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 45–46; Lt. A. Peal, AI9/K/BRIT/977, KB 1073/11G Part 6, A2151, NAA.

6. Harvey, War in Korea, 116; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 124, 126– 27; 29Bde WD, 24 April 1951, WO 281/1157, TNA; Guy Temple, 15557/2, IWMDS.

7. Ronald Norley, 15539/2, IWMDS; Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 42. On Carne’s inspiring leadership see also, e.g., R. F. Matthews, No Rice for Rebels (London: Bodley Head, 1956), 15; Sebastian Mercer, 1989-05-1-1, NAM; Carew, Korea, 218.

8. E. J. Kahn, “No One But the Glosters,” New Yorker, 26 May 1951, 68.

9. Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS.

10. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 47–48; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 126; see also Anthony Eagles, 17283/3, IWMDS; Ronald Norley, 15539/2, IWMDS; Citation for F. G. Strong, p. 193, WO 373/119, TNA.

11. Cyril Papworth, 16618/3, IWMDS; Ronald Norley, 15539/2, IWMDS; see also Patrick Weller, 12664/2, IWMDS.

12. Green, Captured, 102; Holles, Now Thrive, 162; Sebastian “Sam” Mercer, 12605/5, IWMDS; see Matthews, No Rice, 10–12; Byron Murphy, 15338/4, IWMDS; Robert Hickey, 16061/1, IWMDS.

13. Crahay narrative, p. 13, WO 308/49, TNA; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 128.

14. Grist, Remembered, 44. Grist states that the plan was hatched with the brigade major, Ken Trevor. However, as Trevor was on leave during the battle (see Kenneth Trevor, 09784/2, IWMDS) it seems likely he and Watkin-Williams were in fact working with the acting brigade major, Jim Dunning.

15. Gilberto N. Villahermosa, Honor and Fidelity: The 65th Infantry in Korea, 1950–1953 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2009), 128.

16. Grist, Remembered, 44; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 126. On the Glosters rounded up by Grist for the attempt see James Forward, 16078/3, IWMDS.

17. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 48; Harvey, Korean War, 120.

18. J. C. Gorman, “Korean Relief Column,” Stand-To 4, no. 4 (1954): 2.

19. Ibid., 2–3; see Grist, Remembered, 44; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 127.

20. Gorman, “Relief Column,” 3; see Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 414.

21. Salmon, Last Round, 189.

22. Gorman, “Relief Column,” 4, 2; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 127; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 414; Charles Paul, “A Year in Korea 1950/51: Recollections of a Subaltern with the 8th KRI Hussars,” p. 16, www.iccy.org.uk/vanguard vanguard/page0016htm (accessed 19 June 2009). Huth was also evidently concerned that, with evening drawing on, his tanks would be easier targets for ambush. See 8RIH WD, 24 Apr. 1951, WO 281/1142, TNA; Huth to Goslen, 1 August 1957, CAB 157/23, TNA.

23. Milburn quoted in Braim, Will to Win, 251 (on the time of the meeting see Incl. 1, Commanding General’s Journal, April 24, 14:15 hrs and Incl. 2, Assistant Division Commander’s Journal, April 24, 14:45 hrs, 3d Infantry Division, Command Report, Box 2898, RG 407, NARA); Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 127; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 413; 29Bde History, App. H, 29Bde Log, 24 April 1951, WO 308/42, TNA; G-3 Summary on 29th BIB Action, April 22–25, 1951, pp. 2–3, Incl. 3, Office of the AC of S of G-3, HQ 3d Infantry Division, Box 2898, RG 407, NARA. Soule was evidently not the only U.S. Army officer to misunderstand what was being said by Brodie; at 6:45 PM Soule received a message from his liaison officer at brigade HQ stating that the Glosters were “fairly safe.” Villahermosa, Honor and Fidelity, 128.

24. Davies, In Spite, 21; see Stanley Davies, 15475/1, IWMDS.

25. General Brodie Orders the surrounded Glosters to hold, www.thekorean war.co.uk/html.sound_bites.html (accessed 11 August 2007); Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 49–50; see 29Bde History, App. H, Bde Log, 24 Apr. 1951, WO 308/42, TNA; J. R. A. Smith, 18525/1, IWMDS. The assistant divisional commander had broken the news to Brodie in person shortly after 3:30 PM . 3d Infantry Division, Command Report, Apr. 1951, Incl. 2, Assistant Division Commander’s Report, 24 Apr. 1951, Box 2898, RG 407, NARA.

26. Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 472; Gorman, “Korean Relief Column,” 4.

27. Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 471–72; see Gorman, “Korean Relief Column,” 4; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 414; 29Bde History, App. H, Bde Log, 24 Apr. 1951, WO 308/42, TNA; 8RIH WD, 24 Apr. 1951, WO 281/1142, TNA; Eighth Army, Supporting Documents Section II, Book 4, Part 7, Incl. 31, Milburn to Van Fleet, 15 May 1951, pp. 2–3, Box 1184, RG 407, NARA. Abandoning the attempt to rescue the Glosters was probably made easier when Lieutenant-General Sir Horace Robertson of the Australian Army, the most senior Commonwealth officer in the theater and one who also happened to be visiting the two British-led brigades when the Chinese struck, called the I Corps Chief of Staff from IX Corps HQ that evening and “requested him not to endanger the remainder of the Corps if that would be the result of attempting to extricate the trapped Gloster Battalion.” I Corps Command Report, Apr. 1951, Narrative of Operations, 24 Apr., p. 131, Box. 1523, RG 407, NARA.

28. Fitzroy, Men of Valour, 278.

29. Green, Captured, 102.

30. 29Bde History, App. H, 29Bde Log, 24 Apr. 1951, WO 308/42, TNA.

31. Grist, Remembered, 44–45; Davies, In Spite, 20; see Harding, Imjin Roll, 18; A. E. Younger, “Episodes from Korea,” Royal Engineers Journal 65, no. 4 (1951), 347; Holles, Now Thrive, 156, 163; Whatmore, One Road, 77; Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS. On the problem of lack of aircraft recognition panels see Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/3, IWMDS; Kahn, “No One But the Glosters,” 73. Though no other source mentions it, David Green of C Company recalled a botched parachute drop from USAF C-47s that day. “To our great anger and disappointment, they [the parachutes] drifted like dandelion seeds in the wind and fell outside the perimeter. The aircrews must have been on their first mission, utterly clueless and lacking any common sense. All we could do was shake our fists impotently at them, shouting all the names we could lay our hands on.” Green, Captured, 101.

32. Davies, In Spite, 22; A. H. Farrar-Hockley, “Stories from Korea: The Last Day,” The Back Badge, 4, no. 15 (1953): 227; Farrar-Hockley in Daniell, Cap of Honour (1975), 354; see Stanley Davies, 15475/1, IWMDS; David Holdsworth, 15428/2, IWMDS; Owen Smith, 18441/2, IWMDS; Patrick Weller, 12664/1, IWMDS.

33. Kinne, Wooden Boxes, 25; Andrew Scott, 16855/2, IWMDS; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 128; 1RNF WD, 24 Apr. 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 119.

34. See Christopher Nixon’s remarks in www.thekoreanwar.co.uk/html [URL inactive] (accessed 11 August 2007); Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 128. On the porters see John Mole, 23221/5, IWMDS.

35. Denis Whybro, 20008/12, IWMDS; Younger, “Episodes from Korea,” 349. On thinking that men suddenly encountered behind the lines were South Koreans when in fact they were Chinese see Denis Prout, 18775/3, IWMDS; Harvey, War in Korea, 122. On Chinese supposedly dressed as South Koreans being shot at see, e.g., Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/3, IWMDS; M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1, NAM; Mervyn McCord, 21563/4, IWMDS; William Westwood, 19871/1, IWMDS.

36. Carew, Korea, 204; John Mole, 23221/5, IWMDS.

37. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 53. On the Chinese giving themselves away through making too much noise see also Large, One Man’s War, 48. On USAF efforts during the Fifth Phase Offensive see USAF Historical Division, United States Air Force Operations, 62. On night bombing on the 24/25 see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 129. On USAF efforts in support of 29Bde on 23 and 24 April in the daylight hours see Carew, Korea, 205.

38. Carew, Korea, 195–202; 1RNF WD, 24–25 Apr. 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 119. For his leadership Winn was awarded a DSO; some of his men thought he deserved the VC. Salmon, Last Round, 196, footnote.

39. Albert Tyas, 18439/1, IWMDS; see Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 68; No. 3, Notes from Korea, 27 March–26 Apr. 1951, p. 9, WO 308/46, TNA; 1RUR WD, 24–25 Apr. 1951, WO 281/1165, TNA.

40. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 53; see also, e.g., Pte. W. Kear, AI9/K/BRIT/108, KB1073/11G Part 4, A2151, NAA.

41. Whatmore, One Road, 78; see Holles, Now Thrive, 165; Farrar-Hockley in Daniell, Cap of Honour (1975), 355. On Farrar-Hockley deliberately calling in bombardments very close to Gloster trenches see also David Holdswoth, 15428/2, IWMDS.

42. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 52–55. On Gloster morale remaining quite solid through the battle see also, e.g., Large, One Man’s War, 49; Stanley Davies, 15475/1, IWMDS; Sebastian Mercer, 12605/4, IWMDS; Cyril Papworth, 16618/1, IWMDS. On word about the air drop for the 25th spreading to the officers and men see, e.g., Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS; Whatmore, One Road, 77.

43. W. W. Harris, Puerto Rico’s Fighting 65th U.S. Infantry (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio, 1980), 182.

44. Younger, Blowing Bridges, 200–201. In fact Brodie, at age forty-seven, was only a few years older than J. P. Carne, CO of the Glosters, and Kingsley Foster, CO of the Northumberlands, but was still of course responsible for the lives of many times the number of men they were.

45. Younger, Blowing Bridges, 201; Harris, Fighting 65th, 182–83. The CO and staff officers from the 65th Infantry had cause to be grateful, had they known it, for British emotional restraint. “Small groups of the enemy had infiltrated and were operating all round and close to the Brigade HQ during the night,” as the Royal Military Police historian recorded (A. V. Lovell-Knight, The Story of the Royal Military Police [London: Leo Cooper, 1977], 199). Some hours before they arrived at 29th Brigade HQ a friendly-fire incident had been narrowly averted when British soldiers guarding the perimeter had obeyed orders not to fire at a group of approaching foreigners who were initially thought to be Chinese but turned out to be wounded Puerto Ricans. See Davies, Red Winds, 98.

46. Younger, Blowing Bridges, 201; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 129.

47. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 130–31.

48. Harris, Fighting 65th, 183; see 3d Infantry Division, Command Report, Apr. 1951, Incl. 2, Assistant Division Commander’s Journal, 25 Apr., 07:30 hrs., Box 2898, RG 407, NARA. In the end, two attempts were made on the 25th to reach the Glosters, both quickly ending in failure. Eighth Army, Supporting Documents, Section II, Book 4, Part 7, Incl. 31, Milburn to Van Fleet, 15 May 1951, p. 3, Box 1184, RG 407, NARA.

49. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 55–56; see Carew, Korea, 217. The Drum Major borrowed his instrument from another bugler. See P. E. Buss letter, Soldier, 22 July 1996, p. 12; Tony Eagles letter, Soldier, 2 September 1996, p. 29; Anthony Eagles, 12783/3, IWMDS.

