Chapter 10

Board of Enquiry

On 20 August 1942, Acting Vice Admiral Neville Syfret, who had commanded Force F during Operation Pedestal, sent a signal to the Admiralty saying:

From reports from survivors from HMS MANCHESTER which I have seen so far seem to indicate that an enquiry into the loss of this ship is desirable.

Enquires into the loss of HMS EAGLE and HMS CAIRO are not considered necessary.

Enquiry into the loss of HMS FORESIGHT has been held but my recommendations must await report from her captain who was sent home in HMS VICTORIOUS and was not available for the enquiry.1

Two days later, the Admiralty received a message from Washington in which it was stated that on 17 August the US Consul in Tunis had talked to the Captain of Manchester who said that his ship was sunk by a torpedo from an Italian E-boat. The Captain said that this boat and one other were sunk. Manchester had sunk in twenty fathoms about four miles off Kelibia. All documents burnt, nothing compromised, RDF gear destroyed.²

On 24 August C-in-C Home Fleet was ordered to hold an enquiry into the loss of HMS Manchester. Three days later, the C-in-C Portsmouth signalled the Admiralty saying:³

In his report Sergeant Mullins R.M. states that, ‘The Captain said that it might be possible to get the ship underway by the morning at about 12 knots but that he considered that he would lose about 75% of the ship’s company if the ship were engaged by the enemy and therefore he considered it best to abandon the ship and then scuttle her.’

Mr Williams, Warrant Electrician, in his report states, ‘The Captain addressed the ship’s company and told them it was impossible to move the ship and had decided to get everyone away and then scuttle the ship.’

Mechanician GE Williams states, ‘Steering gear was damaged and consequently the ship was unable to manoeuvre. It was estimated that the ship could have steered at 12 knots if the steering gear was in working order.’

Constructor Commander HE Skinner in his technical report to Flag Officer Commanding Force F states that, ‘It is probable that the ship was abandoned due to tactical considerations.’4

C-in-C Portsmouth contacted the Admiralty again on 27 August observing that the forthcoming enquiry needed to address three questions namely, (a) the decision to abandon ship, (b) whether or not the ship was capable of steaming after being torpedoed and after counter flooding action had been undertaken or whether she could have in time been got underway and (c) the general question of damage control. C-in-C Portsmouth felt that question (a) could only be weighed by Acting Vice Admiral Syfret who had been Flag Officer commanding Force F and consequently requested Their Lordships direction on this point.

The Admiralty replied that questions (a), (b) and (c), were equally valid. However, in view of the lack of evidence from Manchester’s senior officers who were interned in Algeria, it was not anticipated that the Board of Enquiry would be expected to adjudicate on whether the cruiser’s Commanding Officer was right or wrong.⁵

The Board of Enquiry

The Court of Enquiry had been undertaken by Captain E.M. Evans-Lombe (HMS Glasgow, President), Captain J.P. Gornall (RNAS Worthy Down), Commander (E) R.C.W. Bett (RN Barracks Portsmouth) and W.R. Andrews (Constructor, DNC Department Bath) who were appointed on 10 September with proceedings commencing on 16 September 1942⁶. The Board was tasked with reporting into the ‘circumstances attending the loss of HMS MANCHESTER and the internment of the bulk of the ship’s company, in so far as this is possible from examination of the witnesses available’.⁷

The Board heard evidence from twenty-four witnesses, three of whom were officers – Lieutenant (Special Branch) Harold McCormack RCNVR, Lieutenant Cyril Kirk RNVR and Sub-Lieutenant James Munro. The witnesses, all of whom had escaped capture and internment by the Vichy French, recounted their experiences aboard the cruiser from the time that Manchester was torpedoed until the time she scuttled.

The Board was particularly concerned with the order ‘Emergency Stations’ and asked Sub-Lieutenant Munro what he knew of this arrangement. He replied that he did not hear the order ‘Emergency Stations’.

