Cor.: From these three preceding propositions it is clear that to change a body’s determination [in a certain direction] requires a force [10] equal to that required to change its motion.52 From which it follows that a body which loses more than half of its determination [in a certain direction] and more than half its motion, suffers more change than one which loses its whole determination [in a certain direction].

[15] P27, Rule 3: If two bodies are equal in bulk, but B is moving a little more quickly than A, not only will A be reflected in the opposite direction, but also B will transfer to A half of its excess speed, and both will proceed to move in the same direction at the same speed.53

[20] Dem.: By hypothesis A is opposed to B not only in its determination [in a certain direction], but also in its slowness, insofar as it participates in rest (by P22C1). So even if it were reflected in the opposite direction, and only [25] its determination [in a certain direction] were changed, not all of the contrariety of the two bodies would thereby be removed. So (by A19) the variation must occur both in the determination and in the motion. But since B (by hypothesis) moves more quickly than A, B will have more force than A (P22). So (by A20) the change in A will proceed [30] from B, from which A will be reflected in the opposite direction. This was the first thing to be proved.

[I/214] Next, so long as A moves more slowly than B, it is opposed to B (by P22C1); therefore, the variation must occur (by A19) until it does not move more slowly than B. But that A should move faster than B is something which, in this hypothesis, is not compelled by any cause [5] of enough force. [B: For if B could impel A so that it moved more quickly than B, these bodies would suffer more variation than was necessary to remove their contrariety. It really was removed (as we [10] proved just now) when A did not move more slowly than B; so (by P23) B cannot impel A to move faster than B.] Since, therefore, when A is impelled by B, it can move neither more slowly than B, nor faster than B, it will proceed to move as fast as B.

[15] Next, if B should transfer less than half its excess speed to A, then A would proceed to move more slowly than B. But if B should transfer more than half its excess speed to A, A would proceed to move faster than B. But each of these is absurd, as we have already demonstrated. Therefore, the variation will occur just until B has transferred [20] to A half its excess speed, which (by P20) B must lose. So both will proceed to move in the same direction with equal speed without any contrariety, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that, the faster a body is moving, the [25] more it is determined to continue moving in the direction in which it is moving; and conversely, the slower it is moving, the less determination [in a certain direction] it has.

Schol.: So that my Readers do not here confuse the force of determination [in a certain direction] with the force of motion, it [30] seems desirable to add a few words to explain this distinction. If two bodies, A and C, should be conceived as equal, and as moving in a straight line toward one another with [35] equal speed, they will be reflected in the opposite direction and retain [I/215] their motion intact (P24). But if C is at B, and is moving obliquely toward A, it is clear that it is less determined to move along the line BD, or CA. So although it has a motion equal to A’s, C’s force of [5] determination when moving directly toward A (which is equal to A’s force of determination) is greater than its force of determination when moving from B toward A, and is as much greater as the line BA is [10] longer than the line CA. For the longer line BA is in relation to CA, then (when B and A are moving with equal speed, as we assume here) the more time B requires to be able to move along the line BD or CA, [15] through which it is opposed to the determination of body A. Therefore, when C meets A obliquely, from B, it will be determined as if it would proceed to move along the line AB toward B (which I assume to be as far from C as C is from B when it is at the point where line AB intersects the extended line BC). But A, retaining its motion and [20] determination intact, will continue to move toward C and will drive body B54 with it, since B, so long as it is determined to motion along the diagonal AB, and is moving with a speed equal to A’s, requires more time than A to describe any part of the line AC by its own motion. And to that extent it is opposed to the determination of body [25] A, which has more force.

But for C’s force of determination, when it is moving from B to A (insofar as it participates in the line CA), to be equal to its force of determination when moving directly toward A (i.e., by hypothesis, to be equal to A’s force of determination), B will have to have more [30] degrees of motion than A in proportion as the line BA is longer than the line CA. And then, when it meets body A obliquely, A will be reflected in the opposite direction, toward A, and B toward B, each retaining its motion intact.

But if the excess of B over A is greater than the excess of the line [35] BA over the line CA, then B will drive A back toward A, and transfer a part of its motion to A, until the motion of B is related to the motion [I/216] of A, as the line BA is to the line CA, and B will continue to move in the direction in which it was moving before, losing as much motion as it transferred to A. E.g., if line AC is to line AB as 1 to 2, and the motion of body A is to the motion of body B as 1 to 5, then B will [5] transfer to A one degree of its motion, drive it back in the opposite direction, and continue to move in the same direction in which it was tending before, with the four remaining degrees of motion.

P28, Rule 4: If body A is completely at rest and a little larger than B,k then [10] no matter how fast B moves toward A, it will never move A, but will be driven back by it in the opposite direction, without loss of motion.55

Note that the contrariety of these bodies is removed in three ways: either one takes the other with it, and afterwards they continue to [15] move in the same direction at equal speeds; or one is reflected in the opposite direction, and the other [B errata: which is at rest] retains its rest intact; or one is reflected in the opposite direction, and transfers some of its motion to the other, which was at rest. But there is no fourth way (by P13). Therefore it will have to be demonstrated now (by P23) that, in accordance with our hypothesis, the least change occurs in these bodies.56

[20] Dem.: If B were to move A until they both proceeded to move with the same speed, then (by P20) it would have to transfer as much of its motion to A as A acquires, and (by P21) it would have to lose more [25] than half of its motion. Consequently (by P27C) it would have to also lose more than half of its determination [in a certain direction]. Hence, (by P26C) it would suffer more change than if it lost only its determination [in a certain direction]. And if A should lose some of its rest, but not so much that it proceeded to move as fast as B, then the [30] contrariety of these two bodies would not be removed. For A, by its slowness, insofar as it participates in rest, will be opposed to the speed of B (by P22C1). There B will still have to be reflected in the opposite direction, and will lose its whole determination [in a certain direction] [35] and part of its motion, which it transferred to A. This is also a greater [I/217] change than if it were to lose only its determination [in a certain direction]. Therefore since the change is only in the determination, it is, in accordance with our hypothesis, the least which can occur in these bodies. Hence, no other change occurs (by P23), q.e.d.

[5] It should be noted that in the demonstration of this Proposition (as in other demonstrations) we have not cited P19, in which it is demonstrated that the whole determination can be changed, while the whole motion remains intact. Nevertheless you must attend to this proposition to rightly perceive the force of the demonstration. For in P23 we did not say that the variation will [10] always be absolutely the least, but the least there can be. It is evident from P18, P19, and P19C that such a change as we have assumed in this demonstration, i.e., one consisting only in the determination, can occur.

[15] P29, Rule 5: If a body at rest, A, is smaller than B, then no matter how slowly B moves toward A.l it will move it with it, and transfer a part of its motion to A, so that afterwards both will move with equal speed. (Read Principles II, 50.)

[20] In this Rule also, as in the preceding one, we can conceive only three cases in which this contrariety would be removed. Indeed we shall demonstrate that, in accordance with our hypothesis, the least change happens in these bodies. Therefore (by P23), they also must be changed in such a way.

[25] Dem.: According to our hypothesis, B transfers to A (by P21) less than half its motion, and (by P27C)57 less than half its determination [in a certain direction]. If B did not take A with it, but were reflected in the opposite direction, it would lose its whole determination, and a [30] greater variation would occur (by P26C)—much greater, if it were to lose its whole determination, and at the same time, part of its motion, as is supposed in the third case. Hence the variation [B: which occurs in these bodies] is, in accordance with our hypothesis, the least, q.e.d.

[I/218] P30, Rule 6: If body A, which is at rest, were exactly equal to body B, which is in motion toward it, [A] would partly be impelled by [B], and partly drive [B] back in the opposite direction.58

[5] Here also, as in the preceding proposition, only three cases can be conceived. Therefore we shall have to demonstrate that we assert here the least variation that there can be.

Dem.: If body B takes body A with it, until both [10] proceed to move with equal speed, then there will be as much motion in the one as in the other (P22) and (by P27C) it must lose half of its determination, and also (by P20) half [15] of its motion. But if it is driven back by A in the opposite direction, then it will lose all of its determination and retain all of its motion (by P18). The second variation is equal to the first (by P26C). But neither of these can happen. For if A were to keep its state, and could change [20] B’s determination, it would necessarily have more force than B (by A20), which is contrary to the hypothesis. And if B were to take A with it until both were moving with equal speed, B would have more force than A, which is also contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore, since neither of these cases can happen, the third will, i.e., B will set [25] A in motion a little59 and be driven back by A, q.e.d. Read Principles II, 51.

P31, Rule 7: If B and A should be moving in the same direction, A more [30] slowly, and B following after it more quickly, so that B finally strikes A, and [I/219] if A should be larger than B, but the excess of speed in B should be greater than the excess of size in A,m then B would transfer so much of its motion to A that afterwards they both proceed in the same direction, with the same speed. [5] But if, on the other hand, the excess of size in A should be greater than the excess of speed in B, [B] would be reflected in the opposite direction, retaining all of its motion.

Read Principles II, 52. Here, as in the preceding propositions, only three cases can be conceived.

[10] Dem.: Of part 1: B, which is supposed to have more force than A (by P21 and P22), cannot be reflected in the opposite direction by A (by A20). Therefore, since B has more force, it will move A with it, and indeed, in such a way that they proceed to move with equal speed. [15] For then the least change will occur, as is easily apparent from the preceding.

Of part 2: B, which is supposed to have less force than A (by P21 and P22), cannot impel A (by A20), nor give it any of its own motion. [20] So (by P14C) B will retain all of its motion, [but] not in the same direction, since it is supposed to be impeded by A. Therefore (by what is said in The Dioptric, chap. 2) it will be reflected in the opposite direction—not in any other direction—retaining all of its motion (by P18), q.e.d.

[25] Note that here and in the preceding Propositions we have assumed as demonstrated that every body which directly meets another, by which it is completely prevented from going further in the same direction, must be reflected in the opposite direction, not in any other direction. To understand this, read chap. 2 of the Dioptric.60

[30] Schol.: Up till now, to explain the changes of bodies that arise from the impulse of one on the other, we have considered two bodies as [I/220] divided from all bodies, and taken no account of the bodies surrounding them on all sides.61 But now we shall consider their state and changes, taking into account the surrounding bodies.

[5] P32: If body B is surrounded on all sides by particles in motion, which are striking it in every direction at once with equal force, then so long as no other cause occurs, it will remain in the same place unmoved.

[10] Dem.: This proposition is evident in itself. For if it were moved in any direction by the impulse of particles coming from one direction, the particles that moved it would strike it with greater force than the others that were striking it at the same time in an opposite direction and could not have their effect (by A20),62 which would be contrary [15] to the hypothesis.

P33: Body B, in the same conditions as assumed above, can be moved in any direction whatever by any external force, no matter how small.63

[20] Dem.: Because all bodies touching B immediately are in motion (by Hyp.), and B remains unmoved (by P32), those bodies are reflected in another direction, retaining all of their motion, as soon as they touch B (by P28). So body B is automatically, and continuously, left by the [25] bodies touching it immediately. Therefore, however large B is feigned to be, no action is required to separate it from the bodies immediately touching it (by what we have noted in section 4 concerning D8). So no external force, no matter how small it is feigned to be, can be thrust [I/221] against it, which is not greater than the force which B has for remaining in the same place (for we have just now demonstrated that it has no force for adhering to the bodies immediately touching it); nor can there be any external force which is not also greater than the force of [5] the other particles striking B in an opposite direction, when it is added to the impulse of the particles which at the same time drive B in the same direction as the external force does (for it was supposed that without the external force, the forces of the particles were equal). Therefore (by A20), body B will be moved in any direction whatever [10] by this external force, however slight it is feigned to be, q.e.d.

P34: Body B, in the conditions assumed above, cannot move more quickly than it is driven by an external force, even though the particles by which it is surrounded may be agitated far more rapidly.

[15] Dem.: The particles that strike body B at the same time and in the same direction as the external force, even though they may be agitated much more rapidly than the external force can move B, nevertheless (by hyp.) do not have a greater force than the bodies which drive B [20] back in the opposite direction. Hence, they expend all their forces of determination merely in resisting these, without (by P32) yielding any of their speed to it. Therefore, since no other circumstances, or causes, are supposed, B will receive a quantity of speed from no cause other [25] than the external force. So (by IA8)64 it will not be able to be moved more quickly than it is driven by the external force, q.e.d.

P35: When body B is thus moved by an external impulse, it receives the greatest part of its motion from the bodies by which it is continuously surrounded, [30] not from the external force.65

[I/222] Dem.: Even though body B may be feigned to be very large, it must be moved by any impulse, no matter how slight (by P33). Let us conceive, therefore, that B is four times larger than the external body [5] by whose force it is set in motion. Since (by P34) both bodies must move with equal speed, there will be four times as much motion in B as in the external body by which it is set in motion (by P21). So (by IA8) it does not have the principal part of its motion from the external [10] force. And because, beyond this, no other causes are supposed except the bodies by which it is continuously surrounded (for B is supposed to be, of itself, unmoved), it receives the chief part of its motion solely from the bodies (by IA7) by which it is surrounded, not from the external force, q.e.d.