50. Robert Hickey, 16061/2, IWMDS; Patrick Weller, 12664/1, IWMDS; Ronald Norley, 15539/3, IWMDS; Davies, In Spite, 23; Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS; Whatmore, One Road, 78 (Whatmore identified the private with the rifle as “Bin-man,” but as there was no soldier of that name in the battalion it is likely that he was thinking of Bingham – see Harding, Imjin Roll, 48). See also W. J. Smyth, “RSM Smyth and the Gloster Bugle,” www.the koreanwar.co.uk/html/sound_bites.html (accessed 11 August 2007); Owen Smith, 18441/2, IWMDS; Guy Temple, 15557/2, IWMDS; Green, Captured, 103; Harvey, War in Korea, 125; Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 56.

4. IMJIN: THE FINAL DAY

1. Davies, In Spite, 23.

2. Ibid.

3. Carne quoted in Daily Telegraph, 2 September 1953, p. 1 (see also Carne to Joslin, 24 July 1957, pp. 4–5, CAB 157/23, TNA); Harris, Fighting 65th, 183; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 130; 29Bde History, App. H, Bde Log, 25 Apr. 1951, WO 308/42, TNA; 3d Infantry Division, Command Report with Annexes of the 65th RCT, April 1951, S-3 Journal, 25 Apr., Box 2963, RG 407, NARA; Villahermosa, Honor and Fidelity, 132–33.

4. 29Bde History, App. H, Bde Log, 25 Apr. 1951, WO 308/42, TNA; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 131. The drop may also have been canceled because it was thought that additional supplies would only weigh down the men when they tried to break out. See Eighth Army, Supporting Documents, Section II, Book 4, Part 7, Incl. 31, Milburn to Van Fleet, 26 May 1951, p. 3, Box 1184, RG 407, NARA.

5. K. Walters, http://members.tripod. com/~Glosters/kpow1.htm (accessed 18 April 2005); see K. V. Godwin, http://members.tripod.com/~Glosters/kpow1.htm (accessed 18 April 2005).

6. Carew, Korea, 213–15; Ronald Norley, 15539/3, IWMDS; see Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 57–58; Matthews, No Rice, 13; K. Walters, http://members.tripod. com/~Glosters/kpow1.htm (accessed 18 April 2005). The comment on the adjutant’s bravery was made by Captain A. N. “Jumbo” Wilson to Private Tony Eagles (see Anthony Eagles, 17283/3, IWMDS). On Farrar-Hockley see also David Holds­ worth, 15428/2, IWMDS; Sebastian Mercer, 12605/5, IWMDS; Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS; Henry Ponsford, 18456/1, IWMDS.

7. Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 58–59; Matthews, No Rice, 14. Along with Washbrook, Captain C. S. Dain of the Royal Artillery, though wounded, helped bring down accurate artillery fire while serving as a FOO with the surrounded Glosters. See Citation for Capt. C. S. R. Dain, f. 54, K-586, WO 373/119, TNA.

8. David Holdsworth, 15428/2, IWMDS (see also Davies, In Spite, 24; Andrew Salmon, Last Round, 214). On the adjutant’s views concerning napalm see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 130. On the Chinese drawing back after the napalm strike see Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 60–63; Whatmore, One Road, 79; Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS. On dislike of napalm see, e.g., Jack Arnall, 09972/1, IWMDS; Cutforth, Korean Reporter, 172; Davies, Red Winds, 74; Green, Captured, 103.

9. Harvey, War in Korea, 125; Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 63–65.

10. WO 308/42, 29Bde History, App. H, Bde Log, 25 Apr. 1951, TNA; Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 63–65; see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 131. After this the 62 Set was destroyed in order to prevent it falling into enemy hands.

11. Carne to Joslen, 24 July 1957, p. 6, CAB 157/23, TNA.

12. Harvey, War in Korea, 128; Robert Hickey, 16061/2, IWMDS; Farrar-Hockley, Edge, 64; see Davies, In Spite, 24–25; Patrick Weller, 12664/2, IWMDS. On Hickey letting the married men go but asking the single men among his staff to stay see also Cyril Papworth, 16618/3, IWMDS. On admiration among the wounded for the MO and his staff who remained with them see, e.g., Cpl. G. Elliott, AI9/K/BRIT/489, KB1073/11G Part 4, A2151, NAA.

13. Davies, In Spite, 26; Stanley Davies, 15475/2, IWMDS.

14. David Kaye, 17468/2, IWMDS; Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS (see also Sgt. F. W. Cottam, AI9/K/BRIT/875, KB 1073/11G Part 3, A2151, NAA); Green, Captured, 104; Matthews, No Rice, 19–20; see also, e.g., WOII G. E. Askew, AI9/K/BRIT/869, KB1073/11G Part 3, A2151, NAA; Pte. D. R. Butcher, AI9/K/BRIT/92, KB1073/11G Part 3, A2151, NAA; Gnr. J. C. Dabbs, AI9/K/BRIT/606, KB1073/11G Part 3, A2151, NAA.

15. Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 30102/1, IWMDS; William Westwood, 19871/1, IWMDS; see also Charles Sharpling, 18544/1, IWMDS; Patrick Weller, 12664/2, IWMDS.

16. Cyril Cunningham, No Mercy, No Leniency (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), 76. According to a U.S. account, Carne, like the MO, had elected to stay with the wounded. See Lieut. Colonel James P.Carne, British Army, f. 453, K-668, WO 373/119, TNA.

17. Harvey, War in Korea, 130; Whatmore, One Road, 80; see David Holds­ worth, 15428/2, IWMDS.

18. Harvey, War in Korea, 131.

19. Ibid.; Whatmore, One Road, 81; Harding, Imjin Roll, 28. On men captured because they stayed with wounded mates see, e.g., Byron Murphy, 15338/4, IWMDS; Ronald Norley, 15539/3, IWMDS. On the wounded see also, e.g., Lt. T. Conneely, AI9/K/BRIT/954, KB1073/11G Part 3, A2151, NAA.

20. Whatmore, One Road, 83; Walter Cleveland, 17348/4, IWMDS; Harvey, War in Korea, 132–33; Harding, Imjin Roll, 28; Salmon, Last Round, 222–23; David Holdsworth, 15428/3, IWMDS; see Owen Smith, 18441/2, IWMDS; Donald Dickensen in Daily Express, 27 April 1951, p. 2. Six others, led by Lieutenant Bob Martin, who took a different route out of the valley, also survived. Salmon, Last Round, 223.

21. Harding, Imjin Roll, 23–26, 30–36, 80–81. On the Chinese making efforts to capture rather than kill parties of Glosters who were trying to make their way back to U.N. lines see, e.g., Cpl. W. K. Westwood, AI9/K/BRIT/157, KB1073/11G, Part 7, A2151, NAA; Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 30102/1, IWMDS.

22. On the Belgians see Crahay narrative, p. 13, WO 308/49, TNA. On the clearing force see Younger, “Episodes from Korea,” 348; Maj. Allan [sic] E. Younger, f. 434, K-720, WO 373/119, TNA; George Cooper, Fight, Dig, and Live (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2011), 42.

23. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 133; Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 119–20; Cooper, Fight, Dig, and Live, 42. On the Oxfords, the Bofors guns, and tanks shedding tracks see Martin, K Force, 42–43.

24. Salmon, Last Round, 227; see O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 62; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 69; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 133.

25. 1RNF WD, 25 Apr. 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; 1RUR WD, 26 Apr. 1951 [note that events for 25 April were wrongly listed as occurring on 26 April], WO 281/1165, TNA; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 71.

26. A. Perrins, 19387/4, IWMDS. For a more detailed account of the withdrawal see Salmon, Last Round, chapter 10. On the accidental shelling of C Company see, e.g., Lt. J. M. C. Nicholls, p. 1, AI9/K/BRIT/42, KB1073/11G Part 3, A2151, NAA; Rfn. L. Jones and Rfn. H. O’Kane in Donald Knox, The Korean War: Uncertain Victory: An Oral History (San Diego, Calif.: HBJ, 1988), 173–74. Foster’s low opinion of Rickord’s textbook tactical withdrawal was not shared by higher authority, the U.S. Army being sufficiently impressed by his leadership during the Imjin battle – including the final withdrawal – to put him up for a Silver Star. Maj. Gerald P. Rickord, f. 434, K-719, HQ I Corps, WO 373/119, TNA.

27. Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/3, IWMDS; Mitchell letter, 3 May 1951, in Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 133; see ibid., 120; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 70. On the friendly-fire incident with C Company and also the breakdown of communications and command and control among the Ulsters see, e.g., Vernon Whitamore, 19664/2, IWMDS; Gordon Potts, 23213/7, IWMDS; William Gibson, 16850/3, IWMDS; George Hobson, 16853/1, IWMDS; see also Quis Separabit, Winter 1951, p. 79. On 8 Platoon, Y Company getting pinned down – and then captured – see Sgt. D. McAnulty, AI9/K/BRIT882, KB1073/11G Part 5, A2151, NAA. On the breakdown of command and control among the Fusiliers see also, e.g., Dennis Matthews, 12729/2, IWMDS; William Bye, 20375/1, IWMDS; David Sharp, 17929/3, IWMDS.

28. William Gibson, 16850/4, IWMDS. On fighting on the saddle see, e.g., Peter Ormrod, 09863/2-3, IWMDS.

29. Kinne, Wooden Boxes, 26; 1RNF WD, 25 Apr. 1951, WO 281/1160, TNA; see Kingsley Foster obituary in St. George’s Gazette 69, no. 821 (1951): 91. Foster had himself been strongly warned against going farther down the road by an Ulsters officer. See Winn, Korean Campaign Supplement, 17; Salmon, Last Round, 235.

30. Noble, Shoot First, 185. On 45FR coming under small-arms fire and firing over open sights see also 45FR narrative, p. 79, WO 308/44, TNA; 45 Field Regiment RA in the Imjin River Battle pamphlet, p. 5, IWMDD (material drawn from Garrison Herald 2, no. 33 [1954]: 24–25); IWMDS John Smith, 18525/1, IWMDS. With the exception of C Troop, which was surrounded, 170 Mortar battery executed a similar fighting withdrawal. See citation for Maj. T. V. Fisher-Hoch, ff. 433–34, K-668, WO 373/119, TNA.

31. On Brigade HQ moving back, coming under fire, and getting support from 11LAA see, e.g., Davies, Red Winds, 99–102.

32. Dennis Matthews, 12729/2, IWMDS; Thomas McMahon, 18819/4, IWMDS; Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/3, IWMDS; Holmes to Golsen, 2 Oct. 1957, p. 3, CAB 157/23, TNA. For NCOs rising to the challenge see, e.g., Cooper, Fight, Dig, and Live, 42–43.

33. Mervyn McCord, 21563/7, IWMDS (see also M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1-1, NAM). On giving Hamill the benefit of the doubt see Salmon, Last Round, 223, footnote.

34. Mervyn McCord, 21563/7, IWMDS; Gordon Potts, 23213/8, IWMDS; John Dyer, 18474/2, IWMDS. On individuals playing dead see, e.g., Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/4, IWMDS; L. Jones in Knox, Korean War, 334. On other cases of men losing their nerve see, e.g., Alfred Gilder, 20057/2, IWMDS.

35. Peter Ormrod, 09863/3, IWMDS; Albert Tyas, 18439/2, IWMDS; see also Dennis Matthews, 12729/2, IWMDS; Fus. S. G. Bartell, AI9/K/BRIT/161, KB1073/11G Part 3, A2151, NAA.

36. M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1-1, NAM; Gordon Potts, 23213/7, IWMDS. On choosing the tank option see, e.g., David Sharpe, 17929/3, IWMDS; Albert Tyas, 18439/2, IWMDS.

