where the terms "citizen" and "citizess" (or "citess") had come into some vogue, but Chauncey Goodrich of Hartford would have no traffic with such foolishness, as he told Oliver Wolcott, Jr., the comptroller of the Treasury:

. . . Our greatest danger is from the contagion of levelism; what folly is it that has set the world agog to be all equal to French barbers. It must have its run, and the anti-feds will catch at it to aid their mischievous purposes. . . . before long the authors of entire equality will shew the world the danger of their wild rant. We treat their Boston notions with derision, and the name of citizen and citess, are only epithets of fun and joke; . . . a noisy set of discontented demagogues make a rant, and it seems as if they were about breaking up the foundations, but the great body of men of property move slowly, but move with sure success."

Such expressions were more characteristic of later opinion, however, than of the present spirit, even in New England.

Early in the new year, Jefferson, writing a private letter to William Short, now at The Hague, in the paternal tone which he had not yet laid aside, chided his former secretary for the "extreme warmth" with which the latter had censured the proceedings of the Jacobins in recent letters. He did this at the injunction of the President, he said, expressing the fear that if Short's criticisms became known they would injure him at home as well as abroad, since they would not be relished by his countrymen. This private letter contains as fervid comments as Jefferson ever made on the French Revolution, and it has been widely quoted by later writers for just that reason.^^

Jefferson's proneness to express himself more vehemently in private letters and memoranda than in public papers and official communications does not make him unique among human beings. Other responsible officers besides him have let themselves go in private while weighing their public words, though the reverse has often been the case with campaign orators — of whom he was never one. Whether the measured judgments of a responsible statesman or the unrestrained private language of the same man should be regarded as the better index of his true sentiments is perhaps an unanswerable question, and both must be taken into account by anyone seeking to arrive at truth, A statesman must be judged at last by his public policies and official acts, which represent the results of his sober deliberation, but private

17 Goodrich to Wolcott, Feb. 17, 1793 (Gibbs, I, 88).

18 TJ to Short, Jan. 3, 1793 (Ford, VI, 153-157), replying to a batch of letters, including a private one of Sept. 15.

language affords an important clue to the state of his own mind and emotions. The contrast was unusually sharp in the case of Jefferson, who imposed extraordinary restraint on himself as a public man while revealing the fervor of his nature in intimate circles and in personal memoranda. To hostile interpreters this apparent contradiction has lent color to the charge of duplicity, but Jefferson himself resolved it by harnessing his emotions (which actually were an essential element in his leadership) to the realistic and reasoned conduct of public affairs (which was his business). His friends could not have been unaware of his proneness to exaggeration when blowing off steam in private; and the persons most aware of it should have been his young friends, who stood in the position of disciples to him, for, like a teacher among his pupils, he was least inhibited and most likely to indulge in hyperbole with them. No saying can be fully understood out of its specific setting, and some of the most vivid of Jefferson's were pedagogical in purpose. These would not have endured had they not contained kernels of eternal truth, but the specific language was owing to particular circumstance. This letter to Short is a case in point. The essential and abiding truth embedded in it is that all human progress is costly, especially progress toward liberty and democracy; but much of its imagery is such as poets would use — not mathematicians or coldly calculating statesmen.

Jefferson's defense of the Jacobins, as a political party in France, need not detain us. Owing to the time-lag, his information about groupings and objectives could not be up to date, and he naturally read back into current struggles the issues he himself had perceived when, as a personal spectator of the revolution, he was better informed of developments than he could ever hope to be again. To him the Jacobins were merely the republican element in the old party of the Patriots, and the Feuillants (who had been discredited by this time) were the monarchical. His friend Lafayette had belonged to the latter group and he himself had been far from unsympathetic with its immediate objectives.^^ In later years he reasserted, in its most essential points, his original opinion. He said in his late seventies:

... I should have shut up the Queen in a Convent, putting harm out of her power, and placed the king in his station, investing him with limited powers, which I verily believe he would have honestly exercised, according to the measure of his understanding. In this way no void would have been created, courting the usurpation of a military adventurer [ Bonaparte 1 nor occasion

!• See Jefferson and the Rights of Man, ch. XII. Letters written him by Morris and giving fuller information about factional groupings had not yet been received.

given for those enormities which demoralized the nations of the world, and destroyed, and is yet to destroy, millions and millions of itsinhabitants.^"

But in the year 1793, when he was fifty, he believed that the experiment of retaining the hereditary executive, which he himself had favored at first, had failed completely and would have resulted in a return to despotism if it had been pursued. Thus he was now convinced that the "expunging" of the King had become an absolute necessity. By this he did not mean that the execution of Louis XVI was absolutely necessary, for at the time it had not occurred. What he did mean was that there was now an unavoidable choice between the revolution and the King. Gouverneur Morris had said practically the same thing, so the only real question was, which was preferable? Jefferson, who had never thought unkindly of this particular King and had given counsels of moderation to the Patriots while in France, had no possible doubt on that point. Being first of all a champion of liberty and popular sovereignty, he sympathized with this revolution, as he said ninety-nine one-hundredths of the American citizens did.

He was certainly not speaking with mathematical precision, but the celebrations of French military successes throughout the country that winter left no doubt that a large majority of the people did favor the Republic. Even Hamilton admitted this. He soon wrote to Short: "The popular tide in this country is strong in favor of the last revolution in France; and there are many who go, of course, with that tide, and endeavor always to turn it to account. For my own part I content myself with praying most sincerely that it may issue in the real happiness and advantage of the nation." ^^ The Secretary of the Treasury harbored real doubts, but even he veiled them in noncommittal language.

In private conversation, as Jefferson noted, John Adams was more forthright and more pessimistic. Adams was convinced that the temporary accession to power of successive revolutionary groups would be marked by the destruction of their predecessors, and that in the end force would prevail. He was quite cynical about it, saying that neither virtue, prudence, wisdom, nor anything else was sufficient to restrain human passions, and that government could be maintained only by force.^^ Like Jefferson, Adams was prone to exaggerated statements, indulging in them in public as well as private to the confusion

20 In autobiography (Ford, I, 141).

21 Hamilton to Short, Feb. 5, 1793 (Lodge, VIII, 293). Because of the f>art played by Short in financial transactions in Europe, Hamilton had extensive correspondence with him.

22 Note of conversation by TJ, Jan. 16, 1793 (LC, 13890).

of Others regarding his actual philosophy of a balanced government, but he showed remarkable prevision regarding the course of events in France. Later developments there were to shake though never to destroy Jefferson's faith in the essential reasonableness of most men, and it is a notable fact that his faith lived on in times of greatest darkness. At the moment, however, he was in line with the predominant opinion of his countrymen. He indulged to some degree in what in our own day is called "rationalization," but he was on strong ground when he pointed out to Short that the logic of the events was inescapable.

Short needed comfort, however, more than logic. The personal cost of the revolution was mounting, and the human toll was being taken among the very people whom he and Jefferson had valued most during the latter's stay in France. Lafayette, who had abandoned the revolution, was now in custody, and the liberal-minded Due de La Rochefoucauld had been snatched from his carriage and killed before the eyes of his old mother and young wife.^^ Of all the tragic events, it was this latter one that affected Short the most and that served most to embitter him. Jefferson did not yet have as full a tally of horrors as Short had, and he had been spared personal observation of them, but he was well aware of the general trend when he sought to bring philosophy to bear on these fearful developments.

... In the struggle which was necessary [he said], many guilty persons fell without the forms of trial, and with them some innocent. These I deplore as much as any body, & shall deplore some of them to the day of my death. But I deplore them as I should have done had they fallen in battle. . . . The liberty of the ivhole earth ivas depending on the issue of the contest, and ivas ever such a prize ivon with so little imwcent blood? My own affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it should have failed, I would have seen half the earth desolated. Were there but an Adam & an Eve left in every country, & left free, it would be better than as it now is.24

23 Sec Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 149-150, 210, 235, for the association of Short and Jefferson with this liberal nobleman and his family. It is not certain that TJ knew of his death when he wrote Short on Jan. 3, 1793. Morris reported it in a letter of Sept. 10, 17^2, which TJ received Jan. 10, 1793. Short's failure to mention it in his letter of Sept. 15, 1792 (received Jan. 2, 1793) and in letters of Oct. 9 and 12, 1792 (actually received in December) suggests that he was avoiding the painful subject. It seems probable, nonetheless, that TJ had received this gruesome piece of news in some other way, and the tone of his letter strongly suggests that he had.

2-* Ford, VI, 154, italics inserted.

In the last two sentences Jefferson indulged in hyperbole, and his words have inevitably been quoted, through the years since they have become known, because of their vividness. They are far more extravagant than the equally famous utterance of his to another young friend, William S. Smith, in a private letter relating to the Shays Rebellion in Massachusetts: "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants." ^^ While that saying has been tortured by later interpreters who have quoted it out of context, its essential truthfulness cannot be questioned by anyone familiar with the course of human history. The expressions to Short are another matter. The annihilation of a large portion of the human race in order that the few survivors may have the full enjoyment of liberty cannot be justified on either historical or philosophical grounds; and the record of Jefferson's reasoned and disciplined life gives every ground to suppose that he himself would have recoiled from such a holocaust. He would certainly have said no such thing in public, and he could hardly have been expected to anticipate that private words of his would be quoted to schoolboys in later generations, seized upon by political partisans, or exploited by reckless demagogues.

In writing to one whom he regarded as a son he let his poetic imagery run away with him, while stating what he regarded as essential truth. The heart of his message lies in the sentence we have italicized: ''The liberty of the whole world was depe?iding on the issue of the contest, and was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood?'''' In terms which should be understandable in any society threatened by any form of political absolutism, he was saying that despotism had been overthrown in France; that, therefore, it would eventually be overcome everywhere; and that in the light of this vast triumph for the cause of human liberty the losses must be regarded as slight. He afterwards had to revise the casualty lists upward, but he was prepared for that; and the abiding significance of his reflections lies in his frank recognition that the cost of liberty may be and frequently is exceedingly high. When the times were much less troubled he had written Lafayette: "we are not to expect to be translated from despotism to liberty in a feather-bed." ^^ This lifelong champion of freedom could not lay first emphasis on security. The tragedy of French developments, as he later perceived it, lay less in their bloodiness, though that was bad enough, than in the fact that they led to

25 Ford, IV, 467; see Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 166. 2* Apr. 2, 1790 (Ford, V, 152).

new despotisms which seemed to confirm the pessimism of John Adams rather than his own optimism. But the counter-revolutionaries as well as the revolutionaries deserve blame for that, and at this stage the balance sheet seemed to show far more gain than loss.

At the moment, also, he was rejoicing that foreign developments were helping the cause of republicanism in his own country. He wrote Short that the triumph of republicanism in France had given the coup de grace to the prospects of the monocrats in America. A few days later, he wrote his son-in-law that the outcome of the revolution in France was now little doubted, and that the sensation that had been created in the United States by the establishment of the Republic showed that the ultimate form of the American government depended far more on events in France than anybody had previously imagined.-^ By now he more clearly recognized the unity of the Atlantic world. Speaking of his own country, he said: "The tide which, after our former relaxed government [the Confederation], took a violent course towards the opposite extreme, and seemed ready to hang every thing around with the tassels and baubles of monarchy, is now getting back as we hope to a just mean, a government of laws addressed to the reason of the people, and not to their weaknesses." Thus he believed that the revolution in France had checked the incipient counter-revolution in America, which would have turned back the political clock.

As for Europe itself, he soon got from John Adams's son-in-law later and more encouraging reports than he had had from William Short and Gouverneur Morris. Writing him from New York, early in February, William S. Smith said:

I left Paris on the 9th of November & have the satisfaction to inform you, that your friends there are well, and pursuing attentively the interests of that great & rising Republic, which notwithstanding the immense combination against them, I doubt not will be finally established, & the principles which gave it birth will expand and effect [sic] more or less every European state.^*

When Smith came to Philadelphia, later in the month, he brought Jefferson fresh information about the hostile attitude of Gouverneur Morris toward the current French government.^'* The Secretary of State already knew a good deal about that. He had received from Morris himself copies of the latter's correspondence with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Le Brun, which indicated strained rela-

27 TJ to TMR, Jan. 7, 1793 (Ford, VI, 157).

28 W. S. Smith to TJ, Feb. 8, 1793 (LC, 14106). 2»Feb. 20, 1793 (Ford, I, 216-217).

tions; and the documents seemed so delicate that Jefferson, rather than let them go through the hands of a clerk, did the necessary translation himself before transmitting them to Washington, though the task took him nearly all day.^" Philip Freneau, whose main business was editing the National Gazette, was still the translating clerk in the Department, but Jefferson kept these confidential documents out of his hands. He did not want the troubles bet\veen A4orris and the French ministry to be bandied about in the American newspapers.

This correspondence showed that Morris had asked for his passport, because he did not like the tone of a letter from Le Brun to him. The manners of the present French officials were certainly not up to those of Vergennes and Montmorin, with whom Jefferson had dealt; they deserved a rebuke and treated Morris better after they got it. Furthermore, their importunity in this instance was definitely connected with financial matters with which, actually, Morris had nothing to do. These were being handled by William Short and events proved that he was not blamable. But the French minister described the situation in language which Jefferson undoubtedly approved. After reminding Morris that the French government had done business with and given aid to the Americans before the government of the latter had "any solid existence," Le Brun said:

Before your Revolution, we had a Government which has always subsisted since. It is true, it has assumed another form; but liberty, the salvation of the country, have thus determined its creation. Besides, you, sir, who are bom in the midst of a free people, should consider the affairs of France under another point of view than that of all the foreign ministers residing in Paris. We support the saine cause as that of your coimtry: the?! our principles and yours should be the same, and, by a series of natural consequences, no reason can be opposed to your residence at Paris.^^

As he translated this passage, Jefferson's mind could hardly have failed to emphasize the words we have italicized, for they represented his own conviction. Morris himself had concluded that he would remain in France, though he wanted a passport into the interior, and he had told Le Brun what he had already told Jefferson. He said: "I have never doubted the right which every people have of forming, to themselves, such government as they please." ^^

30 TJ to Washington, Jan. 13, 1793 (LC, 13985), sending correspondence between Morris and Le Brun, Aug. 30-Sept. 17, 1792 (.A.S.P.F.R., I, 338-340).

