Most research starts with a definition of the main concepts and terms under investigation, as well as the issues at stake. In our case, we cannot follow this established practice, as “gender ideology” eludes all attempts to precisely define the meaning and scope of the term.1 In this chapter, we want to argue that it is exactly this fluidity that makes “gender ideology” a successful rallying cry with the potential to unite a broad range of Christian conservative and right-wing actors with opposing ideologies. As our analysis of this discourse shows, “gender ideology” functions as an empty signifier (Laclau 1996, 36) in the Austrian political discourse. It neither denominates specific social phenomena or policies nor an ideological standpoint, but a vague (albeit emotionally loaded) rejection of the development of family policies, gender equality, gender studies, sexuality policies and sex education. “Gender ideology” is a crucial notion in the establishment of a “chain of equivalences” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 129) that links concerns over anti-abortion and men’s rights activists to anti-LGBTIQ and anti-feminist agendas, as well as to Catholic conservative, right-wing and neoliberal stances on social policies in general.
More to the point, the term “gender ideology” can be defined primarily as a right-wing populist discourse, which typically aims at establishing antagonistic relations. Populism is based on an “equivalential moment” – the creation of “a frontier within the social”, the creation of antagonism. This creation requires the “other” side, the enemy (Laclau 2005, 39 and 41). The creation of a frontier works through a “signifier representing the chain as a totality” (ibid., 39), and the process of representation of a totality by a particular demand through equivalential chains is called “hegemony” (ibid.).
To create hegemony, the chain of equivalences needs to be extended, while its “connection with the particularistic demands which assume the function of universal representation” becomes weaker and weaker (ibid., 39–40). Therefore, the signifiers which construct the popular “we” and the “other” tend to become “empty signifiers”, that is signs without connection to the particularistic demand (ibid., 40). Hence, the contents of (empty) signifiers “become perfectly open to a variety of equivalential rearticulations” (ibid., 42). The potential of such empty signifiers is to “bring to equivalential homogeneity a highly heterogenous reality” (ibid., 40).
On the one hand, the very term “gender ideology” is characterized by flexibility, as it is linked to a rather broad subject area. On the other hand, it is used interchangeably with other notions such as “gender theory”, “genderism”, “gender delusion” or even “gender fascism”, as well as with more open formulations linking “gender” and “ideology”.2 These utterances have a reference to the impending abolition or destruction of gender as a natural and self-evident property of human beings in common, which is allegedly what “gender ideology”, “gender theory”, feminism and LGBTIQ movements are aiming for. Put differently, the notion of “gender ideology” is a specific (mis)representation of (de)constructivist feminist and queer theories, which is used as a background story to delegitimize all kinds of progressive policies in the fields of gender and sexuality (Hark and Villa 2015, 7).
It is noteworthy that even when authors and texts explicitly deal with Austrian examples or contexts, the logic of the argument mirrors the larger debate in Europe, and particularly Germany. This is especially obvious in the criticism of academic gender studies, which, more often than not, relies on German data and examples. Besides, transnational influences also shape debates in Austria, especially with regard to the international Catholic discourse (Paternotte 2015).
The aim of our chapter is to identify the networks of this anti-gender discourse in Austria and to depict the discursive elements of the debate about gender ideology as an empty signifier that might create equivalential chains, which feed into a counter- or anti-hegemonic discourse. Our chapter proceeds as follows. We first describe the Austrian political and religious landscape as an important context for the emergence of an organized and publicly visible anti-gender discourse. Then we characterize the main actors in this discursive field. Next, we provide a brief insight into our critical frame analysis methodology before we present the main results of this document analysis. The conclusion gathers the various elements of “gender ideology” as an empty signifier.
Until the 1990s, the Austrian political system was dominated by two major parties, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreich (SPÖ, Austrian Social Democratic Party) and the conservative Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP, People’s Party) and their closely affiliated social partnership organizations, the Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB, Austrian Federation of Labour Unions) and the Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKÖ, Austrian Chamber of Commerce). The conservative ÖVP, which has historical ties to political Catholicism and the Austro-Fascism of the 1930s, spans a relatively broad political spectrum including liberal as well as very conservative (Catholic) elements. The SPÖ, the Green Party and some (until now mostly short-lived) liberal parties oppose these ideas with a more liberal discourse. Apart from political parties, a large number of civil initiatives, organizations and groups spanning the entire political spectrum participate in debates on gender issues.