37. John Dyer, 18474/2, IWMDS; Peter Ormrod, 09863/3, IWMDS; see, e.g., M. N. S. McCord, 1991-05-1-1, NAM; Denis Whybro, 20008/12-13, IWMDS; John Dyer quoted in The Guardian, 14 April 2001.

38. O’Kane, O’Kane’s Korea, 64; Vernon [Peter] Whitamore, 19664/2, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Martin, K Force, 55; Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/4, IWMDS; Denis Prout, 18775/3, IWMDS; David Sharp, 17929/3, IWMDS; Albert Tyas, 18439/2, IWMDS; Lt. S. W. Cooper, AI9/K/BRIT/955, KB1073/11G Part 3, A2151, NAA. On men on tank hulls making it difficult for the crews to operate effectively see, e.g., Denis Whybro, 20008/12, IWMDS. On thirty men to a tank see 8RIH WD, App. Q , p. 3, WO 281/1142, TNA. On the loss of the ambulance half-track see Douglas Patchett, 16795/1, IWMDS; Peter Ormrod, 09863/3, IWMDS. On placing wounded on tanks as a last resort see, e.g., Martin, K Force, 63. On the loss of six tanks (4 Centurions) see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 134.

39. Roy Utting, 17568/4, IWMDS; Peter Ormrod, 09863/3, IWMDS; see Andrew Scott, 16855/2, IWMDS; Norman Sweetlove in Doherty, Sons of Ulster, 157–58; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 71. The Centurions may have thought they were enemy troops who Huth had been warned were about to overtake the Ulsters. Fitzroy, Men of Valour, 284. On the Korean porters getting out see Gordon Potts, 23213/7, IWMDS.

40. Crahay narrative, pp. 15–16, WO 308/49, TNA; see Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 209–15; Winn, Campaign Supplement, 18–19; Salmon, Last Round, 244–46, 252.

41. Pearson to Winn, 27 Apr. 1951 in Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 125; Gordon Potts, 23213/8, IWMDS; Eighth Army, Supporting Documents, Section II, Book 4, Part 7, Incl. 31, HQ 3d Infantry Division, Office of the AC of S G-3, G-3 Summary on 29th BIB Action, 22–25 Apr. 1951, p. 4, Box 1184, RG 407, NARA. On Huth’s parting shots see Fitzroy, Men of Valour, 285. On ammunition expenditure in 45FR, 23–25 April, see 3d Infantry Division, Artillery Command Report, April 1951, Unit Reports 143, 149, Box 2934, RG 407, NARA. When the 40-mm rounds of the light anti-aircraft battery are included, the total artillery rounds expended were somewhere between 17,000 and 20,000. See Extracts from DO report dated 24 July 1951 by Lt.-Col. M. T. Young, p. 1, WO 308/50, TNA; HQ I Corps citation for Lt.-Col. Maris T. Young, f. 433, K-716, WO 373/119, TNA. On ammunition expenditure in 170 IMB, see Fisher-Hoch, “170 Independent Mortar Battery,” 252. On Ellery appealing to Milburn see Miles Speer letter to John Winn and Charles Mitchell, 29 Apr. 1951, in Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 128. On the North­ umberland losses for 25 April see ibid., 342–60. On the strength of the Ulsters by the end see North Irish Brigade Chronicle 1, no. 4 (1952): 31. On the Belgians on 25 April see also J. Dargent, “Notes sur le combat de nuit: l’infiltration,” Bulletin Militaire 65 (1953): 327.

5. KAPYONG: THE FIRST DAY

1. Gray, Danger Close, 51.

2. 16FR WD, 22 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ.

3. M. Czuboka, p. 5, www.kvacanada.com/stories_czuboka.htm (accessed 28 February 2010); B. Ferguson in Bob Breen, The Battle of Kapyong (St. Georges Heights, N.S.W.: Headquarters Training Command, 1992), 22; see also, e.g., E. L. Eyre in Norman Bartlett, ed., With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: AWM, 1954), 90; Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM; S. Connelly in Kapyong, Arcimedia. On 3RAR and “Sherwood Forest” – in fact an orchard – see P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong’, p. 1, PR83/154, AWM. On 2PPCLI and “Happy Valley” see Bishop, King’s Bishop, 118.

4. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 150; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 121; Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 23; Gray, Danger Close, 142; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 141; Robert Wellcombe, All the Blue Bonnets (London: Arms and Armour, 1980), 132–33; Anderson, Argyll and Sutherland, 226–27. 1MX would shortly be relieved by 1st battalion King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, while 2PPCLI was transferred to the newly arrived 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade. On 28CB see Eaton, Something Extra. On Stone recovering from smallpox see Watson, “From Calgary to Kap’yong,” 111.

5. Gordon, Embarrassing Australian, 153–54; Barry Reed, 2001-02-397, NAM; see also Gallaway, Last Call, 241; Van Fleet to Chung, 2 May 1951 and attachments, Box 86, James Van Fleet Papers, GCM. On problems with the 6th ROK Division and other units see Il-Song Park, “Dragon from the Stream,” 112–13; Bryan Robert Gilby, “Fighting in the Korean War: The American Military Mission from 1946–1953” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2004), 174–75; Ja Jongman, “Making Cold War Soldiers: The Americanization of the South Korean Army, 1945–1955” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006), 94–95. The 6th ROK Division had no heavy machine-guns, no 4.2-inch mortars, and little ammunition for smaller mortars. James A. Van Fleet, “The Truth About the War in Korea: How We Can Win With What We Have,” Life, 18 May 1953, p. 157.

6. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 138. In the first quoted paragraph Farrar-Hockley attached the 40th Army to the 9th Army Group; in fact is was part of the 8th Army Group, though nevertheless assigned to take care of the eastern portion of 6th ROK Division. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 381; Rottman, Order of Battle, 177–79.

7. James A. Van Fleet, “The Truth About Korea,” 128.

8. That IX Corps was likely to be attacked on or after 22 April was known from prisoner interrogations, but not exact details as to enemy strength and axis of advance. See, e.g., Lynn Montross, Hubard D. Kuokka, Norman W. Hicks, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953: Volume IV, The East-Central Front (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G- 3, HQ U.S. Marine Corps, 1962), 100. It has been suggested that General Ridgway expected the 6th ROK Division to collapse, but that under “Plan Audacious” he expected the U.S. divisions on the flanks to hold and funnel the Chinese into a salient that then could be pinched off by the 1st Cavalry Division waiting in army reserve, and that 27BCB only became involved because operations elsewhere necessitated the diversion of two-thirds of the 1st Cavalry Division to other trouble spots (see O’Dowd, Valiant Company, Appendix A). The records concerning Audacious, however, only indicate that Ridgway planned to withdraw to a series of prearranged defensive phase lines once the Chinese attacked and use his reserves – including 27BCB – when and where needed. The bulk of the 1st Cavalry Division, it should be noted, was not committed until the 25th (Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 440, 483).

9. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 381–82; Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War, Vol. II (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 629.

10. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 382; IX Corps Command Report, Book I, April 1951, Box 1797, RG 407, NARA.

11. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 382; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 139.

12. Hoge to Chang, 28 Apr. 1951, Box 12, James Van Fleet Papers, GCM; Sun Yup Paik, From Pusan to Panmunjom (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1992), 144; Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1970), 154–55; see Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Maj. Thomas A. Murphy, Asst. G3, IX Corps, p. 1, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 382–83; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 139; Korea Institute of Military History, Korean War, Vol. II, 630.

13. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 383; see, e.g., 2nd Chemical Mortar Bn Command Report, 1 Sep. 1950–1 Aug. 1951, p. 16, Box 5030, RG 407, NARA.

14. McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 110.

15. Malcolm, Argylls, 84.

16. Wilson, Sum of Things, 187.

17. McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 111; 16FR WD, 22 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ.

18. McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 111.

19. Ibid., 111–12.

20. T. Frazer in Kapyong, Arcimedia; see McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 111–12; 16FR WD, 22 Apr. 1951, WAK 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ; Ralph Porter, “Battle of Kapyong – 16 NZ Fd Regt, 23–25 April 1951,” Duty First 1, no. 4 (1992): 39. Stories of ROKs being bashed about and run over may have been exaggerated. See McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 432n28.

21. Van Fleet, “Truth About Korea,” 128. On the 1st Marine Division in the Chinese spring offensive see Montrose, Kuokka, and Hicks, U.S. Marine Operations, 105ff.

22. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 383.

23. William M. Hoge interview, p. 174, http://140.194.76.129/publications/eng-pamphlets/ep870-1-25/inter.pdf (accessed 25 January 2010).

24. Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 384.

25. Gray, Danger Close, 51–52.

26. 3RAR WD, 23 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM; 2PPCLI WD, 23 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C-3, NLAC; see 27Bde WD, 23 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA. On the equipment losses of 6th ROK Division see Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 407.

27. See Petrie in Gray, Danger Close, 163; D. P. Laughlin, B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 1, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

28. Malcolm, Argylls, 85; see also, e.g., Sim in Bjarnason, Triumph, 97.

6. KAPYONG: THE SECOND DAY

1. CBC Radio, Five Nights, 22 April 1976, archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/korean_war/clips/782/(accessed 27 August 2009).

2. Joe Vezgoff, www.australiansatwar.gov.au/ko_akh.html (accessed 7 October 2009).

3. 27Bde WD, 23 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA; 2PPCLI WD, 23 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C-3, NLAC; The Battle of Kapyong, p. 1, 145.2 P7013 (D4), DHH; O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 136–37. The suggestion that Burke planned to deploy 2PPCLI to Hill 677 and 3RAR to Hill 504 because the latter was more experienced and therefore in a better position to hold a lower and more approachable feature (see M. Edwards in Kapyong, Arcimedia) seems unlikely given that 1MX, though just as experienced as 3RAR, was supposed to hold the highest feature of all, Hill 794.

4. 16FR WD, 23 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 114.

5. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 141; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 114; see also 27Bde WD, 23 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA; Denis Gavin, “Korea – The Battle of Kapyong,” RSA Review 64, no. 5 (1988): 16.

6. McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 17.

7. P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong’, p. 1, PR83/154, AWM; Harry Honner, “A Kiwi Opo with 3RAR Korea 1951,” Duty First 1, no. 4 (1992): 33.

8. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 27. On the “precautionary measure” nature of 27Bde thinking at this stage see Comments made on report of Capt. Gerke, n/d, 2 (a.), 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM. On the Chinese as supposedly six to seven miles north of Hill 504 see Maj. D. P. Laughlin, B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 1, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

9. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 154 (see also O’Dowd in Kapyong, Arcimedia); Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 27; see Gallaway, Last Call, 241–42.

10. See 2PPCLI WD, 23 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C-3, NLAC.

11. 27Bde WD, 23 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA.

12. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 141; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 391; see 2nd Chemical Mortar Bn Command Report, 1 Sep. 50–1 Aug. 51, Part VII – Narrative Summary Period 1 to 30 April 1951, p. 17, Box 5030, RG 407, NARA. The tank company was missing its third platoon, which was guarding the IX Corps CP. Eighth Army, Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, K. W. Koch, p. 1, Box 56, RG 550, NARA.

13. Maj. D. P. Laughlin, B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 1, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

14. Gray, Danger Close, 57; see Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Wade H. Padgett, Harold Burros, John L. Mazyck, Otho C. Bragg, Box 56, RG 550, NARA.

15. Arthur “Nick” Hutley, 18205/4, IWMDS; Capt. K. J. Carter, Kapyong – April 1951, 681.013, DHH; J. N. Shipster, ed., The Die-Hards in Korea (Middlesex: The Middlesex Regiment, 1983), 65; Hickey, Korean War, 212.