Note that here we cannot say, as we did above, that the motion of the [15] particles coming from one direction is required to resist the motion of the particles coming from the opposite direction. For bodies moving toward one another with an equal motion (as these are here supposed to be) are contrary only in their determination [in a certain direction], not in their motion (by P19C). Therefore they expend only their determination in resisting each other, but not [20] their motion.n For this reason, body B can receive no determination, and consequently (by P27C) no speed (insofar as speed is distinguished from motion) from the bodies surrounding it. But it can receive motion. Indeed, as the external force approaches, B must necessarily be moved by them, as we have demonstrated in this Proposition, and as you can clearly see from the way we [25] have demonstrated P33.

P36: If any body, e.g., our hand, can move with equal motion in any direction whatever, so that it does not in any way resist any bodies, and no other bodies [30] resist it in any way, then, in that space through which it would thus move, there will necessarily be as many bodies moving in one direction as in any other, and each will move with a force of speed equal to that of any other and to that of our hand.

[I/223] Dem.: A body can move through no space which is not full of bodies (by P3). Therefore I say that the space through which our hand [5] can thus move is filled by bodies which will move under the same conditions that I have indicated. If you deny this, suppose that they are either at rest or moving in some other way.

If they are at rest, they will necessarily resist the motion of our hand (by P14) until its motion is communicated to them so that in the end they are moving in the same direction that it is, and with an equal [10] speed (P20). But in the hypothesis, they are assumed not to resist. Therefore, these bodies are moving, which was the first thing to be proved.

Next, they must be moving in all directions. For if you deny this, assume that they are not moving in some direction, say from A toward [15] B. Therefore, if the hand is moving from A toward B, it will meet bodies which are moving (by the first part of this demonstration), and moving (according to your hypothesis) with a determination different from that of the hand. So they will resist it (by P14) until they are [20] moving in the same direction as our hand (by P24 and P27S). But (by Hyp.) they do not resist our hand. Therefore, they will be moving in every direction, which was the second thing to be proved.

Again, these bodies will be moving in every direction with a force of speed which is equal in each of them. [25] For if they were supposed to be moving with an unequal force of speed, then let it be assumed that those which are moving from A toward B are not moving with so great a force of speed as those which are moving from A toward C. So if the hand should move from A to B with the same speed with which bodies are [30] moving from A to C (for it is supposed to be able to move with an equal motion in every direction without resistance), then the bodies moving from A toward B will resist the hand (by P14) until they are moving with a force of speed equal to that of the hand (by P31). But [I/224] this is contrary to the hypothesis. Therefore, they will move in every direction with an equal force of speed, which was the third thing to be proved.

Finally, if the bodies are moving with a force of speed not equal to that of the hand, the hand will move either more slowly, or with less [5] force of speed, or more rapidly, or with a greater force of speed, than the bodies do. If the former, then the hand will resist the bodies following it in the same direction (by P31); if the latter, then the bodies which our hand follows, and with which it is moving in the same direction, will resist it (by P31). But each of these is contrary to the [10] hypothesis. Therefore, since our hand can move neither more quickly nor more slowly, it will move with a force of speed equal to that of the bodies, q.e.d.

If you ask, why I say “with an equal force of speed,” and not, unconditionally, “with equal speed,” read P27CS. If you then ask whether the hand, while [15] it is moving, for example, from A to B, does not resist the bodies moving at the same time, with equal force, from B to A, read P33. From that you will understand that their force is balanced by the force of the bodies which are moving at the same time with the hand from A to B (for the latter force, by the 3rd part of this proposition, is equal to the former).

[20] P37: If a body, say A, can be moved in any direction whatever, by any force, no matter how small, it must be surrounded by bodies each moving with a speed equal to that of the others.

[25] Dem.: Body A must be surrounded on every side by bodies (by P6), moving equally in every direction. For if they were at rest, body A could not be moved in any direction whatever, by any force, no [30] matter how small (as is supposed in the hypothesis), but only by a force great enough to be able to move with it the bodies immediately touching A (by A20).

Next, if the bodies by which A is surrounded [I/225] were moving with a greater force in one direction than in another—say from B to C rather than from C to B—since it is surrounded on every side by moving bodies (as we have just now demonstrated), the [5] bodies moving from B to C would necessarily bear A with them in the same direction (by what we have demonstrated in P33). So not any small force would suffice to move A toward B, but only one great enough to make up for the excess of motion of the bodies coming from [10] B to C (by A20). So they must be moving with an equal force in every direction, q.e.d.

Schol.: Since these things happen concerning those bodies which are called Fluid, it follows that fluid bodies are those which are divided into many small particles, moving with equal force in all directions. [15] And although those particles cannot be seen by an eye, no matter how sharpsighted, nevertheless what we have just clearly demonstrated should not be denied. For such minuteness of nature, which cannot be determined or reached by any thought (not to mention the senses), is sufficiently proven from the previously stated PP10 and 11.

[20] Again, since it is also sufficiently established from the preceding, that bodies resist other bodies only by their rest, and that we perceive nothing else in hardness, as the senses indicate, than that the parts of hard bodies resist the motion of our hands, we clearly infer that those bodies whose particles are all at rest in relation to each other are hard. [25] Read Principles II, 54-56.

[I/226] Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated Geometrically
Part III

HAVING thus set out the most universal principles of natural things, we must now proceed to explain those things that follow from them. But since the things that follow from these principles are more than [10] our mind can ever survey in thought, and since we are not determined by them to consider some rather than others, we should first set out a brief history of the main Phenomena whose causes we shall investigate here.1 But you have this in Principles III, from article 5 up to [15] article 15. And from article [20] to article [43] Descartes proposes the hypothesis that he judges most convenient, not only to understand the Phenomena of the heavens, but also to investigate their natural causes.

Next, since the best way to understand the nature of Plants and of [20] Man is to consider how they gradually come to be and are generated from seeds, we shall have to devise such principles as are very simple and very easy to know, from which we may demonstrate how the stars, earth and finally all those things that we find in this visible [25] world, could have arisen, as if from certain seeds—even though we may know very well that they never did arise that way. For by doing this we shall exhibit their nature far better than if we only described what they now are.2

I say that we seek principles that are simple and easy to know; for [30] if they are not, we shall not need them. We only ascribe seeds to [I/227] things fictitiously, in order to get to know their nature more easily, and in the manner of the Mathematicians, to ascend from the clearest things to the more obscure, and from the simplest to the more composite.3

[5] Next, we say that we seek principles from which we may demonstrate how the stars, earth, etc., could have arisen. For we do not seek causes that suffice only to explain the Phenomena of the heavens (as the Astronomers usually do), but causes that will lead us also to a [10] knowledge of the things on earth. For we judge that whatever we observe to happen on the earth ought to be counted among the Phenomena of nature.

To discover such principles, we must observe the following requirements for a good hypothesis:

[15] 1. Considered only in itself, it should imply no contradiction.

2. It should be the simplest there can be.

3. It should be the easiest to know (this follows from the second requirement).

4. Everything which is observed in the whole of nature should be capable of being deduced from it.4

[20] We have said, finally, that we are permitted to assume a hypothesis from which, as from a cause, we can deduce the Phenomena of nature, even though we may know very well that they have not arisen in this way.

So that you may understand this, I shall use the following example. If someone should find drawn on a paper the curved line we call a [25] Parabola, and wish to investigate its nature, it is all the same whether he supposes that line to have been, first cut from some Cone, and then pressed on the paper, or to have been described by the motion of two straight lines, or to have arisen in some other way—provided that he demonstrates all the properties of the Parabola from what he supposes. [30] Indeed, even though he may know it to have come to be from the pressing of a Conic section on the paper, he will nevertheless be able to feign any other cause he pleases, which seems to him most convenient to explain all the properties of the Parabola. Similarly we are permitted to assume any hypothesis we please to explain the features [I/228] of nature, provided that we deduce all the Phenomena of nature from it by Mathematical consequences.

And what is more worthy of note, is that we shall hardly be able to assume anything from which the same effects could not be deduced, though perhaps with more difficulty, through the Laws of nature explained [5] above.

For since matter, with the aid of these Laws, successively takes on all the forms of which it is capable, if we consider those forms in order, we will be able, in the end, to arrive at [the form] of this world. So no error is to be feared from a false hypothesis.5

[10] Post: We ask it to be conceded: [i] that in the beginning God divided all that matter of which this visible world is composed into particles which were, as nearly as possible, equal to one another (not, indeed, into spheres, for several spheres joined together do not fill a continuous [15] space, but) into parts shaped in another way and of medium size, or of a size intermediate among all those of which the heavens and stars are now composed; [ii] that these particles had just as much motion among themselves as is now found in the world, and were moving equally—both each one around its own center and separately from [20] one another (so that they would make up a fluid body, such as we think the heavens to be) and also many together around certain other centers, equally removed from one another, and distributed in the same way that the centers of the fixed stars now are; [iii] that they were also moved around several other [25] points, which equal the number of the Planets; and [iv] that they would thus make as many different vortices as there now are stars in the world.6 See the Figure for Principles III, 47.7

This hypothesis, considered in itself, does not imply any contradiction. For it does not ascribe to matter anything except divisibility and motion, modifications which, as we have demonstrated above, really exist in matter; and because we have shown that indefinite matter is [30] one and the same as the matter of the heavens and the earth, we can suppose these modifications to have been in the whole of matter, without worrying about any contradiction.8

[I/229] Next, this hypothesis is the simplest, because it supposes inequality or dissimilarity neither in the particles into which matter was divided in the beginning, nor in their motion. From this it follows that this [5] hypothesis is also the easiest to know. This is also evident from the fact that, according to this hypothesis, nothing is supposed to have been in matter except what becomes known by itself to anyone from the concept of matter alone, viz. divisibility and local motion.

Moreover, we shall try to show that, from this hypothesis, everything [10] observed in nature can really be deduced, to the extent that such a deduction is possible. We shall adopt the following order. First, we shall deduce the fluidity of the Heavens from it, and explain how this is a cause of light. Next we shall proceed to the nature of the Sun, and at the same time, to those things observed in the fixed Stars. Afterwards, we shall speak of the Comets, and finally, of the Planets [15] and their Phenomena.

DEFINITIONS

D1: By Ecliptic we understand that part of the vortex which, when it rotates around its axis, describes the greatest circle.

D2: By Poles we understand the parts of the vortex which are most [20] remote from the ecliptic, or which describe the smallest circles.

D3: By Striving for motion we do not understand any thought, but only that a part of matter is so placed and stirred to motion, that it really would go somewhere if it were not prevented by any cause.9

[25] D4: By Angle we understand whatever projects beyond a spherical shape in any body.10

AXIOMS

A1: Several spheres joined together cannot occupy a continuous space.

[30] A2: A portion of matter divided into parts which have angles requires [I/230] more space if its parts move around their own centers than if all of its parts are at rest and all their sides touch one another immediately.

A3: The smaller a part of matter is, the more easily it is divided by [5] the same force.11

A4: The parts of matter that are in motion in the same direction, and do not depart from one another by their motion, are not actually divided.12

[10] P1: The parts into which matter was first divided were not round, but had angles.13

Dem.: The whole of matter was divided from the beginning into equal and similar parts (by the Postulate). Therefore (by A1 and IIP2) [15] they were not round, and so (by D4) had angles, q.e.d.

P2: The force which brought it about that the particles of matter would move around their own centers, brought it about at the same time that the angles of [20] the particles would be worn away by their meeting one another.

Dem.: The whole of matter was divided in the beginning into parts which were equal (by the Postulate) and had angles (by P1). Therefore if, as soon as they began to move around their centers, their angles [25] had not been worn away, then necessarily (by A2) the whole of matter would have had to occupy more space than when it was at rest. But this is absurd (by IIP4); therefore their angles were worn away as soon as they began to move, q.e.d.

The rest is lacking.

[I/233] Appendix
Containing Metaphysical Thoughts
Part I

[5] IN WHICH are briefly explained the chief things that commonly occur in the general part of Metaphysics, concerning Being and its Affections.

[B: The end and purpose of this Part is to show that the common [10] Logic and Philosophy serve only to train and strengthen the memory, so that we rightly remember the things which are presented to us, through the senses, randomly and without order or connection, and by which we can be affected only through the senses; but these disciplines do not serve to train the intellect.]

CHAPTER I
[15] OF REAL BEINGS, FICTITIOUS BEINGS, AND BEINGS OF REASON

I shall say nothing concerning either the definition of this Science or the things it is concerned with; my intention here is only to explain the more obscure things which are commonly treated by Writers on Metaphysics.

The definition of Being

[20] Let us begin, therefore, with Being, by which I understand Whatever, when it is clearly and distinctly perceived, we find to exist necessarily, or at least to be able to exist.

Chimaeras, Fictitious Beings, and Beings of reason are not beings

From this definition, or if you prefer, description, it follows that Chimaeras, Fictitious Beings, and Beings of reason can not in any way be [25] classed as beings. For a Chimaera,a of its own nature, cannot exist. But a Fictitious Being cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived, because in that case a man, from his sheer freedom alone, knowingly and intentionally (and not, as in the case of the false, unknowingly) connects what he wishes to connect and disjoins what he wishes to disjoin. [30] Finally, a Being of reason is nothing but a mode of thinking, which helps us to more easily retain, explain, and imagine the things we have understood. Note that by a mode of thinking we understand, as we have already explained in IP15S, all affections of thought, such as [35] intellect, joy, imagination, etc.