31 Sept. 16, 1792; A.S.P.F.R., I, 339, italics inserted.

32 To Le Brun, Sept. 17, 1792 (A.S.P.F.R., \, 340),

Being the representative of a government which had begun its existence in a revolt against a king, he could have consistently taken no other position, but there was no possible doubt of his strong personal dislike of the present French officials, and Jefferson soon learned more of their discontent with his conduct. Ternant turned over certain extracts from their correspondence with him and Jefferson left in his own files translations of these which he himself must have made.^^ One of these officials said of Morris: "His ill will is proved. It is vain that he conceals it under diplomatic forms, which cannot be admitted between two nations who will not submit their liberty to the dangers of Royalty. In this point of view, the Americans of the United States are our brothers, and their Minister , . . betrays them as well as us." Colonel William S. Smith, just back from France, had refused to serve as an official channel of complaint, but he told Jefferson privately that the French ministers had entirely shut their doors to Morris and would receive no further communications from him. It is not to be supposed that these revolutionists were reasonable, but, on his part, Morris was most undiplomatic. In the presence of company at his own table and in the hearing of servants he had cursed the French ministers as "a set of damned rascals" and said that the King would be restored. His own diary shows that he was conniving with the royalists, and he expected to be recalled, believing that the French had asked it.^*

They had not asked his recall in so many words, but Washington himself did not see how Morris could be continued.^^ Perhaps he would not have been if the President had been able to make a more desirable arrangement. He raised sound objections to Jefferson's suggestion that Morris change places with Thomas Pinckney in London, believing that the French would not be satisfied by his transfer to that post. The President then suggested that if Jefferson was really determined to retire as secretary of state, the best possible arrangement would be for him to go to France for a year or two. The moment was important and, possessing the confidence of both sides, he might do great good. Jefferson would not hear of this, however. He was looking forward to real retirement, and he had no intention of ever crossing the

33 Documents dated Sept. 13-19, 1792 (LC, 13376-13377).

34 TJ's memo, of Feb. 20, 1793 (Ford, I, 216-218).

35 M.D. Conway in Ed?nund Randolph (1888), p. 149, quotes the Attorney General as arguing (Feb. 22, 1793) against Morris's dismissal. Randolph's assertion that the charges against Morris had come in an "ambiguous form, half-private, half-public," must be harmonized with the extracts from Ternant in TJ's files. The charges were official enough; though, as Randolph said, there was a real question how far the French themselves intended to press them. Furthermore, the difficulties of Morris's position must not be minimized.

Atlantic again. He had been lucky on his past voyages but he was an exceedingly bad sailor. Furthermore, he said, there was a better chance for him to do good in America, since the French were sending a new minister, armed with sufficient powers. He knew from Smith that Edmond Charles Genet was coming to replace the unhappy Ternant; and, fortunately for his own peace of mind, Jefferson did not anticipate the vast trouble the new envoy would cause.

It was through Smith that Ternant himself first learned of his pending replacement. The news took the edge off the financial negotiations that this faithful public servant was carrying on. In February, on the receipt of instructions from home which he wished he had had sooner, Ternant applied for a payment of three million livres ($544,500, according to Jefferson) on the American debt to his country; the money was to be expended in the United States for provisions to be shipped to France.^" In connection with this application, Jefferson expressed to Washington some of his doubts about the legality of Hamilton's fiscal operations to which we have already referred — particularly the diverting of the foreign fund to domestic uses.^" He may have thought that Hamilton would claim that the necessary funds were unavailable, and, if so, he was prepared to ask why.

When the whole matter was referred to the executive council, however, it proved uncontroversial. The Secretary of the Treasury estimated that the arrears due France to the end of 1792 amounted to about $318,000, and he himself thought that no more than that should be furnished, though the law permitted the President to anticipate payments on the French debt if he saw fit. Hamilton stated that the whole sum could be provided, within periods that would answer the purposes of the application, without deranging the Treasury. Whereupon the others expressed the opinion that the whole amount should be furnished, and Washington accepted their judgment. Acting through Jefferson, he authorized Ternant to make the necessary arrangements with Hamilton. These were to comport with the state of the Treasury, however, and the times of payment were thus left in Hamilton's hands.^*^ Ternant had to do his negotiating henceforth with the Secretary of the Treasury. He showed some vexation about the probable delays, but, judging from his official letters home, he did

38 Ternant got his instructions Feb. 7, 1793, and made his request next day (C.F.M., pp. 170, 173). He kept quiet about Morris at first, in order not to endanger his negotiations.

•" Notes sent Washington, Feb. 12, 1793 (Ford, VI, 175-179); see ch. 2, above.

3S Washington to Tj, I'eb. 26, 1793 (Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 360); TJ to Ternant, Feb. 25, 1793 (LC, 14195); "Cabinet Opinion" of Feb. 25, 1793 (Ford, VI, 190).

not prefer Jefferson to Hamilton at this or any other time. As he had reported the attacks on the Treasury in Congress he had appeared sympathetic with Hamilton, rather than with what he called the "popular party." Within a month, Jefferson suspected that Ternant was a royalist at heart and that a "connection" between him and Hamilton was springing up.^^

It is very likely that relations between the Secretary of the Treasury and the French envoy were more cordial now that the latter was out of favor with the revolutionary leaders at home, but on grounds of official policy toward France there was no serious rift within the administration as Washington's first term drew to a close. Friendship for the old monarchy had been transferred to the new republic in the Old World; and, up to this point, that friendship had been maintained.

38 TJ to Madison, March, 1793 (Ford, VI, 193).

C>v3

Peaceful Intentions in a World of War

AS THE time approached when he must take the oath of office for /jl a second time, the President, who had no precedent to guide him beyond the one he himself had set under rather different circumstances, was in doubt about the proper procedure. Therefore, late in February, 1793, he asked his department heads and the Attorney General to meet and give him their judgment. Hamilton was not there, but he had expressed the opinion that the oath should be administered in the President's own house. The Secretary of the Treasury, though the major champion of power in the government, was indifferent to mere trappings, and he regarded a private ceremony as safer. Randolph and Knox held that the oath should be taken in public, the big Secretary of War arguing for parade. Hamilton afterwards acceded, with some reluctance, to their recommendation that the ceremony take place in the Senate chamber and be open to the public. Jefferson concurred in Hamilton's original opinion, for reasons of his own.^ If his colleague's fears of disorder and the instability of the government were extreme, his own reaction against pretentious formalities had carried him farther than there was any real need of going. The Secretary of State craved republicanism that was pure and unadorned. Only in his desire to house the new government in splendid public buildings, such as were being planned for the Federal City beside the Potomac, did Jefferson manifest any interest in impressive symbols. He did not want to surround the highest office with majesty, believing that George Washington did not need it and that the great man's successors might take advantage of unwise precedents. Monarchy had become a phobia with him in a time when France was un-

1 Washington's letter of Feb. 27, 1793 and editor's note (Fitzpatrick, XXXIl, 361); TJ's memo, of Feb. 28 (Ford, I, 221-222); Cabinet Opinions, Fob. 27, Mar. i, '793 (JC.H., IV, 342-343).

doubtedly threatened with counter-revolution, and he appeared here as a doctrinaire formalist in reverse.

He had lost none of his faith in the American people, however, and none of his confidence in the unanimously re-elected President. He was now disposed to absolve Washington from responsibility for the levees, which he himself regarded as a silly and dangerous aping of foreign courts. About this time he recorded a story he had heard about the part played in the very first one by the President's pompous aide, David Humphreys. According to this, the doors were thrown open and Humphreys, in a loud voice, announced "the President of the United States" to the five or six gentlemen who had assembled. The General did not recover his composure throughout the levee, and afterwards he said: "Well, you have taken me in once, but by God you shall never take me in a second time." ^ Jefferson appears to have noted this episode because he found it reassuring, not because he thought it amusing.

Judging from contemporary accounts, the impressiveness of the second induction of the "beloved and venerable" George Washington on Monday, Anarch 4, 1793, was owing to the innate dignity and characteristic elegance of the man himself, rather than to adventitious ceremony. He had convened the Senate in special session to attend to certain matters touching the public good, and he rode alone in his own carriage to its chamber in Congress Hall. There he took his seat in the chair usually occupied by the president of that body. John Adams was now seated at the right and in advance of him, while Justice William Gushing had a corresponding position on the left. Upon hearing the announcement of the Vice President that the Justice was present and ready to give the oath, Washington arose. It was afterwards said that he was dressed "in a full suit of black velvet, with black silk stockings and diamond knee-buckles," that he carried a cocked hat and wore a light dress sword. He was always fastidious in his dress but he did not dazzle this assembly very long. Besides taking the oath, he made a speech of four sentences, saying that he would make another on a more appropriate occasion.

The heads of departments were there, though Jefferson does not appear to have mentioned it, as were foreign ministers, such members of the House of Representatives as had remained in town, and as many spectators as could be accommodated in the hall. On his return, the President was preceded by the district marshal and the

2 Memo, of Feb. 16, 1793 (Ford, I, 216), recording story of Edmund Randolph. This was confirmed years later by Madison, who was ][)resent (Journal of Jared Sparks, recounting visit in 1831, Harvard Univ. l,ib.).

I

PEACEFUL I N I E N T I O N S IN A WORLD OF WAR 57

county sheriff with their deputies, who had been gathered to prevent disturbance and constituted the only physical protection that the great man had. It was an "extremely serene" day; for, as a newspaper said, "Providence has always smiled on the day of this man, and on the glorious cause which he has ever espoused, of LIBERTY and EQUALITY." The occasion may not have satisfied the Secretary of War, since there was so little parade, but it ought to have pleased the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State. The President was safe — still sacrosanct, and the bare ceremony had no splendor save that his presence gave it.^ One spectator observed that the portraits of the King and Queen of France were covered. Trouble was coming to everybody from their direction, though the President does not appear to have anticipated this when he left Philadelphia for Mount Vernon toward the end of the month, taking with him three servants, including two postilions, and eight horses.*

According to Jefferson the rising of Congress was a joyful event, since it afforded some relaxation to everybody in the public business. Also, the unusual mildness of the season was pleasing to him, but he had to spend a vast lot of time catching up with his correspondence, and he viewed his situation with no satisfaction. Toward the end of March he wrote: "I am in truth worn down with drudgery, and while every circumstance relative to my private affairs calls imperiously for my return to them, not a single one exists which could render tolerable a continuation in public life." ^ He was going to continue for a time, nonetheless, and he had to find a place to live. He did not need a big one, for Maria who was in school, boarding with Mrs. FuUerton, was with him only on holidays. The state of her health disturbed him somewhat that spring. She was troubled with little fevers, nausea, and loss of appetite — from a weakness of the stomach, the doctor thought. It had been expected that her cousin Jack Eppes would go with the

3 For the ceremony, see Annals, 2 Cong., pp. 666-66-j; W. S. Baker, Washington after the Revolution (1898), pp. 251-253, quoting Dunlap's American Daily Advertiser, Mar. 5, and a contemporary letter; Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 374-375. The more glowing account in Scharf & Westcott, Hist, of Philadelphia, I, 473, appears to be based on recollections. Washington made a longer speech to the 3rd Congress, Dec. 3, 1793.

4 He left Philadelphia iMar. 27, 1793 (Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 4047/.; see also 413-414). His nephew, George Augustine Washington, had died a few weeks before and he held funeral services in his memory while at home. As we shall see hereafter, he started back on April 13.

5TJ to Col. David, Mar. 22, 1793 (LC, 14384). His comments on the rising of Congress were made in a letter to Martha, Feb. 24, 1793 (Edgehill Randolph Papers, UVA). His Index to Letters for March shows that he wrote in that month almost a hundred of them.

American commissioners to the big Indian council, but the state of the finances of Francis Eppes dimmed that prospect and the boy went home instead. The main trouble was that an expected judgment in favor of the Wayles estate had not materialized and there was uncertainty whether there would be any ready cash from it anyway. This delay also embarrassed Jefferson, who had a share in the claim, and it was one of the complications in his personal affairs that made him wish that he could go home.^

The house he took was a little way in the country, on the Schuylkill near Gray's Ferry and within sight of Bartram's and Gray's Gardens on the other side of the river. He agreed with the owner, Moses Cox, to take it at the beginning of April, and he moved in a little before his fiftieth birthday.'^ He sent several loads of his books to the country, but shipped others to Virginia, along with his surplus furniture. Upwards of fifty packing cases were put aboard the good sloop Uriion, bound for Richmond, where he expected them to be stored temporarily in a warehouse. He figured that his goods would fill a room, and that the packages containing looking glasses would have to remain in Richmond until the next winter, since they must go thence to Albemarle by water. The season had been dry as well as mild, hence the rivers at the time were low.® Meanwhile, he had had certain repairs made in the house of Thomas Leiper which he was vacating, and just before he left he got the consent of the new tenant for his coachman's wife to remain a little longer. Happening to "lay in," she could not yet be removed with safety.^

He was not sure just how long he would stay on the banks of the Schuylkill, but he regarded the end of the summer as the outside limit and hoped to get away much earlier. In May he was "in readiness for flight" as soon as he could find "an apt occasion," and he tried to make it clear that when he did leave the government it would be for good. Writing his son-in-law, who had recently bought a horse for him, he said: "My next return to Monticello is the last long journey I shall ever

®TJ to Martha, Apr. 8, 1793 (copy, Edgehill Randolph Papers, UVA); Francis Eppcs to TJ, Alar. 6, 1793 (ibid.); Account Book, Feb. 20, 1793, showing payment of $80 to Airs. Fullerton for six months' board for Maria. The case was that of Gary's executor, which kept recurring in TJ's correspondence during the rest of his stay in Philadelphia.