16. See Stone and Castonguay, Korea 1951, 16.

17. O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 138; Ferguson in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 34.

18. Ferguson in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 27.

19. See O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 138– 39; Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 29–37.

20. See Watson, “From Calgary to Kap’yong,” 23; Brown, “Loyal Edmonton Regiment,” 91, 143, 167–68, passim.

21. Stone in McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 20; Stone in Melady, Korea, 73–74.

22. Gray, Danger Close, 58.

23. See McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 115.

24. On 27Bde indicating “a quiet night” on Hill 504, see Gray, Danger Close, 57. On the intent to push up to Hill 794, as Burke had originally planned, see note following 1700 O Group, 2PPCLI WD, 23 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C-3, NLAC.

25. McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 116.

26. Tunstall, I Fought, 112; see also, e.g., Arthur Hutley, 18205/4, IWMDS; 1MX WD, 23 Apr. 1951, 1900 hrs., 1999-11-189-21, NAM.

27. McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 118–20; 16 FR WD, 23 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1/2/1/7, ANZ; Shipster, Die-Hards, 65–66.

28. Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Joe Vezgoff, “Korea Remembered,” p. 10, www.kmike.com/oz/kr/chapter1.htm (accessed 7 October 2009).

29. Some sources suggest 3RAR was in position as early as 5:30 PM (P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong’, p. 1, PR 83/154, AWM), or 6 PM (Maj. B. O’Dowd, A Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, p. 1, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; Patrick Knowles, 19388/2, IWMDS; Bartlett, With the Australians, 92; James J. Atkinson, The Kapyong Battalion [Ryde, N.S.W.: NSW Historical Society, 1977], 17), while others indicate 8 PM (2PPCLI WD, 23 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC; O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 138–39). The 3RAR WD does not provide a time.

30. P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong’, p. 1, PR 83/154, AWM.

31. Joe Vezgoff, “Korea Remembered,” p. 10, www.kmike.com/oz/kr/chapter1.htm (accessed 7 October 2009); also Joe Vezgoff, www.australiansatwar.gov.au/ko_akh.html (accessed 7 October 2009). On the improvised nature of the defenses on Hill 504 and the absence of wire and mines see Jack Gallaway, www.australians atwar.gov.au/ko_akh.html (accessed 7 October 2009).

32. 2PPCLI WD, 23 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC.

33. Edwards in Gray, Danger Close, 58.

34. CBC Radio, Five Nights; see also Bishop, King’s Bishop, 118.

35. Wanniandy in Gray, Danger Close, 61, 63.

36. Melady, Korea, 73 (see McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 17; J. L. Granatstein and David J. Bercuson, War and Peacekeeping [Toronto: Key Porter, 1991], 116); see also, e.g., Crook in “Blood on the Hills,” Breakthrough Films and Television; Edwards and Lapointe in Bjarnason, Triumph, 108; O. R. Browne, “Kapyong! What Is It?” The Patrician 20 (1967): 19.

37. LaPointe in Gray, Danger Close, 61; see Gray in Kapyong, produced by John Lewis (North Fitzroy, Vic.: Arcimedia, 2011). Major Jack George of C Company positioned his men atop Hill 677 but was due to go on leave to Japan; “and he was in tears when he left,” a veteran recalled, “so we knew we were in for something bad.” CBC Radio, Five Nights. Other groups of retreating ROKs were observed or heard still heading south in the valley overnight. See MacLeod in Gray, Danger Close, 68; Melnechuk in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 93.

38. Dicken in Bercuson, The Patricias, 259; see Petrie, Fouldes, Munro in Gray, Danger Close, 53–54, 63.

39. Munro in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 92.

40. 2PPCLI WD, 23 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC; Wood, Strange Battleground, 76. On half-track problems see Hurst and Hoffman in Gray, Danger Close, 62–63; McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 20; Courtenay, Patricias, 188, 191.

41. Transcript of Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, produced by H. Clifford Chadderton (Ottawa: War Amps of Canada, 1989), p. 8, www.waramps.ca/military/korea.html (accessed 2 February 2010).

42. McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 20–21; see Sim in Gray, Danger Close, 64.

43. Campbell in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 95; see, e.g., Reynolds in Bjarnason, Triumph, 119.

44. Gray, Danger Close, 54; Lynch in Bjarnason, Triumph, 120.

45. Munro in Bercuson, Patricias, 259.

46. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 119; see Gray, Danger Close, 53.

47. See Cook in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 91; Cliff Chadderton, www.cliffchadderton.ca/blog/?page_id=15 (accessed 2 October 2009); Herst in Gray, Danger Close, 56, see also 118.

48. On 2PPCLI encounters with ROKs see, e.g., Bishop, King’s Bishop, 121. On Chinese night patrols and 2PPCLI see Campbell in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 95. On the full moon see Maj. D. P. Laughlin, B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 4, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM. On listening to the RAR fight over the radio link see Browne in Gray, Danger Close, 65. On watching what was going on across the valley see, e.g., Munro in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 93.

49. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 162; Maj. D. P. Laughlin, B Company Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 6, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

50. Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 143.

51. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 162; O’Dowd in Kapyong, Arcimedia.

52. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 45. O’Dowd himself had dismissed a report from 1 Platoon about an hour earlier that suggested the Chinese were already below his positions. See P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong’, p. 1, PR83.154, AWM.

53. 2nd Infantry Division: Command Report, 72nd Tank Battalion, Apr. 1951, p. 6, Box 2729, RG 406, NARA. The time of the first attacks is given in this source as 11 PM. However, other sources suggest somewhere around 9:30–10:00 PM. See Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Tanks Above Kapyong, Blumenson summary, p. 1, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 143; Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 45; W. N. Gravener, D Company in the Battle of Kapyong, p. 1, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

54. Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Kenneth W. Koch, p. 2, Robert B. Brown, p. 1, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; see ibid., Leroy W. Ritchotte, p. 1, Bert Tomlinson, p. 1; 2nd Infantry Division: Command Report, 72nd Tank Battalion, Apr. 1951, p. 6, Box 2729, RG 407, NARA; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 143; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 163.

55. Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Wilfred D. Millar, pp. 1–2, Box 56, RG 550, NARA.

56. Ibid., Wilfred D. Millar, pp. 1–2; see in ibid., Kenneth W. Koch, pp. 2–3, Robert B. Brown, p. 1, and Bert Tomlinson, p. 1; Young and Millar in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 48–50; Young in Bartlett, With the Australians, 95; 2nd Infantry Division: Command Report, 72nd Tank Battalion, Apr. 1951, p. 6, Box 2729, RG 407, NARA.

57. O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 141; Maj. D. P. Laughlin, B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 5, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; ibid., Maj. B. O’Dowd, A Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 1, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

58. O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 142.

59. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 164; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 121. In fact a survey of the area had previously been carried out and was available (ibid.).

60. Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; see also Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, A. Argent, p. 1, Box 56, RG 550, NARA. The command report of the 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion suggests that B Company did not withdraw until dawn on the 24th, admittedly without its weapons but in good order. See 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion Narrative Report, 1 Sep. 1950–1 Aug. 1951, p. 18, Box 5030, RG 407, NARA. However, at around midnight a patrol from 3RAR Headquarters Company had come across its position already abandoned. O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 145.

61. Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; see O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 166–67. On the Chinese having grenades and picking up rifles as they went see, e.g., O’Dowd in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 52; Douglas H. Mancktelow, Atsuko and the Aussie (North Vancouver, B.C.: DMA, 1991), 35.

62. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 53; see B. O’Dowd, A Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 2, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

63. B. O’Dowd, A Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 2, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 167; Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Patrick Knowles, 19388/2, IWMDS; P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong,’ p. 2, PR83/254, AWM; Bartlett, With the Australians, 98.

64. Patrick Knowles, 19388/2, IWMDS.

65. P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong,’ pp. 2–3, PR83/154, AWM.

66. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 168.

67. B. O’Dowd, A Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 3, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 169; Patrick Knowles, 19388/2, IWMDS.

68. Laughlin thought the artillery support did eventually arrive (D. P. Laughlin, B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 6, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM) though the New Zealand official history seems slightly puzzled as to who provided it (McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 123) and O’Dowd was pretty certain that none could have been provided to B Company (O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 164–66).

69. Maj. D. P. Laughlin, B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, pp. 7–8, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

70. Ibid., 8–9; see Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Wilfred D. Millar, pp. 2–3, Paul W. Ragen, p. 1, Rudolph Triscik, p. 1. Mylas P. Moore, p. 1, Box 56, RG 550, NARA. On the importance of .50-caliber machine-gun fire from the tanks see Young in Bartlett, With the Australians, 99; Ray Parry, 225727/14-15, IWMDS.

71. See Capt. R. Saunders, C Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 3, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; W. N. Gravener, D Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, pp. 1–2, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

72. Stan Bushell, S03783, AWM.

73. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 53; Capt. R. Saunders, C Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 3, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

74. Don Beard, S02687, AWM; see Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 36.

75. Fred From, S02649, AWM; see Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM; 3RAR WD, 23 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM; A. Argent, “The Next Leader,” in Butler, Argent, and Shelton, Fight Leaders, 105.

76. Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Kenneth W. Koch, p. 2, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; see Bartlett, With the Australians, 95–96; 3RAR WD, 23 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM.

77. Fred From, S02649, AWM; see also From in Gallaway, Last Call, 151.

78. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 53.

79. On the absence of radio communication see 27Bde WD, 24 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA. According to the CO’s personal signaler, Ferguson did not even try to establish contact via radio. Gallaway, Last Call, 250. On the tearing up of telephone lines by vehicles see 3RAR WD, 23 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM.

80. Jack Gallaway, S02651, AWM.

81. Breen, Battle of Kapyong 54 (see also Breen in the Kapyong documentary, Arcimedia); Gallaway, Last Call, 253; see 27Bde WD, 24 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA. Ferguson may in fact have originally intended only to go back to scout out a new position for his HQ. See Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM.

82. McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 125–27; 16 FR WD, 24 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 12/2/1/7, ANZ.

83. See Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Kenneth W. Koch, p. 2, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 55; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 126.

84. 1MX WD, 24 Apr. 1951, 199-11-189-21, NAM; Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Kenneth W. Koch, p. 2, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; see 27Bde WD, 24 Apr. 1951, WO 291/1886, TNA.

85. Shipster, Die-Hards, 66; 1MX WD, 24 Apr. 1951, 1999-11-189-21, NAM.

86. Shipster, Die-Hards, 66–67; Kemp, Middlesex Regiment, 367; 1MX WD, 24 Apr. 1951, 1999-11-189-21, NAM; Barry Reed, 2001-02-397, NAM. The 3RAR war diary incorrectly reported that the 1MX company had not in fact assaulted the position. 3RAR WD, 24 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM.

87. Fred From, S02649, AWM. On the failure of radio communication see, e.g., Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM. On the failure of communications between 16FR and 3RAR HQ around 4 AM see McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 126.

88. Bartlett, With the Australians, 97; Fred From, S02649, AWM.

89. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 57; see Bartlett, With the Australians, 97; Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM; “The Battle of Kapyong,” Australian Army Journal 59 (1954): 17–18

90. Maj. D. P. Laughlin, B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 11, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; see Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 57–59.

7. KAPYONG: THE THIRD DAY

1. Maurice Gasson, The Top of the Hill (Wellington, N.Z.: M. Gasson, 2008), 9.

2. Don Hibbs interview, The National Magazine, 27 July 1999, archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/korean_war/clips/684/(accessed 27 August 2009).

3. Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM [see also Harris and O’Dowd in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 65–66; Patrick Knowles, 19388/3, IWMDS]. On increased support from 16FR see McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 128.