This consensus-oriented system has been challenged by the right-wing populist Freiheitliche Partei Österreich (FPÖ, Austrian Freedom Party). The FPÖ has developed from a small, traditional and German national right-wing extremist party under its leader Jörg Haider in the mid-1980s to a major right-wing populist force (Heinisch 2012). In 2000, the FPÖ and ÖVP formed a coalition government on the national level, which, among other things, dissolved the Women’s Ministry, degraded it to a ministerial section and established a “men’s section” in the Ministry for Social Affairs, Family and Generations headed by a member of a German national student fraternity. The FPÖ’s positions in government advanced conservative discourses on gender (Weiß 2013, 44). In 2008, FPÖ representative Barbara Rosenkranz published a book against gender mainstreaming, laying the groundwork for the FPÖ’s current anti-gender discourse (Rosenkranz 2008). Her publication raised issues of “gender ideology” in Austrian mainstream media for the first time. Today, the FPÖ is the most important, but not the only right-wing populist, actor in Austrian politics, as several less successful populist parties have emerged in recent years.
Austria is a traditionally catholic country. Nevertheless, the credibility of the Catholic Church has declined tremendously over the last years, not least due to blatant cases of sexual abuse. While 74% of the population was members of the Catholic Church in 2001, this number declined to 60% in 2014.3 Austrian state-church relations are characterized by cooperation and state neutrality. Relations between the Catholic Church and the Austrian state are regulated in a concordat dating back to 1933, reinstalled in most parts in 1957 and reformed in the 1960s. Catholic (church as well as lay) organizations, which are especially relevant for the discourse on “gender ideology”, have long focused their campaigns on abortion issues. However, as we will show in this chapter, they have broadened their fields of (publicly noticeable) activities in recent years.
In relation to gender and sexuality, three features of the political and social context are of specific importance for our topic, including the conservative welfare state model and political contentions about gender equality policies as well as sexual politics.
First, the Austrian welfare state still builds on a conservative family ideal, with a (male) breadwinner and a (female) part-time working housekeeper. Among the factors limiting women’s full employment are the rules for parental leave and child allowance, which encourage mothers to prolong their time off work. Even though the second parent has to take at least some months of parental leave in order to exhaust child allowances to the full, their share can be as little as 2 months compared to 12 for the first parent or 6 months compared to 30 months depending on the chosen model. As the gender pay gap in Austria in 2014 was still at 22.9% (EU average 16.1%), the economic rationale leads many couples to opt for a gendered division of care and paid labour. Between 2002 and 2011 the share of parental leave days consumed by fathers has more than doubled but is still at only 4.2%. Although family structures have been changing in the last decades, kindergartens, especially in rural areas, still tend to offer only part-time care and often require the children to be at least 30 months old.4
Second, policies relating to gender equality include the federal law on equal treatment (Bundesgleichbehandlungsgesetz), first established in 1993 for federal institutions and in 2004 for workplace-related issues in the private sector, as well as gender mainstreaming regulations, which have been formally implemented by the Austrian government since 2000. Austria was also the first country in Europe to introduce legislation against violence against women in the private sphere in 1996. Symbolic policies for the inclusion of both women and men in language usage have led to debates in the past, most frenetic with the “gendering” of the Austrian national anthem in 2012. The decision to include Austria’s “great daughters” alongside her “great sons” in the text of the national anthem stirred widespread criticism. The debate became especially heated and public when popular folk pop star Andreas Gabalier pointedly interpreted the anthem with the old text in July 2014 and answered criticism with an open letter, focusing on the “forced gender mania”.
Third, issues of sexuality and reproductive rights were put on the agenda by the Austrian women’s movement in the 1970s. This resulted in the liberalization of abortion legislation by the social democratic government, against the opposition of the ÖVP and the Catholic Church, in 1975. With regard to LGBTIQ policies, a partial decriminalization of homosexuality was initiated in 1971 and was followed by the subsequent abolishment of discriminatory regulations. In 2010, civil unions were established for same-sex couples. They do, however, not entail the same rights as marriage, and the right to adopt children was only granted in 2016.
These current processes of liberalization were accompanied by conservative protests. Since 2012, so-called Marches for the family, with up to 300 participants, have been held against the Vienna Pride by right-wing Catholic, conservative and Far-Right groups every year. The European Song Contest, held in Vienna in 2015, led to protests by the Aktionsgruppe gegen Dekadenz und Werteverfall (A-GDUW, Action Group Against Decadence and the decay of values) against Vienna’s self-marketing as a liberal LGBT-friendly city. A-GDUW also promotes stickers against “gender fascism” on its Facebook page. Homophobic arguments are also at the core of protests of so-called concerned parents, most recently in the form of the Initiative wertvolle Sexualerziehung (Initiative for Valuable Sexual Education), which in 2015 petitioned against the introduction of sexual education guided by ideas of diversity in Austrian schools.