The organisation of this affected everyone on board, he stated: ‘All watertight doors which were open in action for any reason were immediately clipped fully. Such compartments that had men in them had a sentry on the watertight door whose duty was to ensure that the door remained closed. Any hands who were not required for the HA armament were sent to their abandon ship stations. The HA armament remained closed up. Any preparations necessary for abandoning ship were made by hands at abandon ship stations’. Munro added that, ‘if we were in two watches the watch below went to their abandon ship station while the watch on deck manned the HA armament’.

Asked how long HMS Manchester had had this organisation, he replied, ‘In the whole time I was in the ship – I think it sprang from when she was torpedoed before in the Mediterranean’.8

Petty Officer Albert Miller was asked to describe the organisation known as ‘Emergency Stations’ and replied, ‘Emergency Stations were the HA people closed up at action stations and the remainder after closing all doors, to go to their abandon ship stations’.⁹ When asked about ‘Emergency Stations’ Colour Sergeant Joseph Mullins said, ‘our emergency station was to close up to our abandon ship stations unless we were detailed for any other stations’.¹⁰

Able Seaman Alfred Shepherd was present when Captain Drew addressed the ship’s company before the ship was abandoned and reported that he said, ‘he had done the best for the men on the ship. We could beat the Italians, we could get to Vichy France to being taken prisoner of war … nobody said that it was possible to get the ship under way.’¹¹

The Court of Enquiry report dated 17 September 1942 established the following facts:

(a) Ship’s Company including damage control parties were at Action Stations when the cruiser was hit by the torpedo fired by an E-boat.

(b) Damage control at first degree readiness and as far as can be ascertained all gear provided and doors closed.

(c) No evidence that oil fuel tanks in any way abnormal at time of strike.

(d) The ship was altering course to starboard when struck.

(e) Ship hit by a single E-boat torpedo between stations 155 and 198 and probably included Y.3 oil fuel tank. Compartments known to be affected were the after engine-room, Y.1 oil fuel tank, 4-inch HA magazine, clothing issue room and associated stores and the main W/T office. It appears that the watertight compartments and oil fuel tanks on the starboard side of the after engine room were open to the sea.

(f) The after engine room flooded quickly to water level putting port and starboard inner shafts out of action. The starboard outer shafts out of action probably due to direct damage.

(g) No.4 dynamo was put out of action and no electrical power was available abaft 155 station thus putting the steering gear out of action.

(h) Steam was maintained for a considerable period before shutting down–doubt exists whether secondary flooding occurred into the after boiler room.

(i) A split occurred on the lower deck in the Gunroom Flat.

(j) The forward hatch to the after engine room was blown open.

(k) Oil fuel was present on the lower deck in ‘X’ flat, the gunroom and bathroom flats.

(l) There was some structural damage in the Ward Room Flat.

(m) The ship listed about sixteen degrees to starboard.

(n) The following machinery remained in action immediately after the explosion:

(i) Port outer shaft which continued to steam until stopped to prevent the ship circling.

(ii) Both boiler rooms

(iii) No.1 steam, Nos. 2 & 3 diesel dynamos & all electrical power before 155 station.

(o) The following remedial action was taken:

(i) Counter flooding of ship reduced list to six degrees.

(ii) The Fire Main was re-established aft.

(iii) The rudder was centred by hand.

(iv) Power was supplied by emergency leads to the steering motors.

(v) Attempts to re-start the port outer engine failed once it had been stopped. The cause of the failure cannot be determined. The Commanding Officer’s decision to abandon ship followed closely in point of time to the report of this failure.

(vi) The Commanding Officer ordered ‘Emergency Stations’ immediately the ship was damaged.

(vii) The decision to transfer a proportion of the ship’s Company to HMS PATHFINDER was taken before the final state of the port outer engine was known (ten officers and 163 ratings transferred to PATHFINDER).