4. B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 9, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; see Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Wilfred D. Millar, p. 3, Box 56, RG 550, NARA.

5. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 67–68; O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 148.

6. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 171.

7. Capt. W. N. Gravener, D Coy in the Battle of Kapyong, p. 1, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

8. Ibid., pp. 1–2; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 128.

9. See O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 146–48; Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 60–62; Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Kenneth W. Koch, pp. 3–4, Box 56, RG 550, NARA. Among the casualties was Bob Parker, Ferguson’s dispatch rider, who did not receive word of the withdrawal and, trying to make his way south solo on his motorcycle, was injured and captured. See Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 60–61; A2151, AI9/K/AUST/490, 491, 527, 518, p. 3, KB1073/11G Part 6, NAA. Communication problems meant that a number of officers with the forward companies did not get advance word that Ferguson was withdrawing (see Breen in Kapyong, Arcimedia). “Where the hell he was . . .” Bob O’Dowd later commented, “I don’t know. He certainly wasn’t in the battle area” (O’Dowd in ibid.).

10. O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 148, gives the time as 7:15 AM. The 3RAR war diary lists the time as 8 AM (3RAR WD, 24 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM). On the mortar round incident see O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 146; Dusty Ryan in Peter Thompson and Robert Macklin, Keep Off the Skyline (Milton, Qld.: Wiley, 2004), 67.

11. B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, pp. 11–12, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 148; Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Wilfred D. Millar, p. 3, Box 56, RG 550, NARA.

12. See Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM.

13. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 173; Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM.

14. William M. Hoge interview, p. 174, http://140.194.76.129/publications/eng-pamphlets/ep870-1-25/inter.pdf (accessed 25 January 2010). The 5th Cavalry had been part of Eighth Army reserve, but as soon as it was passed to IX Corps in the middle of the afternoon on 24 April it was attached to the Commonwealth Brigade. IX Corps Command Report: Book I, Apr. 1951, p. 37a, Box 1797, RG 407, NARA.

15. The First Team (Paduca, Ky.: Turner, 1994), 141.

16. B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 12, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; see O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 174.

17. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 74–75.

18. Ibid., 75–77; see B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 13, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

19. B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, pp. 13–14, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 80– 81; MC citation for Lt. L. M. Montgomerie and MM citation for T/Cpl. D. B. Davie in Atkinson, Kapyong Battalion, 54–56.

20. Don Beard, S02687, AWM; see Eighth Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Wilfred D. Millar, p. 3, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 82. Paradoxically, the 31 Set that Ferguson took with him now worked perfectly. Butler, Argent, and Shelton, Fight Leaders, 107n17.

21. Millar in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 83.

22. The 7.30 Report, 25 April 2001, transcript p. 4, www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2001/s283098.htm (accessed 28 January 2010); see Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 84.

23. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 174–75; see Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM.

24. B Coy Report – Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, p. 16, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

25. O’Neill, Australia, Vol. II, 148; Report on the Battle of Kapyong, C Company, 3RAR, pp. 4–5, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM.

26. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 175; AWM P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong’, p. 4, PR 83/154, AWM; Patrick Knowles, 19388/2, IWMDS.

27. D Coy in the Battle of Kapyong, p. 2, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; see O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 175.

28. Atkinson, Kapyong Battalion, 54.

29. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 96–98; Bartlett, With the Australians, 103–104; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 178; Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; D Coy in the Battle of Kapyong, p. 4, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, A. Argent, p. 2, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; Mo Gwyther in Patsy Adam-Smith, Prisoners of War (Ringwood, Vic.: Viking, 1992), 574–75; see also Patrick Knowles, 19388/2, IWMDS; Len Opie, S02654, AWM. Argent, IO for 3RAR, and the 3RAR war diary give the time of the attack as 1:30 PM. O’Dowd and Breen both suggest it took place at about 3 PM. It is also unclear if a strike had been called in; various sources suggest Gravener called for air support (Bartlett, With the Australians, 103; “Battle of Kapyong,” 24; Battle of Kapyong, 23–24 Apr. 1951, 3RAR, p. 4, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM), but O’Dowd (Valiant Company, 178) denies this. Fifty percent of air support during the Fifth Phase offensive came from aircraft launched from the carriers of Task Force 77. See Allan R. Millett, “Korea, 1950–53,” Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support, ed. Benjamin Franklin Cooling (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 379. Ironically, most of the USMC air sorties on the 24th were flown in support of I Corps farther west. See Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, Marine Operations, Vol. IV, 116. As the 3RAR mortar platoon commander put it, air strikes at Kapyong were “few and far between.” Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM.

30. Hawkins in Durney, Far Side, 117; see also Joe Vezgoff, “The Great Adventure 1950–1951,” p. 10, www.kmike.com/oz/kr/chapter1.htm (accessed 7 October 2009).

31. Don Beard, S02678, AWM.

32. Len Opie, S020654; AI9/K/AUST/490, 491, 517, 518, p. 4, KB1073/11G Part 6, A2151, NAA; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 185.

33. The 7.30 Report, 25 April 2001, transcript p. 1, www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2001/s283098.htm (accessed 28 January 2010); Parry won an MM for this action (Atkinson, Kapyong Battalion, 56).

34. Goslen narrative, 27 Bde, April 1951, WO 308/36, TNA; Wood, Strange Battleground, 74–76.

35. Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM. Exactly when this conversation took place is unclear. Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 86, 91, suggests about 12:30 PM. The battalion war diary (3RAR WD, 24 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM) indicates some point after 11:00 AM. O’Dowd claims that it was after USMC Corsairs struck 10 Platoon (O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 178), an event which the war diary lists as occurring at 1:30 PM and Breen (Battle of Kapyong, 96) after 3:00 PM. Decades later, Stone of 2PPCLI related that he overheard on the radio net Ferguson saying: “Withdraw as best you can to the Middlesex positions. I can no longer keep control.” James Riley Stone, SC407_SJR_198, UVic.

36. See Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 54, 67.

37. P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong’, p. 4, PR 83/154, AWM.

38. O’Dowd in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 92. On anticipating the order, see O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 179. O’Dowd also had to think about how to bring out the wounded as well as the unwounded, his men having made it clear that they should not be left behind in any withdrawal. See P. J. Knowles, A Rifleman’s View of ‘The Battle of Kapyong’, p. 4, PR 83/154, AWM. Dead bodies, though, would be left where they lay. See Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 95.

39. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 179–80; Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 92–93.

40. Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 183; see Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 99–100; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 130. The exact time at which the withdrawal was supposed to and did start is not entirely clear, but it occurred somewhere between 3:00 PM and 5:30 PM. See Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 93; “The Battle of Kapyong,” 24; O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 182. O’Dowd at first thought it too dangerous to take the forty-plus Chinese POWs along and considered having them shot, but in the end ordered Laughlin to take them with him. This decision turned out to have practical as well as moral advantages. “They did exactly as they were told,” O’Dowd recalled: “In fact we used a few of them to carry the wounded out – mainly Gravener’s burn cases from the American napalm.” O’Dowd in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 99; see O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 182.

41. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 183; see McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 130; D Coy in the Battle of Kapyong, p. 3, 665/7/1, Series 114, AWM; Donald Scott, 16 Fd Regt and the ‘Utah’ Battalion at Kapyong, p. 1, www.riv.co.nz/mza/tales/scott.htm (accessed 27 January 2010); Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Blaine Johnson, p. 2, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; Porter, “Battle of Kapyong – 16 NZ Fd Regt 23–25 April 1951,” 39; Hammond in Kapyong, Arcimedia.

42. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 184; see O’Dowd in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 102.

43. O’Dowd, Valiant Company, 184–85; Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 102–103; 3RAR WD, 24 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM.

44. AWM Len Opie, S02654, AWM. See, however, J. F. M. MacDonald, The Borderers in Korea (Berwick-upon-Tweed: Martins, 1978), 15.

45. CBC Radio, Five Nights; see also, e.g., MacLeod in Gray, Danger Close, 68.

46. Unidentified soldier in McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 24; see also, with reference to refugees/infiltrators passing by the mortar platoon, Michael Czuboka, p. 6, www.kvacanada.com/stories_ czuboka.htm (accessed 28 February 2010).

47. Mitchell in Barris, Deadlock, 84.

48. Gray, Danger Close, 69, 73–74; 2PPCLI WD, 24 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18381, RG-24-C3, NLAC. Loaded with extra ammunition, the men of B Company had arrived on Hill 504 carrying over sixty pounds of kit. They were, however, assisted by a platoon of Korean porters. Courtenay, Patricias, 200.

49. archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/korean_war/clips/742/(accessed 3 January 2010).

50. Mason in Gray, Danger Close, 78. Like those captured on the Imjin, prisoners taken at Kapyong noted the extent of this camouflage technique. “All around me were hundreds of Chinese with their own personal tree,” Private Bob Parker (3RAR) remembered: “When they moved it was like a whole forest moving.” Parker in Breen, Battle of Kapyong, 61.

51. Dave Crook in “Blood on the Hills,” Breakthrough Films and Television; see William Chrysler, “Military Activities,” p. 4, www.vac-acc.gov.ca/remembers (accessed 31 July 2009); Chrysler in Kapyong, Arcimedia.

52. archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/korean_war/clips/742 (accessed 3 January 2010). This man was likely Ray Nickerson of A Company: see Ray Nickerson, “Were You scared?” www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012). On fear see also McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 39; Gerald Edward Gowing, “Waves of Screaming Enemy,” www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012); Hibbs in Bjarnason, Triumph, 118. The argument that A Company later gave way to semi-panic as battle raged around other companies (see Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 92–93) is overstated (see Bishop, King’s Bishop, 126; Browne in Gray, Danger Close, 80; Ray Nickerson, “To the Hills Near Kapyong,” www.veterans.gc.ca [accessed 10 July 2012]).

53. Unidentified soldier in McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 22. This may have been a Korean civilian refugee, but the assumption was that disguised Chinese were mixed in with both military and civilian Koreans and no chances were taken. See Barris, Deadlock, 84.

54. archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/korean_war/clips/742 (accessed 3 January 2010).

55. 2PPCLI WD, 24 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC; Gray, Danger Close, 78.

56. Brian Munro in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 92.

57. Gray, Danger Close, 77.

58. Brent Watson, “Recipe for Victory: The Fight for Hill 677 During the Battle of the Kap’yong River, 24–25 April 1951,” Canadian Military History 9, no. 2 (2000): 17.

59. 2PPCLI WD, 24 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC.

60. Bercuson, Patricias, 260; see Ulmer in Courtenay, Patricias, 218; Hibbs in Bjarnason, Triumph, 118–19; Gray in Kapyong, Arcimedia.

61. Bercuson, Patricias, 260; see Menard in Gray, Danger Close, 91; Gerald Edward Gowing, “Waves of Screaming Enemy,” www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012); Courtenay, Patricias, 219.

62. Reaume in Courtenay, Patricias, 220.

63. 2PPCLI WD, 24 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC; Lilley in G. R. Stevens, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, 1919–1957 (Griesbach, Alta, Canada: Historical Committee of the Regiment, 1959), 301; Gray, Danger Close, 89–90, 95–96; Wood, Strange Battleground,76; McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 24; Wayne Mitchell in transcript of Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, War Amps of Canada, p. 9.

64. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 127.

65. James Riley Stone, SC407_SJR_198, UVic (hereafter J. Stone [UVic]).

66. Stone and Castonguay, Korea 1951, 20–21; see J. Stone (UVic); McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 24–25. Lilley gives the time of this assault as 2 AM (Lilley in Stevens, Princess Patricia’s, 301), but official sources suggest the attempted attack on battalion HQ took place before midnight. See 2PPCLI WD, 24 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC; The Kapyong Battle, p. 2, 145.2 P7013 (D4), DHH.