All in all, the situation with regard to politics on gender and sexuality can be described as ambivalent. This ambivalence is further enhanced by differences between cities and rural areas, where traditional gender relations are hardly disputed and Catholic influence is still strong.
We identified five broad clusters of actors that are most active on “gender ideology”. Although distinctions are sometimes blurred, actors can be grouped according to their ideological or normative background. The first cluster includes groups with a background in right-wing extremism and populism. This cluster encompasses a range of political parties – most notably the FPÖ – as well as small, independent groups of activists, for example the Identitäre Bewegung Österreich (IBÖ, Identitarian Movement Austria) or the A-GDUW. Members of this cluster show two common traits: an ideological history or background in right-wing extremism and (German) nationalism (which is often presented in modernized form, among other things, as “ethnopluralism” today) and the use of populist discursive logic and strategies. What is so specific to right-wing populism is the double antagonism it creates by opposing elites – national politicians, the European Union or the so-called Femocracy – as well as external “others”, that is immigrants, Muslims or refugees (Reinfeldt 2000, 133).
The second cluster consists of right-wing (Catholic) conservatism. Although many of the political demands voiced by actors in this group are similar to those of the first group, their historically developed ideological background differs. While right-wing extremism has traditionally been anti-Catholic and anticlerical, right-wing Conservatism has strongly relied on Catholicism.5Groups within this cluster range from the right wing of the Christian conservative ÖVP to smaller conservative groups (often strongly backed by former nobility). Groups in this cluster share a Catholic background but are clearly defined as organizations working in the political field.
In contrast, the third cluster is formed by Catholic organizations, which make religion itself and the spreading of Christian values in society their main goals. It includes a number of very small Christian parties that sometimes manage to stand for election, independent Christian associations (e.g. Human Life International [HLI] or Jugend für das Leben [Youth for Life]), and actors directly affiliated with the Catholic Church. Catholic bishop Andreas Laun from Salzburg, for instance, is responsible for Catholic Pro-Life activities and has repeatedly stirred debates, mostly resulting from his homophobic statements. Also, independent Catholic (online) media are rather outspoken on issues of “gender ideology”, more so than most of the Catholic hierarchy.6
The fourth cluster encompasses groups that mobilize for “men’s” and “father’s rights”. These groups are defined by a common agenda to fight against the discrimination of men through family legislation and/or gender equality measures. Despite the small number of activists, their agenda is regularly represented in mass media, where antagonism to “gender ideology” is often articulated by means of an anti-discrimination rhetoric.
Last but not least, groups of “concerned parents” lobbying against sexual education or the use of gender-sensitive language in schools form the fifth cluster. Some of these groups prove to be closely linked to political actors. The Catholic pro-life activist, chairwoman of the Dokumentationsarchiv der Intoleranz gegen Christen (Observatory on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians), and ÖVP representative Gudrun Kugler-Lang, for instance, appeared as a “concerned mother” lobbying against sexual education (Baumgarten 2012).
Alliances formed in the fight against “gender ideology” are quite broad in terms of actors with different political orientations. Issues surrounding “gender ideology” serve as a point of convergence between actors embodying traditionally antagonistic right-wing orientations. Nevertheless, the anti-gender networks – including lasting contacts and ad hoc coalitions – are strengthened by individuals who interlink these different ideological milieus. In some cases, personal friendships bridge ideological differences, and individual, personal as well as political trajectories play an important role. For example the secular German nationalist and FPÖ representative Barbara Rosenkranz, who refused to have her ten children baptized, maintains personal contacts with the Catholic fundamentalist and leader of Human Life International (HLI) in Austria, Dietmar Fischer. This resulted in Fischer supporting Rosenkranz during the presidential elections in 2010 for the FPÖ, even though Rudolf Gehring, who ran for the Christian Party, would have appeared to be the more “natural choice” for an HLI leader.
To analyse the discourse on “gender ideology”, we focused on a selection of documents. We chose 13 texts published between 2011 and 2015, ranging from brochures to book chapters, articles, blogs and websites. The following criteria guided the text selection: all five clusters of anti-gender actors had to be covered; all texts had to be publicly available and identify “genderism” as their main topic. Furthermore, they had to be programmatic in style, that is they had to include arguments against “gender ideology”, and not merely condemn it without further explication. The method of critical frame analysis (Verloo and Lombardo 2007, 35) was applied in order to focus on the normative claims made to legitimize the problematization of “gender ideology”. Critical frame analysis focuses on the construction of problems and solutions as well as on processes of allocating blame and responsibility (Rein and Schön 1977).
