Panther

A short time after the onslaught of Operation Barbarossa, German forces were faced on the battlefield by more modern Soviet battle tanks such as the T-34 and KV. At first these appeared in small numbers, but were always poorly deployed by tactically-inept commanders. However as the invasion progressed, they appeared in increasing numbers and provided a serious threat to German forces. The sight of these apparently unstoppable tanks to Germany infantry, already having to contend with mud and bitter cold, was frightening and many abandoned their positions.

On 22 June 1941 the attack began; German Panzer divisions had over 3,000 tanks, including some 1,000 PzKpfw I and PzKpfw II which had little combat value. Also there were 700 PzKpfw III mounting the 5cm KwK L/42 gun, and 440 PzKpfw IV and 200 StuG assault guns, both armed with a 7.5cm gun.

The initial expectations of the German military planners were fulfilled, as many units of the Soviet defenders proved incapable of stopping the advance. Even the German light tanks (armed with 2cm and 3.7cm guns) proved to be effective against Soviet T-26 and BT-series tanks.

A further factor that contributed to the absolute superiority of German battle tactics was the many purges by Stalin against his experienced military high command which had left the Red Army decimated. Led into battle by incompetent political commissars, many of whom had no military training, the defenders suffered devastating losses. For German forces, victory seemed to be within their grasp.

However, history shows that despite the massive territorial gains by the Germans and the colossal number of Soviet casualties, the ambitious time schedule, set by Hitler, could not be kept. One reason was the brave (and sometimes fanatical) resistance by the Soviets; another was the supply problem caused by the rapid advance which was to be made even more difficult due to the unpredictable climatic conditions of such a vast country. Also of equal significance was the appearance on the battlefront of two tank types of a much more modern design and improved performance which had been developed unnoticed in what was considered, by some, as a somewhat industrially backward Soviet Union.

The Red Army had a series of light tanks in its inventory which they used for a number of purposes, from reconnaissance to the transportation of spare parts and fuel to front-line units. Here a T-60 has been hit and caught fire during street fighting in Kharkov. (Anderson)

During the pre-war years, the Soviet Union had two tank types in mass production; the T-26 light tank was intended for direct infantry support, while the BT5 and BT7 cavalry tanks were used for a variety of operational duties. The T-28 and T-35, multi-turreted heavy tanks, were used for battlefield observation and command. France and Great Britain deployed their tank forces in a similar way until the outbreak of World War II.

Towards the end of the 1940s, this concept was critically reviewed by Soviet military planners and a decision was made not to continue the practice of developing existing designs. Instead, they would be replaced by completely new designs – battle tanks far ahead in technology than those being developed in the west.

The T-34 was designed from the outset as a medium tank, and (unique at the time) had a hull with sloping (60º front, 40º sides, 48º rear) surfaces, fabricated from welded armoured steel plate. (Although frontal protection was moderate at 45mm, the sides and rear were an impressive 40mm.) The sloping armour provided a very high level of protection, but the true horizontal thickness was significantly higher as an incoming shell would quite often ricochet off without causing damage.

The running gear was a further development of the Christie-type bogie as used on the BT series. The option of removing the tracks for running on roads at high speed used on the BT was rejected, possibly due to unsatisfactory experience in service. All components were designed to suit the Russian terrain; broad track plates and the large-diameter running wheels had no gaps which prevented them from becoming blocked by mud, stones and gravel. In the Rasputitsa (mud season) of autumn and winter, the T-34 remained operational where other types (including German) were immobilized.

The T-34 was powered by a 38,800cc Model V-2-34 V-12 diesel engine mounted in the rear, ahead of the KMDB-designed transmission which drove the rear sprockets. The 500hp engine propelled the 29-ton tank at 53kph.

The KV (Kliment Voroshilov) was produced initially in two variants; the KV-1 heavy breakthrough tank, and KV-2 assault gun with a heavier gun for fire support. The hull and turret on both versions was fabricated from welded armour plates. By 1940 standards, the thickness of the hull and turret armour was excellent, but not sloped as on the T-34. The sides and rear of the hull were equally as thick. The running gear had six wheels on each side mounted on torsion-bar suspension, and the very wide tracks gave substantially less ground pressure than lighter German tank types. The engine and transmission were located as in the T-34, but due to the increased weight of a KV engine, power was raised to 600hp.