67. See Gray, Danger Close, 92–93; Michael Czuboka, p. 7, www.kvacanada.com stories-czuboka.htm (accessed 23 August 2011); Bjarnason, Triumph, 126–27.

68. 2PPCLI WD, 24 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC.

69. Wood, Strange Battleground, 77; see Mitchell, transcript of Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, War Amps of Canada, pp. 9–10; Bjarnason, Triumph, 121–22; Wani-andy in Bercuson, Patricias, 262.

70. Lilley in Wood, Strange Battleground, 79; see Gray, Danger Close, 95–96; Michael Czuboka, p. 6, www.kvacanada.com/stories_czuboka.htm (accessed 28 February 2010).

71. Lilley in Stevens, Princess Patricia’s, 301; see Wood, Strange Battleground, 76, 79; The Kapyong Battle, p. 2, 145.2 P7013 (D4), DHH; Gray, Danger Close, 89.

72. Wood, Strange Battleground, 77; Gray, Danger Close, 94.

73. 2PPCLI WD, 24 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC [entries for the early hours of 25 April appear under 24 April]; The Kapyong Battle, pp. 2–3, 145.2 P7013 (D4), DHH; Mills in Wood, Strange Battleground, 77. The assertion that the Chinese were using the tubes abandoned by B Company, 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion against the Canadians on the night of 24–25 April (see Gray, Danger Close, 87–88) seems unlikely given their recovery – along with the equipment abandoned by the 74th Engineer Combat Battalion – during the daylight hours of 24 April (see 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion Command Report, 1 Sep. 1950 – 1 Aug. 1951: Part VII – Narrative Summary Period – 1 to 30 April 1951, p. 19, Box 5030, RG 407, NARA; RG 550, Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Wade H. Padgett, Harold Burros, John L. Mazyck, Otho C. Bragg, Haywood Butler, Frank Heard Jr., Box 56, RG 550, NARA).

74. See Stone in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 94.

75. 2PPCLI WD, 24 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC [entries for the early hours of 25 April appear under 24 April]; Mills in Wood, Strange Battleground, 77–78; McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 25; Gray, Danger Close, 102. There is some question as to how bad the situation was with 12 Platoon. See ibid., 104.

76. Stone and Coombe in Gray, Danger Close, 104, 111; see Stone in Melady, Korea, 77; J. Stone (UVic); see also Notes on talk given by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone, 5 June 1951, p. 4, 681.011 (D3), DHH. On the limits to vision even under the bright moonlight see, e.g., Bishop, King’s Bishop, 124. Hub Gray, a mortar platoon officer, was convinced that the veteran Levy, in contrast to the comparatively un-blooded Mills, knew what he was doing at Kapyong. See Gray, Danger Close, xvi, 5, 7, 73, 115–16, 118, 214–25; Bjarnason, Triumph, 132–37. Others, however, suggest that Mills behaved quite professionally. See Courtenay, Patricias, 218, 228, 230–31, 237.

77. Stone and Castonguay, Korea 1951, 22; Stone in Melady, Korea, 77. The air drop was suggested to Stone by his IO, Lieutenant A. P. McKenzie. Courtenay, Patricias, 232; J. Stone (UVic).

78. See Notes on talk given by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone, 5 June 1951, p. 4, 681.011 (D3), DHH; Report by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone on activities of 2PPCLI in Korea, 23 Dec. 1950, p. 2, 145.2 P7013 (D6), DHH.

79. Gray, Danger Close, 104–106, 114; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 134.

80. McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 25; see also, e.g., Browne, “Kapyong! What Is It?” 21.

81. 16FR WD, 24/25 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ; McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 134.

82. Campbell in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 96.

83. IX Corps Command Report, Book 1, Apr. 1951, p. 38, Box 1797, RG 407, NARA.

84. Campbell in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 96. On the barrage see also 16FR WD, 25 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ.

85. 27Bde WD, 25 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA; see The Kapyong Battle, p. 4, 145.2 P7013 (D4), DHH; 16FR WD, 25 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ.

86. William Chrysler, “Military Activities,” www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012). On expecting to be overrun see CBC Radio, Five Nights; Ray Nickerson, “To the Hills Near Kapyong,” www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012).

87. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 126.

8. KAPYONG: THE FINAL DAY

1. Middleton in Gray, Danger Close, 120.

2. McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 27.

3. Michael Czuboka, pp. 7–8, www.kvacanada.com/stories_czuboka.htm (accessed 28 February 2010); see Courtenay, Patricias, 245–46.

4. See Middleton in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 99. On the two helicopters see also 27Bde WD, 25 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA. The wounded were flown to the Indian Field Ambulance and then to a Commonwealth hospital in Japan. See Douglas in Gray, Danger Close, 121–22.

5. Gray, Danger Close, 118. On claims that no hatred was felt for the Chinese, see, e.g., archives.cbc.ca/war_conflict/korean_war/clips/742 (accessed 3 January 2010); John Kelanchey, 19386/2, IWMDS.

6. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 126.

7. Stone and Castonguay, Korea 1951, 3.

8. McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 40.

9. Welsh in Barris, Deadlock, 89; see Bill Lee in Gray, Danger Close, 122.

10. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 126; Michael Czuboka, p. 8, www.kvacanada.com/stories_czuboka.htm (accessed 28 February 2010); William Chrysler, “Military Activities,” www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012); see 2PPCLI WD, 25 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC; McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 27–28; Stone and Castonguay, Korea 1951, 22; James Riley Stone, SC407_SJR_198, UVic; Wood, Strange Battleground, 78. On the U.S. ammunition see Courtenay, Patricias, 246. On the redistribution of .303 ammunition see William Chrysler, “Military Activities,” www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012); McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 26; Courtenay, Patricias, 245.

11. Gray, Danger Close, 122.

12. See ibid., 131–35, 233; McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 26–27.

13. Gray, Danger Close, 123–24.

14. 2PPCLI WD, 25 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC; The Kapyong Battle, p. 3, 145.2 P7013 (D4), DHH. On sniper fire and grenades see Gray, Danger Close, 123.

15. See Gray, Danger Close, 118–19, 121; Cook in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 91–92; Douglas in Bjarnason, Triumph, 124–25. Douglas, who survived, was awarded an MM for his selfless action.

16. Pearson in Gray, Danger Close, 123; see 2PPCLI WD, 25 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC.

17. 2PPCLI WD, 25 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC.

18. IX Corps Command Report, Book 1, Apr. 1951, p. 37a, Box. 1797, RG 407, NARA; 27Bde WD, 25 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA.

19. Johnson in Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 97; 2PPCLI WD, 25 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC. On artillery fire on the 25th see also 16FR WD, 25 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ.

20. 3RAR WD, 25 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM; Melnechuk in Gray, Danger Close, 125; see IX Corps Command Report, Book 1, Apr. 1951, p. 38, Box 1797, RG 407, NARA; Gray, Danger Close, 125, 127.

21. 27Bde WD, 25 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA.

22. 3RAR WD 25 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM.

23. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 127; see 2PPCLI WD, 25 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC.

24. 2 PPCLI WD, 25 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC.

25. 3RAR WD, 25 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM; 27Bde WD, 26 Apr. 1951, WO 281/710, TNA.

26. Middleton in Gray, Danger Close, 135. In another version Middleton remembered the visitors included Ridgway himself; see Courtenay, Patricias, 248–49.

27. Gray, Danger Close, 127; 16FR WD, 26 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ; 2PPCLI WD, 26 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC.

28. Michael Czuboka, p. 8, www.kvacanada.com/stories_czuboka.htm (accessed 28 February 2010).

29. McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 29.

30. See 2PPCLI WD, 26–27 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC; 3RAR WD, 26–27 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM.

31. Bishop, King’s Bishop, 130; Munro in Gray, Danger Close, 127–29.

32. The 3RAR war diarist, after recounting some problems, admitted that: “Compared with the [U.N.] withdrawals of December [1950] and January [1951], the present just completed were orderly and well executed.” 3RAR WD, 28 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM. On confusion within the brigade during the withdrawal see, e.g., McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 34; Middleton in Gray, Danger Close, 126–27.

33. Tunstall, I Fought, 113; see Notes on Talk by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone, 5 June 1951, p. 4, 681.011 (D3), DHH; 2PPCLI WD, 27–28 Apr. 1951, Vol. 18318, RG-24-C3, NLAC; 3RAR WD, 27–28 Apr. 1951, 4/28, Series 85, AWM; 16FR WD, 27 Apr. 1951, WA-K 1 DAK 1 2/1/7, ANZ; 1KOSB WD, 27–28 Apr. 1951, WO 281/478, TNA. On the withdrawal not being liked in, e.g., 1MX, see Shipster, Die-Hards, 67; Kemp, Middlesex Regiment, 368.

EPILOGUE

1. Carne remark reported in Daily Express, 2 September 1953, p. 2.

2. McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 39.

3. See Salmon, Last Round, 252.

4. Cubiss letter in Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 123; see also, e.g., Alex Patterson in Doherty, Sons of Ulster, 158; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 71; Mason, Diplomatic Dispatches, 71; R. S. Gill, letter 64, 26 April 1951, IWMDD.

5. Barclay, First Commonwealth, 67; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 135. On the Gloster casualty figures see Harding, Imjin Roll, 46–77, 80–83. On the Northumberland casualty figures see Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 342–60. On the Ulster casualty figures see Quis Separabit, Winter 1951, p. 79. On the Belgian casualty figures see Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 215.

6. Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 157; Brodie to Steele, 29 April 1951, in Quis Separabit 18, no. 1 (1951): 9; see Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 429; Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 479, 630n48 (see also Appleman diary, September 10, 1951, Roy E. Appleman Papers, USAMHI). On Brodie blaming Soule, see Harris, Fighting 65th, 183; see also Brodie to Joslen, 19 July 1957, CAB 157/23, TNA.

7. Ridgway to Van Fleet, 9 May 1951, Folder T-Z, Box 19, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USAMHI.

8. Harris, Fighting 65th, 183.

9. Eighth Army, Command Conference held by Army Commander with Corps commanders, 30 April 1951, Box 1180, RG 407, NARA.

10. Van Fleet to Ridgway, 11 May 1951, File T-Z, Box 19, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USAMHI.

11. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (London: Cresset, 1968), xii. On the American view that the British had not called for help soon enough see also, e.g., oral history, Section III, p. 51, Harold K. Johnson Papers, USAMHI.

12. Ions, Call to Arms, 161; Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 140; Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), 172; see Robertson to Slim, 17 May 1951, Impressions of the British Commonwealth part in the CCF offensive on 22–26 April 1951, p. 2, WO 216/345, TNA.

13. There were, however, occasional hints in the press that the South Koreans were to blame. See, e.g., Washington Post, 15 May 1951, p. 14.

14. Daily Herald, 30 April 1951, p. 1; Guardian, 27 April 1951, p. 5; see also, e.g., The Times, 27 April 1951, p. 6; 30 April 1951, p. 4.

15. Daily Express, May 2, 1951, p. 1; Daily Telegraph, 28 April 1951, p. 1.

16. Statement by the Minister of Defence on Operations in Korea – 2 May 1951, PREM 8/1405, TNA.

17. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5 Series, 2 May 1951, cols. 189–90.

18. Daily Herald, 3 May 1951, pp. 1–2; Guardian, 3 May 1951, p. 6; The Times, 3 May 1951, p. 5; Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1951, p. 4.