■'TJ to Cox, Alar. 12, 1793 (LC, 14287); see also TJ to Martha, Mar. 10 (Randall, II, i9i);TJtoCox, Alar. 7 (LC, 14252).

8 Various items in Account Book, Apr. 6-9, 1793, show payments for "portage" of books and furniture. He wrote James Brown in Richmond about the shipment. Apr. 7 (copy, Edgehill Randolph Papers), and got a shipping receipt for 50 casei and I bbl. on Apr. 9 (LC, 14499).

8 TJ to Thomas Leiper, Apr. 11, 1793 (LC, 14511).

J

PEACEFUL INTENTIONS IN A WORLD OF WAR 59

take, except the last of all, for which I shall not want horses." ^^ He did not get home as soon as he expected, but he got himself into the countryside anyway. Maria's health improved somewhat and she spent Sundays with him. When hot weather came he practically lived outdoors — eating, writing, reading, and receiving his company beneath the plane trees.^^

In the middle of March the Secretary of State wrote his old friend, Dr. George Gilmer of Pen Park in Albemarle County, that there had been no news of France since the beginning of the King's trial.^- He did not know that Louis XVI had been seven weeks dead. But he and Washington had enough knowledge of the plight of Lafayette to be deeply troubled about that, and before the President left for Mount Vernon they did what little they could for him.

The turn of events with respect to the Marquis was ironical in the extreme. Early in the previous summer, Jefferson, who had known him so intimately in Paris, had addressed him thus: "Behold you, then, my dear friend, at the head of a great army, establishing the liberties of your country against a foreign enemy. May heaven favor youf cause, and make you the channel through which it may pour its favors." Employing the extravagance of language he allowed himself in private letters, he spoke of his old friend as "exterminating the monster aristocracy, and pulling out the teeth and fangs of its associate monarchy." This letter had not reached Lafayette when that liberal nobleman deserted the revolution and fled to Belgium, where he fell into the hands of the Austrians. In fact, he did not get it until after he emerged from prison some six years later.^^ Gouverneur Morris promptly reported that he had "taken refuge with the enemy," though this letter did not reach the Secretary of State much before the end of the year. "Thus his circle is completed," wrote the American minister. "He has spent his fortune on a revolution, and is now crushed by the wheel which he put in motion. He lasted longer than I expected." i'*

Early in 1793, Washington, without any solicitation, had deposited in Amsterdam 200 guineas to be subject to the orders of the Mario TJ to TMR, May 19, 1793 (LC, 14864); TJ to J. W. Eppes, May 23, 1793 (Ford, VI, 264).

11 TJ to Martha, May 26, July 7, 1793 (Ford, VI, 267; Randall, II, 191-192).

12 Mar. 15, 1793 (Ford, VI, 202).

13 To Lafayette, June 16, 1792 (Ford, VI, 78); from Lafayette, Nov. 20, 1800 (LC, 18846).

!■* Morris to TJ, Aug. 22, 1792 (A.S.P.F.R., I, 336). Lafayette deserted on Aug. 19, and TJ acknowledged this letter on Dec. 30, 1792.

quise — stating that he owed her husband at least that amount for services that had been rendered him but for which no account had ever been received.^^ Afterwards he heard from her and was somewhat reassured about her personal situation, though still at a loss about what, if anything, he could do for her imprisoned husband. At length Jefferson, on Washington's instructions, asked Morris to procure Lafayette's liberation by informal solicitations if possible, and to use formal ones if these should seem desirable. Also, he assumed the difficult and delicate task of drafting the letter which Washington sent to the Marquise. "My affection to his nation and to himself are unabated," said the President in the Secretary of State's language, "and notwithstanding the line of separation which has been unfortunately drawn between them I am confident that both have been led on by a pure love of liberty, and a desire to secure public happiness, and I shall deem that among the most consoling moments of my life which should see them reunited in the end, as they were in the beginning, of their virtuous enterprise." ^^ The words were those of a friend of the man himself and also of the revolution which had engulfed him, and if they voiced the sentiments of Jefferson they were subscribed to by Washington. They had hardly been written when news reached Philadelphia that Louis XVI had been executed by the guillotine.

The death of the King was generally regretted by Americans, but the shading of opinion — between sorrow and anger — tended to conform to domestic political complexions. Jefferson noted this fact, but informed Madison that the execution had not produced as open condemnation from the "Monocrats" as he had expected. The ladies of the first social circle in Philadelphia were "all open-mouthed against the murderers of a sovereign" but their husbands were more cautious.^'^ Even Oliver Wolcott, Jr., whom Jefferson placed on the extreme right wing, expressed himself with restraint. Sending his father a paper containing "an account of the fate of poor Louis," he mildly said: "It remains to see the result of the great experiment which the French are attempting." Chauncey Goodrich of Hartford spoke of the execution as "a wanton act of barbarity, disgraceful even to a Parisian mob," adding that it threatened the success of republicanism in France — a thing which he himself did not approve of. It

15 Washington to the Marquise de Lafayette, Jan. 31, 1793 (Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 322).

i« Washington to TJ, Mar. 13, 1793 (Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 385-386); TJ to Morris, Mar. 15, 1793 (Ford, VI, 202-203); draft of letter to Madame de Lafayette, Mar. 16, 1793 (Ford, VI, 203-204); letter as sent to Marquise de Lafayette, Mar. 16, 1793 (Fitzpatrick, XXXIf, 389-390).

'■^ TJ to Aladison, Marcli, 179^ (Ford, VI, 192-193).

J

might be expected to serve a good purpose in America, also — by-checking "the passions of those who wish to embroil us in a desperate cause, and unhinge our government." ^^

At the other extreme was an anonymous writer in Freneau's National Gazette who entitled his article: "Louis Capet has lost his caput." This author said: "From my use of a pun it may seem that I think lightly of his fate. I certainly do. It affects rne no more than the execution of another malefactor." ^^ Jefferson himself would not have been in character if he had descended to such unbecoming levity, and, as a matter of fact, he left in the record very few contemporary comments on these events. In later years, while still declining to sit in historical judgment on the executioners of the King, he skillfully-summed up their arguments and made clear his personal disagreement with theuL Toward the end of his life he wrote:

... I am not prepared to say that the first magistrate of a nation cannot commit treason against his country, or is unamenable to its punishment; nor yet that where there is no written law, no regulated tribunal, there is not a law in our hearts, and a power in our hands, given for righteous employment in maintaining right, and redressing wrong. Of those who judged the king, many thought him wilfully criminal, many that his existence would keep the nation in conflict with the horde of kings, who would war against a regeneration which might come home to themselves, and that it were better that one should die than all. / should not have voted "with this portion of the legislature.^^

At the moment, however, this peace-loving man who laid such store by orderly constitutional processes seems to have harbored no doubt that monarchs were "amenable to punishment like other criminals"; and, despite his generally charitable judgment of L-ouis XVI as a human being, he was wasting no sympathy on an ill-advised King, when more innocent men than he had died.^^ He might well have suffered a revulsion of feeling if he had been in France in early 1793, just as Thomas Paine did, but he still believed that the liberty of the whole earth depended on the issue of the contest. Nor was he any less aware than Alexander Hamilton of the possible repercussion of these events on the American public mind.

Reporting to him a little later about Virginia, James Monroe said: "I

18 Oliver Wolcotr, Jr., to Oliver Wolcott, St., Mar. 20, 1793; Chauncey Goodrich to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., Mar. 24, 1793 (Gibbs, I, 90). See also Oliver Wolcott, Sr., to his son. Mar. 25, 1793 {ibid., p. 91).

1^ National Gazette, Apr. 20, 1793.

-f* in his autobiography (Ford, I, 141), italics inserted.

-1 To an unknown person, Mar. 18, 1793 (L. & B., IX, 45).

scarcely find a man unfriendly to the French revolution as now modified. Many regret the unhappy fate of the Marquis of Fayette, and likewise the execution of the King. But they seem to consider these events as incidents to a much greater one, and which they wish to see accomplished." 22 These reassuring words really amounted to a summary of Jefferson's own position. In its shading this judgment differed from one that Edward Carrington, a man of different political persuasion, gave Hamilton about these same Virginians. He said: "I believe the decapitation of the king is pretty generally considered as an act of unprincipled cruelty, dictated by neither justice nor policy. In my own mind, it was a horrible transaction in every view; and to an American, who can yield to its propriety, it ought to be felt as a truly sorrowful event." With respect to the cause of France, however, he believed that the general wish was for its success.-^ Meanwhile in Philadelphia, that friend of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, Dr. Benjamin Rush, while deploring the act and praising the King rather more than he deserved, was saying that the noble cause in which France was engaged, "though much disgraced by her rulers, must finally prevail." ^*

About the time that George Washington went home to Amount Vernon, the father of the comptroller of the Treasury wrote from Hartford to his son: "I hope that the President will continually superintend the conduct of the Secretary of State, so as not to suffer by his indiscretion these states to be involved in the vortex of European politics." 25 Had this Connecticut Yankee been permitted to look over the shoulder of the Secretary of State when the latter was writing American representatives abroad at this very juncture he should have been reassured; though he would also have been deprived, at an early stage, of one of the most important of the allegations of Hamilton and his partisans. Late in March, Jefferson wTote prophetically:

. . . The scene in Europe is becoming very interesting. Amidst the confusion of a general war which seems to be threatening that quarter of the globe, we hope to be permitted to preserve the line of neutrality. We ivish not to meddle with the internal affairs of any country, nor with the general affairs of Europe. Peace with all nations, and the right which that gives us with respect to all nations, are our object. It will be necessary for

22 Monroe to TJ, May 8, 1793 (S.M.H., I, 252).

23 Carrington to Hamilton, Apr. 26, 1793 (J.C.H., V, 555).

2* To J. C. Lettson, Letters of Benjmnin Rush (1951), ed. by L. H. Butterfield, 11,635. 25 Oliver Wolcott, Sr., to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., Mar. 25, 1793 (Gibbs, I, 91).

PEACEFUL INTENTIONS IN A WORLD OF WAR 63

all our public agents to exert themselves with vigilance for securing to our vessels all the rights of neutrality, and from preventing the vessels of other nations from usurping our fiag.-^

Here is a major clue to the policy which Jefferson consistently pursued as Secretary of State, under much greater difficulties than he now anticipated, and here are some of the germs of the policy later pronounced by his disciple Monroe in his famous Doctrine. There is no point in arguing about the major credit for policies which were advocated by so many leaders in common, but these were wholly consistent with Jefferson's own past and represented a concern for the welfare of his own country which was relatively, if not wholly, independent of ideology. No one was more convinced than he that his country required peace and time to grow in. He had no thought of letting it be hitched to the war chariot of any other nation.

If there was any exception to his prevailingly peaceful intentions, it was with respect to Spain, the country that controlled the mouth of the Mississippi. He had instituted negotiations with the Spanish, but toward them he was not unwilling to sound bellicose.^^ At length his young friend William Short had joined William Carmichael in Madrid, where the two commissioners were destined to suffer long frustrations, and in the meantime new problems had arisen because of the activities of the Governor of Louisiana in connection with the Indians. When these were discussed in the executive council in the autumn of 1792, it was Hamilton who talked most of peace, and the Secretary of the Treasury even broached the matter of a British alliance. It was Jefferson who wanted to refer to Congress a recent Spanish communication, since the matter of declaring or not declaring war lay within their province. This is not to say that he himself wanted war, but he was prepared to consider it as a possibility. The Spanish letter was sent to Congress, and Jefferson wrote the American commissioners in Spain to make representations to the Spanish Court.-^

Nothing came of this business, and it is mentioned here chiefly to illustrate Jefferson's attitude toward the Spanish. This was largely owing to his continuing concern for the navigation of the Mississippi and his consciousness that Spain was a waning power which could be chalk :ged with relative safety by his own country, now growing

26 TJ to C. W. F. Dumas, Mar. 24, 1793 (L. & B., IX, 56), italics inserted. He wrote in the same vein to others.

27 See Jefferso?! and the Rights of MaJi, pp. 406-411.

28 Memo, of Oct. 31, 1792 (Ford, I, 205-207); TJ to Carmichael and Short, Nov. 3, 1793 (Ford, VI, 129-130). The communication from the Spanish commissioners in America, Viar and Jaudenes, was sent to Congress on Nov. 7 (A.S.P.F.R., I, 139). Short did not reach Madrid till Feb. i, 1793.

rapidly in strength on the western waters. The further weakening of Spain seemed so desirable to him that he welcomed later reports that the French purposed to free the Spanish colonies, and he instructed Carmichael and Short not to offer Spain any American guarantee of these. Previously, he had been willing to guarantee her possessions west of the Mississippi if she would cede those on the east, but the situation was now changed. He had intimations that the French would not object to the incorporation in the United States of the Spanish territories east of the great river, as he also had that the Spanish and British were now acting in concert. That concert was to become closer than he yet anticipated — for the old ally of Bourbon France entered into a formal British alliance before summer, thus eifecting a diplomatic revolution, shifting the balance of power in the New World as well as the Old, and causing the Spanish themselves to become more bellicose toward the Americans. This new alignment did not endear them to Jefferson the more, and it gave him a new reason for friendliness to France, but the point that calls for emphasis in the early spring of 1793 is that Jefferson was most likely to be belligerent on American questions — of which the security of the United States on its own continent was a major one. As a responsible statesman he had no thought of getting embroiled in European quarrels, regardless of personal predilections and ideology. From the beginning to the end he favored a policy of neutrality.^*

Within ten days of the execution of Louis XVI the European war, hitherto confined to the Continent, was extended to include Great Britain, the news being received in Philadelphia early in April. At the same time, Holland was drawn into it, as Spain was a few weeks later.^*^ It was now unquestionably a general war, and with the involvement of the colonial powers it embraced the entire Atlantic world of which the United States of America was a part. The difficulties wliich the young Republic faced were not merely such as

29 TJ learned of French designs against the Spanish colonies at least by Feb. 20, 1793, when he talked with W. S. Smith (memo, in Ford, I, 216-218). His change in the instructions to Carmichael and Short was made Mar. 23 (Ford, VI, 206), which was before he had heard of the beginning of war between France and Great Britain and considerably before he heard of the declaration of war on Spain by France. His intimations of the concert between Spain and Great Britain must have been received earlier, perhaps from Smith. The treaty of alliance between Spain and Great Britain (May 25) made the mission of Carmichael and Short more futile than ever, for at this point or earlier Spanish fears for Louisiana temporarily disappeared. On June 23, 1793, TJ wrote Madison that Spain was trying to pick a quarrel with the U. S. (Ford, VI, 316).