While concrete articulations – that is the harshness of attacks, the language used, topics examined and examples given – vary greatly between actors, similar patterns of meaning creation could be identified. In the following, we focus on frames that appeared as dominant patterns of meaning creation in the discourse on “gender ideology” and seem to guide and structure the discourse.
The idea that the concept of “gender” negates nature and the natural (and therefore valuable) gender order is the baseline of nearly all arguments against “gender ideology”. This deeply held belief unites all actors and fuels into the frame on a “threat” to the biological reproduction of the autochthonous population of Austria (Reichel 2015, 124).7 Interestingly, this line of argument is commonly coupled with other frames in order to make the “threat” posed by this defiance against nature more acute. The naturalization of the (heterosexual, two-parents-with-kids) “family” is the most important discursive nod in this respect. Some actors stress the danger to society and the state posed by the decay of the family, supposedly the “core and foundation of the state” (Stadler 2014).8 A programmatic text by the FPÖ details the consequences of this view for gender equality policies. Men and women are understood as being “different, but of equal value”; therefore a “holistic approach” is called for that would celebrate the complementarity of men and women rather than stressing their equality9 (FPÖ 2013, 137).
While this line of argument might be expected from right-wing political actors, it was surprising to see that Catholic actors also regularly use “nature” and “natural sciences” rather than theological reasoning to legitimize their arguments – albeit often in specific ways that link “nature” to “religion” by arguing that the “natural” order of things is the one “god” created and should therefore not be changed by humans (Abtei Mariawald 2014; Kirche in Not n.d.; on similar strategies of the Slovenian and Croatian Catholic Church, see Kuhar 2015). The international Catholic organization Kirche in Not (Church in Distress) claims that the Bible (Genesis) and natural sciences agree in their ideas on gender complementarity (Kirche in Not n.d., 13).
In many cases, the argument that “gender ideology” contradicts “nature” is closely linked to a more specific understanding of “nature” as the domain of (natural) sciences, most notably biology. This line of reasoning is often linked to criticism over the allegedly “ideological” character of gender studies. The argument rests on the common-sense expectation that the relation of science to ideology is per se antagonistic. Science stands for the unbiased application of logic and reason to any given phenomena, while ideology distorts phenomena by relying on assumptions and serving political ends. Several interlinking arguments are made to strengthen this claim.
First, gender studies are opposed to the sciences by claiming that they ignore or are in conflict with – seemingly uncontroversial – findings of biology, for example results of neuroscientific studies claiming innate gender differences in human brains (RFS n.d.; see also Reichel 2015, 105; Kirche in Not n.d., 12). In a specific turn of this argument, the idea that science itself is a social enterprise and cannot be separated from its social setting is refuted as a “trick” through which gender studies try to cover up their own shortcomings in terms of scientific standards (Reichel 2015, 106). Second, gender studies are accused of following predefined (political) goals. To the same end, it is claimed that gender studies “do not correlate with the real world” and are to be seen as a “new theology” or religion, working in the sphere of “pure theory, without any empirical basis”, which renders them non-falsifiable and therefore unscientific (Unterberger 2015, 148).10 Third, gender researchers are attacked ad personam by right-wing and conservative actors, often in a homophobic fashion, that is as being “predominantly lesbian women” (Nagel 2015, 53; see also Pekarek 2011).11 According to another kind of accusation, gender studies are a refuge for feminists, granting them money and power, now that the movement has become irrelevant, now that equality between men and women has been achieved (Unterberger 2015, 149).
Attacks on gender studies are often interwoven with other issues in the right-wing and Catholic discourse, most notably the allegedly totalitarian and authoritarian character of “gender ideology” (e.g. Reichel 2015, 105–107) and the devastating effects of sexual education, which is allegedly based on gender studies’ ideological output (e.g. Unterberger 2015, 151).