19. R. S. Gill letter 69, 9 May 1951, IWMDD.

20. The Times, 9 May 1951, p. 6. The full Milburn tribute was reproduced in St. George’s Gazette, 31 May 1951, p. 104. Van Fleet was also “full of praise” for the Glosters when interviewed privately about the Imjin battle several months later. See Appleman diary, 15 Sep. 1951, Roy E. Appleman Papers, USAMHI.

21. On the citation and its presentation see Harding, Imjin Roll, 95–96; Barclay, Commonwealth Division, 67; The Times, 12 May 1951, p. 5.

22. Daily Telegraph, 9 May 1951, p. 1; Daily Herald, 9 May 1951, p. 2. On audiences cheering see The Back Badge 3, no. 11 (1951): 226.

23. The Times, 4 June 1951, p. 4; 21 May 1951, p. 4; 16 May 1951, p. 4; see, e.g., Washington Post, 15 May 1951, p. 14.

24. Kahn, The Gloucesters. On enthusiasm for Kahn’s article see, e.g., The Back Badge 3, no. 11 (1951): 226.

25. The Back Badge 3, no. 11 (1951): 227–28.

26. Noble, Shoot First, 185–86; Holles, Now Thrive, 173; Grist, “Korean Campaign,” 44.

27. Frank Cottam, 21729/4, IWMDS [see also, e.g., Charles Sharpling, 18544/1, IWMDS]. On captured officers feeling guilty see Cunningham, No Mercy, 76; see also Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 30102/1, IWMDS; though see also David Holds­ worth, 15428/3, IWMDS. Other ranks might have similar feelings. See, e.g., Large, One Man’s War, 71.

28. Gordon Potts, 23213/8, IWMDS (also on the platoon commander who had to be replaced); Denis Prout, 18775/4, IWMDS; Whatmore, One Road, 85; M. Harvey quoted in news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/uk_news/1288010.stm (accessed 14 August 2007); see also Roy Rees, 19854/2, IWMDS; Grist, Remembered, 46; Kavanagh, Perfect Stranger, 111.

29. Kavanagh, Perfect Stranger, 122 (see also, e.g., Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/3, IWMDS). On the men recovering quickly see, e.g., Dennis Matthews, 12729/2, IWMDS; North Irish Brigade Chronicle 1, no. 4 (1952): 32; H. G. Martin, “With the 27th and 29th Brigades,” Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1951, p. 4.

30. Younger, Blowing Bridges, 208.

31. On a mutiny in 9 Platoon of the Fusiliers see WO 71/1024, TNA. On bitterness in the RNF see also Cpl. W. K. West-wood, p. 2, AI9/K/BRIT/157, KB1073/11G Part 7, A2151, NAA. On the court-martial cases for desertion in the aftermath of the Imjin see list in WO 93/59, TNA. On breaking down under fire post-Imjin, see, e.g., description by Adams in Walker, Barren Place, 21.

32. “Korea 1951,” Journal of the Northamptonshire Regiment 15, no. 2 (1953): 20; Scott to Blackett-Orde, 1 May 1951, in Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 131. On replacing signals equipment see Robertson to Slim, 17 May 1951, p. 3, WO 216/345, TNA. On officer replacements being flown out see, e.g., Ions, Call to Arms, 148–53. Other ranks also might find themselves aboard aircraft for at least part of the journey. See, e.g., Ronald Wells’s narrative, pp. 7–8, IWMDD.

33. Harvey, War in Korea, 136; Grist, Remembered, 42; see “Korea 1951,” Journal of the Northamptonshire Regiment 15, no. 2 (1953): 20; Major Boris J. Eastwood, f. 442, K-671, WO 373/119, TNA.

34. The Telegram [Toronto], 27 April 1951, p. 6; The Age [Melbourne], 27 April 1951, p. 1; Sydney Morning Herald, 28 April 1951, p. 2; see, e.g., Sydney Morning Herald, 27 April 1951, p. 1; The Globe and Mail [Toronto], 26 April 1951, p. 1; The Telegram [Toronto], 26 April 1951, p. 1; The Gazette [Montreal], 26 April 1951, p. 1.

35. See “Unique,” by Harry Hall – himself an ex-Gloster – in The Telegram, Toronto, 14 June 1951, p. 6; see also www.glosters.org.uk/collection (accessed 15 March 2010). For a rare British report on the Kapyong battle – made in conjunction with a report on the Imjin fighting – see Daily Telegraph, 30 April 1951, p. 4.

36. WO 32/14250, TNA.

37. On national coverage of the PUC see, e.g., Globe and Mail [Toronto], 27 June 1951, p. 6; The Telegram [Toronto], 26 June 1951, pp. 1–2; Toronto Daily Star, 26 June 1951, pp. 1–2; Sydney Morning Herald, 27 June 1951, p. 1.

38. The casualty figures are from Bartlett, With the Australians, 106. On fatigue see, e.g., Young in Bartlett, With the Australians, 105; Patrick Knowles, 19388/2, IWMDS; Tim Holt in Thompson and Macklin, Keep Off, 70. On morale see Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM.

39. Stone and Castonguay, Korea 1951, 23; see Notes on talk by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone, 5 June 1951, p. 4, 681.011 (D3), DHH. The casualty figures are those listed in Stevens, Princess Patricia’s, 303.

40. McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 39.

41. See, e.g., Jack Gallaway, http://www.australiansatwar.gov.au//ko_akh.html (accessed 7 October 2009); Tom Muggleton, S02652, AWM; William Chrysler, “Military Activities,” www.veterans.gc.ca (accessed 10 July 2012).

42. Doherty, Sons of Ulster, 158; see Owen Smith, 18441/3, IWMDS. On the grim business of identifying remains see Sean Fitzsimons in Doherty, Sons of Ulster, 159; Grist, Remembered, 51; Harvey, War in Korea, 144; Whatmore, One Road, 92–98; Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/5, IWMDS; Denis Whybro, 20008/13, IWMDS.

43. Keith Taylor, 1989-05-257-1, NAM.

44. Samuel Phillips, 17688/3, IWMDS; Andrew Scott, 16855/2, IWMDS; on strengthening defenses see also, e.g., Grist, Remembered, 52; 1GLOS WD, 29 June 1951, WO 281/1244, TNA; Gordon Potts, 23213/9, IWMDS; Anthony Perrins, 19387/3, IWMDS; Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 77; Gregory Blaxland, The Regiments Depart (London: Kimber, 1971), 183.

45. Linklater, Year in Space, 108; see also, e.g., Cassels, “The Commonwealth Division,” 367. Prior to its departure for Hong Kong, 1MX, as part of 28Bde, had also dug in with a will. See Shipster, DieHards, 68.

46. Keith Taylor, 1989-05-257-1, NAM; see, e.g., Taylor to Slim, 21 July 1951, WO 216/741, TNA.

47. Minute 3, RAC1 to FVA2, 25 May 1951, WO 32/14418, TNA.

48. On, e.g., 8RIH officers trading whisky for Browning machine-guns see Salmon, Last Round, 266; see also Gray in Walker, Barren Place, 75; George Forty, At War in Korea (Shepperton: Ian Allan, 1982), 141.

49. Ions, Call to Arms, 177; see, e.g., Maj. R. Leith-Macgregor Battle Experience Questionnaire, p. 1, WO 231/89, TNA; Martin, K Force, 147–48.

50. On Major Wilson and the grenades see Dare Wilson, Tempting the Fates (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2006), 173. On wearing helmets post-Imjin, see, e.g., Keith Taylor, 1989-05-257-1, NAM.

51. Taylor letter, 9 Oct. 1951 in Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 207; see also Thomas Cunningham-Booth, 19913/4, IWMDS; Samuel Phillips, 17688/3, IWMDS. On Operation Commando see Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 218–29. On the part played by the Ulsters see also Hamill, Ulster Rifles, 91–94. The Northumberlands, it seems clear, were far from happy to find themselves attacking only six days before they were due to leave (see Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 206, note).

52. Barclay, Commonwealth Division, 204; 45FR would go home in November, 8RIH in December. Many of the Belgians had already returned home in August. 16FR stayed in Korea, but, as with 3RAR, most officers and men were replaced in the course of 1951.

53. Appleman diary, September 10, 1951, Roy E. Appleman Papers, USAMHI; see Brigadier Thomas Brodie, f. 454, K-664, WO 373/119, TNA; www.unithistories.com/officers/Army_officers_B04.html (accessed 27 June 2009). On the replacing of Brigadier Taylor see Hickey, Korean War, 264. On Burke see www.generals.dk/general/Burke/Brian_Arthur/Great_Britain.html (accessed 17 March 2010).

54. See Barclay, Commonwealth Division, 223; Farrar-Hockley, British Part, Vol. II, 135. On the static phase of the war, 1951–53, see, e.g., Hastings, Korean War, chapter 16.

55. 339 Australian and 516 Canadian servicemen died between 1950 and 1953.

56. Grist, Remembered, 61; see The Times, 22 December 1951, p. 2; Holles, No Rice, 174–75; Ronald Wells narrative, p. 12, IWMDD.

57. The Times, 22 December 1951, p. 2; 21 December 1951, p. 6.

58. “US General Ridgway and the Glosters battle,” www.thekoreanwar.co.uk html/sound_bites.html (accessed 11 August 2007).

59. Daily Telegraph, 24 April 1952, p.5; The Times, 24 April 1952, p. 3; see The Times, 27 March 1952, p. 6; 28 April 1952, p. 4; 1 May 1952, p. 3. On the Imjin POWs in Chinese hands see S. P. MacKenzie, British Prisoners of the Korean War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), chapter 5.

60. Linklater, Our Men, 61. The Imjin narrative was covered on pp. 55–61, while Kapyong was covered on pp. 61–64. On the development of Our Men in Korea see AIR 2/11509, BW 83/17, INF 12/602, TNA.

61. VC Citation in Harding, Imjin Roll, 89–90. On the DSC see The Times, 19 November 1953, p. 5. On press interest in the return of Carne and the Glosters see, e.g., Daily Express, 2 September 1953, p. 2; Daily Telegraph, 15 August 1953, p. 7; 29 August 1953, pp. 1, 8; 31 August 1953, pp. 1, 8; 1 September 1953, p. 1; 14 October 1953, pp. 1, 5.

62. See Farrar-Hockley, Edge; Davies, In Spite; Kinne, Wooden Boxes; Matthews, No Rice.

63. Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters, Canada’s Army in Korea (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1956), 14–18; Barclay, First Commonwealth, 58–70.

64. See, e.g., Eagle’s comment, “Korean Veterans Remember Fallen Comrades,” 20 April 2001, news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/uk_news/1288010.stm (accessed 14 August 2007). The “forgotten” theme is also plugged in the titles of various programs and films; see, e.g., Korea: Canada’s Forgotten War, produced by H. Clifford Chadderton (Ottawa: War Amps of Canada, 1989), www.waramps.ca/military/korea.html (accessed 2 February 2010); “The Forgotten Battle in the Forgotten War,” The 7.30 Report, ABC Television, 25 April 2001, www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2001/s283098.htm (accessed 28 January 2010).

65. One popular British writer went even further, suggesting that it was the stand of 29th Brigade that not only halted the enemy drive on Seoul but also first brought the Chinese to the negotiating table. See Perrett, Last Stand, 213. This was also the implication – with the Glosters very much at center stage – in Newbould and Beresford, Glosters, 126–27. On Canadian and Australian claims to have saved Seoul compare, e.g., the statements made in two television programs: Ben Evans in The 7.30 Report, ABC Television, 25 April 2001, www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2001/s283098.htm (accessed 28 January 2010); Dan Bjarnason in The National Magazine, 27 July 1999, archives.cbc.ca/war_con-flict/korean_war/clips/684/ (accessed 27 August 2009). Compare also the claims made on behalf of the two brigades for the South Korean official history: Ministry of National Defense, United Nations Forces II, 179, 623.