German troops inspect a damaged T-34. At the time, the type had better all-round armour than German tanks which, to save weight, had much thinner side and rear armour. Also the T-34 had a much easier (more economical) to manufacture cast-steel turret. (Anderson)

From the beginning both tanks were armed with a 76.2mm L/30.5 main gun, but towards the end of 1941 an improved long-barrel (L/41.5) gun was being used.

The performance of the T-34 and KV were far superior to all enemy tanks, but their fighting value was relative to the economic and political situation in the Soviet Union. For example, there were serious difficulties with maintaining a supply of important components; even radio equipment, vital to tank commanders on the battlefield, was not so much as promised. In general, military training was very poor and not suited to modern mechanized warfare.

German forces, whose own tanks were outclassed, found it very difficult to combat the new Soviet tanks. On 22 October 1941, 4.PzDiv sent an urgent request for assistance to XXDXIV PzKorps:

During recent battles, 4.PzDiv has repeatedly engaged Russian heavy tanks. At first these appeared only occasionally and could be avoided or driven off by concentrated artillery fire.

After the capture of Or’ol, the Russians deployed their heavy and heaviest tanks for the first time in a massed attack. In several battles, the heaviest fighting took place because the Russian tanks were no longer deterred by artillery fire. In these battles, and for the first time in the campaign, the undoubted superiority of the Russian 29t and 52t tanks over our PzKpfw III and IV was evident. Most of the Russian tanks would be assembled in a semi-circle at a range of 1,000m and open fire on our tanks with their 7.62cm guns. The penetrative power was enormous and their accuracy very good.

While our 5cm gun was not able to score a penetrative hit at the most sensitive points (except at 50m range and under especially favourable circumstances), our tanks were being hit at a range of several hundred metres. Repeatedly, our tanks are destroyed by a frontal hit; on a number of PzKpfw III and IV the commander’s cupola has been completely shot away.

Besides the superior weapon performance and heavy armour, the T-34 is without doubt superior in speed, manoeuvrability and has a superior turret-traversing mechanism. The type has wide tracks which enable it to cross marsh-type terrain which is impassable to our tanks. Ground pressure is much better than with our tanks so that, despite their greater weight, Russian tanks can cross the same bridges we use.

The excellent diesel engine also deserves our attention. During the advance from Gluchov to Mzersk we never came across a single Russian tank which had failed due to mechanical problems; whereas, some 20 tanks from PzRgt 35 were stranded along the same stretch due to mechanical failures. However, we have noted that the Russian tanks were new from the factory.

Our tanks do have a special advantage; the commander has a better view of the battlefield due to the number of vision blocks in the cupola.

Above all we have gained the impression that the Russian has become aware of the superiority of their tank force and from now on deploy it accordingly. Over time this will have a detrimental effect on the morale of our tank troops.

(a)Immediately replicate a Russian 29t tank and also re-deploy captured undamaged 29 and 52t tanks using our crews. Ideally one company in each PzRgt.

(b)Instal the Russian 7.62cm gun in a PzKpfw IV; if necessary without the commander and any armour reinforcement. Also the co-axial Maschinengewehr (MG) can be removed.

(c)Introduction of a 10cm self-propelled anti-tank gun. It is essential to have at least six per PzRgt.

(d)Creation of new ammunition with significantly increased penetration performance.

(e)As an immediate or emergency measure: installation of 5cm anti-tank gun in the PzKpfw III even if it increases weight over the front of the vehicle.

(c)Withdrawal of the 3.7cm PaK gun in favour of the more powerful 5cm PaK. Use captured Russian 7.62cm PaK whenever possible.

The Kliment Voroshilov-1 (KV-1) used the same engine and transmission as the T-34 and was also fitted with torsion bar supension. Although heavily armoured, the type was of more conventional construction. (Anderson)

The KV-2 heavy artillery assault gun mounted a 152mm ML-20S howitzer and was built on the chassis of the KV-1. The vehicle has received a number of hits which have not penetrated the heavy armour. (Anderson)

Panzerjägerabteilung (PzJgAbt – tank hunter battalion) 521 was equipped with two 10cm K18 auf PzSfl IVA. Krupp built both in 1941, using the PzKpfw IV Ausf A chassis, as a Schartenbrecher (bunker buster) vehicles. Both were deployed on the Russian Front but were found to have poor manoeuvrability and were occasionally used against the modern T-34 and KV tanks. (Anderson)

The driver of a T-34 was provided with a large hatch which could be opened to allow a very good view. However this was also a weak spot in the frontal armour. (Anderson)

The are numerous reports in the archives that have a similar content. The despair felt by a tank commander firing shell after shell at these Russian tanks without being able to stop them can be easily imagined. In this context the wishes expressed in the report are understandable, but a closer examination reveals that they could not be tactically or technically realized.

