In 1989, the term “fatwa” became globally known when Iranian ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa that ordered Muslims to kill author Salman Rushdie, whose novel
The Satanic Verses was deemed to be blasphemous to Islam. Few fatwas are as specific and extreme as the one pronounced on Rushdie, but jihadists continue to use them to promote similar forms of terrorist activity. Today, the Internet has become a useful platform for posting fatwas and interpretations of fatwas. This chapter describes the use of jihadist fatwas, especially online fatwas, as a major instrument in bridging the current wave of terrorism and religion. The analysis illustrates how cyber-fatwas are related to key issues in promoting terrorism, used to justify such actions as the use of suicide terrorism; the killing of innocents, women and children, and other Muslims; or the use of various weapons (including weapons of mass destruction and cyberterrorism). There are two implications of the trends documented here. First, the analysis of the online fatwas and the fatwa wars may tell us about terrorist motivations, doubts, and fears; second, it may guide counterterrorism campaigns.
The Emergence of Cyber-Fatwas
A fatwa is an Islamic religious ruling, a scholarly opinion on a matter of Islamic law. Because there is no central Islamic priesthood, there is also no unanimously accepted method to determine who can issue a fatwa and who cannot, leading some Islamic scholars to complain that too many people feel qualified to issue fatwas (Bar 2006a). In Sunni Islam, fatwas are nonbinding and therefore not obligatory, whereas in Shia Islam an individual could consider the fatwa to be binding, depending on his or her relation to the scholar. The person who issues a fatwa is called, in that respect, a mufti (i.e., one who issues a fatwa). As described by Shmuel Bar (2006b, 1),
The mechanism by which the scholar brings the principles of shari’ah to bear in the practical world is fiqh—Islamic jurisprudence, and its product is the fatwa—a written legal opinion or ruling on a specific subject, which dispels uncertainty and shows the clear path for behavior on the chosen subject. A fatwa can only be given by a scholar with wide enough knowledge of shari’ia to be considered a mufti. The classic fatwa consists of a question (istifta’), posed by a petitioner (mustafti pl. mustatifun), and a response (jawab). A fatwa must be based on the sources (usul) of fiqh: these include the Qur’an, the Sunna, logical analogy (qiyas) and consensus of the “ulama.” However, most fatwas make little use of these tools and instead very often cite precedents from decisions by the mujtahidun of early Islam and the codex of existing fatwas.
A fatwa may concern many aspects of individual life, such as social norms, religion, war, peace, jihad, and politics. Millions of fatwas have been issued over the 1,400-year history of Islam; most deal with issues faced by Muslims in their daily lives, such as the customs of marriage, financial affairs, female circumcision, or moral questions. They are usually issued in response to questions by ordinary Muslims. The assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981 was attributed to a fatwa issued against him by Egyptian Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the spiritual leader of the radical group Jama’at al-Jihad, who was commonly known in the United States as “The Blind Sheikh.” Rahman was indicted along with the Jama’at al-Jihad members who assassinated Sadat because he was accused of issuing a fatwa ordering Sadat’s murder. Later, Rahman traveled to the United States, where he issued a fatwa that declared the robbing of banks and killing of Jews to be lawful in America. He called on Muslims to assail the West, “cut the transportation of their countries, tear it apart, destroy their economy, burn their companies, eliminate their interests, sink their ships, shoot down their planes, kill them on the sea, air, or land” (quoted in Wright 2007, 177).
Rahman, along with nine of his followers, was arrested on June 24, 1993, following the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) managed to record Rahman issuing a fatwa encouraging acts of violence against US civilian targets, particularly those in the New York and New Jersey metropolitan area. The most startling plan, the government charged, was to set off five bombs in 10 minutes, blowing up the United Nations, the Lincoln and Holland tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and a federal building housing the FBI.