[I/234] By what modes of thinking we retain things

That there are certain modes of thinking which help us to retain things more firmly and easily, and when we wish, to recall them to mind or keep them present to the mind, is sufficiently established for those who use that well-known rule of Memory, by which to retain [5] something very new and imprint it on the memory, we recall something else familiar to us, which agrees with it, either in name or in reality. Similarly, the Philosophers have reduced all natural things to certain classes, to which they recur when anything new presents itself [10] to them. These they call genus, species, etc.

By what modes of thinking we explain things

We also have modes of thinking which serve to explain a thing by determining it through comparison to another. The modes of thinking by which we do this are called time, number, and measure, and perhaps [15] there are other besides. Of these, time serves to explain duration, number discrete quantity, and measure continuous quantity.

By what modes of thinking we imagine things

Finally, since we are accustomed to depict in our fantasy also images of whatever we understand, it happens that we imagine nonentities [20] positively, as beings. For the mind, considered in itself, since it is a thinking thing, has no greater power of affirming than of denying. But as imagining is nothing but being aware of the traces found in the brain from the motion of the spirits aroused in the senses by objects, [25] such an awareness can only be a confused affirmation.1 Hence it happens that we imagine as if they were beings all those modes which the mind uses for negating, such as blindness, extremity or limit, term, darkness, etc.

Why beings of reason are not Ideas of things and are nevertheless taken to be ideas

So it is evident that these modes of thinking are not ideas of things, and can not in any way be classed as ideas. So they also have no object [30] that exists necessarily, or can exist. Moreover, the reason why these modes of thinking are taken for ideas of things is that they arise from the ideas of real beings so immediately that they are quite easily confused with them by those who do not pay very close attention. So [I/235] these people also give names to them, as if to signify beings existing outside our mind, which Beings, or rather Nonbeings, they have called beings of reason.

Being is badly divided into real being and being of reason

From this it is easy to see how improper is the division of being [5] into real being and being of reason.2 For they divide being into being and nonbeing, or into being and mode of thinking. Nevertheless, I do not wonder that Philosophers preoccupied with words, or grammar, should fall into such errors. For they judge the things from the words, not the words from the things.

[10] In what sense Beings of reason can be called a mere nothing, and in what sense they can be called real Beings

Nor do they speak less improperly who say that a being of reason is not a mere nothing.3 For if anyone looks outside the intellect for what is signified by those words, he will find it to be a mere nothing. But if he means the modes of thinking themselves, they are indeed real beings. For when I ask, what is a species, I seek nothing but the [15] nature of that mode of thinking, which is really a being and distinguished from another mode of thinking.

Still, these modes of thinking cannot be called ideas, nor can they be said to be true or false, just as love cannot be called true or false, but [only] good or bad. So when Plato said that man is a featherless [20] biped, he erred no more than those who said that man is a rational animal. For Plato was no less aware than anyone else that man is a rational animal. But he referred man to a certain class so that, when he wished to think about man, he would immediately fall into the [25] thought of man by recalling that class, which he could easily remember. Indeed Aristotle erred very seriously if he thought that he had adequately explained the human essence by that definition of his. Whether, indeed, Plato did well, one can only ask. But this is not the place for these matters.

[30] In the investigation of Things real Beings must not be confounded with beings of reason

From all that has been said above, it is clear that there is no agreement between a real being and the objects of a being of reason. From this also it is easy to see how carefully we should be on guard in the investigation of things, lest we confound real beings with beings of reason. For it is one thing to inquire into the nature of things, and another to inquire into the modes by which things are perceived by [I/236] us. Indeed, if these things are confounded, we shall be able to understand neither the modes of perceiving, nor nature itself. Moreover, and this is most important, we shall, on that account, fall into great [5] errors, as has happened to many before us.

How the being of reason is distinguished from the fictitious being

It ought also to be noted that many confound beings of reason with fictitious beings.4 For they think that a fictitious being is also a being of reason because it has no existence outside the mind. But if one attends correctly to the definitions just given of beings of reason and [10] fictitious beings, he will discover a great difference between them, both with respect to the cause, and also with respect to their nature, without regard to the cause. For we said that a fictitious being is nothing but two terms connected by a sheer act of the will alone, without any guidance from reason. So a fictitious being can be true [15] by chance. But a being of reason does not depend on the will alone, nor does it consist of any terms connected with one another, as is sufficiently obvious from the definition.

If anyone asks, therefore, whether a fictitious being is a real being or a being of reason, we need only to go back and repeat what we have already said, that being is badly divided into real being and being [20] of reason, and that therefore the question is ill-founded. For it is supposed that all being is divided into real being and being of reason.

The division of being

But let us return to our proposition, from which we seem to have strayed somewhat. From the definition of being already given (or if [25] you prefer, from the description), it is easy to see that being should be divided into being which exists necessarily by its own nature, or whose essence involves existence, and being whose essence involves only possible existence. This last is divided into Substance and Mode, whose definitions are given in the Principles of Philosophy I, 51, 52, and [30] 56. So it is not necessary to repeat them here.

I only wish it to be noted, concerning this division, that we say expressly that being is divided into Substance and Mode, and not into Substance and Accident. For an Accident is nothing but a mode of thinking, inasmuch as it denotes what is only a respect. E.g., when I [I/237] say that the triangle is moved, the motion is not a mode of the triangle, but of the body which is moved. Hence the motion is called an accident with respect to the triangle. But with respect to the body, it is called a real being, or mode. For the motion cannot be conceived without [5] the body, though it can without the triangle.5

So that you may understand better what has already been said, and what will follow, we shall try to explain what should be understood by the being of essence, the being of existence, the being of idea, and the being of power. We are moved to do this by the ignorance of certain people [10] who recognize no distinction between essence and existence, or who, if they do recognize such a distinction, confuse the being of essence with the being of idea or the being of power. We shall explain this matter as distinctly as we can in what follows, both to satisfy them, and for its own sake.

CHAPTER II
[15] WHAT ARE THE BEING OF ESSENCE, THE BEING OF EXISTENCE, THE BEING OF IDEA AND THE BEING OF POWER

To perceive clearly what should be understood by these four, it is necessary only to consider what we have already said about uncreated [20] substance, or God:

That creatures are in God eminently

(1) That God contains eminently what is found formally in created things, i.e., that God has attributes in which all created things are contained in a more eminent way. See IA8 and P12C1. E.g., we conceive [25] extension clearly without any existence, and therefore, since it has, of itself, no power to exist, we have demonstrated that it was created by God (IP21). And since there must be at least as much perfection in the cause as there is in the effect, it follows that all the perfections of extension are in God. But because we saw afterward [30] that an extended thing, by its very nature, is divisible, i.e., contains an imperfection, we could not attribute extension to God (IP 16). So [I/238] we were constrained to allow that there is some attribute in God which contains all the perfections of matter in a more excellent way (IP9S) and can take the place of matter.

(2) That God understands himself and all other things, i.e., that he [5] also has all things objectively in himself (IP9).

(3) That God is the cause of all things, and that he acts from absolute freedom of the will.

What are the being of essence, of existence, of idea and of power6

From this, one may see clearly what should be understood by those [10] four. For first, being of Essence is nothing but that manner in which created things are comprehended in the attributes of God. Being of Idea is spoken of insofar as all things are contained objectively in God’s idea. Being of Power is spoken of only with respect to God’s power, by which he was able to create all things not yet existing from the absolute [15] freedom of his will. Finally, being of Existence is the essence itself of things outside God, considered in itself. It is attributed to things after they have been created by God.

These four are only distinguished from one another in creatures

From this it is evident that these four are only distinguished from one another in created things, but not at all in God. For we do not conceive God to have been in another by his power, and his existence [20] and his intellect are not distinguished from his essence.

Reply to certain questions concerning essence

Hence we can easily reply to the questions that are usually raised concerning essence. These questions are as follows: whether essence is distinguished from existence? and if it is distinguished, whether it is anything different from the idea? and if it is something different [25] from an idea, whether it has any being outside the intellect? The last of these must surely be granted.

To the first question we reply by making a distinction: in God essence is not distinguished from existence, since his essence cannot be conceived without existence; but in other things it does differ from [30] and certainly can be conceived without existence. To the second we say that a thing that is conceived clearly and distinctly, or truly, outside the intellect is something different from the idea.

But again it is asked whether that being outside the intellect is by [I/239] itself or has been created by God. To this we reply that the formal essence neither is by itself nor has been created, for both these presuppose that the thing actually exists. Rather it depends on the divine essence alone, in which all things are contained. So in this sense we agree with those who say that the essences of things are eternal.

[5] Still, it could be asked how we understand the essences of things, when the nature of God is not yet understood. For these essences, as we have just said, depend on the nature of God alone. To this I say that it arises from the fact that the things have already been created. For if they had not been created, then I should concede fully that it would be impossible to understand the essences of things without an adequate knowledge of the nature of God—just as impossible as knowing [10] the nature of the coordinates of a Parabola prior to a knowledge of its nature (or even more so).

Why the author recurs in the definition of essence to the attributes of God

Next it is to be noted that, although the essences of nonexistent modes are comprehended in their substances, and their being of essence [15] is in their substances, nevertheless we wished to recur to God in order to explain generally the essence of modes and of substances, and also because the essence of modes has only been in their substances after the creation of the substances and we were seeking the eternal being of essences.

[20] Why he has not recounted the definitions of others

I do not think it worthwhile to refute here those Authors who think differently than we do, nor to examine their definitions or descriptions of essence and existence. For in this way we should render a clear [25] thing more obscure. Since we can give no definition of anything without at the same time explaining its essence, what do we understand more clearly than what essence is, and what existence is?

How the distinction between essence and existence is easily learned

Finally, if any Philosopher still doubts whether essence is distinguished from existence in created things, he need not labor greatly over definitions of essence and existence to remove that doubt. For if [30] he will only go to some sculptor or woodcarver, they will show him how they conceive in a certain order a statue not yet existing, and after having made it, they will present the existing statue to him.

[I/240] CHAPTER III
CONCERNING WHAT IS NECESSARY, IMPOSSIBLE, POSSIBLE, AND CONTINGENT

What is to be understood here by affections

Having explained in this way the nature of being, insofar as it is being, we pass to the explanation of some of its affections. It should [5] be noted, that by affections we here understand what Descartes has elsewhere called attributes (Principles I, 52). For being, insofar as it is being, does not affect us by itself alone, as substance. It must, therefore, be explained by some attribute, from which, nevertheless, it is distinguished only by a distinction of reason. So I cannot sufficiently [10] admire the very subtle cleverness of those who have sought—not without great harm to the truth—for a middle ground between being and nothing.7 But I shall not stay to refute their error, since they themselves vanish entirely in their empty subtlety when they struggle to give definitions of such affections.

[15] The definition of affections

Let us, therefore, attend to our own business. We say that affections of being are certain attributes, under which we understand the essence or existence of each thing, [the attributes,] nevertheless, being distinguished from [being] only by reason. I shall try here to explain certain things concerning these attributes (for I do not undertake to treat them all), and also [20] to distinguish them from denominations, which are affections of no being. First I shall treat of what is necessary, and what is impossible.

In how many ways a thing is said to be necessary, and impossible

A thing is said to be necessary or impossible in two ways: either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause.8 We know that God exists necessarily in respect to his essence, for his essence cannot be [25] conceived without existence. And it is impossible that a chimaera exist in respect to its essence, which involves a contradiction.

[Other] things—e.g., material ones—are called either impossible or necessary in respect to their cause. For if we consider only their essence, we can conceive it clearly and distinctly without existence. [30] Therefore, they can never exist by the power and necessity of their essence, but only by the power of their cause, God, the creator of all things. And so, if it is in the divine decree that some thing exists, it [I/241] will necessarily exist; but if not, it will be impossible that it should exist. For it is evident in itself that if a thing has neither an internal nor an external cause for existing, it is impossible that it should exist. Nevertheless, such a thing is assumed in this second hypothesis:9 one [5] that could exist without either the power of its own essence (which is what I understand by an internal cause), or the power of the divine decree (the only external cause of all things). It follows that things of the sort described by us in the second hypothesis cannot exist.

Chimaeras properly called verbal beings

First, it should be noted that we may properly call a Chimaera a [10] verbal being because it is neither in the intellect nor in the imagination. For it cannot be expressed except in words. E.g., we can, indeed, express a square Circle in words, but we cannot imagine it in any way, much less understand it. So a Chimaera is nothing but a word, [15] and impossibility cannot be numbered among the affections of being, for it is only a negation.

Created things depend on God both for essence and existence

Second, it should be noted that not only the existence of created things, but also their essence and nature depend on the decree of God alone, as we shall demonstrate very clearly below in the second part.10 [20] From this it clearly follows that created things have no necessity of themselves. For they have no essence of themselves, nor do they exist by themselves.

The necessity which is in created things from their cause is either of essence or of existence, but these two are not distinguished in God

Finally, it should be noted that necessity, as it is in created things by the power of their cause, is said either in respect to their essence [25] or in respect to their existence. For these two are distinguished in created things. The former depends on the eternal laws of nature, the latter on the series and order of causes. But in God, whose essence is not distinguished from his existence, necessity of essence is also not distinguished from necessity of existence.