In mid-November 1941, as a direct result of that situation, a Special Tank Commission was created. A group of designers travelled to the Ostfront (East Front) in order to inspect the new enemy tanks. On 18 November 1941, Generaloberst Guderian of PzGruppe 2, delivered an address to the commission:

Those in attendance: Oberst Fichtner, Major Ründen, Oberbaurat Kniepkamp, Prof Dr F. Porsche, Dir.Dr. Hacker (Steyr), Dir Dr. Roland (Vereinigte Stahlwerke), Dir. Wunderlich (Daimler-Benz), Dir. Dorn (Krupp Kanonen), Oberingenieur Aders (Henschel), Ing. Oswald (MAN), Oberingenieur Zimmer (Rheinmetall).

In the Polish and French campaigns, and in the first part of the campaign in Russia, our tanks were in every way superior to those of our opponents. The Russian heavy tanks first appeared at Beresina and were superior to our own, especially in armour and firepower.

It is the task of the armaments industry to restore our original superiority. In the Russian campaign we experienced difficulties with the terrain on a previously unknown scale. In summer there was dust, which had a most unexpected damaging effect on engines. In autumn, deep mud both in the terrain and on lightly-gravelled roads or dirt tracks. From here it became clear that we need to reduce the ground pressure of the tracks. Moreover driving through mud imposes colossal demands on all military vehicles. In winter, frost hardened the terrain which cause tank tracks to slide. Also the extremely low temperatures made many items brittle and break easily. The snow which we are expecting next will bring new difficulties.

Here it must be remembered that our actual fighting strength will be reduced by breakdowns occurring at any moment.

We had a starting strength of 1,000 tanks including 150 new vehicles. Today we have 150 tanks operational. All the others are unfit for combat.

A new gun which will penetrate the Russian tank from a range at which our own tanks are not vulnerable. On no account must current production be interrupted; some may conclude that real improvements to armour and running gear cannot be made. The men in the field will allow for that if the requirement for a new gun is met.

Better armoured tanks, improved running gear with broader tracks, a more powerful gun, more engine horsepower to give a better power-to-weight performance thus allowing long-distance drives over unmade tracks and across open country to be made.

In his concluding speech to the conference, Guderian listed in order of priority the requirements for improving the tank force:

The Generaloberst emphasized that at the beginning of the next offensive every PzAbt must have guns able to penetrate [Russian armour] either fitted in the tank, or as accompanying anti-tank weapons, so that our troops once again have the feeling of superiority in firepower.

A suggestion considered to be very useful is to send future tank crews to the factory assembly line to observe the production process.

The introduction of a Selbstfahrlafette (Sfl) [self-propelled (SP)] chassis for the artillery and tank-support artillery is desirable. This would release a corresponding number of towing tractors. However, supply of the Sfl must not interfere with the production of PzKpfw IV.

Also emphasized is the need for more armoured infantry carriers, armoured ambulances and cross-country motor vehicles.

The autumn weather on the Eastern Front caused conditions on unmade roads to deteriorate and cause serious problems for the narrow tracks on German tanks. Here pioneers struggle to dig out a bogged-down PzKpfw III Ausf G armed with a 5cm KwK L/42. (Anderson)

Some of the PzKpfw III and IV were fitted for deep fording. These amphibious tanks were used to cross the border River Bug into Soviet occupied Eastern Poland. The gun on this PzKpfw IV Ausf D als Tauchpanzer (diving tank) has a waterproof cover, and an anti-aircraft Maschinengewehr (MG) 39/41 has been mounted on the cupola. (Anderson)

In the late summer of 1942, the PzKpfw VI Tiger Ausf E heavy tank entered service. The well-armoured and armed vehicle was originally designed as a Durbruchswagen (breakthrough tank) and remained supreme on the battlefield until 1943. (Anderson)