The most frequently voiced argument against “gender ideology” is its totalitarian and authoritarian character: “Gender ideology” is pictured as today’s Socialism, Communism or Marxism after their defeat in 1989.12 In some cases, the authoritarian character of “gender ideology” is grounded differently – most notably in anti-EU rhetoric (Nagel 2015, 53). This argument is part of the common right-wing populist strategy of opposing an elite, which is depicted as the adversary of “the people” (Mudde 2004). It therefore points to commonalities between right-wing populism in general, and “gender ideology” discourse in particular. While anti-EU stances are widespread in populist discourses, the idea of “gender ideology” as the reincarnation of Socialism is a specific feature of the discourse under study and therefore analytically more interesting. It is most clearly voiced by right-wing extremist as well as right-wing conservative actors, pointing at the connection to broader ideological struggles against liberalism and left-wing politics. The ghost of Communism invoked here simultaneously plays on the fears of losing civic rights and the possibility of choice, as well as on fears of poverty and economic decline, and on the image of an elite, distant from the people they claim to represent. Most commonly, “gender ideology” is constructed as part of a direct historic lineage that starts with Karl Marx and – even more importantly for his writing on gender relations and the family – Friedrich Engels. It includes Simone de Beauvoir and Shulamith Firestone and finishes with Judith Butler’s deconstruction of gender (Pekarek 2011; FPÖ 2013; Zeitz 2015). When the argument focuses more on LGBTIQ rights and queerness (or “cultural homosexuality” as it is termed by one author, Zeitz 2015),13 Wilhelm Reich and Herbert Marcuse are added to the list of forerunners. A specific definition of “differences” and “equality” is at the core of the argument, claiming an equivalence between the eradication of economic differences in Socialism and the alleged aim of “gender theory” to abolish sexual differences. Both allude to social technologies as creating a new human being while destroying individuality.
Self-victimization, moreover, plays an important role in the depiction of “gender ideology” as an authoritarian enterprise. Gender-sensitive language is constructed as the main culprit here, as it is deemed a “dictate”, a “politically correct codex”, enforced through a “language police” and “thought control” (Pekarek 2011; see also Abtei Mariawald 2014; Kirche in Not n.d.14). Groups of “concerned parents” made a similar point with regard to textbooks, but they refrained from situating these arguments in a broader political context. The defamation of gender-sensitive language is taken one step further when criticism is directed at the “invention” of new terms allegedly designed to silence criticism of “gender ideology”. Several authors lament that critics of “gender ideology” are pathologized through the use of the term “homophobia” and that homophobia is “equated with racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism and criminalized” (Pekarek 2011). Bishop Andreas Laun makes the same argument about homophobia and goes on to equate homosexuality with an illness (Abtei Mariawald 2014).
In all these cases, the argumentative logic works the same way. First, discriminations addressed by these measures are belittled or declared non-existent. Second, such measures or regulations are painted as all-encompassing, powerful devices that interfere directly with everyone’s life, limiting their freedom of choice, democratic rights, freedom of speech and thought or amounting to a new form of persecution of Christians. This strategy serves a two-fold purpose: it paints a very dark picture of “gender ideology”, while simultaneously displaying the courage of the critic who still dares to talk. Bishop Laun explicitly makes that point by comparing the lack of a public debate on “gender ideology” to the lack of resistance against the National Socialist regime; yet while anti-Fascism was a life-threatening endeavour then, most people remain quiet about “gender ideology” for lesser reasons today: “[S]ome because of lack of knowledge, others out of convenience and yet others out of cowardice” (Abtei Mariawald 2014). Alluding to National Socialism without explicitly claiming a parallel to today’s situation can be understood as further strategy of demonization.
According to its critics from the Catholic and right-wing camp, “gender ideology” is not only totalitarian and authoritarian, it is even more dangerous because it hides its true intentions. This argument is most often made with regard to gender mainstreaming. While there are several variations in its articulation, the basic logic of this framing is always the same. Gender mainstreaming claims to be about gender equality and equal chances for women and men, when in reality it is about the denaturalization and destruction of sexual difference, of heterosexuality and families (FPÖ 2013; Abtei Mariawald 2014; Kirche in Not 2014; Stadler 2014).
This idea of a “hidden agenda” serves several purposes. First, it underlines the alleged anti-democratic character of gender knowledge and plays into the narrative of elites working against the people. In this context, the technical description of gender mainstreaming as a top-down strategy is often used to strengthen the argument. Second, it allows actors to position themselves as pro-equality and tolerant, while simultaneously condemning equality policies. As regards gender equality policies, this either plays out as a rhetoric affirmation of demands for equal pay and equal opportunities for men and women (Kirche in Not n.d., 2; RFS n.d.) or as a suggestion that gender equality has already been established in the West (Unterberger 2015, 148–149). Therefore, while women’s emancipation has been a valuable goal in the past, today’s gender equality policies have become harmful “genderism” (ibid.). The same argument is made with regard to sexual orientation, as some authors claim that discrimination against homosexuality has already been abolished by law15 (ibid.).