^Trance declared war on Great Britain and Holland on Feb. i, 1793; and against Spain on Murcii 7.

PEACEFUL INTENTIONS IN A WORLD OF WAR 65

would inevitably arise from conflicts on the seas where its commerce plied. The nation was allied by treaty with one of the contending powers, France, whose forces were now arrayed against the field. In the light of history, the conflict may be viewed as one between nations, for their respective advantages. It may also be described in terms of revolution and counter-revolution, for the countries opposing the French were trying to extinguish what threatened to become an all-consuming fire. Alexander Hamilton perceived this clearly from the start. Writing Washington, he said: "The present war, then, turns essentially on the point — What shall be the future government of France? Shall the royal authority be restored in the person of the successor to Louis, or shall a republic be constituted in exclusion of it?" ^^ There could be no question where Hamilton stood in this conflict between legitimacy and revolution, between ancient authority and emerging democracy, and there can be no doubt where Jefferson stood. The irrepressible conflict between the two men and their philosophies was now being waged on a larger front.

While neither man could remain a mere spectator or a philosopher in a tower, it would be unjust to describe one of them as pro-French and the other as pro-British. That was the language of political partisanship in that day and it has found its way into many works of history, but fairness to both of these eminent Americans requires that such terms should not be loosely used.^^ Of the two, Hamilton had been much more indiscreet in his relations with British representatives, especially George Hammond, who was still in the United States, than Jefferson had been in his dealings with Ternant, the French minister. Judging from the past, therefore, Hamilton might have been expected to be less mindful of the proprieties and more reckless in his approach to the problems of the hour. In spirit he was far more the military man and less the civilian than his great rival, and there were grave dangers in the bellicosity of his nature, as Jefferson realized and John Adams afterwards found out. But his national patriotism was unquestionable, and the success of his financial policies was contingent on the maintenance of peace.

In public, though not always in private, Jefferson was much more controlled, and, as he told John Adams at a time when a rupture with Great Britain seemed much more imminent, he had been through one war and did not want to face another.^^ More clearly than Hamilton

31 April, 1793 (J.C.H., IV, 365).

32 This matter is well stated by C. M. Thomas, American Neutrality in 77^5 (1931), pp. 14-15. I have benefited greatly from reading this study.

he perceived that the victors are punished in war, as well as the vanquished; and certain efforts of his in later years to attain national ends by nonmilitary means led him to be described as a pacifist, though he certainly was not that. He was fully aware of the need of his growing country for peace, and he had said already that the only real gainers from war were the neutrals. Ever since his own stay in Europe he had believed that the United States stood to gain from the distress and vicissitudes of the nations of the Old World. There was astute calculation in his public policy, and history was destined to substantiate his major hopes.^* But for the troubles in the Old World, the United States would hardly have picked up Louisiana and the Floridas so easily in later years. With respect to the interests of his own country, particularly its territorial interests, he was positively avaricious and at times sounded ruthless; but he relied on diplomatic methods and the assistance of external events even when, upon occasion, he rattled the saber or talked extravagantly behind the scenes. His benevolence toward the French cause at this stage may be assumed wholly apart from ideology, for he had long ago concluded — as indeed John Adams had — that France was the natural friend of the United States. This was true of the old monarchy and it seemed reasonable to suppose that it would be even truer of the new republic. Thus, unquestionably, he hoped for French victory. But he now believed that the United States could serve the French better as a neutral than as a belligerent. American armed might was small, but provisions were plentiful.

He regarded Great Britain as a natural competitor and rival and w as deeply suspicious of a government which, in his American opinion, had deliberately violated the treaty of peace and had certainly ignored the elaborate representations he had made to George Hammond.•''■■' That minister had gained his impressions of the Secretary of State's position from Hamilton as well as from his own rather humbling experiences. Writing home to his government, he had expressed the opinion that the United States would not go to war with Great Britain, but was dubious about Jefferson, believing the latter to be "so blinded by his attachment to France, and his hatred of Great Britain . . . that he would without hesitation commit the immediate interests of his country in any measure which might equally gratify his predilections and his resentments." ^'^ There can be no possible doubt that Jefferson

3< This point about TJ is strongly emphasized by S. F. Bemis in his writings. 35 See Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 417-420.

3* Hammond to Grenvillc, Mar. 7, 1793, quoted from British State Papers b) Thomas, p. 22W. This was before he had learned of the declaration of war.

Courtesy of the Museum of the City of New York

Colossus in Marble

Bust of Haviilton by Giuseppe Ceracchi

Courtesy of Indc-pcndence National Historical Park: Photograph by Peter A. Jiiley 6- Son

Jefffrsov \\fiiff Secretary of State

This porrniir by Charles Willson Peale, painted late in 1791, sii(n\ s his hi<4h color, hazel eves, and reddish hair

PEACEFUL INTENTIONS IN A WORLD OF WAR 67

resented the treatment that he and his country had received at tlie hands of the British government, but the zealous young minister's misinterpretation of him followed the Hamilton party line precisely and this fact could not have been wholly coincidental.

The President had first-hand knowledge of his Secretary of State. George Washington could hardly have been surprised, therefore, when Jefferson, in a letter announcing the extension of the European war, said that it was necessary "to take every justifiable measure for preserving our neutrality." About the same time Hamilton referred to "a continuance of the peace, the desire of which may be said to be both universal and ardent." ^" But peace and neutrality arc very general terms, and witliin the broad area of agreement there was abundant ground for disagreement regarding specific actions. If the patient President, who vie\\'cd this conflict with fewer predilections than either of his chief advisers, did not realize this already, he found it out soon after he got back to Philadelphia.

37TJ to Washington, Apr. 7, 1793 (Ford, VI, 212); Hamilton to Washington, Apr. 8, 1793 (J.C.H., IV, 357).

Cv3

Fair Neutrality in Theory and Practice

IF GEORGE WASHINGTON had any hopes of relaxing in the spring sunshine at Mount Vernon in early April, 1793, these were soon banished by the news from Europe. This was relayed by Hamilton as well as Jefferson; indeed, the ubiquitous Secretary of the Treasury wrote of the extension of the war a little sooner than his more prudent colleague.^ Nobody had been caught napping, however, and the President, after replying to his two chief assistants in similar language on one day, set out for the seat of government on the next.- In both letters he used the expression "strict neutrality," and he referred to reports that American vessels were already being prepared as privateers. There lay the immediate danger of unneutral actions. Washington wanted his advisers to give thought to any measures which should be taken.

Back in Philadelphia within a week, he promptly submitted to the Heads of Department and the Attorney General a set of questions, thirteen in number, asking them to be prepared to discuss these at a meeting at his house the first thing next day. The questions were in the President's handwriting, but Jefferson and Randolph believed they were largely drawn by Hamilton, as they almost certainly were.^ Because of patriotic or partisan zeal or both, the officious Secretary of the Treasury had seized the initiative in matters which directly

1 Hamilton to Washington, Apr. 5, 8, 1793 (J.C.H., IV, 355-356); TJ to Washington, Apr. 7, 1793 (Ford, VI, 212).

2 Both letters dated Apr. 12, 1793 (Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 415-416). In J.C.H., IV, 357, the letter to TJ is incorrectly designated as the one to Hamilton.

3 Washington got back Apr. 17 and submitted the questions Apr. 18, 1793 (Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 419-421). See TJ's memo, dated Apr. 18 and written May 6 (Ford, I, 226-227). Thomas (pp. 28-30) thinks that Hamilton was responsible for at least 12 of the 13. He had already consulted John Jay and received from him a draft of a proclamation; Jay to Hamilton, Apr. 11, 1793 (J.C.H., V, 552-553, and draft in HP, i ser., 19:2877).

FAIR NEUTRALITY IN T H F, O R Y AND PRACTICE 69

and more immediately concerned the Secretary of State. Also, he had caused some questions to be asked which, in Jefferson's opinion, should not have been raised at all.

Only two of the questions were answered at the first meeting at the President's house. It was unanimously agreed that a proclamation should be issued and that a minister from the French Republic should be received. The latter decision related to the newly appointed minister, Edmond Charles Genet, then en route, whom Washington, before he went away, had already decided to receive. Randolph and Hamilton had concurred in the decision, though the latter did so reluctantly.'* Hamilton's present argument was that the outbreak of war had introduced a new element, but this consummate and inveterate politician may have thrown the question into the hopper merely for bargaining purposes. He now yielded to the judgment of the others, as Jefferson did in the matter of the proclamation, and the surprising thing is that either man should have demurred at all.

Since Jefferson had already made it abundantly clear to Washington and others that he favored a policy of neutrality, his doubts related wholly to the desirability of a proclamatio?i and to its form and timing. His first objection was on the constitutional ground that a declaration of no war was as much beyond the competence of the executive as a declaration of war, which was clearly the prerogative of the legislative branch. In the light of Washington's later statement that "he never had an idea that he could bind Congress" ^ this sounds a good deal like legalistic quibbling. Jefferson soon agreed with his colleagues that the President should not summon Congress and thereby create alarm, but he suspected that Hamilton wanted to bind the future conduct of the country by executive act, pressing executive powers to their limit according to his custom.*'

What he himself really wanted was a declaration that the country was in a state of peace, in which it was the duty of the citizens neither to aid nor injure any of the belligerents. This state of peace would properly be preserved by the Executive until the constitutional authorities (Congress) should determine otherwise. He said afterwards: "The declaration [by the President] of the disposition of the United States can hardly be called illegal, though it was certainly officious and

^ TJ's memo, of Mar. 30, 1793, referring to earlier conversations (Ford, I, 224). Washington said he never had any doubts on the subject. He recommended that Genet should be received "not with too much warmth or cordiality," but TJ believed that this was a "small sacrifice" to the opinion of Hamilton.

^ TJ's memo, of Nov. 18, 1795 (Ford, I, 266-267).

^ His fears were largely borne out by Hamilton's Pacificus papers in the summer (Lodge. IV, 135-191); see below, pp. iio-ui.

yO JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY

improper." "^ He also said: "The instrument was badly drawn, and made the P. go out of his line to declare things which, though true, it was not exactly his province to declare." ^ His objections were met at the time, supposedly, by the omission of the word "neutrality" from the document. He soon noted, however, that the word was widely used anyway; and it has seemed to many writers since his time that he was making a distinction where there was little or no real difference. The pressure of circumstances would not allow, it seemed, for this degree of constitutional purism.

His second line of objection was that a proclamation would be premature, since the warring nations, and especially the British, would be willing to buy American neutrality by the sort of concessions he had long been vainly seeking. He did not like to surrender his bargaining power, and he clung to the beUef that he could have gained something. Some \\ eeks later he wrote Madison: "I now think it extremely possible that Hammond might have been instructed to have asked it [neutrahty], and to offer the broadest neutral privileges, as the price, which was exactly the price I wanted that we should contend for." Judging from Hammond's instructions, which we can read though Jefferson could not, such was not the case. No concessions of any sort were suggested in these, and the envoy was told to support the American friends of Great Britain, the chief of whom was unquestionably Hamilton.^ Jefferson left no possible doubt of his own opinion of his colleagues's attitude. Before long he wrote James Monroe: "Hamilton is panic-struck if we refuse our breach to every kick which Great Britain may choose to give it. He is for proclaiming at once the most abject principles, such as would invite and merit habitual insults." '°

Jefferson's initial wariness about the Proclamation cannot be separated from his inveterate and by no means unwarranted suspicions of the Secretary of the Treasury, and very likely there was in it an element of pique. But he fully recognized the necessity of warning American citizens against actions that were dangerous to them and to their country. For example, they must be told that they were not free to take sides with either belligerent and "enrich themselves by depredations on the commerce of the other." ^^ He believed that, while the

7 To iMadison, July 29, 1793 (Ford, VI, 328).

^TJ to Madison, Aug. 11, 1793 (Ford, VI, 369). See also TJ to Monroe, July 14, 1793 (Ford, VI, 346).

">* TJ to Madison, June 29, 1793 (Ford, VI, 328); Grenville to Hammond, Feb. 8 and Mar. 12, 1793 (/./i./V/., pp. 35, 37).

'*' TJ to iVlonroe, May 5, 1793 (Ford, VI, 238-239).

FAIR NEUTRALITY IN T H li O R Y AND PRACTICE 7 I

lure of easy profits was great, the desire for peace was practically universal. The day after the meeting at which he agreed to the issuance of a proclamation and two days before its signing, on April 22, he wrote to Gouv^erneur Morris in France:

. . . No country perhaps was ever so thoroughly against war as ours. These dispositions pervade every description of its citizens, whether in or out of Office. They cannot perhaps suppress their affections, nor their wishes. But they will suppress the effects of them so as to preserve a fair neutrality.^^

He himself did not hesitate to use the word "neutrality," for, indeed, there was no other so good to use. But he left no doubt of liis own affections for France and his wishes with regard to the outcome of this conflict. In his opinion, the enemies of that country were "conspirators against human liberty."