The importance of fatwas for promoting violence and terrorism is described by Kenan Malik (2009) in his book From Fatwa to Jihad. As Malik argues, the publication of both The Satanic Verses in 1989 and the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005 did not immediately lead to violent overreaction: it took quite a while, in each case, to carefully stoke the fires before a small number of opponents managed to fan the flames in just the right way to make for the conflagrations that followed. Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie was a turning and rallying point; the reactions to it, especially by European governments, suggested that such intemperate actions were a great way to get attention—and to get one’s way. And, as Malik indicates, many have continued to play right into the hands of the small but vociferous extremist minority.
The Internet soon became a popular platform for Islamists to present their messages, including fatwas. There are numerous “online fatwa” websites, mostly in the form of answers given by Muslim authority. Online fatwas are particularly attractive to Muslims who do not have access to a qualified mufti. Naturally, this category especially applies to Muslims in the diaspora. Presumably, many of them look for a suitable fatwa website in the most common way: through the Internet. That means that high-ranking, visually attractive, well-advertised, or professional-looking pages are most likely to gain more visitors and thereby more influence. Some of these web-sites publicize their sites with slogans like “The most comprehensive online Islamic fatwa guide” and “1346 Fatwas Available” (
FatwasIslam.com) or “Fatwa from the Major Scholars of the Muslim World” (
fatwa-online.com). The numerous fatwas posted on these sites relate to daily Muslim practices, duties, and guidance. They are not violent, and they do not promote terrorism, suicide, or war. However, several jihadi fatwas started to emerge online, and today the Internet has become the most instrumental and effective instrument for spreading terrorist fatwas. In his article “The Internet Is the New Mosque,” Abdallah el-Tahawy (2008, 10), a journalist at Islam Online, argues:
Specifically, the Internet has become not only a clearinghouse for Koranic text, but also for religious guidance and even fatwas (religious edicts). This new, global online Islam has been propagated by countless websites maintained by sheikhs, religious scholars and even laymen. Today, any person can look up a fatwa on any subject, checking whether a particular action is haram (forbidden) or halal (permissible), sometimes within minutes, with just a few clicks of the mouse. Needless to say, this accessibility has been a boon to Islamic practice.
Jihadist Fatwas
The authors of jihadist fatwas come from diverse backgrounds. Some are scholars, some are religious authoritative figures, and others are political leaders of radical movements who are not seen in the wider Islamic world as having authority to provide fatwas, but are accepted as authorities by their own followers. Moreover, not all of the fatwas are initiated by individuals; some are published or posted online by Islamic institutions or by “fatwa committees” affiliated with certain Muslim communities or radical Jihadi groups.
Osama bin Laden issued two fatwas, one in 1996 and another in 1998. Both documents initially appeared in the Arabic-language London newspaper
Al-Quds Al-Arabi. At the time, bin Laden was not a wanted man in any country except his native Saudi Arabia, and was not yet known as the leader of the international terrorist organization al-Qaeda. Therefore these fatwas received relatively little attention. Bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa is entitled “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” It is a long declaration, documenting American activities in numerous countries (Ranstorp 1998). The 1998 fatwa was signed by five people, four of whom represented specific Islamist groups: Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Ahmed Refai Taha and Abu Yasser (an alias) of the Egyptian Sunni Islamist group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Mir Hamzah, “Secretary of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan,” and Fazul Rahman, “Emir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh” were also among the signatories. The signatories were identified as the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.” This fatwa complains of American military presence in the Arabian Peninsula, and American support for Israel. It purports to provide religious authorization for indiscriminate killing of Americans and Jews everywhere. In this fatwa, faxed to the London newspaper
Al-Quds, the group also wrote: “The ruling is to kill the Americans and their allies is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it, in order to liberate the Al Aqsa mosque [Jerusalem] and the Holy Mosque [Mecca] … This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God.… We, with God’s help, call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it” (MideastWeb 2013).