[30] It follows from this that if we were to conceive the whole order of nature, we should discover that many things whose nature we perceive clearly and distinctly, that is, whose essence is necessarily such, can not in any way exist. For we should find the existence of such things in nature to be just as impossible as we now know the passage of a [I/242] large elephant through the eye of a needle to be, although we perceive the nature of each of them clearly. So the existence of those things would be only a chimaera, which we could neither imagine nor understand.

[5] Possible and contingent are not affections of things

Let this be enough about necessity and impossibility. But it seems desirable to add a few words about the possible and the contingent; for these are taken by some to be affections of things. Nevertheless, they are nothing but a defect in our understanding, as I shall show clearly, [10] after I have explained what is to be understood by these two.

What possibility and contingency are

A thing is called possible, then, when we understand its efficient cause, but do not know whether the cause is determined. So we can regard it as possible, but neither as necessary nor as impossible. If, however, we [15] attend to the essence of the thing alone, and not to its cause, we shall call it contingent. That is, we shall consider it as midway between God and a chimaera, so to speak, because we find in it, on the part of its essence, neither any necessity of existing (as we do in the divine essence) [20] nor any impossibility or inconsistency (as we do in a chimaera).

And if anyone wishes to call contingent what I call possible, or possible what I call contingent, I shall not contend with him. For I am not accustomed to dispute about words. It will suffice if he grants us that these two are nothing but a defect in our perception, and not anything [25] real.

That possibility and contingency are only a defect of our understanding

Moreover, if anyone wishes to deny this, his error can be demonstrated to him with no difficulty. For if he attends to nature and how it depends on God, he will find that there is nothing contingent in things, that is, nothing which, on the part of the thing, can either [30] exist or not exist, or as is commonly said, be a real contingent.

This is readily apparent from what we have taught (IA10), viz. that as much power is required for creating a thing as for preserving it. So, no created thing does anything by its own power, just as no created [I/243] thing has begun to exist by its own power. From this it follows that nothing happens except by the power of the cause who creates all things, namely God, who produces all things at each moment by his concurrence.

Moreover, since nothing happens except by the divine power alone, it is easy to see that whatever happens, happens by the power of God’s [5] decree and his will. But since in God there is no inconstancy or change (IP18 and P20C), he must have decreed from eternity that he would produce those things which he now produces. And since nothing is more necessary in its existence than what God has decreed would exist, it follows that a necessity of existing has been in all created [10] things from eternity. Nor can we say that those things are contingent because God could have decreed otherwise. For since in eternity there is no when, nor before, nor after, nor any other affection of time, it follows that God never existed before those decrees so that he could decree otherwise.

[15] [B: In order that this proof may properly be understood, we must note what is said in the second part of this appendix concerning the will of God, namely, that God’s will or constant decree is only understood when we conceive the thing clearly and distinctly. For the essence of the thing, considered in itself, is nothing other than God’s decree, or his determinate will. But we also say that the necessity of really existing is not distinct from the necessity of essence (II, ix). That is, when we say that God has decided that the triangle shall exist, we are saying nothing but that God has so arranged the order [20] of nature and of causes that the triangle shall necessarily exist at such a time. So if we understood the order of causes as it has been established by God, we should find that the triangle must really exist at such a time, with the same necessity as we now find, when we attend to its nature, that its three angles are equal to two right angles.]

[25] The reconciliation of the freedom of our will and of God’s predestination surpasses the human understanding

As for the freedom of the human will (which we have said is free, IP15S), that also is preserved by the concurrence of God, nor does any man will or do anything but what God has decreed from eternity that he would will and do. How this can happen and human freedom [30] still be preserved is beyond our grasp.

But we should not reject what we perceive clearly because we are ignorant of something. For if we attend to our nature, we understand clearly and distinctly that we are free in our actions and that we deliberate about many things, simply from the fact that we will [to do [35] so]. Also if we attend to the nature of God, we perceive clearly and distinctly, as we have just shown, that all things depend on him and that nothing exists whose existence has not been decreed by God from [I/244] eternity. But how the human will is produced by God at each moment in such a way that it remains free we do not know. For there are many things exceeding our grasp which we nevertheless know to have been [5] done by God—e.g., there is that real division of matter into indefinite particles, which we have already demonstrated quite clearly (IIP11), though we do not know how that division occurs.

Note that we here take it as something known that these two notions, possible and contingent, signify only a defect in our knowledge [10] about a thing’s existence.

CHAPTER IV
OF DURATION AND TIME

What eternity is; What duration is

From our earlier division of being into being whose essence involves existence and being whose essence involves only possible existence, [15] there arises the distinction between eternity and duration. Of eternity we shall speak more fully later. Here we say only that it is an attribute under which we conceive the infinite existence of God. But duration is an attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things insofar as they [20] persevere in their actuality. From this it clearly follows that duration is only distinguished by reason from the whole existence of a thing. For as you take duration away from the thing, you take away just as much of its existence.11

What time is

But to determine this duration, we compare it with the duration of [25] other things which have a certain and determinate motion. This comparison is called time. Time, therefore, is not an affection of things, but only a mere mode of thinking, or, as we have already said, a being of reason. For it is a mode of thinking that serves to explain duration. We should also note here—since it will be of use later, when we speak [30] of eternity—that duration is conceived as being greater or lesser, and as composed of parts, and finally, that it is only an attribute of existence, and not of essence.

[I/245] CHAPTER V
OF OPPOSITION, ORDER, ETC.

What Opposition, Order, Agreement, Difference, Subject, Adjunct, etc. are

From the fact that we compare things with one another certain notions arise which nevertheless are nothing outside the things themselves [5] but modes of thinking. This is clear from the fact that if we wish to consider them as things posited outside of thought [B: outside the intellect], we immediately render confused the clear concept which we otherwise have of them. These are such notions as Opposition, Order, Agreement, Difference, Subject, Adjunct, and whatever others are like [10] these. We perceive them clearly enough, I say, insofar as we conceive them not as something different from the essences of the things opposed, ordered, etc., but only as modes of thinking by which we retain or imagine the things themselves more easily. So I do not judge [15] it necessary to speak more fully about them. Instead I pass to the terms usually called transcendental.

CHAPTER VI
OF THE ONE, TRUE, AND GOOD

These terms are taken by nearly all Metaphysicians to be the most [20] general Affections of Being; for they say that every being is one, true and good, even though no one thinks of these things. But we shall see what should be understood concerning them when we have examined each of these terms separately.

What unity is

So let us begin with the first, viz. One. They say that this term [25] signifies something real outside the intellect. But what this adds to being they cannot explain, which shows sufficiently that they confound beings of reason with real being; by doing this they render confused what they understand clearly. We say, however, that Unity is not in any way distinguished from the thing itself, or that it adds [30] nothing to the being, but is only a mode of thinking by which we [I/246] separate the thing from others which are like it or agree with it in some way.12

What multiplicity is; in what respect God can be called one, in what respect unique

To unity is opposed multiplicity, which, of course, also adds nothing [5] to things, is nothing but a mode of thinking, as we understand clearly and distinctly. I do not see what more remains to be said about a thing so clear. All that need be noted here is that God can be called one insofar as we separate him from other beings. But insofar as we conceive that there cannot be more than one of the same nature, he is [10] called unique. Indeed, if we wished to examine the matter more accurately, we could perhaps show that God is only very improperly called one and unique. But this does not matter greatly, or even at all, to those who care about things and not about words. So we shall leave this behind and pass on to the second topic, and at the same time we shall say what the false is.13

[15] What the true and the false are, both among ordinary people and among Philosophers

To perceive these two, the true and the false rightly, we shall begin with the meaning of the words, from which it will be plain that these are only extrinsic denominations of things and are not attributed to things except metaphorically. But since ordinary people first invent words, which afterwards are used by the Philosophers, it seems desirable [20] for one seeking the original meaning of a term to ask what it first denoted among ordinary people—particularly where we lack other causes that could be used to investigate that [meaning], causes drawn from the nature of language.

The first meaning of true and false seems to have had its origin in [25] stories: a story was called true when it was of a deed that had really happened, and false when it was of a deed that had never happened.

Afterwards the Philosophers used this meaning to denote the agreement of an idea with its object and conversely. So an idea is called true when it shows us the thing as it is in itself, and false when it [30] shows us the thing otherwise than it really is. For ideas are nothing but narratives, or mental histories of nature. But later this usage was transferred metaphorically to mute things, as when we call gold true or false, as if the gold which is presented to us were to tell something of itself that either was or was not in it.

[I/247] True not a transcendental term

So they are thoroughly deceived who judge true to be a transcendental term, or affection of being. For it can only be said improperly—or if you prefer, metaphorically—of the things themselves.

Truth and a true idea, how they differ

If you should ask what truth is beyond a true idea, ask also what [5] whiteness is beyond a white body. For they are related to each other in the same way.

The cause of the true and of the false, we have already dealt with previously. So nothing remains to be noted—even what we have said would not have been worth the trouble of noting, if writers had not [10] so entangled themselves in trifles of this kind that afterwards they have not been able to untangle themselves, finding difficulties where none exist.

What are the properties of truth? Certainty is not in things

The properties of truth, or of a true idea, are (1) that it is clear and distinct, and (2) that it removes all doubt, or in a word, that it is certain. Those who seek certainty in the things themselves are deceived [15] in the same way as when they seek truth in them. And although we say that the thing is uncertain, this is a figure of speech which takes the object for the idea. In the same way we call a thing doubtful, except perhaps that then we understand by uncertainty contingency, or a thing which inspires uncertainty or doubt in us. There [20] is no need to delay longer concerning these, so we shall proceed to the third term, and at the same time we shall explain what should be understood by its contrary.

Good and bad are only said in respect to something

No thing is said to be either good or evil considered alone, but only in respect to another [thing], to which it is advantageous in acquiring [25] what it loves, or the contrary.14 So each thing can be said at the same time to be both good and evil in different respects. E.g., the counsel given by Achitophel to Absalom is called good in Sacred Scripture; nevertheless it was very bad for David, at whose death it aimed.15

And indeed many other things are good, which are not good for all. [30] So salvation is good for men, but neither good nor evil for animals or plants, to which it has no relation. To be sure, God is called supremely good, because he acts to the advantage of all, preserving, by his concurrence, each one’s being, than which nothing is dearer. But [35] there is no absolute evil, as is evident through itself.

[I/248] Why some have maintained a Metaphysical good

However, those who eagerly seek some Metaphysical good, needing no qualification, labor under a false prejudice, for they confuse a distinction of reason with a real or modal distinction. They distinguish [5] between the thing itself and the striving that is in each thing to preserve its being, although they do not know what they understand by striving. For though the thing and its striving to preserve its being are distinguished by reason, or rather verbally (which deceives these people very greatly), they are not in any way really distinct.

[10] How the thing and the striving it has to persevere in its state are distinguished

To make this clear, let us take an example of a very simple thing. Motion has a force of persevering in its state; this force is really nothing other than the motion itself—that is, the nature of motion is such. For if I say that in this body, A, there is nothing but a certain quantity of motion, it follows clearly from this that, so long as I attend to A, I [15] must always say that it is moving. For if I were to say that it was losing, of itself, its force of moving, I should necessarily have to attribute to it something else, besides what we have supposed in the hypothesis, through which it was losing its nature.

If this reasoning seems somewhat obscure, let us concede that that [20] striving to move itself is something beyond the laws themselves and nature of motion. Since, therefore, you suppose this striving to be a metaphysical good, this striving will necessarily also have a striving to persevere in its being, and this again will have another, and so on to infinity.16 I know of nothing more absurd which could be feigned. But [25] the reason why some distinguish the thing’s striving from the thing itself is that they find in themselves a longing to preserve themselves and they imagine such a [longing] in each thing.

Whether God could be called good before creation of things

Nevertheless, it is asked whether God could be called good before he created things. It seems to follow from our definition that God had [30] no such attribute, because we say that a thing can be called neither good nor evil, if it is considered in itself alone. This will seem absurd to many; but I do not know why. For we ascribe to God many attributes of this sort, which could only be ascribed to him potentially [I/249] before things were created, as when he is called creator, judge, compassionate, etc.17 So such arguments should not cause us any delay.

How perfection may be ascribed in a certain respect, and how absolutely

Next, just as good and bad are said of a thing only in a certain respect, so also is perfection, except when we take perfection for the [5] very essence of the thing. In that sense we said previously that God has infinite perfection, that is, infinite essence or infinite being.

It is not my intention to add more to this. I think the rest of what pertains to the general part of Metaphysics is sufficiently known, and so not worth the trouble of pursuing further.

Part II of the Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts

IN WHICH are briefly explained the chief things which commonly occur [15] in the special part of Metaphysics about God, his Attributes, and the human Mind.

[B: In this Chapter God’s existence is explained quite differently from the way in which men commonly understand it; for they confuse God’s existence with their own, so that they imagine God as being [20] somewhat like a Man and do not take note of the true idea of God which they have, or are completely ignorant of having it. As a result, they can neither prove God’s existence a priori, i.e., from his true definition, or essence, nor prove it a posteriori, from the idea of him, insofar as it is in us. Nor can they conceive God’s existence.