The drafting of the proclamation was left to Edmund Randolph, with Jefferson's obvious consent. The instrument was communicated to him after it was drawn, but he said later that all he did was run his eye over it to see that it was not a "declaration of neutrality." " He was then engaged in drawing an elaborate opinion on the French treaties, in opposition to Hamilton, which he probably regarded as a more important piece of business at the moment. It has been alleged that he avoided direct responsibility for the proclamation in order that he might be free to criticize it afterwards.^"* He did speak slightingly of it in his intimate political circle, though apparently nowhere else. Within a week, when writing Madison, he referred to the "cold caution" of the government and he later spoke to this friend of the "milk and water views" of the proclamation, even terming it pusillanimous.^^

In view of the fact that he, more than any other official, was charged with the enforcement of the policy of neutrality and that he was assiduous in his efforts throughout the rest of his term of office, this criticism seems to involve a contradiction. Here we have again a contrast between his public conduct and his private opinion. During the next few weeks this seems to have increased rather than diminished — as he learned more about the sentiment of the people and the views of his closest political friends, as he became increasingly im-

12 Apr. 20, 1793 (Ford, VI, 217).

13 TJ ro Madison, Aug. 11, 1793 (Ford, VI, 369). ^■* Thomas, p. 457?.

15 To Madison, Apr. :8, May 19, June 29, 1793 (Ford, VI, 232, 259, 328).

patient with Edmund Randolph and suspicious of Hamilton as an Anglophile. He regarded the policy as inevitable but regretted this damper on American enthusiasm for the cause of France. Very early he wrote iMadison: "I fear that a fair neutrality will prove a disagreeable pill to our friends, though necessary to keep out of the calamities of a war." ^^

To his political intimates it did seem that a bitter pill w^as being administered. "Peace is no doubt to be preserved at any price that honor and good faith will permit," wrote Madison from Orange, but he feared "a secret Anglomany" behind the mask of neutrality.^'' A little later Madison spoke much more strongly:

... I regret extremely the position into which the P. has been thrown. The unpopular cause of Anglomany is openly laying claim to him. His enemies masking themselves under the popular cause of France are playing off the most tremendous batteries on him. The proclamation was in truth a most unfortunate error. It wounds the national honor, by seeming to disregard the stipulated duties to France. It wounds the popular feelings by a seeming indifference to the cause of liberty. And it seems to violate the forms & spirit of the Constitution, by making the executive Magistrate the organ of the disposition, the duty and the interest of the Nation in relation to War & peace, subjects appropriated to other departments of the Government. It is mortifying to the real friends of the P. that his fame & his influence should have been unnecessarily made to depend in any degree on political events in a foreign quarter of the Globe; and particularly so that he should have anything to apprehend from the success of liberty in another country, since he owes his pre-eminence to the success of it in his own. If France triumphs, the ill-fated proclamation will be a millstone, which would sink any other character, and will force a struggle even on his.^^

In comparison with such words as these, Jefferson's early private comments to Madison and Monroe seem mild. It would almost appear that he was justifying his own official conduct to them against the charge of being a traitor to their political cause and the cause of liberty. Also, the popular support of the French even surpassed his expectations. About six weeks after the issuing of the proclamation he wrote Monroe: "The war between France & England seems to be producing an effect not contemplated. All the old spirit of 1776 is re-

i«Apr. 28, 1793 (Ford, VI, 232).

^■^ May 8 and 27, 1793 (Hunt, V\, 128, 130).

18Madison to TJ, June 10, 1793 (Hunt, VI, i27-i28«.).

kindling." '^ Though rejoicing in this revival of the spirit of liberty, he added: "I wish we may be able to repress the spirits of the people within the limits of a fair neutrality." He took no stock in the criticisms of George Washington. In his opinion, Hamilton, whom Knox supported, was for proclaiming "the most abject principles," Randolph was appallingly indecisive, and, in the councils of the government, every inch of ground had to be fought over desperately to maintain even a "sneaking neutrality." If this should be preserved, the country would be indebted to the President, not his counselors. He wrote Madison in May: "If anything prevents its being a mere English neutrality^ it will be that the penchant of the P. is not that way, and above all, the ardent spirit of our constituents." ^^

There is no indication that he himself did anything to inflame the public mind in this time of reckless and irresponsible journalism, but up to a point he could and did rejoice at expressions of popular opinion which would deter the government from veering to the English side. Also, he observed to Madison that the alignment was much the same as on domestic issues. On the one side were (i) the fashionable circles of Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Charleston, (2) merchants trading on British capital, and (3) "paper men." All the old Tories, he believed, were included in one of these three groups. On the other side were: (i) merchants trading on their own capital, (2) Irish merchants, (3) tradesmen, mechanics, farmers, and all other descriptions of citizens. These people believed, as he did, that the French were fighting the battle of democracy, whether or not they used that term, and many of them were more passionate partisans than his official responsibilities permitted him to be.

Following the unanimous and virtually inescapable decision on April 19 to issue a proclamation and to receive the new French minister, the executive council met again at the President's house next day to discuss the remaining questions he had submitted.-^ Practically all of these related directly or indirectly to the existing treaties with France, and American obligations under them.-^ The most disturbing obligation, in this time of general war, was the guarantee of French possessions in America, that is, in the West Indies. This guarantee was included in the treaty of alliance that was signed in 1778, when the United States

i» May 5, 1793 (Ford, VI, 238).

20 May 12, 1793 (Ford, VI, 251).

21 TJ's memo, in Ford, I, 226-227.

22 The question of summoning Congress, which was decided adversely by unanimous vote, was an exception. Also, there was a hypothetical question about the reception of the "future regent" of France.

had needed an ally so badly. Some also anticipated difficulty from the provision in the treaty of commerce of the same year whereby the United States agreed to admit to its ports French warships and privateers with their prizes, while denying this privilege to the enemies of France. All of these responsible leaders wanted to avoid any embarrassment to their country which the promises in the treaties might entail. There was a sharp difference of opinion, however, as to the degree and immediacy of danger and as to the policy which should now be pursued.

At the first meeting at Washington's house Jefferson gained the impression that Hamilton regarded the treaties with France as void, and at that time he made notes of his colleague's arguments.^^ He also noted that Knox supported Hamilton's position, "acknowledging at the same time, like a fool that he is, that he knew nothing about it." ^^ He himself had no doubt whatever that the treaties were still valid, and he was supported by Edmund Randolph. At this juncture, however, Hamilton produced a quotation from an authority on the law of nations, Vattel, which seemed pertinent and which could not be countered at the moment since no copy of the latter's treatise was accessible. This led Randolph to agree to look into the matter further. The Attorney General announced that he would give a written opinion, whereupon Jefferson concluded that he would put his own ideas into written form. No opinion was ever offered by Knox, but Hamilton made up for this by writing two, with characteristic loquacity. Thus the private debate between the major antagonists was continued and concluded in writing. Neither Secretary appears to have seen what his colleague wrote. As in the case of the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, the audience before which the two men debated consisted of George Washington and posterity, but Jefferson had much the better of it on this occasion.

In his written argument Hamilton did not go so far as to claim that the treaties were void, but spoke rather to the effect that they should be regarded as "temporarily and provisionally suspended." ^^ He had backed down a little — perhaps as a result of the discussion in the executive council, perhaps on the advice of his friends. He had discussed matters with Chief Justice John Jay and Senator Rufus King. The latter wrote him: "The change which has happened will not, perhaps, justify us in saying 'the treaties are void' — and whether we may

-^ Thomas, p. 60, cites LC, 14560, saying that TJ on the back of this slip of paper jotted down the principles he himself would use in replying to him.

--»Ford, I, 227.

2i»J.C.H., IV, 363. His two opinions, dated April 1793 and May 2, 1793, are in that edn., IV, 362-390.

contend in favor of their suspension is a point of delicacy, and not quite free from doubt." ^^ In these international matters Jefferson exercised a moderating influence on leading Republicans, while Hamilton's closest political friends were trying to moderate him.

In his opinions to Washington, Hamilton also made considerable concession both in regard to the right of a nation to change its own form of government and in regard to the binding effect of treaties regardless of ciiange.-" He argued, however, that no nation had the right to involve an ally absolutely and unconditionally in the effects of the changes it might make, holding that for "good and sufficient cause" that ally might renounce a treaty. The only real disagreement between him and Jefferson on this point lay in the meaning of "good and sufficient cause." He quoted Vattel as saying that an ally remained the ally of the state after the deposition of a king, but that, nevertheless, the alliance might be renounced when the change rendered it ''^useless, dcmgcroiis, or disagreeable.^^ -^ From this Hamilton argued that there must also be the right to suspend the operations of a treaty in the midst of a revolution, \\'hile waiting to see what the results would be. It seemed to him that the admission that the treaties were still in operation was equivalent to taking the part of France. He M'anted to be able to say to foreign powers: "In receiving the minister of France, we have not acknowledged ourselves its ally. We have reserved the point for future consideration." -^ Without delay he wanted to suspend the dangerous alliance. Also, he wanted to avoid the possible charge of support of the revolutionary group against the monarchy, with which the treaties had originally been made and which might be restored. Without avowing his own sympathy with the counter-revolutionaries he left no real doubt of it. He admitted that the United States was bound to pay the debt to France but saw no need to risk the resentment of other nations by recognizing any other obligations. The dangers of French resentment apparently did not at all disturb him.

He unequivocally took the position that this was an offensive war on the part of France. It was coupled, he said, "with a general invitation and encouragement to revolution and insurrection, under a promise of fraternity and assistance.'''' ^^^ Thus it had ceased to be a war for the defense of French rights and liberties and had become one of

26 Apr. 24, 1793 (J.C.H., V, 553). Edward Carrington wrote him moderately on Apr. 26 (ibid.,V,s56). 27J.C.H., IV, 365-367.

28/^i^., IV, 371.

29 Ibid., IV, 380.

30 Ibid., IV, 386.

acquisition. Since the treaty of alliance with the United States was defensive, he concluded that the guarantee in it could not apply, even though the West Indian Islands were attacked.

This argument was in Hamilton's second paper, and does not appear to have entered into the oral opinion which Jefferson was answering. If it did not reflect representations which the British minister could easily have made to Hamilton by this time, it definitely followed the British line.^^ From the beginning Jefferson had presumed that the first declaration of war was on the part of France, but he also stated that previous British actions — such as their asking the French minister to retire — could be regarded as clear evidence of their intention to go to war. He did not believe that the guarantee would be asked of the United States anyway, and in this respect at least the British agreed with him.^^ So also did the French, as we now know, though their reasoning was quite different.^^

By and large, Hamilton's two written opinions deserve the judgment that Jefferson passed on his colleague's oral one. The reasoning is ingenious, though not convincing. His own closely argued, M^ell-organized paper gains by comparison with this rather confusing prolixity.^* Since Washington told Jefferson that he had never doubted the validity of the treaties, the Secretary of State would not have needed to write at such length, and perhaps would not have needed to write at all, if the Secretary of the Treasury had not raised so many questions. In the "Opinion" that Jefferson gave the President he dealt convincingly with all of them that had not been answered already. More elevated in spirit than his powerful reply to Hammond, this reply to Flamilton is, altogether, one of the ablest of his papers. Because of Washington's acceptance of it, it became to all practical purposes the official statement of the American position.

Jefferson laid down certain basic "principles": that nations have the right to change their government as they like; that the people constitute the nation; that the treaties were not made between the United States and Louis Capet but between the two nations. Therefore, since the two nations remained in existence, though both of them had since changed their form of government, the treaties were still in effect. He recognized that the non-performance of contracts on the part of men

31 He took the same line later in his Pacificus papers.

32 TJ to Madison, Apr. 7, 1793 (Ford, VI, 212-213); Grenville to Hammond, Feb. 8, 1793 (I.B.M., p. 35). The British opinion was based on the ground that this was an "oflfensive" war.

33 Thomas, p. 63W., discusses this in the light of Genet's instructions.

34 April 28, 1793, with covering letter to Washington (Ford, VI, 218-231). See also TJ's memo, of that date (Ford, I, 227).

is sometimes excusable by circumstances — such as the impossibility or sclf-dcstructiveness of performance. Annulment is permissible under certain degrees of danger, "yet the danger must be imminent and the decree great." Thus the main difference between him and Hamilton appeared. He approached this problem in no absolutist frame of mind, but he inquired specifically what dangers might be apprehended from the French treaties, considering these one by one — on grounds of likelihood, not mere possibility. "If possibilities would avoid contracts," he said, "there never could be a valid contract. For possibilities hang over everything." ^^ Some of Hamilton's fears were reducible to irrationality, if not to absurdity. Could it be that there was danger that the French government would issue in military despotism, and that the United States as an ally would thus be tainted with despotism? If so, the country would be back where it started, since the French government was a perfect despotism at the time the alliance was actually made. Could the peril be that it would issue in a republic and thus strengthen American republican principles? The great mass of the people hoped it would do just that. Or was it that the changes might "end in something we know not what and bring on us danger we known not whence?"

More importantly, he considered possible dangers under the specific promises in the treaties. Those relating to the admission of warships, privateers, and prizes of the French, while denying this privilege to their enemies, did not disturb him, for there were similar provisions in other treaties, including the last one between England and France. No one could object on this ground, he said, and events afterwards proved that the British did not. Then there was the prohibition to the enemies of France from fitting out privateers in American ports. "But," he said, "we are free to refuse the same thing to France, there being no stipulation to the contrary, and we ought to refuse it on principles of fair neutrality." ^^ The danger here, as he soon found out, lay in French misinterpretation of the treaty; but he expressed at this early stage the policy by which the administration was to be guided.