The Internet became a useful platform for the posting of jihadi fatwas and interpretations of fatwas. As noted by Bar (2006b, 3), “The age of information has opened up a new venue for Muslims to acquire religious instruction without coming in direct contact with the consulting Sheikh. The Internet now allows a Muslim to send a query to any learned Sheikh by E-Mail and to receive his ruling either directly or in the public domain of websites dedicated to such fatwas.” This trend was well documented by Gary Bunt’s studies (Bunt 2000; 2003; 2009). According to Bunt, the Internet has profoundly shaped how Muslims perceive Islam and how Islamic societies today rely on online fatwas, social networking sites, blogs, and forums. Furthermore, the Internet has dramatically influenced forms of radical Islam and radical Islamic activism, including jihad-oriented campaigns and terrorist propaganda. Online terrorist fatwas have become instrumental platforms for such campaigns. Though most online fatwas are not related to terrorism, violence, radicalism, or jihad, terrorist groups have been using the Internet to post radical fatwas. There is a clear rise in the number of fatwas that declare jihad to be a religious obligation and define clear guidelines for waging jihad. Many of these online fatwas provide moral and religious justification for the use of terrorism and relate to terrorist issues, including the definition and identification of the battle space in which the attacks are to be executed, the identity of legitimate victims, the proper means of action, and the legitimacy of suicide attacks.
In November 2009, Quilliam, a think tank funded by the British Home Office, claimed that jailed jihadists in Britain are “strengthening jihadist movements” by posting online fatwas (BBC 2009). Abu Qatada, a radical Islamist cleric described by British domestic intelligence service MI5 as “Osama Bin Laden’s right-hand man in Europe,” has published fatwas on the Internet from the maximum-security Long Lartin prison in Worcestershire, England, calling for holy war and the murder of moderate Muslims. Qatada, who is wanted on terrorism charges in Jordan, is held in the “supermax” segregation wing of the prison, which should be one of the most secure buildings in the country. Yet Qatada and Adel Abdel Bari, leader of the British branch of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, were able to smuggle out multiple fatwas legitimizing attacks by al-Qaeda and endorsing the murder of moderate Muslims and Muslims who are opposed to al-Qaeda.
The recent conflict in Syria has witnessed the emergence of radical Syrian Salafist groups—such as the al-Qaeda–linked Al-Nusra Front—and an influx of jihadists from Arab and European countries. Several jihadi clerics have ruled that the situation in Syria constitutes a defensive jihad, a war to repel a non-Muslim enemy that invaded a Muslim country (
jihad al-daf’). According to this fatwa, coming to Syria in order to wage jihad is a personal duty incumbent upon all able Muslim men (MEMRI Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor 2013a).
1 In one of the most powerful statements yet against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and the Shiites, Islamic scholars issued the fatwa, declaring: “Jihad is necessary for the victory of our brothers in Syria—jihad with mind, money, weapons; all forms of jihad,” adding: “What is happening to our brothers on Syrian soil, in terms of violence stemming from the Iranian regime, Hezbollah and its sectarian allies, counts as a declaration of war on Islam and the Muslim community in general” (quoted in Nasralla 2013). Earlier in 2013, a fatwa claimed to be issued by rebel groups in Syria allowed the fighters to rape non-Sunni women in Syria as part of a “sexual jihad.” In March 2013, CNS News, a conservative US news outlet, reported that girls as young as 14 were being sent to Syria from other Middle Eastern and North African countries, following a fatwa issued by Saudi scholar Sheikh Mohamed al-Arifi for rebels to engage in “sexual jihad,” a so-called “temporary marriage” that amounts to little more than sex slavery (Goodenough 2013). Though al-Arifi later backtracked after pressure, he had issued a fatwa saying that Syrian rebels can “temporarily marry” Syrian girls as young as 14, and promising “paradise” to the “wives” concerned. Later in 2013, another Islamic cleric publicly announced a fatwa that would permit jihadi rebels to rape women. Salafi Sheikh Yasir al-Ajlawni’s fatwa declared that it was legal for those Muslims fighting to topple secular Syrian president Bashar Assad and install sharia law to “capture and have sex with” all non-Sunni women, specifically naming Assad’s own sect, the Alawites, as well as the Druze and several others—effectively, all non-Sunnis and non-Muslims (Ibrahim 2013). Although the reports of these “sexual jihad” fatwas come from conservative news sites, the online coverage indicates current concerns over the use of fatwas to sanction terrorist violence against both combatants and noncombatants.