In this Chapter, therefore, we shall attempt to show as clearly as we [25] can that God’s existence differs entirely from the existence of created things.]

CHAPTER I
OF GOD’S ETERNITY

The division of substances

We have already pointed out that there is nothing in Nature but [30] substances and their modes. So it is not to be expected here that we should say anything about substantial forms and real accidents, for these things, and others of the same kind, are clearly absurd.

[I/250] We have divided substances into two chief kinds, extension and thought; thought we have divided into created, or the human Mind, and uncreated, or God. His existence we have demonstrated more than sufficiently, both a posteriori, from the idea which we have of [5] him, and a priori, or from his essence as the cause of his existence. But since we have treated certain of his attributes more briefly than the dignity of the argument requires, we have decided to return to them here, to explain them more fully, and at the same time to resolve some problems.

[10] That duration is not attributed to God

The chief attribute, which deserves consideration before all others, is God’s Eternity, by which we explain his duration. Or rather, so as not to ascribe any duration to God, we say that he is eternal. For as we have noted in Part I, duration is an affection of existence, and not [15] of the essence of things.1 But since God’s existence is of his essence, we can attribute no duration to him. Whoever attributes duration to God distinguishes his existence from his essence.

Nevertheless, there are those who ask whether God has not existed longer now than he had when he created Adam. It seems to be clear enough to them that he has and they hold that duration should in no [20] way be taken away from God.2

But they beg the question. For they suppose that God’s essence is distinguished from his existence and ask whether God, who has existed until Adam, shall not have existed for more time from the creation of Adam until us. So they ascribe to God a greater duration each [25] day and think of him as if he were created continuously by himself. If they did not distinguish God’s existence from his essence, they would not ascribe duration to him at all, since duration cannot in any way pertain to the essences of things. For no one will ever say that the essence of a circle or a triangle, insofar as it is an eternal truth, [30] has endured longer now than it had in the time of Adam.

Again, since duration is conceived as being greater or lesser, or as composed of parts, it follows clearly that no duration can be ascribed to God: for since his being is eternal, i.e., in it there can be nothing [I/251] which is before or after, we can never ascribe duration to him, without at the same time destroying the true concept which we have of God. I.e., by attributing duration to him, we divide into parts what is infinite by its own nature and can never be conceived except as infinite. [5] [B: We divide his existence into parts, or conceive it as divisible, when we attempt to explain it by duration. See I, iv.]

The reasons why Writers have attributed duration to God

The reason why these Writers have erred is threefold: first, because they have attempted to explain eternity without attending to God, as [10] if eternity could be understood without contemplation of the divine essence—or as if it were something beyond the divine essence; and this again has arisen because we are accustomed, on account of a defect of words, to ascribe eternity also to things whose essence is distinguished from their existence, as when we say that it does not involve [15] a contradiction for the world to have existed from eternity; also we attribute eternity to the essences of things so long as we conceive the things as not existing, for then we call them eternal; secondly, they have erred because they have ascribed duration to things only insofar as they judged them to be subject to continuous variation and not, as we do, insofar as their essence is distinguished from their existence; [20] thirdly, they have erred because they have distinguished God’s essence from his existence, just as they do in the case of created things.

These errors, I say, have provided them with the occasion for further error. For the first error resulted in their not understanding what eternity is, but rather considering it as if it were a species of duration. [25] The second, in their not being able to discover easily the difference between the duration of created things and the eternity of God. And the last, as we have said, in their ascribing duration to God, although duration is only an affection of existence and they have distinguished his existence from his essence.

[30] What is eternity?

In order that we may better understand what Eternity is, and how it cannot be conceived without the divine essence, we need to consider what we have already said before, viz. that created things, or all things except God, always exist only by the power, or essence, of God, and not by their own power. From this it follows that the present existence [I/252] of things is not the cause of their future existence, but only God’s immutability is. So we are compelled to say that when God has first created a thing, he will preserve it afterwards continuously, or will continue that same action of creating it.

[5] From this we conclude: (1) that the created thing can be said to enjoy existence, because existence is not of its essence; but God cannot be said to enjoy existence, for the existence of God is God himself, as is his essence also; from which it follows that created things enjoy duration, but that God does not in any way; (2) that all created things, [10] while they enjoy present duration and existence, altogether lack future duration and existence, because it must continually be attributed to them; but nothing similar can be said of their essence. But we cannot ascribe future existence to God, because existence is of his essence; for the same existence which he would have then ought even now to [15] be ascribed to him actually, or, to speak more properly, infinite actual existence pertains to God in the same way as infinite actual intellect pertains to him. And I call this infinite existence Eternity, which is to be attributed to God alone, and not to any created thing, even though its duration should be without beginning or end.

[20] So much for eternity. Of the necessity of God I say nothing. There is no need, since we have demonstrated his existence from his essence. Let us proceed then to his unity.

CHAPTER II
OF GOD’S UNITY

[25] We have often wondered at the worthless arguments by which Writers try to prove God’s Unity, such as, If one could create the world, others would be unnecessary, and If all things tend toward the same end, they are all produced by one maker, and similar arguments drawn from relations [30] or extrinsic denominations.3 Leaving all these to one side, we shall here put forward our own proof as clearly and briefly as we can.4

[I/253] That God is unique

Among the attributes of God we have numbered also supreme understanding, and we have added that he has all his perfection from himself and not from another. If now you say that there are many Gods, or supremely perfect beings, they will all have to understand, [5] in the highest degree. To satisfy that condition, it is not sufficient that each one should understand only himself; for since each one must understand all things, he will have to understand both himself and the rest. From this it would follow that the perfection of each one’s intellect would depend partly on himself and partly on another. Therefore, [10] there could not be any supremely perfect being, i.e., as we have just noted, any being that has all its perfection from itself and not from another. Nevertheless we have already demonstrated that God is a supremely perfect being and that he exists. From this we can now conclude that he is unique. For if there were more than one, it would [15] follow that a most perfect being has an imperfection, which is absurd. [B: But although this proof is completely convincing, nevertheless it does not explain God’s Unity; therefore I advise the Reader that by right we infer God’s Unity from the nature of his existence, which is [20] not distinguished from his essence, or which necessarily follows from his essence.] This will suffice on God’s Unity.

CHAPTER III
OF GOD’S IMMENSITY

How God is called infinite, how immense

We have explained previously that no being can be conceived as [25] finite and imperfect, that is, as participating in nothing, unless we first attend to the perfect and infinite being, i.e., to God. So only God is to be called absolutely infinite, insofar as we find that he really consists of infinite perfection. But he can also be called immense, or interminable, [30] insofar as we consider the fact that there is no being by which God’s perfection can be limited.

From this it follows that God’s Infinity, in spite of what the term suggests, is something most positive. For we call him infinite insofar [I/254] as we are attending to his essence, or supreme perfection. But Immensity is only ascribed to God in a certain respect. For it does not pertain to God insofar as he is considered absolutely, as a most perfect being, but only insofar as he is considered as the first cause, which, even if [5] it were only most perfect in respect to secondary beings, would still be no less immense. For there would be no being, and consequently, no being could be conceived, more perfect than him, by which he could be limited or measured.a

What is commonly understood by the immensity of God

Nevertheless, usually when authors deal with God’s Immensity, they [10] seem to ascribe quantity to him.5 For from this attribute they wish to conclude that God must necessarily be present everywhere, as if they thought that if there were some place which God was not in, then his quantity would be limited.

This is even clearer from the other argument they bring forward to [15] show that God is infinite, or immense (for they confuse these two), and also that he is everywhere. If God, they say, is pure act, as indeed he is, he must be everywhere and infinite. For if he were not everywhere, either he would not be able to be wherever he wishes to be, or he would necessarily—note this—have to move. From this it is clear that [20] they ascribe Immensity to God insofar as they regard him as having a certain quantity; for they seek to argue for God’s Immensity from the properties of extension, which is most absurd.

A proof that God is everywhere

If you should now ask how we shall prove that God is everywhere, [25] I reply that we have already demonstrated this more than sufficiently when we showed that nothing can exist for even a moment that is not produced by God at each moment.6

God’s omnipresence cannot be explained

Now, of course, for God’s omnipresence or presence in each thing to be properly understood, it would be necessary for us to know fully the [30] inmost nature of the divine will, by which he has created things and continually produces them. Since this is beyond man’s grasp, it is impossible to explain how God is everywhere.

[B: Here we should note that whenever ordinary people say that God is everywhere they introduce Him as a spectator at a Play. From this what we say at the end of this Chapter is evident, viz. that People [35] usually confuse the Divine nature with Human nature.]

[I/255] That God’s Immensity is said by some to be threefold, but wrongly

Some claim that God’s Immensity is threefold: immensity of essence, of power, and of presence;7 but that is foolish, for they seem to distinguish between God’s essence and his power.

[5] That God’s power is not distinguished from his essence

But others have also asserted the same thing more openly, when they say that God is everywhere through his power, but not through his essence8—as if the power of God were distinguished from all of his attributes, or his infinite essence. Nevertheless it cannot be anything else. For if it were something else, it would be either some [10] creature or something accidental to the divine essence, which the divine essence could be conceived to lack. But both alternatives are absurd. For if it were a creature, it would require the power of God in order to be conserved, and so there would be an infinite regress. And if it were something accidental, God would not be a most simple being, contrary to what we have demonstrated above.9

[15] Nor is his Omnipresence

Finally, by Immensity of presence they seem also to mean something beyond the essence of God, through which things have been created and are continually preserved. Such is the absurdity into which they have fallen, through confusing the divine intellect with the human and [20] frequently comparing his power with the power of kings.

CHAPTER IV
OF GOD’S IMMUTABILITY

What Change is; What Transformation is

By Change we understand here whatever variation there can be in a [25] subject while the very essence of the subject remains intact; commonly the term is taken in an even broader sense, signifying the corruption of things, not an absolute corruption but one which at the same time includes the generation following corruption, as when we say that peat is changed into ashes, or men into beasts. But Philosophers use a [30] different term to denote this, viz. Transformation. Here we are speaking only of that change in which there is no transformation of the subject, as when we say that Peter has changed his color, or his ways.

[I/256] Transformation cannot be ascribed to God

We must see now whether such changes can be ascribed to God; for there is no need to say anything about transformation, after we have explained that God exists necessarily—i.e., that God could not cease to be, or be transformed into another God. For then he would cease [5] to exist, and at the same time there could be many gods, both of which we have shown to be absurd.

What are the causes of Change

In order to understand more distinctly the things which remain to be said here, we need to consider that every change proceeds either from external causes (with the subject either willing or unwilling), or [10] from an internal cause and the choice of the subject himself. E.g., that a man becomes darker, becomes ill, grows, and the like all proceed from external causes, the two former against the subject’s will, the last in accordance with it; but that he wills to walk,10 to display anger, etc., these result from internal causes.

[15] That God is not changed by another

The first sort of change, which proceeds from external causes, can not be ascribed to God, since he is the sole cause of all things and is acted on by no one. Add to this the fact that no created thing has in itself any power of existing, much less any power of producing any effect outside itself or on its cause. And although it is often found in [20] Holy Scripture that God has been angry or sad on account of men’s sins, in such places the effect is taken for the cause—just as we say that the Sun in summer is stronger and higher than in winter, although it has not changed its position or renewed its strength. And [25] that such things are often taught in Holy Scripture may be seen in Isaiah—for he says (59:2), when he is reproaching the people: ‘Your iniquities separate you from your God.’

Nor by himself

Let us, therefore, go on to ask whether there is any change in God from God himself. We do not concede that there is such a change in [30] God—indeed, we deny it completely. For every change which depends on the will occurs in order that its subject may change into a better state. But this cannot occur in a most perfect being. Also there is no change except for the sake of avoiding some disadvantage or [I/257] acquiring some good which is lacking, neither of which can occur in God. So we conclude that God is an immutable being.

[B: Note that this can be much clearer if we consider the nature of God’s will and his decrees. For as I shall show in what follows, God’s will, through which he has created things, is not distinct from his intellect, through which he understands them. So to say that God [5] understands that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is the same as saying that God has willed or decreed that the three angles of a triangle should equal two right angles. For this reason, it will be as impossible for us to conceive that God can change his decrees as it is for us to think that the three angles of a triangle are not equal to two right angles. Moreover, this proposition—that there can be no change in God—can also be proven in other ways; but [10] because we are trying to be brief, we prefer not to pursue this further.]

Note that I have here deliberately omitted the common divisions of change, although in a way we have encompassed them too. For there was no need to show of each one that God is free of it, since we have [15] demonstrated (IP 16) that God is incorporeal and those common divisions include only changes of matter.

CHAPTER V
OF GOD’S SIMPLICITY

The threefold Distinction of Things: Real, Modal, of Reason

We proceed to the Simplicity of God. In order to understand this [20] attribute of God rightly, we need to recall what Descartes has taught (Principles I, 48, 49), viz. that there is nothing in nature but substances and their modes. From this a threefold distinction of things is deduced (I, 60-62), viz. real, modal, and of reason.