66. See Notes on Talk by Lt.-Col. J. R. Stone, 5 June 1951, p. 4, 681.0 11 (D3), DHH; Odgers, Remembering Korea, 91.

67. See Dolcater 3d Infantry, 205; Hickey, Korean War, 235. For the patriotic habit of associating the figure of 10,000+ enemy casualties with the efforts of 29Bde on the Imjin see, e.g., Newbould and Beresford, Glosters, 126–27; www.remuseum.org.uk/on_line/rem_online-korea3.hm (accessed 10 March 2009); Charles Whiting, Battleground Korea (Stroud: Sutton, 1999), 168; Ministry of National Defense, United Nations Forces, Vol. II, 623 (the official South Korean account drafted by British authorities – see Hickey, Korean War, 382). British accounts of the Korean War almost always place greater emphasis on the Battle of the Imjin than American accounts. It is notable that in the latter the halting of the Chinese Fifth Phase offensive is explained as a collective effort in which the Battle of the Imjin played only a part and which did not culminate until 29 April. See, e.g., Mossman, Ebb and Flow, chapters 21–22; Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 458–97; Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (New York: Times Books, 1987), chapter 26.

68. On the 10,000 figure as accepted but rather arbitrary see Hastings, Korean War, 270.

69. Salmon, Last Round, 260, second footnote. It is also commonly repeated that the Chinese 63rd Army was so badly mauled by the brigade that it had to be withdrawn from the war. This was not in fact the case. Ibid., first footnote.

70. On the Glosters dodging amalgamation as a result of their battle honors from Korea see, e.g., Blaxland, Regiments Depart, 336, 482; see also Salmon, Last Round, 329. On public awareness of the war in Britain centering on the Imjin battle see, e.g., BBC News, “Korea veterans return to scene of battle,” 22 April 2001, news.bbc.co.uk/1290593.stm (accessed 29 February 2008); “Veterans Return to Pay Their Respects,” Soldier, 26 May 1997, pp. 17–19. A battlefield memorial was unveiled in 1957 when the last British soldiers left the Republic of Korea. See Soldier 13 (1957): 19. A memorial to 3RAR at Kapyong did not appear until 1963 (rebuilt 1988), and the Commonwealth Monument at Kapyong – along with a full-scale Imjin monument – only appeared in 1967, followed by a Canadian monument in 1975 and a New Zealand monument in 1988. 1st Peace Camp for Youth, youth-peace-camp.blogspot.com (accessed 17 March 2010).

71. Younger, Blowing Bridges, 205 (“severe setback”). For the designation of each battle as a “separate engagement” see War Office, The Official names of the Battles, Actions & Engagements fought by the Land Forces of the Commonwealth during the Australian Campaign in the “South-West Pacific 1942–1945” and the “New Zealand Campaign in the South Pacific 1942–1944” and the “Korean Campaign 1950–1953” (London: HMSO, 1958), 16–17.

72. See Stone in William Johnston, A War of Patrols (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 105.

CONCLUSION

1. John Mole, 23221/5, IWMDS; see also Thomas Chadwick, 1653727/27, IWMDS.

2. Stone and Castonguay, Korea 1951, 23; see also James Stone, “Some Commonwealth Men,” Duty First 1, no. 4 (1992): 37.

3. Unidentified 29Bde HQ officer quoted in Hastings, Korean War, 261. Tom Brodie in fact used this phrase in reference to the Glosters only, and to the divisional rather than the corps commander.

4. See Grey, Commonwealth Armies, 82.

5. On the Chinese having to conduct improvised reconnaissance at Kapyong (in contrast to the detailed picture built up before the attack across the Imjin started) see, e.g., Browne, “Kapyong! What Is It?” 20. As one Canadian historian has noted, “the Chinese were initially slow to exploit the ROK collapse.” Johnston, War of Patrols, 91. This may have been because the enemy was expecting to encounter and fight it out with 27Bde. McGibbon, New Zealand, Vol. II, 111.

6. On blaming the 1st ROK Division see Ridgway, The Korean War (Doubleday), 172; Washington Post, 15 May 1951, p. 14; Robertson to Slim, 17 May 1951, Impressions of the British Commonwealth Part in the CCF Offensive on 22–26 April 1951, p. 2, WO 216/345, TNA; Ions, Call to Arms, 161; Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 140.

7. Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 30102/1, IWMDS. On the 1st ROK Division fighting well at the Imjin see Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 468–69; see also Salmon, Last Round, 260, third footnote.

8. Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 103 (“morale problem”); Phil Bennett, S02656, AWM (“no esprit”); Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM (“not very good”). On Australian complaints about D Coy 1MX withdrawing at Kapyong and their unfairness see Barry Reed, 2001-02-397, NAM. Reed himself, as noted, won an MC. Compare also the award totals for the Patricias and Australians on the one hand and the Fusiliers and Glosters on the other for actions between 22 and 25 April 1951: 2PPCLI garnered an MC, a DSO, a DCM, and two MMs (Gray, Danger Close, 146, 225), while 3RAR received an MC, a DSO, a DCM, and two MMs (Atkinson, Kapyong Battalion, 53–57). 1RNF, meanwhile, received two MCs, two DSOs, and two DCMs (Perrins, ‘Pretty Rough,’ 362–90) while 1GLOS got two VCs, three MCs, and eight MMs (Harding, Imjin Roll, 86–87).

9. On the steepness of the slopes making it hard for attackers – or tourists – to quickly ascend Hill 677 see, e.g., Norm Christie’s comments in “Blood on the Hills,” Breakthrough Films and Television.

10. Pearson in Gray, Danger Close, 73; see also, with reference to the Lee-Enfield rifle, e.g., Ben O’Dowd, S02659, AWM; Large, One Man’s War, 46.

11. On the increase in MMGs see Taylor to Slim, 21 July 1951, WO 216/741, TNA. On the hunt for U.S. weapons see, e.g., Martin, K Force, 147–48.

12. See Eighth Army Command Report: Section IV: After-Action Interviews: Book 2: Tanks Above Kapyong, Box 56, RG 550, NARA; Winn, Korea Campaign Supplement, 12–21.

13. See Watson, “Recipe for Victory,” 18, 21.

14. Reliable communication between D Company and Battalion HQ allowed for the calling in of the massed artillery that saved the 2PPCLI position in the early hours of 25 April. “We had telephone lines to each company,” Stone recalled, “and by good fortune they remained intact.” He also had unusually good reception on the brigade radio net. Stone, “Commonwealth Men,” 37. Other units, as noted in previous chapters, suffered communication breakdowns at various stages. See with reference to 3RAR, e.g., Peter Londey, “Feeling Like an ANZAC: The Battle of Kapyong, April 1951,” Wartime 9 (2000): 22.

15. Grey, Commonwealth Armies, 85.

16. Lieutenant Michael G. Levy, according to another junior officer in 2PPCLI, functioned far more competently than Captain J. G. Mills at Kapyong, though it was the latter who was awarded an MC. See Gray, Danger Close, passim.

17. Grey, Commonwealth Armies, 85.

18. Korea Institute of Military History, Korean War, Vol. II, 635–36. Stone argued that “they could have overrun us” but did not because “our area was the limit of their operation.” Stone, “Commonwealth Men,” 37. Even if the Chinese had pushed harder, though, 2PPCLI was unlikely to have suffered the same fate as the Glosters. See Johnston, War of Patrols, 105.

19. Grey, Commonwealth Armies, 84.

20. On the Americans blaming the British and vice versa see Epilogue. On the Belgians blaming the British see, e.g., Gunst, Philips, and Vehaegen, Saison, 145ff.

21. Douglas Johnson-Charlton, 1525/6, IWMDS; see also, e.g., Hepenstall, Find the Dragon, 104.

22. Appleman, Ridgway Duels, 471.

23. See Watson, “Recipe for Victory,” 20.

24. Salmon, Last Round, 314. There is also a question mark surrounding Carne’s decision not to try to break out southward on the 24th in order to link up with the 10BCT/8RIH force, which before being stopped was only a couple of thousand yards from Gloster Hill. This arises, however, with the advantage of hindsight, that is, the knowledge – denied to Carne at the time – that this would be the closest any rescue effort would come in light of the dispersion of the relief forces on the 25th. If Carne had struck out on the 24th, there might well have been fewer overall Gloster casualties than was ultimately the case, but the likelihood is that while fewer prisoners would have fallen into Chinese hands, the number of dead and wounded would have been higher than was ultimately the case. What would actually have happened if Carne had chosen to gamble rather than exercise prudence on Tuesday afternoon? “The answer, of course,” as Andrew Salmon rightly points out, “can never be known.” Ibid., 308.

25. Andrew Salmon argues that the “sticky” misunderstanding on Tuesday afternoon was essentially irrelevant, since the Glosters did indeed hold out through the night and – if they had not been redeployed due to other pressing needs – the American units originally allocated for the counter-attack on Wednesday were strong enough to have broken through. Ibid., 309–10. This does, however, overlook the possibility that if Brodie had used more forceful, American-style language, then Soule, perhaps with help from Milburn, might have been able to gather forces sufficient to reinforce the 10BCT/8RIH force that had failed and make a second, more powerful, and ultimately successful attempt to push up Route 57 before darkness fell on Tuesday. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that such a second task force would have been able to escort the Glosters back before nightfall; in other words, the end result might well have been an even larger U.N. force (the Glosters plus the rescuers) surrounded and facing either ultimate extinction or a “death ride” southward, and of a worse kind than the rest of 29th Brigade experienced at the same time as all U.N. forces were pulling back on Wednesday. See Huth to Joselen, 8 Aug. 1957, CAB 157/23, TNA.

26. See Grey, Commonwealth Armies, 85.

27. The adjutant of the Glosters, Tony Farrar-Hockley, remembered asking himself repeatedly, after the Glosters were ordered not to withdraw, what was the point of having prepared positions to fall back on? Hastings, Korean War, 261. Farrar-Hockley probably was referring to Line Delta, which Eighth Army had prepared earlier, rather than to positions dug by the Glosters, which explains why no references to a Gloster-created fall-back line could be found by Andrew Salmon (Last Round, 311, first footnote).

28. Appleman diary, September 15, 1951, Roy E. Appleman Papers, USAMHI.

29. On Van Fleet privately thinking the loss of the Glosters had been worth it see Van Fleet to Ridgway, May 11, 1951, Folder T-Z, Box 19, Ridgway Papers, USAMHI. On Van Fleet not wanting to withdraw too hastily see Braim, Will to Win, 248, 251. Andrew Salmon argues: “Had the Glosters pulled out on the 23rd or 24th, they would have left a gap some four miles wide in Line Kansas, which would have opened the floodgates . . .” Salmon, Last Round, 313–14. This argument does seem to assume, however, that the Glosters would have been unable to establish effective defensive positions farther south during a fighting retreat – an understandable position in light of what happened when the rest of the brigade withdrew from Line Kansas – and that no U.S. reserve forces could have been made available to help plug the gap.

30. Paik, Pusan to Panmunjom, 144.

31. See Salmon, Last Round, xiv; McKeown, Kapyong Remembered, 40; Bishop, King’s Bishop, 118.

32. Tom Brodie, www.thekoreanwar.co.uk/html_sound_bites.html (accessed 11 August 2007).