It should be noted that terrorist fatwas are often meant to serve the terrorists’ needs rather than to enforce sharia standards. An example of the flexible use of fatwas is the drug policy of the Taliban: When they were the uncontested rulers of Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban outlawed drugs as entirely immoral. However, when facing urgent monetary needs to finance their ongoing insurgency against the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force coalition, the Taliban changed their “policy,” using fatwas to support farming and drug trafficking in their dominions (Brahimi 2010, 9). This reconsideration proved to be quite effective, as the Taliban generated about $100 million per year from drug trading (Erwin 2008).
Cyber-Fatwas of Terror
As argued by numerous scholars, the role of radical online fatwas in legitimizing terrorism is a pivotal element in the social and political legitimization of terrorism and in the motivation of its supporters. Let us illustrate how these cyber-fatwas are related to justifying key issues in promoting terrorism: the use of suicide terrorism; the killing of innocents, women and children, or other Muslims; or the use of various weapons (including weapons of mass destruction and cyber-terrorism).
Who Are Legitimate Targets?
A common example of a legitimate target for jihad is the nonbeliever, a term that includes both Jews and Christians and often extends to foreigners in general. In March 2005, the Salafi Group for Call and Combat, today known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a fatwa for jihad against foreigners in Algeria. The fatwa was signed by Abu Ibrahim Mustafa, the emir (prince) of the Salafi Group, who had taken over leadership of the group in October 2003 and had immediately pledged loyalty to bin Laden and al-Qaeda. According to the fatwa, “The Salafi Group states in these hard circumstances for the Muslim nation in general, and especially the mujahideen, to declare war on every foreigner nonbeliever in the Algerian lands. The governments in the Muslim lands are no more than flags put by the Crusaders before leaving to keep a watchful eye on the Muslims so they don’t have a government which brings back the glory of Islam.” The fatwa therefore calls for the killing of “the Jews and the Christians and all other nonbelievers” in Algeria, and calls on all Muslim Algerians to fight foreigners and disregard the local government: “Everyone, which concerns the individuals and establishments, is doing the duty for the victory of Islam and Muslims, is pushing away the attacks of Jews and Christians and other non-believers as they declare that they are not bound by any agreement with the converted Algerian government” (SITE Monitoring Service 2005). Abu Ibrahim Mustafa’s fatwa was circulated on jihadist websites.
Jihadi fatwas also reinterpret the definition of civilians. According to al-Qaeda, in democracies the citizens are to blame for their government’s decisions. A fatwa authorizing this view was issued by Sheikh Hammoud al-Uqla al-Shuyabi, the godfather of Saudi jihadis. As early as 2001, he published a fatwa declaring holy war against America and its supporters, and included members of the Saudi royal family among its targets. In his October 2001 fatwa, al-Shuyabi said that “whoever supports the infidel is considered an infidel” and “it is a duty to wage jihad on anyone who attacks Afghanistan.” He answered a question posted online about when jihad, or holy war, is permissible: “Jihad is allowed against infidels like the Jews, Christians and atheists,” he replied online (quoted in Tell 2006, 131). A similar fatwa came from Egyptian cleric Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who has a history of activism in the Muslim Brethren. Forced from Egypt for his extreme views, he currently lives in Qatar. His fatwas are published and distributed primarily online. He issued numerous fatwas on jihad and violent activities, including one legitimizing the targeting of Israeli civilians. His ruling on Israelis included both men and women, since “an Israeli woman is not like women in our societies, because she is a soldier.” Another example of a conveniently flexible definition of civilians concerns Iraq: Al-Qaradawi issued a fatwa permitting the abduction and killing of American civilians in Iraq in order to pressure the American army to withdraw from Iraq, arguing that “all of the Americans in Iraq are combatants, there is no difference between civilians and soldiers, and one should fight them, since the American civilians came to Iraq in order to serve the occupation. The abduction and killing of Americans in Iraq is a [religious] obligation so as to cause them to leave Iraq immediately” (MEMRI Jihad & Terrorism Studies Project 2004).