That distinction is called real by which two substances are distinguished [25] from one another, whether they have the same or different attributes, e.g., thought, and extension, or the parts of matter. This is known from the fact that each can be conceived, and consequently, can exist, without the aid of the other.

The modal distinction is shown to be twofold: there is that between [30] a mode of a substance and the substance itself, and that between two modes of one and the same substance. We know the latter from the fact that, although either mode may be conceived without the aid of the other, nevertheless neither may be conceived without the aid of the substance whose modes they are. The former is known from the fact that, although the substance can be conceived without its mode, [35] nevertheless, the mode cannot be conceived without the substance.

[I/258] Finally, that distinction is said to be of reason which exists between substance and its attribute, as when duration is distinguished from extension. And this is also known from the fact that such a substance cannot be understood without that attribute.

[5] Whence all composition arises, how many kinds there are

From these three all composition arises. The first sort of composition is that which comes from two or more substances which have the same attribute (e.g., all composition which arises from two or more bodies) or which have different attributes (e.g., man). The second comes from the union of different modes. The third, finally, does not [10] occur, but is only conceived by the reason as if it occurred, so that the thing may be the more easily understood. Whatever is not composed in these first two ways should be called simple.

That God is a most simple Being

It must be shown, therefore, that God is not something composite, from which we shall be able to conclude that he is a most simple [15] being. This we shall accomplish easily. For since it is clear through itself that component parts are prior in nature at least to the thing composed, those substances by whose coalition and union God is composed will necessarily be prior in nature to God himself, and each one will be able to be conceived through itself, although it is not attributed [20] to God. Then, since they must be really distinguished from one another, each one will also necessarily be able to exist through itself without the aid of the others; and so, as we have just said, there could be as many gods as there are substances from which God would be supposed to be composed. For since each one is able to exist through [25] itself, it will have to exist of itself, and therefore will also have the power of giving itself all the perfections which we have shown to be in God (as we have already explained more fully in IP7, where we have demonstrated the existence of God). But since nothing more absurd than this can be said, we conclude that God is not composed of a coalition and union of substances.11

[30] That there is also in God no composition from different modes is sufficiently demonstrated from the fact that there are no modes in God. For modes arise from the alteration of substance (Principles I, 56).

Finally, if anyone wishes to feign another manner of composition, from the essence of things and their existence, we will not contradict [I/259] him at all. But it should be remembered that we have already sufficiently shown that these two are not distinct in God.

That God’s Attributes are distinguished only by reason

And from this we can now clearly conclude that all the distinctions we make between the attributes of God are only distinctions of reason [5] —the attributes are not really distinguished from one another. Understand such distinctions of reason as I have just mentioned, which are recognized from the fact that such a substance cannot exist without that attribute. So we conclude that God is a most simple being. For the rest, we pay no attention to the hodgepodge of Peripatetic distinctions [10] but go on to God’s life.

CHAPTER VI
OF GOD’S LIFE

What the Philosophers commonly understand by life

In order that this attribute, the Life of God, may be rightly understood, it is necessary for us to explain generally what in each thing is [15] denoted by its life. First, we shall examine the opinion of the Peripatetics. By life they understand the persistence of the nutritive soul with heat (see Aristotle, De Respiratione, I, 8).12 And because they have feigned three souls, vegetative, sensitive, and intellective, which they ascribe [20] only to plants, the lower animals, and men, it follows, as they themselves confess, that all other things are without life.

But in the meantime they did not dare to say that minds and God lack life. Perhaps they were afraid that they would fall into its contrary, i.e., that if minds and God lacked life, they might be dead. So [25] Aristotle (Metaphysics XI, vii) gives another definition of life, which is peculiar to minds, viz. Life is the actuality of the intellect.13 In this sense he attributes life to God, who understands and is pure act.

We shall not take much trouble to refute these doctrines. We have already proven sufficiently that those three souls they attribute to plants, [30] the lower animals, and men are only fictions, for we have shown that there is nothing in matter but mechanical constructions and operations. As far as God’s life is concerned, I do not know why [Aristotle] [I/260] should call it an action of the intellect more than an action of the will and of similar things. But because I expect no reply from him, I pass to the explanation promised, i.e., what life is.

[5] To what things life can be attributed

Although this term is often taken in an extended sense, to signify the conduct of some person, we shall explain briefly only what is denoted by it philosophically. Note that if life ought to be attributed to corporeal things also, nothing will be without life. But if it should be attributed only to those things in which a soul is united to a body, [10] then it will have to be ascribed only to men, and perhaps also to the lower animals, but not to minds or to God. But since the term life is commonly used more widely than this, there is no doubt but what it should also be ascribed to corporeal things not united to minds and to minds separated from the body.

[15] What life is, and what it is in God

So we understand by life the force through which things persevere in their being. And because that force is different from the things themselves,14 we say properly that the things themselves have life. But the power by which God perseveres in his being is nothing but his essence. So they speak best who call God life. Some Theologians think [20] it was for this reason, i.e., that God is life, and is not distinguished from life, that the Jews, when they swore, said chay yëhowah, living Jehovah, but not chey yëhowah, the life of Jehovah, as Joseph, when he swore by the life of the Pharaoh, said chey phar’oh.15

CHAPTER VII
[25] OF GOD’S INTELLECT

[B: From what is proven in these next three chapters, in which we treat of God’s intellect, will and power, it follows very clearly that the essences of things, and the necessity of their really existing from a [30] given cause, are nothing but God’s determinate will, or decree. Therefore God’s will is clearest to us when we conceive things clearly and [I/261] distinctly. So it is ridiculous for the Philosophers to take refuge in the will of God whenever they are ignorant of the causes of things. We often see this happen: for example, when they say that the things [5] whose causes are unknown to them have happened solely by God’s pleasure and from his absolute decree.

Ordinary people too have found no stronger proof of God’s providence and rule than that based on the ignorance of causes. This shows [10] clearly that they have no knowledge at all of the nature of God’s will, and that they have attributed a human will to him, i.e., a will really distinct from the intellect. I think this misconception has been the sole cause of superstition, and perhaps of much knavery.]

That God is Omniscient

Among the attributes of God we have previously numbered Omniscience, [15] which is quite certainly ascribable to God. For knowledge involves perfection, and God, as the supremely perfect being, must lack no perfection. So we shall have to attribute to God knowledge in the highest degree, i.e., such as presupposes, or supposes, no ignorance, or privation of knowledge. For then there would be an imperfection [20] in the attribute itself, or in God. From this it follows that God has never had a potential intellect, nor does he conclude anything by reasoning.

The objects of God’s knowledge not things outside God

It also follows from God’s perfection that his ideas are not determined, as ours are, by objects placed outside God. On the contrary, [25] the things which have been created outside God by God are determined by God’s intellect.b For otherwise the objects [of his knowledge] would have their own nature and essence through themselves, and would be prior, at least in nature, to the divine intellect. But that is absurd.

Because some people have not taken sufficient note of this, they [30] have fallen into very great errors, and have maintained that there is matter outside God, coeternal with him, existing of itself. According to some, God, in understanding, only reduces this matter to order; according to others, he impresses forms on it. And then some have maintained that things are, of their own nature, either necessary, or [I/262] impossible, or contingent, and that God, therefore, also knows them as contingent and is completely ignorant of whether they exist or not. Finally, others have said that God knows contingents from their circumstances, perhaps because he has had long experience of them. In addition to these, I could mention here still other errors of this kind, [5] if I did not judge it superfluous. From what has been said, their falsity should be evident without further discussion.

But God himself

Let us return then to our thesis, viz. that outside God there is no object of his knowledge, but that he himself is the object of his knowledge, or rather is his own knowledge. Those who think that the world [10] is also the object of God’s knowledge are far less discerning than those who would have a building, made by some distinguished Architect, be considered the object of his knowledge. For the builder is forced to seek suitable material outside himself, but God sought no matter outside himself. Both the essence and the existence of things have been [15] made from his intellect or will.

How God knows sins, and beings of reason, etc.

The question now arises whether God knows evils, or sins, and beings of reason, and the like. We reply that God must understand those things of which he is the cause, particularly since they could not [20] even exist for a moment without his concurrence. Therefore, since evils and sins are nothing in things, but are only in the human mind, which compares things with one another, it follows that God does not know them outside human minds. We have said that beings of reason are modes of thinking, and in this way must be understood by God, [25] i.e., insofar as we perceive that he preserves and produces the human mind, in whatever way it is constituted. But we do not mean that God has such modes of thinking in himself in order to retain more easily the things he understands. And if only the little we have said here is rightly attended to, it will not be possible to propose any difficulty concerning God’s intellect which cannot be very easily resolved.

[30] How he knows singular things and universals

But in the meantime, we must not pass over the error of those writers who say that God knows only eternal things, such as the angels, the heavens, etc., which they have feigned to be, by their nature, unsusceptible either to generation or to corruption, but that he knows nothing of this world, except species, inasmuch as they also are not [I/263] subject to generation or corruption. These writers seem determined to go astray and to contrive the most absurd fantasies. For what is more absurd than to deprive God of the knowledge of singular things, which cannot exist even for a moment without God’s concurrence. Then [5] they maintain that God is ignorant of the things that really exist, but fictitiously ascribe to him a knowledge of universals, which neither exist nor have any essence beyond that of singular things. We, on the contrary, attribute a knowledge of singular things to God, and deny him a knowledge of universals, except insofar as he understands human minds.

[10] In God there is only one simple idea

Finally, before we put an end to this argument, we must deal satisfactorily with the question whether there is more than one idea in God, or only one, absolutely simple idea. To this I reply that the idea of God in virtue of which he is called omniscient is unique and absolutely [15] simple.16 For really, God is called omniscient only because he has the idea of himself, which idea or knowledge has always existed with God. For it is nothing but his essence, nor could it exist in any other way.

What God’s knowledge concerning created things is

But God’s knowledge concerning created things cannot so properly be referred to God’s knowledge; for if God had willed it, created things [20] would have had another essence, which has no place in the knowledge God has concerning himself. Nevertheless, it may be asked whether what is (properly or improperly) called knowledge of created things is manifold or one.

But, we may reply, this question is like those which ask whether [25] God’s decrees and volitions are many or not, and whether God’s omnipresence, or the concurrence by which he preserves singular things, is the same in all things. And we have already said that we can have no distinct knowledge concerning these.

Nevertheless, we know most evidently that just as God’s concurrence, [30] if it is referred to his omnipotence, must be unique, although it is manifested variously in its effects, so also his volitions and decrees (for so it pleases us to call his knowledge of created things), considered in God, are not many,17 although they are expressed variously through created things, or rather, in created things.

[I/264] Finally, if we attend to the proportion of the whole of nature,18 we can consider it as one being, and consequently there will only be one idea of God, or decree concerning natura naturata.

CHAPTER VIII
[5] OF GOD’S WILL

That we do not know how God’s Essence, his intellect, by which he understands himself, and his will, by which he loves himself, are distinguished

God’s will, by which he wills to love himself, follows necessarily from his infinite intellect, by which he understands himself. But how are these three things—God’s essence, his intellect, by which he understands himself, and his will, by which he wills to love himself—[10] distinguished? We do not know. Not that we are ignorant of the term personality, which the Theologians commonly use to explain this matter. But though we are familiar with the term, we do not know its meaning, nor can we form any clear and distinct concept of it. Nevertheless, [15] we believe firmly that God will reveal this to his own, in the most blessed vision of God which is promised to the faithful.

God’s Will and Power, as far as externals are concerned, are not distinguished from his intellect

God’s Will and Power, as far as externals are concerned, are not distinguished from his intellect, as has already been well-established above. For we have shown that God decreed, not only that things [20] would exist, but also that they would exist with such a nature. That is, that their essence and their existence had to depend on the will and power of God. From which we perceive clearly and distinctly that God’s intellect, and his power and will, by which he has created, understood, and preserves, or loves, created things, are not distinguished [25] from one another in any way, except in regard to our thought.19

God is improperly said to hate things, and love others

But when we say that God hates some things and loves others, this is said in the same sense Scripture uses in maintaining that the earth disgorges men, and other things of that kind. That God is angry with no one, that he does not love things in the way in which ordinary people persuade themselves he does—these propositions may be inferred [30] sufficiently from Scripture itself. Isaiah says, and the apostle Paul to the Romans more clearly, For when they (namely the sons of Isaac) had not yet been born and had done neither good nor evil, it was said to her [Rebekah] that in order that God’s purpose should be maintained according [I/265] to his choice, not because of works, but because of his call, the elder would serve the younger, etc.20 And a little later, Therefore, he has pity on whom he will, and hardens whom he will. You will say to me—What does he still complain of? For who resists his will? But, who are you, man, to answer [5] God thus? Will what is made say to him who made it—Why have you made me in this way? Does the potter not have power over his clay, to make, from the same mass, one vessel for honor, and another for dishonor? etc.21

Why God warns men, why he does not save without warning, and why the impious are punished

If you should ask now, why does God warn men? the answer is [10] easy, viz. that God has decreed from eternity to warn men at that time, in order that those whom he willed to be saved might be converted. If you ask next, whether God could not save them without that warning, we reply that he could have.

Why, then, does he not save? you will perhaps ask again. I shall [15] answer this after you have told me why God did not render the Red Sea passable without a strong east wind, and why he does not bring about all singular motions without others, and infinitely many other things which God does by mediating causes.