Third, and most important, the “hidden agenda” argument multiplies possibilities for rendering “gender ideology” as a threat. The claim that its true intentions are deliberately obscured by malevolent elites permits the projection of nearly any content and any development assumed dangerous or unwanted onto “gender ideology”. Anti-feminism and homophobia shape the background to the bleak (yet sometimes involuntarily comical) picture painted in some of these claims, for example when sexual education is explained as gay activists’ wish to breed followers as “young and sexy as possible” (Unterberger 2015, 151) and assessed as leading to more instead of less sexual abuse (Initiative wertvolle Sexualerziehung n.d.). Men are also afraid of becoming victims, as women are encouraged to make up stories of (sexual) violence in order to take advantage of their former husbands (Unterberger 2015, 152–156). Especially the latter example – which is part of a plea to end the criminal liability of rape in marriages – clearly shows how far the term “gender ideology” might be stretched. This discursive strategy, therefore, plays an important part in establishing “gender ideology” as an empty signifier as it allows for the ongoing addition of further topics – or rather, further threats – that can in some way be constructed in relation to the denaturalization of gender and/or sexuality. As “gender ideology” is defined as obscure from the beginning, there is no need for clarity on its contents in order to construct a plausible narrative.
Critics of “gender ideology” claim that the concept promotes discrimination, especially the discrimination of women as mothers. Gender is framed as an “outdated” concept (RFS n.d.) that hinders true gender equality. The effects of “gender ideology” on boys and men are much harsher as they suffer from constant discrimination and devaluation. The main culprit is a feminized education system that treats boys unfairly and aims to destroy their male identity altogether (Unterberger 2015, 151–152). Gender equality policies and quotas further discriminate men at universities and in the job market, as women’s quotas serve to “discriminate men in disciplines that are preferred by women, at attractive work places and in leading positions” (Reichel 2015, 120). Further “political correctness” and anti-discrimination legislation serve to destabilize male identities and render men helpless, with the aim of abolishing “masculinity and everything that is connected to it like willingness to do hard work and take risks, bravery, competitiveness etc.” (ibid., 109).
Not only do individuals suffer from the consequences of “gender ideology”, but society as a whole. Gender ideology, this line of argumentation claims, leads to an economic decline at several levels. Entrepreneurs are hindered by the regulations demanded by political correctness like women’s quota, tax money is wasted on gender issues and women are encouraged to study unproductive subjects at university and work in sectors of little economic value,16 while East Asian countries take a leading role in research and development (Reichel 2015, 118; see also Pekarek 2011). Other authors rather stress the Socialist-capitalist interest in women’s employment and/or the “genderless human” as an “undemanding and modest worker” (Pekarek 2011; see also FPÖ 2013, 136). Some connect the threat of economic decline not only to the Socialist legacy of “gender ideology” but also to sexual liberation. The “total hedonism” allegedly promoted by “gender ideology” is the “classical anti-thesis to the concept of the modern bourgeois society” (Zeitz 2015), as the immediate satisfaction of all kinds of desires hinders accumulation and therefore economic progress. These different interpretations mirror ideological and strategic differences between actors. This seemingly anti-capitalist stance has to be understood with regard to right-wing populist articulations, which criticize “big capital” or “financial capital” by juxtaposing it with the “hard-working entrepreneur”. These articulations have historically been grounded in anti-Semitism and do not present a critique of capitalist structures but of specific (types of) actors. Therefore, they do not conflict with the neoliberal belief in the free market, an anti-state agenda and a focus on (national) competitiveness.
The “feminization of society” (Reichel 2015, 109) as advocated by “gender ideology” would also have devastating consequences, beyond the economic. The end of male virtues in Europe, the destruction of families and the resulting demographic decline join hands with the destruction of Christianity as the basis of Western civilization as well as economic destruction, rendering Europe incapable of defending itself against “pre-modern cultures”, more specifically against Islam (Reichel 2015, 124; see also Zeitz 2015).
Even though “Islam” is not a dominant frame in quantitative terms, we believe this to be an interesting intersection, as right-wing actors thereby define the long-term winner of “gender ideology’s” destructive endeavor. The assumed antagonistic relations between Islam and European societies grounded in Christianity appear as a meta-narrative, providing the background for the interpretation of developments within Europe. Ways of tying Islam into “gender ideology” vary between authors, but they do rest on a few common assumptions, for example Islam’s alleged intrinsic sexism (and homophobia), its assumed intolerance towards differences and its striving for power in Europe. In this view, an analogy between Islam and “gender ideology” is constructed, yet the relationship between these two enemies of enlightened Western Christianity is constructed in different ways.