Online fatwas also provide rulings on the legitimacy of larger targets. A question posted in October 2010 on the Salafi-jihadi Minabr al-Tawhid wal-Jihad website, belonging to Salafi ideologist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, asked about attacking Christians in Egypt: What is the ruling regarding attacking churches and blowing them up, and what is the ruling on attacking stores, vehicles, and other Christian property? What is the ruling with regard to intentionally or unintentionally attacking Christian women and children? The ruling, posted by Sheikh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shanqiti in November 2010, was that “if we narrow down the conflict, it is only permitted to attack those heading the attack against the Muslims, whether they are priests or not. But if we expand the conflict, then it is permitted to harm anyone in which there is an interest in attacking, according to the stages of the conflict and its severity.… This is because they [the Christians] are the ones who enabled the West to reach Islamic countries and served as a fifth column against Islam. Therefore, their blood is permitted as well as their money and property” (quoted in Jihadi Websites Monitoring Group 2010, 5–6). According to al-Shanqiti, Christians are the target in the conflict today because they are taking the position of the aggressor, not simply because they are Christian. Unlike al-Qaradawi’s ruling on the status of Israeli women, al-Shanqiti states that children and women must not be harmed unless they took part in attacking Muslims. He explains that it is permitted if women and children are unintentionally harmed, but that one should be wise and prevent the enemy from using them as a shield. On December 31, 2010, al-Shanqiti posted a fatwa as a response to an individual who asked if Muslims are justified in attacking Christians in Muslim lands:
We clarify that these Christians present in Muslim lands are not the people of the covenant, and the rules of protection do not apply to them. Not every unbeliever born in a Muslim country or living there are of the people of the covenant, because protection under the covenant has description and conditions, which if not fulfilled, make a person outside the people of the covenant. We mention that the rulings of protection under the covenant do not apply to the unbelievers residing in lands of Islam today, because they do not pay the jizia [a tax imposed on non-Muslim subjects of an Islamic state] or abide by inferiority, and do not stop harming Muslims. Each one of these alone is sufficient to abrogate the covenant, because their blood was permissible from the start. As for the case of targeting them, it is up to the leaders of jihad in every country. If they decide to confront them in revenge for our Muslim sisters, then we should help them, and every Muslim who loves jihad must be an arrow in their quiver. (Quoted in Weimann 2011b, 771)
On April 12, 2013, al-Maqdisi’s Minbar al-Tawhid wal-Jihad website posted a newer fatwa by Sheikh al-Shanqiti about the permissibility of bombing synagogues and churches. The fatwa was issued in response to a query by a reader who called himself “Assad al-Ma’arik,” and asked specifically about bombing “the Jews’ houses of worship in European states.” Al-Shanqiti used the opportunity to address the general question of attacking Jewish and Christian houses of worship. The fatwa started by summarizing an opinion shared by many Islamic jurisprudents, namely that attacking houses of worship is illegitimate. This opinion was based on Qur’an 22:40: “Had Allah not defended some men by the might of others, the monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which His praise is daily celebrated would have been utterly destroyed.” Al-Shanqiti rejected this view, arguing that the above verse refers only to the pre-Islamic era, as Judaism and Christianity both lost their validity with the appearance of Islam. However, although al-Shanqiti ruled it permissible to attack synagogues and churches in certain circumstances, he concluded that it is preferable to avoid this, for both religious and tactical reasons: “Attacking houses of worship, [even] in cases where it is legitimate, will be used as a pretext to defame jihad. Therefore, the mujahideen should not resort to this tactic except where there is an urgent need and necessity” (MEMRI Jihad & Terrorism Studies Project 2013a).