You will ask again, why are the impious punished? For they act [20] from their own nature, and according to the divine decree. But I answer that it is also from the divine decree that they are punished. If only those were fit to be punished whom we feign to sin only from freedom, why do men try to exterminate poisonous snakes? For they only sin from their own nature, nor can they do otherwise.

[25] Scripture teaches nothing which contradicts the natural light

Finally, if any other passages which give rise to scruples still occur in Sacred Scripture, this is not the place to explain them. For here we are inquiring only after those things that we can grasp most certainly by natural reason. It suffices that we demonstrate those things clearly for us to know that Sacred Scripture must also teach the same things. [30] For the truth does not contradict the truth, nor can Scripture teach such nonsense as is commonly supposed. For if we were to discover in it anything that would be contrary to the natural light, we could refute it with the same freedom which we employ when we refute the Koran and the Talmud. But let us not think for a moment that anything could be found in Sacred Scripture that would contradict the [35] natural light.22

[I/266] CHAPTER IX
OF GOD’S POWER

How God’s Omnipotence should be understood

We have already proven sufficiently that God is omnipotent. Here we shall only attempt to explain briefly how this attribute is to be [5] understood. For there are many people who speak of it neither piously enough nor according to the truth. They say that some things are possible, others impossible, and still others necessary, by their own nature, and not by God’s decree. And they say that God’s omnipotence applies only to possible things.

[10] But we, who have already shown that all things depend absolutely on God’s decree, say that God is omnipotent. Moreover, after we have understood that he decreed certain things from the sheer freedom of his will, and then that he is immutable, we say now that he can do nothing against his own decrees, and that this is impossible for the [15] sole reason that it is incompatible with God’s perfection.

All things are necessary with respect to God’s decree, but it is not the case that some are necessary in themselves, and others with respect to his decree

But perhaps someone will argue that we find some things to be necessary only by attending to God’s decree, and others to be necessary without attending to his decree. For example, that Josiah would burn the bones of the idolators on Jeroboam’s altar.23 If we attend [20] only to Josiah’s will, we shall regard the matter as possible, nor shall we call it necessarily future in any way, except from the fact that the prophet had predicted it from God’s decree. But that the three angles of a triangle must equal two right angles, the thing itself shows.

Those who say this surely feign distinctions in things out of their [25] own ignorance. For if men understood clearly the whole order of Nature, they would find all things just as necessary as are all those treated in Mathematics. Yet because this is beyond human knowledge, we judge certain things to be possible, but not necessary. Accordingly, [30] we must say either that God can do nothing, since all things are really necessary, or that he can do all things, and that the necessity we find in things has resulted from the decree of God alone.

[I/267] If God had made a different nature of things, he would have had to give us a different intellect

Suppose someone asks now: what if God had decreed otherwise and had made false those things which are now true? would we not, nevertheless, admit them as quite true? Yes indeed, if he had left us with [5] the nature which in fact he has given us; but then he would also have been able, if he had so willed, to give us such a nature as he has now given us, by which we would understand the nature of things, and their laws, as God would have decreed them. Indeed, if we attend to God’s veracity, [we shall see that] he must have given us such a nature.

The same conclusion is also evident from what we said above, viz. that the whole natura naturata is only one being. From this it follows [10] that man is a part of Nature, which must be coherent with the other parts. Accordingly, it would also follow from the simplicity of God’s decree that, if God had created things in another way, he would at the same time have constituted our nature so that we would understand things just as they had been created by God. So though we wish to retain the same distinction concerning the power of God that [15] the Philosophers commonly teach, nevertheless, we are forced to explain it differently.

The subdivisions of God’s Power: absolute, ordained, ordinary, extraordinary; what they are

We divide the power of God, therefore, into absolute and ordained, and we call God’s power absolute, when we consider his omnipotence without attending to his decree, but ordained, when we do consider his [20] decrees.

Then there is the ordinary power of God, and his extraordinary power. The ordinary is that by which he preserves the world in a certain order; the extraordinary is exercised when he does something beyond the order of nature, e.g., all miracles, such as the speaking of an ass, the appearance of angels, and the like.

[25] Concerning this last there could, not without reason, be considerable doubt. For it seems a greater miracle if God always governs the world with one and the same fixed and immutable order, than if, on account of human folly, he abrogates the laws which (as only one thoroughly blinded could deny) he himself has most excellently decreed [30] in nature, from sheer freedom. But we leave this for the Theologians to settle.

We omit the other questions commonly raised about God’s power, viz. whether it extends to the past, whether he can do better what he does, [I/268] whether he can do more than he has done.24 For after what we have said above, such questions are very easily answered.

CHAPTER X
OF CREATION

[5] What creation is

That God is the creator of all things we have already established. Now we shall try to explain what should be understood by creation. Then we shall answer as well as we can the questions commonly raised [10] concerning creation. We say, therefore, that creation is an activity in which no causes concur except the efficient, or a created thing is that which presupposes nothing except God in order to exist.25

The common definition of creation rejected

There are several things which need to be noted here: (1) we omit those words which the philosophers commonly use, viz. ex nihilo, as [15] if nothing was the matter from which things were produced. The reason why philosophers speak this way is that when things are generated, they customarily suppose something prior to the things, out of which the things are made; consequently they were not able to omit that particle ex in creation.

The same thing has happened concerning matter. Because they see [20] that all bodies are in a place and are surrounded by other bodies, when they ask themselves where the whole of matter would be, they reply, in some imaginary space. So there is no doubt that they have not considered nothing as the negation of all reality, but have feigned or imagined it to be something real.26

[25] The author’s own definition explained

(2) I say that in creation no other causes concur beyond the efficient. I could, indeed, have said, that creation denies, or excludes, all causes except the efficient. Still, I preferred concur, so as not to be forced to answer those who ask whether God had set no end before him, on [30] account of which he created things.

Furthermore, to explain the matter better, I have added the second definition, viz. that a created thing presupposes nothing except God. [I/269] Surely if God had some end before him, it was not outside God. For there is nothing outside God by which he might be roused to action.

That accidents and modes are not created

(3) From this definition it follows that there is no creation of accidents and modes; for they presuppose a created substance in addition [5] to God.

There was no time or duration before creation

(4) Finally, we can imagine neither time nor duration before creation; but these latter have begun with things. For time is the measure of duration, or rather, is nothing but a mode of thinking. Consequently [10] it presupposes, not just any created thing whatever, but particularly, thinking men. Moreover, duration ceases when created things cease to be, and begins when created things begin to exist.

I say created things, for we have already shown quite unmistakably that no duration, but only eternity, is ascribable to God. Wherefore, [15] duration presupposes, or at least, supposes created things. Those, however, who imagine duration and time before created things labor under the same prejudice as those who invent a space outside matter. That is evident enough through itself. This will suffice concerning the definition of creation.

[20] God’s activity is the same in creating the world as in preserving it

Again, there is no need for us to repeat here what we demonstrated in IA10, viz. that as much power is required for creating a thing as for preserving it,27 i.e., that God’s activity is the same in creating the world as in preserving it.

[25] With these matters noted, we pass to the second thing we promised. We need to ask (1) what has been created, and what is uncreated? and (2) whether the created could have been created from eternity?

What created things are

[30] To the first, we reply that the created is everything whose essence is conceived clearly without any existence, and is nevertheless conceived through itself. E.g., matter, of which we have a clear and distinct concept, when we conceive it under the attribute of extension, and we conceive it equally clearly and distinctly whether it exists or not.

[I/270] How God’s thought differs from ours

But perhaps someone will say that we perceive thought clearly and distinctly without existence, and nevertheless, ascribe it to God. To this, however, we reply that we do not ascribe to God a thought such as ours is, i.e., susceptible of being acted on, and limited by the nature [5] of things, but one that is pure act, and therefore involves existence, as we have demonstrated above at sufficient length. For we have shown that God’s intellect and will are not distinguished from his power and essence, which involves existence.

There is not something outside God, and coeternal with him

Therefore, since all those things whose essence involves no existence [10] must be created by God in order to exist, and must be continuously preserved by the creator himself, as we have explained above, many times, we shall not waste time in refuting the opinion of those who have set up the world, or chaos, or matter devoid of all form, as coeternal with God, and therefore independent of him.28 So we pass [15] to the second question and ask whether what has been created could have been created from eternity.29

What is denoted here by the words: from eternity

To understand the question rightly, we must attend to this manner of speaking: from eternity. For by this we wish to signify here something altogether different from what we explained previously when [20] we spoke of God’s eternity. Here we understand nothing but a duration without any beginning of duration, or a duration so great that, even if we wished to multiply it by many years, or tens of thousands of years, and this product in turn by tens of thousands, we could still [25] never express it by any number, however large.

A proof that there could not have been something created from eternity

But that there can be no such duration is clearly demonstrated. For if the world were to go backward again from this point, it could never have such a duration. Therefore the world also could not have arrived at this point from such a beginning.

[30] You will say, perhaps, that to God nothing is impossible, for he is omnipotent, and therefore could make a duration such that there can not be a greater. We reply that God, because he is omnipotent, will never create a duration such that he cannot create a greater. For the nature of duration is such that, for any given duration, a greater or [I/271] lesser can always be conceived, just as is the case with number.

You will insist, perhaps, that God has existed from eternity, and therefore has endured up to this time. So there is a duration than which a greater cannot be conceived. But in this way you attribute to God a duration consisting of parts, which we have already refuted [5] more than adequately, when we showed that, not duration, but eternity pertains to God. Would that men had considered this rightly! For then they could have extricated themselves very easily from many disputes and absurdities, and would have occupied themselves entirely with the most blessed contemplation of this being, to their very great [10] delight.

But let us proceed to reply to the arguments of certain writers30 who try to show the possibility of such an infinite prior duration.

From the fact that God is eternal, it does not follow that his effects can also exist from eternity

First, they contend, a thing produced can exist at the same time as its [15] cause, but since God has existed from eternity, his effects could also have been produced from eternity. And this they confirm further by the example of the son of God, who has been produced by the father from eternity. But from what we have previously said, it is clear that they confuse eternity with duration and only attribute duration to God from eternity, as is also [20] evident from the example they use. For the same eternity they ascribe to the son of God they hold to be possible for creatures. Again, time and duration are imagined prior to the establishment of the world and they wish to set up a duration without created things, just as others invent an eternity outside God. We have already shown both views to [25] be very far from the truth.

We reply, therefore, that it is quite false that God can communicate his eternity to creatures. Nor is the son of God a creature; rather like the father, he is eternal. So when we say that the father has begotten the son from eternity, we mean only that he has always communicated [30] his eternity to the son.31

That God, if he acted necessarily, is not infinitely powerful

Secondly, they argue that God is not less powerful when he acts freely, than when he acts necessarily; but if God acted necessarily, since his power is infinite, he would have had to create the world from eternity. Still, we can [I/272] reply very easily to this argument also if we pay attention to its basis. For those good men32 suppose that they can have different ideas of a being of infinite power. For they conceive God to be of infinite power, both when he acts from the necessity of nature and when he acts freely.

[5] But we deny that God, if he acted from the necessity of nature, would be of infinite power. We may deny this now, and indeed they are obliged to concede it, after we have demonstrated that the most perfect being acts freely and can only be conceived as unique.

They may reply that it can, nevertheless, be posited that God, when [10] he acts from the necessity of nature, is of infinite power, even though what is supposed is impossible. Our answer is that it is no more legitimate to suppose that, than to suppose a square circle in order to infer that not all lines drawn from its center to its circumference are equal. And this is adequately established by what we have said just now, so that there is no need to repeat what was said earlier. For we [15] have just demonstrated that there is no duration such that its double, or a greater or lesser duration cannot be conceived, and that therefore, for any given duration, a greater or lesser can always be created by God, who acts freely with infinite power. But if God acted from the necessity of nature, that would not follow at all. For he could produce [20] only that [duration] which would result from his nature, and not infinitely many others greater than the given [duration].

Briefly, we argue thus: if God created a greatest duration, such that he himself could not create a greater one, then he would necessarily diminish his power. But the latter is false, for his power does not [25] differ from his essence. Therefore, etc. Again, if God acted from the necessity of nature, he would have to create a duration such that he himself cannot create a greater; but if God creates such a duration, he is not of infinite power, for we can always conceive a duration greater than any given duration. Therefore, if God acted from the necessity of nature, he would be of infinite power.

[30] How we have the concept of a greater duration than the world has

But here perhaps a difficulty will occur to some, viz. how is it that—seeing that the world was created five thousand years ago, or more, if the calculation of the chronologists is correct33—we can nevertheless conceive a greater duration, which we said could not be understood [I/273] without created things. That difficulty can be very easily removed, if it is noted that we do not understand this duration from the mere contemplation of created things, but from the contemplation of God’s infinite power of creating. For creatures cannot be conceived as [5] existing, or enduring, through themselves, but as existing through God’s infinite power, from which alone they have all their duration. See IP12 and its corollary.

Finally, in order not to waste time here replying to worthless arguments, the following things only are to be noted: the distinction [10] between eternity and duration, and that duration is not in any way intelligible without created things, nor eternity without God. If we perceive these things rightly, we can reply to all the arguments very easily. So we do not think it necessary to dwell on them further.