The only danger with any semblance of reality, in his opinion, was connected with the guarantee of the French West Indies. He asked a dozen questions about it, thus giving a dozen reasons for believing that the country would never be called on to make it good. Obviously doubting that the United States could do anything effective it if were called on, he shrewdly suspected what was actually the fact, namely, that the French themselves had the same idea.

35Ford, VI, 222. aePord, VI, 223.

As for the reception of the French minister, which Hamilton wanted to couple with reservations, he regarded this as a recognition of the legitimacy of his government and nothing more. He believed that it had nothing to do with the treaties, being based only on the common usage of nations. Hamilton was making far too much of it. Furthermore, repudiation of the treaties would require positive action, while letting them go on required none, and such inaction could hardly be regarded as an infraction of neutrality. Nothing could deprive the United States of the right of noncompliance with the treaties when compliance would involve the country in "great and inevitable danger," but, as he believed, the present dangers existed chiefly in Hamilton's imagination. Or, to put it a little better, they arose from the conditions of war, not from the stipulations of the treaties. The renunciation of the treaties, as he rightly saw, would have been a real breach of neutrality, "by giving just cause of war to France."

This is probably the most devastating opinion that Jefferson ever directed against the arguments of his colleague. The most learned and by no means the least devastating part of it consisted of an examination of the quotation which Hamilton had extracted from Vattel, saying that an alliance may be renounced if a change in the form of government of one party made it "useless, dangerous, or disagreeable" to the other. Marshaling quotations from three other authorities (Grotius, Puffendorf, and Wolf), he set them impressively in parallel columns, and overwhelmed Vattel by sheer weight of numbers. Jefferson saw no reason for specifying "danger," recognizing that that exception existed in all cases, but he was outraged by the terms "useless" and "disagreeable," regarding this single quotation as distinctly unfair to Vattel himself. Among other quotations he produced from that writer was this: "No more security, no more commerce among men, if they think themselves not obliged to preserve faith, to keep their word. ... he who does not observe a treaty is assuredly perfidious, since he violates his faith." ^'^ In view of the self-righteousness with which the Hamiltonians talked about money "contracts" of a much less formal nature, this was a fitting rebuke; and Jefferson was warranted in his indignation that "this scrap should have been culled, and made the hook whereon to hang such a chain of immoral consequences." ^^ iMadison was equally indignant, saying in a private letter: "The attempt to shuffle off the treaty altogether by quibbling on Vattel is equally contemptible for the meanness and folly of it. If

37Ford, VI, 229. 38 Ford, VI, 230.

a change of government is an absolution from public engagements, why not from those of a domestic as well as of a foreign nature; and what then becomes of public debts &C&C." ^^

It was lucky for Hamilton that this controversy occurred wholly in private. Jefferson quoted, apparently from his notes, a reckless remark of his colleague's that the United States would not have allied itself with France under the latter's present form of government. Jefferson then asked: "Who is the American who can say with truth that he would not have allied himself to France if she had been a republic? or that a republic of any form would have been as disagreecthle as her ancient despotism?" ■*" If these papers had been used as a campaign document, instead of reposing in Washington's files, Hamilton could easily have been accused of being un-American on the strength of them. A more important observation can be made on this exchange of arguments, however: Jefferson demonstrated that, in these circumstances, the path of true neutrality was not only the way of honor but also that of common sense.

11

Even more important than the Proclamation of Neutrality was the application and enforcement of the policy it embodied. While this task was shared by all the executive officers, it belonged primarily to the Secretary of State. The chief difficulties of that official came, not from the British of whom he was so suspicious, but from the irrepressible new minister of France, who was properly received without qualifications, as he had insisted. It was to Genet that he expressed the "twin principles" of neutrality: "that it is the right of every nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exercised by any other within its limits; and the duty of a neutral nation to prohibit such as would injure one of the warring powers." ^^ By emphasizing duties no less than rights he set the policy of the young American Republic on an unusually high plane.

It was the particular task of Jefferson to put into practice these twin principles which he pronounced. About the time he retired from office, the British attested to the success of the policy as it related to them. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs wrote in January, 1794: "With respect to the conduct of the present Government of America

39 Madison to TJ, May 8, 1793 (Hunt, VI, 128).

40 Ford, \a 231.

41 TJ to Genet, June 5, 1793 (Ford, VI, 283); well discussed by Hiomas, pp. 92-93.

His Majesty's Ministers think that there appears to have prevailed in its general tenor a desire for the maintenance of a fair neutrality and even a disposition friendly towards this country." ^~ Jefferson himself made no pretense of friendliness towards His Majesty's Ministers, but he cannot be justly denied major credit for the sincere and successful attempt of his government to be fair. A quarter of a century later, in the House of Commons, George Canning paid tribute to this policy. "If I wished for a guide in a system of neutrality," he said, "I should take that laid down by America in the days of the presidency of Washington and the secretaryship of Jefferson, in 1793." '*^ The tribute to both men was deserved, but it is doubtful if any Britisher could have realized the agonies this Secretary suffered at a time when his emotions were in conflict with his reason and hardly anybody was in position to understand his difficulties.

His situation as the chief administrator of neutrality was precarious enough; but actually his position was never as anomalous as it appeared on the surface, and by painful effort he eventually resolved most of its seeming contradictions. He remained a devoted friend of the French cause, but his mind told him from the first that belligerency would be disastrous to the United States without being of any real benefit to France. The party line of the Hamiltonians was that just as they were the only true supporters of the Constitution and George Washington, so also they were the only genuine upholders of neutrality. Jefferson's conduct as a responsible minister, as shown in official records and his own public papers, comprises a sufficient rejoinder; but at the time there was much confusion about what neutrality really meant in practice. Referring to the numerous problems which had arisen, he said in midsummer: "These questions depend for their solution on the construction of our treaties, on the laws of nature and nations, and on the laws of the land." ** His persistent effort to be fair to all the interested parties in this unending process of construction is written into the record, but he could not slough off his predilections readily and he gave vent to his personal feelings in private letters. Less than a week after the Proclamation, he wrote to his friend Madison: "Cases are now arising which will embarrass us a little till the line of neutrality be firmly understood by ourselves and the belligerent parties," "^^ This was true enough, whether the pre-

42 Grenville to Hammond, Jan. 1794 (I.B.M., p. 44).

■*3 Apr. 16, 1823 (quoted by Thomas, p. 137?.).

4'* To the Chief Justice, July 18, 1793 (Ford, VI, 351). This he said in connection with the request, which the Supreme Court denied, that particular questions be referred to that tribunal; see below, pp. 118-119.

45 April 28, 1793 (Ford, VI, 232).

diction npplicd to the government or to his poHtical friends; and even before the most disturbing actor, the new French minister, arrived on the scene in Philadelphia in mid-May, it proved to be an understatement as applied to Jefferson personally. He faced a real psychological problem as vv^ell as a vexatious administrative task from the very first.

The warship that bore Citizen Genet to America, the famous frigate E?nbuscade, came into the harbor at Philadelphia while the new and still unaccredited minister remained for purposes of his own in Charleston, where he had landed. The Emhuscade brought with her a prize, as presumably she was entitled to do under the terms of the treaty, and it did not immediately come to light that the frigate had taken the British merchant ship Grmige in Delaware Bay, that is, in American waters. Jefferson could not restrain his private delight at this French triumph and its electrifying effects on American opinion. He wrote his nephew Jack Eppes that thousands collected on the beaches when the prize came up, "and when they saw the British colors reversed and the French flag flying above them they rent the air with peals of exultation." Describing the scene to his son-in-law, he said that it was the '"''yeovminy of the city (not the fashionable part nor paper men)" who had showed this "prodigious joy," ^^ Toward the end of the summer, when reviewing the course of events, he said that on the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain citizens of the United States were not in the first instant aware of the new duties resulting from their own new and unexperienced situation, and of the "restraints it would impose even on their dispositions toward the belligerent powers." ^'^ It appears that he himself was not fully sensible of new duties at the outset and put no such rein on his own dispositions as he did later.

When he said that the war was rekindling "the old spirit of 1776" he certainly meant the revival of enthusiasm for liberty — an abstraction which he always tended to personify and which he virtually invested with the attributes of divinity. In concrete terms he meant the revival of anti-British feeling, which seemed to him inevitable under the particular circumstances. Therefore, he rejoiced in the "furious Philippics" against England while hoping, at the same time, that the spirits of the people could be kept "within the limits of a fair neutrality." In view of the fact that he hewed to the line of fair neutrality in his official conduct with such success that ultimately the British acknowledged it, and that in his relations with the leaders of his own political

4«TJ to J. W. Eppes, May 12, 1793 (MHS); to TMR, May 6, 1793 (Ford, VI, 241).

'*'^ To Couvcrncur Morris, Aup. k'), 1793 (Ford, VI, ^76).

group he exercised a moderating influence, he cannot be justly charged with hypocrisy. But no reader of liis private correspondence can doubt that the problem of attaining and maintaining poise and balance in his own mind was difficult in the extreme.

About this time he despatched to France a letter which was ostensibly unneutral. In form it was a private letter of introduction, but it was addressed to Brissot de Warville, whom he supposed to be still a leader in the National Convention.'^^ "We too have our aristocrats and monocrats," he said, "and as they float on the surface, they shew much, though they weigh little." For a more explicit description of characters, objects, and parties, he referred Brissot to the bearer of the letter. He told the latter it was important that these be well understood among the French, especially by their government. "Particular circumstances have generated suspicions among them that we are swerving from our republicanism," he said.^^ He was glad of the opportunity to remove these suspicions and of a safe occasion to put himself personally on record. He informed Brissot: "I continue eternally attached to the principles of your revolution. I hope it will end in the establishment of some firm government, friendly to liberty, & capable of maintaining it. If it does, the world will become inevitably free."

He wrote from deep conviction, and at the moment he was probably thinking more about the clash of ideas than of the struggle for power between nations, but he addressed to a supposed leader in a belligerent country a sympathetic letter. It was also an exceedingly ironical and a wholly futile one. Brissot and the Girondists associated with him were on the point of falling, and before this message could have reached him he was in prison, where he languished until his execution in the autumn. Jefferson could not have been expected to foresee the full course of events, and he was at a disadvantage because of the time-lag, but it now appears that he directed his friendly gesture to a most inappropriate person.^^ Brissot was the leading advocate of war in 1792, and in 1793 he presented the motion extending it to Great Britain and Holland.^^ At the bar of history he bears a terrible responsibility.

To Brissot this was "a war of the human race against its oppressors

48 May 8, 1793 (Ford, VI, 248-249).

4!* To Dr. Enoch Edwards, May 8, 1793 (Ford, VI, 24G).

so While in France, he had been consulted by Brissot about the book this journalist was writing with foienne Claviere, De la France et des fyats-Unis (1787), and no doul)t he remembered him as being notably pro-American (TJ to Brissot, August 16, 1786 (J.P., X, 261-264)). How much he knew of Brissot's career in the Legislative Assembly and the National Convention is difficult to determine.

51 Eloise Ellery, Brissot de Warville (191 5), p. 324.

FAIR NEUTRALITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 83

. . . the most just, the most glorious war that had ever been known." ^-Gouverneur Morris, like Hamilton, took quite a different view of it. He reported to Jefferson in due course that one of the reasons for the declaration of the French was their hope to excite an insurrection in Austrian Flanders, and that their subsequent acquisitions of territory cast grave doubts on the sincerity of their protestations against con-quest.^^ But Jefferson continued to view their actions as basically defensive, even when offensive in form, and the war had undoubtedly strengthened in his own mind the conviction that the democratic struggle was international. Also, he now realized that it had crystallized American parties. He wrote Monroe a few weeks later: "The ivar has kindled and brought forward the two parties with an ardour which our own interests merely coidd never excited ^* This created a real problem for one who shared the ardor but who, as a responsible official, could not publicly display it.

His official actions had to be taken on other grounds. The capture of the Grange occasioned protests from the British as well as exultation among the yeomanry of Philadelphia and private rejoicing on the part of the Secretary of State. Hammond, who had not yet transmitted a reply to the complaints Jefferson had submitted to him a year ago, showed the utmost promptness in presenting his own. He got speedy action on them. If this had happened in American waters the United States would not put up with it, Jefferson said; and the official opinion which Edmund Randolph gave him settled the matter. The Secretary asked Ternant, who was still the accredited French minister, to restore the ship and her cargo and release the prisoners. Hammond also wanted compensation for the detention of the vessel, but Jefferson was warranted in regarding this ruling as proof of the justice and impartiality of the United States to all parties. When Genet finally arrived, he acceded to it, though he afterwards seemed to think it more to his credit than Jefferson did.^^

Hammond also objected to the action of the French consul in Charleston in condemning a captured British vessel. Jefferson agreed that this action was a legal nullity, since such a matter should have been handled by an American tribunal, and he described it as disrespect-

52 Ibid., p. 257, citing Fatriote Frangais, April 21, 1792.

53 Morris to TJ, June 10, 1792 (A.S.P.F.R., I, 329), and Dec. 21, 1792 (ibid., 347). The latter letter, speaking of the "adoption" of Savoy as a department, was not received until Apr. 22, 1793.

54 June 4, 1793 (Ford, VI, 282), italics inserted.

55 TJ to Hammond, May 3, 1793, and to Ternant that day (Ford, VI, 236-237); TJ to Hammond, May 15, 1793, and to Ternant May 15 (Ford, VI, 255); opinion of Randolph, May 14, 1793; Genet to TJ, May 27, 1793 (A.S.P.F.R., I, 148-150).

fill to the United States. At the time the eloquent Genet asserted that the French republicans, enhghtened on the rights of man, also had just ideas of the law of nations. So far as he was concerned there were already reasons to doubt this, for in Charleston he interpreted the Franco-American treaties to suit himself, but there was no question of Jefferson's attitude and intentions. In writing Temant he stated that the government would apply impartially to both parties the principles on which it was proceeding; and he soon stated emphatically to Genet that as a neutral his country was concerned with its duties as well as its rights.