What Are Legitimate Actions?
Online fatwas allow terrorists to express their opinions on legitimate targets for terrorism. One such example is the case of Hamid Abdallah Ahmad al-Ali, a Kuwait-based terrorist recruiter who has provided financial support and ideological justification for al-Qaeda–affiliated groups seeking to commit acts of terrorism in Kuwait, Iraq, and elsewhere (United Nations Security Council 2009). On January 16, 2008, the United Nations Security Council listed al-Ali as being associated with al-Qaeda for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating or perpetrating acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, or in support of … supplying, selling or transferring arms and related material to” and “recruiting for” al-Qaeda–affiliated cells in Kuwait. In his role as a recruiter for terrorist organizations, al-Ali has not only provided financial support for recruits (including paying their travel expenses to Iraq), but has also issued fatwas to justify acts of terrorism, including a fatwa endorsing suicide bombing operations and, more specifically, the flying of aircraft into targets during such operations. This fatwa sanctioned “the permissiveness, and sometimes necessity, of suicide operations on the conditions of crushing the enemy (or causing moral defeat to the enemy), to obtain victory.” According to this fatwa, “In modern time(s) this can be accomplished through the modern means of bombing, or by bringing down an airplane on an important site that causes the enemy great casualties” (United Nations Security Council 2009).
Other online fatwas target iconic Western companies. In November 2010, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s jihadi website Al-Minbar wal-Tawhid posted a fatwa permitting mujahideen to target companies owned by infidels, such as Coca-Cola and McDonald’s. The fatwas on the Al-Minbar wal-Tawhid site came in response to a posting by a member named “Abu Sayyed Qutub,” which included the following questions: What is the ruling regarding companies that distribute Jewish and American products, such as Coca-Cola and McDonald’s? Is it permissible to receive help from gangsters in order to carry out jihad operations, as they say the jihad in Algeria is doing? And is a group of fewer than 10 young people without military or organizational experience permitted to target tourists in countries with apostate [Muslim] governments, where no known jihad group operates? Sheikh Abu Walid al-Maqdisi, a Gaza-based cleric, replied that according to Islamic law, it is forbidden to harm Muslim lives and possessions, but it is permissible “to target infidel and polytheist lives and possessions.” “If the owners of these companies are Muslims, it is forbidden to harm or steal from them, even if they distribute or sell goods produced by the Jewish and Christian enemies of Allah, as long as the essence of the commerce and of the goods is permissible according to sharia,” Abu Walid al-Maqdisi said. “However, if these companies are controlled by infidels, their property may be taken as booty, since the infidels of today are considered combatants” (MEMRI Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor 2010).
Abu Walid al-Maqdisi has provided rulings on other aspects of terrorist action. Kidnapping and killing tourists was permissible so long as it was done by “people who are reliable, knowledgeable in Sharia, and have organizational and military experience” and are acting for the benefit of Muslims, he said. If a Muslim lives in a place where no organized jihadist group exists, al-Maqdisi said, he should establish one. Finally, he added, Muslims are prohibited from obtaining help from infidel gangsters (although they may purchase weapons from them). Islamic law does not bar Muslims from receiving help from Muslim criminals, but according to al-Maqdisi, the assistance should be rejected “if it is likely to harm the reputation of the mujahideen, or their jihad plan” (MEMRI Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor 2010).