[15] CHAPTER XI
OF GOD’S CONCURRENCE

Little or nothing remains to be said about this attribute, after we have shown that at each moment God continually creates a thing, anew as it were. From this we have demonstrated that the thing, of itself, [20] never has any power to do anything or to determine itself to any action, and that this applies not only to things outside man, but also to the human will itself. Then we reply also to certain arguments concerning this; and though many other arguments are usually brought [25] forward, our intention here is to ignore them, since they pertain principally to Theology.

Nevertheless, because there are many who admit God’s concurrence, but in quite a different sense from that in which we maintain it, we must, in order to uncover their fallacy most readily, take note [30] here of what we have proven previously. Viz. that the present time has no connection with the future time (see IA10), and that we perceive [I/274] this clearly and distinctly. And if only we attend properly to this, we will be able, without any difficulty, to answer all of the arguments they can draw from Philosophy.

How God’s Preservation is related to his determination of things to act

Still, in order not to mention this question uselessly, we shall reply [5] in passing to the query, whether it adds something to God’s preservation, when he determines a thing to act. When we spoke of motion, we already suggested an answer to this. For we said that God preserves the same quantity of motion in nature. So if we attend to the whole nature of [10] matter, nothing new is added to it. But with respect to particular things, it can in a sense be said that something new is added to them. It does not seem that this applies also to spiritual things; for it is not evident that they depend on one another in this way.

Finally, since the parts of duration have no connection with one [15] another, we can say, not so much that God preserves things as that he creates them. So if a man now has a determinate freedom to do something, it must be said that God has created him thus at this time. Nor is it an objection to this that the human will is often determined [20] by things outside it, and that in turn all things in nature are determined by one another to activity. For they have been determined so by God. No thing can determine the will, nor can the will in turn be determined,34 except by the power of God alone. But how this is [25] compatible with human freedom, i.e., how God can do this and human freedom still be preserved, we confess that we do not know, as we have already frequently remarked.

That the common division of God’s attributes is more nominal than real

These are the things I had decided to say about God’s attributes. So far I have given no division of them. But that division Writers [30] generally give—that God’s attributes are divided into the communicable and the incommunicable—to confess the truth, that division seems more nominal than real. For God’s knowledge agrees no more with human knowledge than the Dog that is a heavenly constellation agrees with the dog that is a barking animal. And perhaps even much less.35

[I/275] The Author’s own division

But we give this division. There are some attributes of God which explain his active essence, others which explain nothing of his action, but only his manner of existing.36 Unity, eternity, necessity, etc., are [5] of the latter sort, but understanding, will, life, omnipotence, etc., of the former. This division is sufficiently clear and evident, and includes all of God’s attributes.

CHAPTER XII
OF THE HUMAN MIND

[10] We must go on now to created substance, which we have divided into extended and thinking. By extended substance we understood matter, or corporeal substance. But by thinking substance we understood only human minds.

Angels are a subject for theology, but not for metaphysics

And though the Angels have also been created, nevertheless, because [15] they are not known by the natural light, they do not concern Metaphysics. For their essence and existence are known only by revelation, and so pertain solely to Theology. Since theological knowledge is altogether other than, or completely different in kind from, natural knowledge, it ought not to be mixed with it in any way. So [20] no one will expect us to say anything about angels.

The human mind is not transmitted but created by God, though we do not know when

Let us return, then, to human minds, about which few things now remain to be said, apart from reminding you that we have said nothing about the time of the human mind’s creation.37 Our reason is that it is not sufficiently established at what time God creates it, since it can [25] exist without body. It is sufficiently certain that it is not by transmission.38 For that occurs only in things which are generated, i.e., in the modes of some substance. But substance itself cannot be generated; it can only be created by the Omnipotent alone, as we have proven fully in the preceding.

[30] In what sense the human soul is mortal

But let me add something concerning its immortality. Quite certainly we cannot say of any created thing that its nature is such that it would involve a contradiction for the thing to be destroyed by God’s [I/276] power; he who has the power of creating a thing, has also the power of destroying it. Moreover, as we have already fully demonstrated, no created thing can exist by its own nature for even a moment, but each is created continually by God.

[5] In what sense immortal

In spite of this, we see clearly and distinctly that we have no idea by which we conceive that a substance is destroyed, as we have ideas of the corruption and generation of modes. For we conceive clearly, when we attend to the structure of the human body, that such a structure [10] can be destroyed. But when we attend to corporeal substance,39 we do not conceive clearly that it can be annihilated.

Again, a Philosopher does not ask what God can do by his supreme power, but judges the nature of things from the laws that God has [15] placed in them. So he judges to be fixed and settled what is inferred from those laws to be fixed and settled, though he does not deny that God can change those laws and everything else.40 Hence we also do not ask, when we speak of the soul, what God can do, but only what follows from the laws of nature.41

[20] Its immortality is demonstrated

Moreover, since it clearly follows from these laws that a substance can be destroyed neither through itself nor through another created substance (as we have already proven abundantly, unless I am mistaken), we are compelled, from the laws of nature, to maintain that the mind is immortal.

And if we wish to look into the matter still more thoroughly, we [25] shall be able to demonstrate most evidently that it is immortal. For as we have just demonstrated, it follows clearly from the laws of nature that the soul is immortal. But those laws of nature are God’s decrees, revealed by the natural light, as is also established most plainly by the preceding. Now we have also already demonstrated that God’s decrees [30] are immutable. From all this we infer clearly that God’s immutable will concerning the duration of souls has been manifested to men not only by revelation, but also by the natural light.

God acts, not against nature, but above nature; what this is, according to the author

Nor does it matter if someone objects that God sometimes destroys those natural laws to bring about miracles. For most of the more prudent [I/277] Theologians42 concede that God does nothing against nature, but only acts above nature. I.e. (as I explain it), that God also has many laws of acting which he has not communicated to the human intellect. But if these laws had been communicated to the human intellect, they [5] would be just as natural as the rest.

So it is quite clearly established that minds are immortal, and I do not see what remains to be said here about the human soul in general. Nor would there remain anything to be said in particular about its functions, if the arguments of certain Authors did not summon me to [10] reply to them. For they try, by these arguments, to bring it about that they do not see and think what they do see and think.

Why some think the will is not free

Some think they can show that the will is not free, but is always determined by something else. And they think this because they understand by will something distinct from the soul, something they [15] consider as a substance whose nature43 consists entirely in that it is indifferent. To remove all confusion, we shall first explain [what the will is]. Once this is done, we shall lay bare the fallacies of their arguments very easily.

What the will is

We have said that the human mind is a thinking thing; it follows, [20] accordingly, that, from its own nature alone, considered in itself, it can do something, viz. think, i.e., affirm and deny. But these thoughts are determined either by things existing outside the mind, or by the mind alone. For it is a substance from whose thinking essence many [25] acts of thought can and must follow. But those acts of thought which recognize no other cause of themselves than the human mind are called volitions. And the human mind, in so far as it is conceived as a sufficient cause for producing such actions, is called the will.

[30] That there is a will

But that the soul has such a power, although determined by no external things, can be explained most conveniently by the example of Buridan’s ass. For if we put a man, instead of an ass, in such a condition of equilibrium,44 the man will rightly be considered, not a thinking thing, but a most shameful ass, if he should perish from hunger and thirst.

[I/278] The same conclusion is also evident from the fact that, as we have said before, we willed to doubt all things, and indeed, not just to judge doubtful those things which can be called in question, but to reject them as false. (See Descartes Principles I, 39.)

[5] And that it is free

Next, it must be noted that, although the soul is determined by external things to affirming or denying something, it is not so determined as if it were compelled by external things, but it always remains [10] free. For no thing has the power of destroying its essence. So what the soul affirms and denies, it always affirms and denies freely, as is explained sufficiently in the fourth Meditation. Hence, if anyone asks why the soul wills this or that, or does not will this or that, we shall reply, because the soul is a thinking thing, i.e., a thing which, of its [15] own nature, has the power of willing and not willing, of affirming and denying. For this is what it is to be a thinking thing.

And should not be confused with wanting

With these matters explained, let us now look at our opponents’ arguments. (1) The first is as follows: If the will can will contrary to the last dictate of the intellect, if it can want what is contrary to the good prescribed [20] by the last dictate of the intellect, it will be able to want evil as evil. But the latter is absurd. Therefore the former is also.

From this argument it is plain that they do not understand what the will is. For they confuse it with the appetite which the soul has after it has affirmed or denied something. This they have learned from their [25] Master, who has defined the will as an appetite for what seems good.45

But we say that the will is the affirming that this is good, or the contrary. We have already explained this fully in dealing with the cause of error, which we have shown to arise from the fact that the will extends more [30] widely than the intellect. But if the mind had not affirmed from the fact that it is free, that this is good, it would want nothing.

So we reply to the argument by conceding that the mind can will nothing contrary to the last dictate of the intellect, i.e., that it can will nothing insofar as it is supposed not to will it. And that is what is supposed here, when it is said that the mind has judged something [I/279] evil, i.e., it has not willed it. Nevertheless, we deny that the mind absolutely could not have willed what is evil, i.e., judged it good. That would be contrary to experience. For we judge good things that [5] are evil, and evil many things that are good.

Nor is the will anything except the mind itself

(2) The second argument—or if you prefer, the first, since so far there has been none—is this: If the will is not determined to willing by the last judgment of the practical intellect, then it will determine itself. But the will does not determine itself, because of itself and by its nature it is [10] indeterminate. So they go on to argue thus. If the will, of itself and by its own nature, is indifferent to willing and not willing, it cannot be determined by itself to willing. For what determines must be as determinate as what is determined is indeterminate. But the will, considered as determining itself, is [15] as indeterminate as it is when it is considered as to be determined. For our opponents posit nothing in the determining will which is not the same in the will which either is to be determined or has been determined. Nor indeed, can they posit such a thing here. Therefore, the will cannot be determined by itself to willing. And if not by itself, then it is determined by another.

[20] These are the very words of Professor Heereboord of Leiden.46 They show plainly that he understands by will, not the mind itself, but something else either outside the mind or in the mind, like a blank tablet, lacking all thought, and capable of receiving any picture whatever. Or rather he conceives it as a balance in a state of equilibrium, [25] which is moved in either direction you like by any weight whatever, as the added weight is determined [in a certain direction], or finally, as something that neither he nor any mortal can grasp by any thought.

But we have just said, indeed we have shown clearly, that the will is nothing except the mind itself, which we call a thinking thing, i.e., [30] one that affirms and denies. From this we clearly infer, when we attend to the nature of the mind alone, that it has an equal power of affirming and of denying. For this, I say, is thinking.

So if we conclude that the mind has the power of affirming and denying from the fact that it thinks, why then do we seek adventitious [I/280] causes of the production of what follows from the nature of the thing alone? You will say that the mind is no more determinate toward affirming than toward denying. Therefore, you will conclude, we must seek a cause by which it is determined.

[5] But I argue on the contrary, that if the mind, of itself and by its own nature, were determined only to affirming (although it is impossible to conceive this, as long as we think it is a thinking thing), then of its own nature alone it could only affirm, and never deny, no matter how many causes concurred; if it is determined neither to affirming [10] nor to denying, then it will be able to do neither; and finally, if it has the power to do each, as we have just shown it to have, then it will be able to bring about each one, of its own nature alone, with no other cause assisting.

This will be quite evident to all those who consider the thinking [15] thing as a thinking thing, i.e., who in no way separate the attribute of thought from the thinking thing itself, from which it is only distinguished by reason. Our opponents do make this separation when they strip the thinking thing of every thought and feign it as that prime matter of the Peripatetics.

[20] So I reply thus to the argument. First, to its major premise. If by will one understands a thing stripped of every thought, we grant that the will is, of its nature, indeterminate. But we deny that the will is something stripped of every thought. On the contrary, we maintain that it is a thought, i.e., a power of doing each one, of affirming and [25] of denying. By a power of doing each one, of course, nothing else can be understood than a cause sufficient for each one.

Next, we also deny that, if the will were indeterminate, i.e., deprived of every thought, some adventitious cause (except God, by his [30] infinite power of creating) would be able to determine it. For to conceive a thinking thing without any thought is the same as wishing to conceive an extended thing without extension.

Why Philosophers have confused the mind with corporeal things

There should, finally, be no need to examine many arguments here. I give warning only that our Opponents, because they have not understood [I/281] the will and have had no clear and distinct concept of the mind, have confused the mind with corporeal things. This has happened because they have used words that they are accustomed to use for corporeal things to signify spiritual ones which they did not understand. [5] For they have been accustomed to call indeterminate those bodies which are propelled in opposite directions by equivalent and opposite external causes. So when they say that the will is indeterminate, they seem to conceive it also as a body in equilibrium. And because [10] those bodies have nothing but what they have received from external causes (from which it follows that they must always be determined by an external cause), they think the same thing follows in the will. But we have already explained sufficiently how the matter really stands, so we make an end of it here.

[15] Of extended substance we have already said enough previously, and beyond these two, we recognize no others. As for real accidents and other qualities, they have already been rejected adequately and it is not necessary to spend our time refuting them. So here we bring our work to a close.

The End