However, Islam is also constructed as an outright adversary of “gender ideology”. Demographic changes in Europe will lead to Muslim majorities “within this century” in some European countries, which will also lead to “the definitive end of genderism” (Unterberger 2015, 149). Another author claims that, in Muslim and African “parallel societies”, contempt for symbols of “western decadence, perversion and decline” is growing (Reichel 2015, 124–125). Again, this is linked to a demographic threat: “Communists died the economic death, genderists will die the biological one” as the author puts it (ibid.).
One author explicitly wondered why Muslim authorities keep quiet on “gay culture” and do not protest against events showing decadence and sexual liberties, even though Islam’s position on homosexuality is absolutely prohibitive (Zeitz 2015). The answer is to be found in Islam itself, or more precisely in Muslim strategies of dominance. While Christianity rests on values that can be included in societal debates, Islamic rules are presented as one monolithic entity that will be enforced once Muslims have reached demographic majority and the balances of power shift. Since “gender ideology” is detrimental to European societies, it is not criticized by Islamic authorities and “average Muslims” alike, despite their hatred for LGBTIQ people and sexual liberation (ibid.). Zeitz also sees more practical reasons for the alliances of Islam and “gay culture”. Both profit from anti-discrimination legislation, and even though it goes against their values of equality for women, “gender ideologists” follow an Islam-friendly agenda. In this view, “gay culture”, Socialism and Islam converge in a “common agenda”: “the plan to recreate the world on the basis of a fundamental outrage against the Christian god” (ibid.).
Discourses on anti-Muslim racism and on “gender ideology” – contradictory as they may appear – are interlinked to form a broader picture of decay and ultimate danger. Thereby, two of the most important political issues today, addressed by different kinds of right-wing political actors, are becoming discursively intertwined. Until now, the Catholic Church and its officials have refrained from anti-Islamic statements and have therefore not taken up this discursive node, but more extremist Christian groups readily include the alleged threat of “Islam” into their agitation.
Even though the anti-gender discourse already originated in the Catholic Church in the 1990s, it entered public debates in Austria only in the late 2000s and gained momentum in recent years. Nevertheless, the anti-gender discourse today presents a common ground for different Christian as well as secular branches of the right-wing political spectrum. This common discourse, which is associated with the construction of common enemies and common threats, allows coalition building despite deep divisions between the different actors of the Right. Moreover, the rejection of gender as ideology seems to enable actors to criticize and challenge reforms that have led to the liberalization of gender and sexual relations in the country since the 1970s.
Our frame analysis shows that “gender ideology” as an empty signifier lends itself easily to populist discursive strategies, for equivalential chains are created between the antagonisms of men and women, the (gender) elite and “normal” people, LGBTIQ people and families, autochthonous people and Muslims. “Gender ideology” is able to re-articulate elements of diverse discourses into a common framework that different actors can connect to. This framework includes the narrative of an existential threat that renders their views and actions as part of something bigger and highly important. “Gender”, the argument goes, does not only legitimize abortion, women’s quotas or the right to a family life for gay and lesbian couples, but challenges the survival of Austrian culture and society.
Through this rhetoric of an existential threat, the discourse of “gender ideology” creates an impenetrable antagonism that is not limited to specific problems or policy fields, but pertains to society as a whole. “Gender ideology” as an empty signifier is well suited to create antagonisms as well as to render family and kinship; gender relations, that is inequality between men and women; and heterosexuality as nature into common sense. Once conflicts are redefined in such a way, they are not debatable – let alone solvable – by existing political means anymore, but rather need “radical” solutions.
In Austria, this anti-gender discourse is linked to right-wing populist strategies of re-articulating Islam in European societies in terms of ethicized and culturalized conflicts. Again, one of the effects of demonization and naturalization strategies is the impossibility of any political dialogue. “The” Muslims are not merely seen to be wrong about specific issues but embody this wrongness simply because of the way they live (Herrmann 2015). They are “the” Other that needs to be excluded.
Even though the frames we found in the Austrian discourse seem to be available across Europe, their effects have to be understood in the specific Austrian context. We might conclude that those actors who built an anti-gender coalition – against gender equality policies and gender studies – aim at gaining cultural power by creating an anti-hegemonic approach against the equality and emancipation of women and LGBTIQ people as well as against the liberalization and pluralization of Austrian society since the 1970s. Hence, the “gender ideology” discourse might fuel a new right-wing hegemonic project against the social-democratic reorganization of Austrian society since the 1970s, in favour of a national-exclusive and anti-pluralist setting.