Online fatwas have also authorized cyberterrorism and attacks on web-sites. In October 2008, a fatwa published on the website of the Islamist Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement declared that top Muslim scholars have decreed that hacking and sabotage of American and Israeli web-sites are allowed under Islamic law and are a form of jihad or holy war. The fatwa was issued by a committee from the highest authority in Sunni Islam, Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, and was posted online as a response to numerous questions from radicals asking to be allowed to destroy Israeli and American state websites. “This is considered a type of lawful Jihad that helps Islam by paralyzing the information systems used by our enemies for their evil aims,” the fatwa read. “This Jihad is not different from the armed one. In fact, it might be more important if you consider the global dimensions of the Internet. Whoever wins this war will become the strongest in the realm of information” (Adnkronos International 2008).
Finally, the media are a legitimate target for terrorism. An online fatwa issued in November 2013 by the militant Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan group approves death for television hosts, journalists, analysts, and media personalities whose acts and views are deemed by the Taliban to be against Islamic law. The fatwa was first authored in 2012 by a group of ulama (clerics) and muftis associated with the group, and reissued online (MEMRI Jihad & Terrorism Threat Monitor 2013b).
Are Suicide Operations Legitimate?
Most religions consider suicide to be an undesirable act. In Islam, the Qur’anic verse “Spend in the way of Allah; do not cast yourself into destruction” (Qur’an 2:195) is one example of a religious ruling against suicide. Nonetheless, jihadi fatwas have found creative ways to justify suicide bombing. In the “forbidding verse,” the words “in the way of Allah” (fi sabil Allah, in Arabic) are interpreted as “for the sake of Allah.” Thus, some fatwas claim that this means that suicide is acceptable if it is done for Allah. In these fatwas, the same verse that traditional Islam interprets as prohibiting suicide is interpreted as supporting suicidal actions if committed “in the way of Allah.”
Another tactic in jihadist fatwas is to present suicide as a new conception of martyrdom. This shift challenges traditionally strong Islamic prohibitions against suicide (Qaradawi 2003). Bernard Freamon (2003, 300) argues that “this transformation of religious doctrine … resulted in the appearance of a new norm of jihadist battlefield behavior—self-annihilation—a norm that is now accepted as a valid discharge of religious obligation under the law of the military Jihad.” Yusuf al-Qaradawi is a leading figure in online terrorist fatwas and a good example of the use of fatwas to legitimize terrorist actions. Here is a typical al-Qaradawi question-and-answer form of fatwa:
The martyr operation is the greatest of all sorts of jihad in the cause of Allah. A martyr operation is carried out by a person who sacrifices himself, deeming his life [of] less value than striving in the cause of Allah, in the cause of restoring the land and preserving the dignity. To such a valorous attitude applies the following Qur’anic verse: “And of mankind is he who would sell himself, seeking the pleasure of Allah; and Allah hath compassion on (His) bondmen.” (Qur’an, 2: 207). But a clear distinction has to be made here between martyrdom and suicide. Suicide is an act or instance of killing oneself intentionally out of despair, and finding no outlet except putting an end to one’s life. On the other hand, martyrdom is a heroic act of choosing to suffer death in the cause of Allah, and that’s why it’s considered by most Muslim scholars as one of the greatest forms of jihad. When jihad becomes an individual duty, as when the enemy seizes the Muslim territory, a woman becomes entitled to take part in it alongside men. Jurists maintained that when the enemy assaults a given Muslim territory, it becomes incumbent upon all its residents to fight against them to the extent that a woman should go out even without the consent of her husband, a son can go too without the permission of his parent, a slave without the approval of his master, and the employee without the leave of his employer. This is a case where obedience should not be given to anyone in something that involves disobedience to Allah, according to a famous juristic rule.… To conclude, I think the committed Muslim women in Palestine have the right to participate and have their own role in jihad and to attain martyrdom. (Middle East Forum 2004)
Al-Qaradawi’s fatwa on suicide was echoed in numerous other terrorist fatwas. For example, Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, then one of the leaders of Hamas, argued that “suicide depends on volition. If the martyr intends to kill himself, because he is tired of life—it is suicide. However, if he wants to sacrifice his soul in order to strike the enemy and to be rewarded by Allah—he is considered a martyr (
shahid). We have no doubt that those carrying out these operations are martyrs” (quoted in MEMRI Jihad & Terrorism Studies Project 2001). Al-Rantisi based this distinction on al-Qaradawi’s fatwa.