The Grajjge case fell within the area of American right, and it marked a step toward the determination of the limits within which the United States exercised legal authority. Other cases were not so simple, for many of them raised the question of the extent of jurisdiction beyond the coastline. The historic three-mile limit was not set until autumn. This, as Jefferson stated, was the smallest distance claimed by any nation, being the utmost range of a cannon ball, commonly given as one sea league, while the greatest was the extent of human sight, estimated at twenty miles or more. The lesser distance was decided on by the President, for practical reasons, and it proved acceptable to both the major belligerents. Jefferson himself would have preferred to claim wider jurisdiction, and he was strongly determined to maintain all just neutral rights.^^ More significant at this early stage, however, was his emphasis on neutral duties, and his worst headaches resulted from his attempt to perform these.

Working out the mechanics of enforcement was difficult, since no American precedents existed. As usual, the incessantly active Secretary of the Treasury had suggestions, and one that he made a couple of weeks after the issuing of the Proclamation aroused Jefferson's deep suspicions. Hamilton wanted to make particular use of the collectors of customs, who were responsible to him. After an inconclusive conference with him and Randolph, Jefferson wrote the latter at some length, believing that some of his own objections could be made with better grace by the Attorney General.^^

Jefferson opposed the system of espionage which Hamilton wanted to set up, fearing that prosecution might be instituted on ''the secret information of a collector.'^ Believing that the acts of American cities On the three-mile limit, see TJ to Washington, October 3, 1793 (Ford, VI, 433-435); TJ to Genet, Nov. 8, 1793 (Ford, VI, 440-441).

''''See TJ's memo, of May 6, 1793 (Ford, I, 227-228), and his letter of May 8, 1793, to Randolph (Ford, VI, 244-246).

zens, as distinguished from foreigners, should fall under the ordinary system, he favored the substitution of grand juries and judges for customs collectors. Also, he wondered if the superintendence of neutrality and the preservation of peace with foreign nations could be properly assigned to the Treasury, which was supposed to deal with financial matters merely and was already "amply provided with business, patronage, and influence."

Randolph put himself on record in a long letter which Jefferson found disappointing.^^ He admitted certain current suspicions of Hamilton. "It was impossible not to have heard, that the revenue-ofl^cers have been suspected to be a corps, trained to the arts of spies, in the service of the Treasury," he said. But he had accepted Hamilton's assurances that he was not "prying into the conduct of individuals." Randolph regarded the customs collectors as suitable informants because of their closeness to the scene of probable violation. He stated, however, that Hamilton had accepted his suggestion that they should report to district attorneys. Thus he believed that Jefferson's main objection had been met, and he agreed with him that from that point on the normal legal machinery should operate. But he did not put himself on the side of his fellow Virginian in opposition to the entrance of the Treasury Department into this business. He took the position that something could be said on both sides and that the President must always decide in such matters. In Jefferson's opinion, this was a good example of fence-straddling.

The letter which Hamilton finally issued to the collectors ordered that information about violations of neutrality be referred to district attorneys and governors, and this partial modification was attributable to the Attorney General, no doubt.^^ But Jefferson had gained an impression of the latter's vacillation which he never lost. A few days after this exchange he wrote Madison that, because of the division of the council and the close vote, everything hung on the opinion of a single person [Randolph], "and that the most indecisive one I ever had to do business with. He always contrives to agree in principle with one but in conclusion with the other." ^" The vote was generally 2/2 against i Yz, he had told iMonroe, thus dividing the Attorney General into halves; one of these supported Jefferson while the other w^ent along with Hamilton and Knox.^^

As a description of procedure in the executive council during that

58 Randolph to TJ, May 9, 1783 (LC, 14757-14758).

59 Aug. 4, 1793 (J.C.H., III, 574-576).

^ TJ to Madison, May 12, 1793 (Ford, VI, 251). ^1 TJ to Monroe, May 5, 1793 (Ford, VI, 239).

trying summer this was inadequate, and the situation was not such a desperate one for Jefferson as he impKed in these letters to intimates. Long years later, when arguing the advantages of a single over a plural executive, he wrote: "During the administration of our first President, his cabinet of four members was equally divided by as marked an opposition of principle as monarchism and republicanism could bring into conflict. Had that cabinet been a directory, like positive and negative quantities in algebra the opposing wills would have balanced each other and produced a state of absolute inaction. But the President heard with calmness the opinions and reasons of each, decided the course to be pursued, and kept the government steadily in it, unaffected by the agitation. The public knew well the dissensions of the cabinet, but never had an uneasy thought on their account, because they knew also they had provided a regulating power which would keep the machine in steady movement." ^^ A survey of Jefferson's own contemporary memoranda for this year leads to the impression that the President, though tending to accept the judgment of a majority of his assistants in any matter presented to them as a group, followed no unvarying procedure. While by no means abdicating, he continued to serve as a balance wheel. He valued unanimity and got it more often than Jefferson's quoted comments imply.^^

The Secretary of State did not exaggerate the difference between himself and the Secretary of the Treasury in world-view, and undoubtedly he believed that he must always be on guard against that aggressive colleague and his pro-British leanings, just as Hamilton believed he must be on guard in turn. But Jefferson would have found it hard to point out any major decision of the government affecting his own department in which he was overruled and to which in the end his mind did not consent.^* The record which the administration made that summer was one on which it, and he, could stand with satisfaction. This amiable man of reason was always ill at ease in a quarrelsome atmosphere, however, and at first he may have been as distressed by the conflict in his own breast as by that within the administration.

His difficulties would have been great in any case. As he said a little later, the incidents to which the war had given rise filled the executive with business, "equally delicate, difficult, and disagreeable." Continuing, he said: "The course intended to be pursued being that

02 To Dcstutt dc Tracy, Jan. 26, 1811 (Ford, IX, 307).

^•'^ TJ's memoranda in the Anas, 1793 (Foi-d, I, 214-272).

^ The negotiation of a new commercial treaty with France, as permitted by Genet's instructions, was a possible exception, but the course of events made this quite impracticable.

of a Strict and impartial neutrality, decisions, rendered by the President rigorously on that principle, dissatisfy both parties, and draw complaints from both." ^^ He was speaking particularly of the French and British ministers, but the generalization applied also to the domestic parties that were now assuming more definite form. He continued to rely on the wisdom of George Washington; but through force of circumstances foreign policy, along with other serious matters, was now superintended by the entire executive council. Hamilton's famous reports on the public credit had not had to undergo the advance scrutiny of his colleagues, but at this stage Jefferson's important letters were gone over by the others, sometimes paragraph by paragraph, sentence by sentence, and phrase by phrase. This must have been as galling to his spirit as the literary emendation of the Declaration of Independence by Congress, but there is reason to believe that the effects were good in both cases. In his earliest letters to Genet, while censuring that envoy's conduct, he inserted expressions of friendship to the French people which his colleagues struck out. He avoided these thereafter with the result, he said, that his letters were "as dry and husky as if written between the generals of two enemy nations." ^^ This was disturbing to a polite man who still thought of the French as allies, but under existing circumstances it was just as well.

By and large, it was fortunate for the country that all the high executive officers were consulted about these crucial matters and the net result was a generally well-executed policy. But the difficulties which Jefferson faced as a diligent official, a loyal republican, a passionate advocate of human freedom, and a sensitive human being were enough to bear anybody down.

It is not surprising that these circumstances occasioned another informal debate between him and his closest political friend, Aiadison, regarding his own continuance in office. Writing him from his own sanctuary in Orange County, Virginia, Madison said: "I feel for your situation but you must bear it. Every consideration private as well as public requires a further sacrifice of your longings for the repose of Monticello." ^'^ Actually, Madison was laying chief emphasis on personal and partisan considerations. He said: "You must not make your final exit from public life till it will be marked with justifying circumstances which all good citizens will respect, and to which your

^^TJ to Morris, June 13, 1793 (Ford, VI, 299-301). 6^ Memo, of Aug. 20, 1793 (Ford, I, 260-261). ^"^ Madison to TJ, May 27, 1793 (Hunt, VI, 129).

friends can appeal. At the present crisis, what would the former think, what would the latter say?"

Jefferson's reply is one of the most moving of his many lamentations over the personal sacrifices incident to public office and one of his strongest disclaimers of personal ambition. Also, it describes vividly if extravagantly his longings and his sufferings as a human being at this time of stress and seeming frustration. Since no paraphrase can do justice to it, it must be quoted at some length.

. . . To my fellow-citizens the debt of service has been fully & faithfully paid. I acknolege that such a debt exists, that a tour of duty, in whatever line he can be most useful to his country, is due from every individual. ... I have now been in the public service four & twenty years; one half of which has been spent in total occupation with their affairs, & absence from my own. I have served my tour then. No positive engagement, by word or deed, binds me to their further service. . . . The motion of my blood no longer keeps time with the tumult of the world. It leads me to seek for happiness in the lap and love of my family, in the society of my neighbors & my books, in the wholesome occupations of my farm & my affairs, in an interest or affection in every bud that opens, in every breath that blows around me, in an entire freedom of rest or motion, of thought or incogitancy, owing account to myself alone of my hours & actions.

Against these prospects, this lover of home and books and nature set the circumstances of his present existence:

. . . Worn down with labours from morning to night & day to day; knowing them as fruitless to others as they are vexatious to myself, committed singly in desperate & eternal contest against a host who are systematically undermining the public liberty & prosperity, even the rare hours of relaxation sacrificed to the society of persons in the same intentions, of whose hatred I am conscious even in those moments of conviviality when the heart wishes most to open itself to the effusions of friendship and confidence, cut off from my family & friends, my affairs abandoned to chaos & derangement, in short, giving everything I love, in exchange for everything I hate, and all this without a single gratification, in possession or prospect, in present enjoyment or future wish.^*^

The prospect was exceedingly doleful to George Washington, also. Jefferson reported that the President was not well; little lingering fevers hung over him and affected his looks remarkably. He was ex-

*8TJ to Madison, June 9, 1793 (Ford, VI, 290-292).

I

FAIR NEUTRALITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 89

trcmelv disturbed bv the attacks made on him in the newspapers. The Secretary of State said: "I think he feels those things more than any person I ever met with. I am sincerely sorry to see them." ^® A little earlier, noting that the President was particularly incensed with Fre-neau, he had inferred that his own interposition with that editor was desired, perhaps the withdrawal of Freneau's appointment as translating clerk in the Department of State. To this Jefferson was quite unwilling, in view of Freneau's services in checking the "monocrats." He believed that the President, insensible to the designs of that party, had not with his usual good sense perceived that the good effects of this free journal outweighed the bad.^° But Jefferson himself was again involved in a contradiction, for he believed that the newspaper attacks on his revered chief, though unfair in themselves, were planted on popular ground, on the love of the people for France and her cause, w^hich he still regarded as that of all humanity.

The coming of Citizen Genet had stimulated these expressions of democratic ardor and, as Jefferson soon found out, caused the situation to become even more paradoxical. By his excesses of patriotic zeal this missionary of revolutionary democracy struck blows against that cause such as the Secretary of the Treasury could never have delivered, and these acutely embarrassed the policy of fair and strict neutrality. That in itself was a sufficient reason for Jefferson's unhap-piness in office until he finally arrived at a distinction between the cause and its representative which brought him a measure of relief.

«» Ford, VI, 293.

C^'Q

Impact of a Missionary: Citizen Genet

THE news of the arrival in the United States of the new minister of the French RepubHc, Edmond Charles Genet, who was to replace Ternant, an appointee of the monarchy, was received in Philadelphia on April 22, 1793, the day that the Proclamation of Neutrality was issued. Two weeks earlier he had landed in Charleston, a remote port as viewed from the seat of the federal government, and this news was surprising in itself. Jefferson expected him in Philadelphia in a few days, but actually he did not arrive until the middle of May. He was in the country about six weeks before even presenting his credentials, and it soon appeared that he was actively promoting the interests of his own nation before he was officially accredited as its representative. This irregularity of procedure might have been expected to ruffle the Secretary of State, a man who was notably scrupulous about official proprieties, and one wonders what he was expecting of Genet as he sat in his office on High Street or under the plane trees at his rented house beside the Schuylkill.

Jefferson was not in position to read Genet's instructions or his dispatches home, as we are, but he had some advance information from John Adams's son-in-law. Late in February, Colonel William S. Smith brought the encouraging report that Genet would be empowered to grant commercial privileges, especially in the French West Indies.^

1 Anas, Feb. 20, 1793 (Ford, I, 216-217). Genet's instructions can be conveniently seen in Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797, edited by F. J. Turner; Annual Report of the A.H.A., 190$, II (1904), 201-211 (referred to as C.F.M.). I have greatly benefited from the analysis of these and of the mission as a whole by Albert H. Bowman, in "The Struggle for Neutrality: A History of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and France, 1790-1801" (Columbia University dissertation, 1953). Also, I have learned much from Maude H. Woodfin, "Citizen Genet and His Mission" (University of Chicago dissertation, 1928) and from other published and unpublished writings on the subject, to some of which I may not specifically refer.

I

Also, Jefferson heard Smith say that the French contemplated giving freedom to their own West Indian possessions and had plans to "emancipate" South America from the Spanish. Before Genet set out, as we now know, the French had given up the elaborate scheme which Miranda had talked them into, and were looking toward Florida and Louisiana. Almost any move against the Spanish, however, would have been viewed with sympathy by Jefferson.