1.It is noteworthy that the openness is further enhanced by the use of the English term “gender” instead of Geschlecht, which in German means both “sex” and “gender”. The distinction between “sex” and “gender” therefore seems less obvious to German speakers. While the English term “gender” is regularly used among experts in German texts (i.e. Gender Studies, Gender Mainstreaming, Gender Budgeting), it is still relatively unknown to the broader public.
2.In this context the term “ideology” is always used in the sense of “false consciousness”, that is of a worldview that distorts (allegedly simple) facts.
3.Katolische Kirche, accessed 30 March 2016. http://www.katholisch.at/kirche/meldungen-zur-kirchenstatistik-97495. Statistik Austria, accessed 30 March 2016. http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/volkszaehlungen_registerzaehlungen_abgestimmte_erwerbsstatistik/bevoelkerung_nach_demographischen_merkmalen/022885.html.
4.The organization of kindergartens is being supervised by the Austrian Länder and might be handled by municipalities, enterprises, religious or non-profit associations. Therefore opening hours, the age at which children are accepted and prices vary considerably. In many cases kindergartens are free until midday, but parents have to pay for afternoon care.
5.Differences between these two right-wing camps might be traced back to the deadly competition between Catholic fascism and National Socialism in the 1930s.
6.It has to be noted that the Austrian Catholic Church is far from united on these issues. One example for the different viewpoints is the fierce criticism of conservative Catholics directed, among other things, against the Katholische Frauenbewegung (KFÖ, Catholic Women‘s Movement), which is accused of being part of the “network of the abortion-lobby and gender-ideology” (Katholisches Info 2015).
7.Werner Reichel is an independent journalist, who has been working at a number of private radio stations and a lecturer at private colleges. He focuses mainly on the failures of social democratic policies regarding the media – that is the pitfalls of state-owned TV and radio. Recently he discovered “gender ideology” as a main topic. With other ultra-conservative and right-wing or “new right” authors, he published a book on the Eurovision song contest-winner Conchita Wurst, as well as a number of online articles.
8.All quotes from analysed texts have been translated by the authors. Ewald Stadler represents one of the nodes of the “gender ideology” network. He started his political career with the FPÖ, where he tried to introduce the idea of a “Christianity able to defend itself” (“Wehrhaftes Christentum”) already in the 1990s. In 2007 he moved on to Jörg Haider’s new party, BZÖ, which allowed him to become a member of the European Parliament (EP) in 2011, where he stayed even after his suspension from the BZÖ in 2013. He then founded his own party, Reformkonservative (REKOS, Reformist Conservatives), which did not manage to win a seat at the EP in 2014. A lawyer by profession, Stadler cultivates close ties to a number of Christian as well as conservative and right-wing actors.
9.The German language lends itself to this argument more easily, as it allows for the translation of “equality” in different ways. Right-wing actors argue that equality, in the sense of equal value, equal possibilities and chances, differs from equality in the sense of “sameness”. While – at least rhetorically – accepting the first meaning, they strongly denounce the second as an ideological construction.
10.Andreas Unterberger is former chief editor of the influential Austrian conservative daily Die Presse. He publishes his ultra-conservative views, among other things, on his own blog, which is often used by other actors as a respectable source in order to legitimize their claims.
11.Georg Immanuel Nagel used to be the spokesperson for the Austrian branch of the PEGIDA movement that started in Germany. As PEGIDA turned out to be a failure in Austria, Nagel founded his own A-GDUW. Their planned demonstration against the Eurovision song contest failed due to bad weather, but the list of speakers published beforehand showed that Nagel could gain support from both Catholic organizations and the FPÖ. He regularly writes for the newspaper Zur Zeit, which is affiliated with the FPÖ. Edith Pekarek is mainly active in Catholic conservative groups, that is holds lectures and writes articles against “gender ideology”. She has close (family) ties to a number of organizations and actors.
12.These terms are used interchangeably. This can be understood as a deliberate strategy in order to invoke (invented or real) images of former communist regimes in Austria’s neighbouring countries as well as associations to current left-wing politics.
13.Christian Zeitz is a member of the ultra-conservative Wiener Akademikerbund (Vienna Academic Association), where he is the spokesperson on issues concerning Islam. He often uses biblical language and metaphors in his texts, for example picturing “gay culture” in terms strongly associated with Catholic ideas of Satan and Hell. His strong stance against Islam informs his position on “gender ideology”, as we will discuss later.
14.The latter dealing, for example with an especially shocking example as even the Bible has been translated to a gender-sensitive language.
15.However, this is only halfway true. While the penalization of homosexuality has been abolished, lesbian and gay relationships are still not equal to traditional marriages.
16.This is also the only reason for the gender wage gap. The free market does not discriminate (Reichel 2015, 118–119).
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