(viii) At the time of the decision of the Commanding Officer to abandon and sink the ship, the ship was not in danger of sinking but was incapable of steaming. There is some evidence to show that the Commanding Officer believed at the time that there was a chance the ship could be repaired sufficiently to steam at slow speed. The position of the ship at the time and the consequent tactical considerations appear to have decided the Commanding Officer not to attempt this chance.

(p) The ship was sunk by three scuttling charges in a position approximately five miles from Cape Bon in between twenty and thirty fathoms.

(q) Ship’s Company advised to proceed to neutral Vichy territory. The weather conditions were such that there was no immediate imperative to get ashore but had the effect that only a small proportion of the ship’s company were rescued by SOMALI and ESKIMO which subsequently appeared on the scene.

(r) The damage control organisation appeared to work well.

(s) The evidence shows that a premature opinion was created in the ship that she would have to be abandoned as evidenced by:

(i) Emergency Stations were almost immediately ordered after the damage occurred.

(ii) HMS PATHFINDER was ordered to embark a considerable proportion of the ship’s company before it was certain that the ship could not steam (even if the latter was actually true).

(t) The organisation adopted for ‘Emergency Stations’ was dangerous. It entailed all seamen and marines, other than HA personnel, leaving their stations and preparing to abandon ship. This must inevitably react upon the determination of the remainder of the ship’s company–as in fact it did.

(u) The decision to abandon ship was taken after it was known that the outer engine could not be moved under steam. The Court felt unable to express an opinion as to whether this decision was premature. However, it appears possible that the whole of the ship’s company could have been rescued by British destroyers if this decision had been delayed to daylight. Furthermore, there is no evidence to show what was the reason for the seizure of the port shaft or that it could not have been rectified within this extra time.

(v) The Court was unable to form an opinion whether the ship’s company should have been ordered to remain together until daylight or whether they should to steer northward. We are of the opinion that the advice that they should immediately pull for shore was premature under the conditions prevailing.12

The Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (F)’s minute on outcomes of Court of Enquiry, dated 2 October 1942, stated that:

I generally agree with the findings of the Court of Enquiry but there is no one who can speak with authority as to what reports were made to the Captain.

It cannot be stated positively:

(a) Whether or not the ship could have been got under way in the morning.

(b) Whether the Captain knew that other destroyers were coming later who could have taken off the remainder of the Ship’s Company and so save them from internment.

The position in which the ship was sunk is not precise and therefore the possibility of recovery by divers of books, etc. (even though thrown overboard in chests) cannot be precluded. There does not appear to have been any panic or disorganisation and the Captain appears to have made his decision deliberately and calmly and uninfluenced by immediate enemy action or danger of sinking.

Two courses appear to have been open to him.

(a) To sink her as he did because he believed the chances of getting under way were zero.

(b) To have taken the chance that she could steam slowly later in the morning. In this case he should have put his wounded and unnecessary personnel into Pathfinder and fought his ship through.

It is difficult not to feel after reading the evidence that the Captain’s decision was wrong, unbalanced and showed a lack of determination. No further evidence or inquiry seems desirable at present but further enquiry into the whole circumstance should be made as and when other survivors return to the Country.13

The First Sea Lord’s comment on the outcome of the Court of Enquiry on 7 October 1942 was predictable and damning:

As long as a ship remains afloat and has even one gun in action she may cause damage to the enemy. In spite of the sketchy nature of the evidence, I do not consider that there can be any doubt that MANCHESTER was sunk prematurely and that this shows a lack of determination on the part of the Captain which renders him unfit to command one of HM Ships. I am of the opinion that a notation should be made in the Captain Drew’s record to the following effect:

All the available evidence pointing to the fact that HMS MANCHESTER was scuttled prematurely. Captain Drew is not again to be employed in Command of one of HM Ships unless a further Board of Inquiry at which Captain Drew produces evidence which necessitates a reversal of the above decision.¹⁴

The First Lord, A.V. Alexander, approved Pound’s comments two days later and on 10 October the Naval Secretary recorded that the necessary notation had been made in Captain Drew’s record.¹⁵