Preface

John Haldane

Elizabeth Anscombe’s article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, published in 1958, is in some respects a characteristic piece of work. It approaches its topic afresh, argues from first to last, introduces many striking ideas (some as asides), but is more concerned to identify fallacies and confusions and refute prevailing dogmas than it is to set out a theory of its own. It is unlike much of her work, however, in having a broadly narrative structure, and offering something of a historical survey. These two features may be attributable to the circumstances that led to its being composed: reading in short order a great many writings in moral philosophy for the purpose of tutoring in the subject, and undertaking to give a non-specialist talk on the theme of the title.

Like much of Anscombe’s work its freshness endures; but it also seems to have something of a prophetic character. The latter impression is due in large part to the fact that it gave rise to future developments in British, and later American, moral philosophy, so that looking back at it later it appeared to anticipate them. The main developments came in two phases: first, stalling and then reversing the trend to assume that there is no intrinsic connection between facts, values and practical directives; second, directing attention towards the category of virtues in attempting to say how one ought to act. Although the second is now the more prominent association, it is the first that she was herself more concerned with.

If Anscombe had written nothing else on ethics she would still have been known for ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’; and indeed many who know of it may have read little else by her on moral themes. Such is the unsystematic character of her writings that it is not obvious at first or second pass what the connections may be between her investigations of intention, promising, authority, killing and other topics. There is also the fact that much of what she wrote on first-order topics, or ethical questions, appeared in publications that would not easily come to the attention of academic philosophers; and remained uncollected in her lifetime.

Ten years ago St Andrews Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs published Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe edited by Mary Geach and Luke Gormally. A decade later three further volumes of Anscombe’s writings have appeared in the same series. I am very grateful to those editors for their work in making this body of material available. It includes a few essays previously included in earlier collected papers but which are now set in contexts of other hitherto inaccessible or unpublished associated writings thereby allowing readers to get a broader, deeper and more detailed sense of Anscombe’s thought.

Given this background it is very fitting that the volume immediately succeeding the last of Anscombe’s own writings should be a collection of essays exploring aspects of her moral philosophy. Here we see reflections on themes presented in the 1958 essay, but also on topics from earlier and mostly from later writings. As we proceed towards the centenary of her birth in 1919, thanks to Geach and Gormally and to the editors of the present volume and the authors they have collected, we are in a better position than ever before to understand Elizabeth Anscombe’s philosophy and to evaluate it.

As General Editor of the series I am grateful to all concerned, including Jared Brandt and Graham Horswell who were involved in aspects of the production.