Counter-fatwas have challenged the legitimization of suicide attacks. In August 2005, the Syrian cleric Abu-Basir al-Tartusi posted a fatwa online under the headline “A Word of Warning About Suicide Operations.” He argued: “I have received 1,000 questions about these operations, which are for me closer to suicide than martyrdom. They are haram (forbidden) and impermissible, for several reasons.” Al-Tartusi, who lives in London, cited in the fatwa some of the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, among them: “Anyone who harms a believer has no jihad” (quoted in Bunt 2009, 219). The fundamentalists launched a bitter attack on al-Tartusi on their websites and accused him of letting down al-Qaeda’s supporters. One of them asked, “What do you expect from him when he lives in London?” Another posting argued, “One should not get attached to these people because they did not fight before. The rules on jihad are taken from the mujahideen. I never thought of learning about jihad from those sitting who are used to issuing fatwas from London.”
Is the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Legitimate?
Online fatwas have also been dedicated to considering terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In May 2003, the young Saudi cleric Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd published “A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Infidels” (Fahd 2003). Al-Qaeda and its supporters have used this fatwa as a justification and authorization for using weapons of mass destruction against infidels—in this case, against the United States. Al-Fahd begins by describing the term “weapons of mass destruction” as an “inexact term,” claiming that chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons that killed a thousand people would be called “internationally banned weapons” by the West, whereas the use of “high explosive bombs weighing seven tons apiece and [that] killed three thousand or more” would be called “internationally permissible weapons.” On that basis, he dismisses the West’s treaties and regulations banning WMD proliferation as mere attempts to scare others and protect itself. “Thus it is evident,” he wrote, “that [the Western nations] do not wish to protect humanity by these terms, as they assert; rather, they want to protect themselves and monopolize such weapons on the pretext of banning them internationally.” As a result, he argues, “all these terms have no standing in Islamic law, because God Almighty has reserved judgment and legislation to Himself.… This is a matter so obvious to Muslims that it needs no demonstration.… In judging these weapons one looks only to the Koran, the Sunnah [the sayings and traditions of the Prophet], and the statements of Muslim scholars.” Al-Fahd also argues that large civilian casualties are acceptable if they result from an attack meant to defeat an enemy, and not an attack aimed only at killing the innocent: “The situation in this regard is that if those engaged in jihad establish that the evil of the infidels can be repelled only by attacking them at night with weapons of mass destruction, they may be used even if they annihilate the infidels” (Fahd 2003).
In 2008, Ayman al-Zawahiri released his book The Exoneration. In it, he resurrected the WMD fatwa issued by Nasir al-Fahd in 2003. Al-Zawahiri adopted al-Fahd’s ideas to reach the same conclusion: The use of nuclear weapons would be justified as an act of equal retaliation, “repaying like for like.” Al-Zawahiri raised key Qur’anic themes to sweep away all potential objections to the use of WMD and adopted al-Fahd’s examples word for word. The Prophet Muhammad’s attack on the village of al-Taif using a catapult, for instance, permits the use of weapons of “general destruction” that are incapable of distinguishing between civilians and combatants (Mowatt-Larssen 2010). By echoing the previous fatwa on the subject, al-Zawahiri’s fatwa reinforces the legitimacy of the use of WMD in global jihad.
Radical Islam has adopted the Internet as a favorite platform for spreading jihadi fatwas, legitimizing the use of violence, suicide attacks, targeting innocents, and even of killing moderate Muslims. By learning the flow of fatwas and their sources and reasoning, and by monitoring the debates over fatwas, one can find practical ways to combat the misleading and illegitimate uses to which they have been put.