Gouverneur A^orris, in Paris, had not been consulted about Genet's appointment and he reported it to Washington rather than to Jefferson. If his descriptions of the envoy were passed on, Jefferson learned that Genet was a man of good parts and education and of an ardent temper. Morris thought him very much an opportunist and believed that the President would see in him immediately "the manner and look of an upstart." 2 Jefferson was disposed to discount Morris's unfavorable comments on the revolutionary upstarts, but by now he had received from this source better information about factional groupings than he possessed during the winter. He knew that there were differences between Brissot and his associates, known to later history as the Gi-rondins, and the Jacobins, and that the former were in power at the time of Genet's appointment. He may have surmised that Brissot was responsible for this, as in fact he was, and that would have meant to Jefferson that the new minister was backed by a group professing great admiration and friendship for the United States.^ He did not particularly associate Brissot and the Girondins with grandiose territorial ambitions and excessive zeal in propaganda, as historians now do.

Without specifying the Brissotines, Morris had issued timely warnings against the spirit of aggrandizement and propaganda among the revolutionists. He pointed out, in a letter received by Jefferson on the date of the Neutrality Proclamation, that their declaration that they would "erect the standard of liberty everywhere" had occasioned international alarm.^ After the propaganda decrees of the autumn of 1792, Morris and others anticipated the attempt of the revolutionary leaders to surround their country with dependent states. Within a few weeks Jefferson himself, in private, became critical of French propagandist activities. He wrote his son-in-law: "The French have been guilty of great errors in their conduct towards other nations, not only in insulting uselessly all crowned heads, but endeavoring to force lib-

2 Morris to Washington, Jan. 6, 1793 (Diary, II, 595). See also letter of Dec. 28, 1792, written before Morris met Genet (A.S.F.F.R., I, 395). In a letter to TJ, Feb. 13, 1793, Morris complained that the members of the French diplomatic committee had slighted him by not consulting him (ibid., I, 350).

3 To Brissot, May 8, 1793 (Ford, VI, 248).

4 Dec. 21, 1792 (A.S.P.F.R., I, 347).

erty on their neighbors in their own form." ^ At first, however, he was disposed to accept their claim that their actions were defensive measures.

Practical questions bearing on Genet and his activities arose soon after his arrival on the South Atlantic coast. The actions of the French frigate E?nbuscade in Delaware Bay could hardly be dissociated from the new envoy, and reported events in Charleston certainly could not. The assumption of jurisdiction by the French consul there in prize proceedings in violation of American sovereignty was a case in point, since this action supposedly was taken on the instructions of Genet. Mangourit, the consul, whom he described as "an excellent patriot," was charged with arrangements for a projected expedition against East Florida, for which South Carolinians and Georgians were to be recruited, but it is doubtful that Jefferson knew about this. The vigilant British minister, George Hammond, informed him that French privateers were being fitted out in Charleston, and that these were manned for the most part by American citizens. This matter he referred to the federal district attorney in Philadelphia, asking him to take such measures to apprehend and prosecute citizens committing depredations on the property and commerce of nations at peace with the United States as were according to law.^ He had already indicated his own unwillingness to permit the arming and equipment of privateers in American ports, though he did not make a decisive statement of the official position until after Genet reached Philadelphia.

Before he knew much about what was happening in Charleston, he wrote Madison that it seemed as if Genet's arrival in Philadelphia "would furnish occasion for the people to testify their affections without respect to the cold caution of their government." "^ Writing home, the missionary himself boasted that his journey northward through the interior was an uninterrupted succession of civic fetes and his entrance into Philadelphia a triumph for liberty. "The true Americans," he said, "are at the height of joy." ^ He was welcomed into towns by the roar of cannon and undoubtedly he attracted crowds, but, judging from the newspaper accounts, his journey was rather less triumphal than he supposed.^ Congressman John Steele of North

6 To TMR, June 24, 1793 (Ford, VI, 318).

8 This led to the celebrated case of Gideon Henfield, which will be discussed hereafter. See Francis Wharton, State Trials of the United States during the Administration of Washington and Ada?ns (1849), pp. 49-89. Hammond wrote TJ on May 8, 1793, and TJ wrote District Attorney Rawle on May 15.

7 Apr. 28, 1793 (Ford, VI, 232).

*To Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 18, 1793 {C.F.M., p. 215),

8 Woodfin, cii. VI.

Carolina, whom time was to show as a rather moderate Federalist but who admitted that he feared "this citizen," described Genet as a man of good person and fine ruddy complexion who seemed always in a bus-tle.^^ From other accounts we learn that the new^ minister of the French Republic, who so announced himself to all comers, was thirty years old, of middling stature; that he had blue eyes and auburn hair; that he spoke English well; that his manners were engaging and he made a very favorable first impression. He had a quick temper, however, and showed little or no capacity to understand anybody who disagreed with him.

Genet arrived in Philadelphia on Thursday, May i6. Calculations about the number of people who M^ere at Gray's Ferry to greet him varied with the sentiments of the reporters, but no doubt there would have been more if the emissary had not arrived sooner than expected and disrupted the original plans of certain citizens.^^ On that same day a group of merchants and traders of Philadelphia met and adopted an address to the President, approving the Neutrality Proclamation.^^ Jefferson, who regarded this group as pro-British, said that this address contained "much wisdom but no affection." He told Madison that the citizens, as distinguished from the merchants, perceived coldness in the Proclamation; and, suspecting that there was doubt in the minds of the President's counselors about receiving Genet, they determined to receive him and to draw up a counter-address. Apparently the Secretary of State perceived nothing unpatriotic in such action.

A body of these citizens held a meeting in the State House Yard that evening and appointed a drafting committee. Their leaders, though identified by Hamilton with the "enemies and disturbers" of the government, were men of importance and intelligence. Jefferson himself named the mathematician David Rittenhouse, president of the American Philosophical Society; the latter's son-in-law, Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, a prominent lawyer; the popular physician Dr. James Hutchinson, who was interested in all things human and Republican; and Alexander James Dallas, secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The address was approved at a meeting at the same place the following evening, and a committee of thirty bore it to the City Tavern, two or three blocks aw^ay, where Genet was staying.

i<> Steele to Hamilton, April 30, 1793 (J.C.H., V, 561).

11 For a newspaper account, see Philadelphia General Advertiser, May 17, 1793. Hamilton reported on Genet's reception during his first days in Philadelphia in an undated letter to an unnamed correspondent (Lodge, VIII, 300-303). Jefferson covered the same period in a letter to Madison, May 19 (Ford, VI, 259-261).

12 Delivered May 17 and replied to that day by Washington (Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 460).

Even Hamilton admitted that a big crowd had been gathered by that time, and Jefferson described it as a "vast concourse." There is no reason to suppose, however, that he was a part of it.

A dinner was given Genet on Saturday night, about one hundred being present.^^ This was attended chiefly by French, whose numbers were being swollen by refugees from Santo Domingo, and by French-Americans. An ode by Citizen Pichon w^as read by Citizen Duponceau, and Citizen Freneau was requested to put this into English verse.^^ They sang the "iMarseillaise," Genet himself rendered a song "replete with truly patriotic and republican sentiments," and somebody placed the cap of liberty on his head. To this group, however, these actions involved no derogation of the government of the United States and its head. One of the toasts was as follows: "The virtuous Washington; may heaven grant to France and to the United States many citizens that resemble him."

The newspapers of the time bear out Genet's boast to the Foreign Minister of his own country, two \^'eeks after his arrival at the seat of government. "I live here in the midst of perpetual fetes," he said; "I receive addresses from all parts of the Continent." ^^ The day after he wrote this sanguine letter the "citizens of Philadelphia" gave him "an elegant civic feast" at Oeller's Hotel, which had more room than any other place in town.^^ It is said that upwards of two hundred were present, including a number of state and federal officers who attended "in their capacity of private citizens — not as guests." Among these was Governor Thomas Mifflin, who gave a volunteer toast, but none of the accounts say that Thomas Jefferson was there. None of the fifteen regular toasts attacked the policy of neutrality or urged any direct participation of the United States in the war, but they left no possible doubt of this group's sympathies. Here are a few samples:

The Republics of France and America — may they be forever united in the cause of liberty.

The spirit of seventy-six and ninety-two — may the citizens of America and France, as they are equal in virtue, be equal in success.

13 May i8, 1793 (General Advertiser, M^y 21, 1793).

14 French version in General Advertiser, May 27; Frencau's on May 31. This was in 12 stanzas and was entitled "Ode to Liberty." It is not to be confused with Freneau's own ode which was sung June i.

15 Genet to Le Brun, May 31, 1793 (C.F.M., p. 216).

i^June I, 1793. Details drawn chiefly from National Gazette, June 5, 1793; see also General Advertiser, June 4, 1793. The account in the Hamiltonian Gazette of the U. S., June 5, tiiough briefer, is not hostile in tone.

May the clarion of freedom, sounded by France, awaken the people of the world to their own happiness, and the tyrants of the earth be prostrated by its triumphant sounds.

All day the flags of the two republics had flown from the cupola of the hotel. They were also on the table, along with the cap of liberty. Following the regular toasts, this was placed on the head of Citizen Genet, "and in its revolution around the table, inspired every citizen with that enthusiasm and those feelings which bafile all description, which Freemen only can conceive, and of which slaves and despots have the most distant comprehension." ^" In the course of the evening, certain verses of Philip Freneau were sung to the tune of "God Save the King."

God save the Rights of Man! Give us a heart to scan Blessings so dear: Let them be spread around Wherever man is found, And with the welcome sound Ravish his ear.

Let us with France agree And let the world be free While tyrants fall. Let the rude savage host In their vast numbers boast Freedom's almighty host Laughs at them all.

There were four more stanzas identifying the cause of France with that of liberty. The last one ended:

Freedom will never want Her Washington.

Other addresses to Genet and other dinners followed the elegant civic feast. Popular enthusiasm for him never approached universality as closely as he imagined, but it continued at a high pitch at least until midsummer, when the difficulties he had created in official circles began to be noised about. By that time the Republicans, whose zeal had been stimulated by his presence and who had embraced him too ardently, began to be embarrassed.

'■'' General Advertiser, June 4, 1793.

Having fired the fraternal spirit of the American people all the way from Charleston to Philadelphia, as he believed, Genet delivered his credentials on May 17 and was presented to the President by the Secretary of State. He was now in position to act officially, and it was high time. He had not followed the wise counsel of the foreign minister of his own country. "Your mission requires of you very great activity," Le Brun had written, "but to be efficacious this ought to be hidden. The cold character of the Americans warms up only by degrees and indirect ways will be less useful than official steps." ^^ Also, Le Brun assured him that he could have entire confidence in the sentiments of the President and the Secretary of State. Years later, when in a spiteful mood, he said that his reception by the President was "perfectly neutral and insignificant," ^^ but Genet raised no objection in the first exuberant dispatches he sent home.

To his first ministerial conference with the Secretary of State, which occurred a few days later, he had looked forward with special confidence, knowing Jefferson's "principles, his experience, his talents, his devotion to the cause we defend." '^ Genet brought with him a letter from Condorcet, who, along with Lafayette and the Due de La Rochefoucauld, had been Jefferson's guests at a parting dinner just before he left Paris in 1789.^^ The letter was six months old, and most of it was devoted to Lafayette, who, in Condorcet's eyes, had shown great folly in going over to the enemies of liberty. While vouching for Genet's zeal for liberty, Condorcet did not laud an envoy whose appointment he had actually opposed, as we now know, but he did glorify Franco-x\merican friendship. "Our republic, founded like yours on reason, on the rights of nature, on equality, ought to be your true ally," he said; "we ought in some sort to form one people." The two republics, he continued, had the same interests, the same purpose to destroy all "anti-natural" constitutions, while the kings of Europe did not conceal their purpose to join forces to destroy liberty everywhere. These sentiments could hardly have failed to strike a responsive chord in Jefferson's breast. Genet presented himself, therefore, under favorable auspices.

Jefferson tended to be unsuspicious of persons who shared, or seemed to share, his general principles, being disposed to take them at

18Feb. 24, 1793 (C.F.M., p. 21572.). This dispatch was one of those acknowledged by Genet on May 18, and he may have received it sooner.

!'•* Genet to TJ, July 4, 1797, from Genet Papers (Woodfin, Appendix A).

20C.F./U., p. 215.

21 Condorcet to TJ, Dec. 21, 1792 (LC, 79:13778). This very difficult letter was deciphered for me by John J. dePorry of the Library of Congress. For the earlier association, see Jefferson and the Ria^hts of Man, p. 235.

their own valuation as long as he could. The important principle in this instance was devotion to the universal cause of liberty, and Genet affirmed that with sufficient eloquence. Writing Madison shortly after his first conference with Genet, Jefferson did not commend the man himself but did say: "It is impossible for anything to be more affectionate, more magnanimous than the purport of his mission." ^^ He told the President that the French were not calling on the United States for the guarantee of their West Indian islands, despite the treaty of alliance. This assurance vindicated his own judgment, and he was happy to be confirmed in his opinion of French friendliness, "Cherish your own peace and prosperity," Genet said, reporting at the same time that he was armed with full powers to make a more liberal treaty of commerce. Accordingly, it seemed to Jefferson that Genet offered everything and asked nothing. He doubted if the offers of negotiations would be accepted, however, and lamented to Madison that one or two at least of his colleagues (Hamilton and Knox) "under pretence of avoiding war on the one side have no great antipathy to run foul of it on the other, and to make part of the confederacy of princes against human liberty."

In this mood he probably was not appalled by the flamboyance of Genet's first written communications to him, though these were far different in tone from the formal diplomatic correspondence he had had with Vergennes and Montmorin and, more recently, with Ter-nant. The ebullient emissary referred to "innumerable hordes and tyrants" who were menacing the rising liberty of the French nation, and to "perfidious ministers of despotism" whom the citizens of the two allied republics must combat. These particular rhetorical flourishes were made in a covering letter to a decree of the French Convention, opening to United States vessels all ports of the French colonies on the same terms as French vessels.-^ Ostensibly the action was liberal, but its purpose can be readily surmised. The French wanted to avail themselves of American shipping, now that they were engaged in warfare with the British and likely to lose much of their own. The decree also proposed that the United States grant to French merchants "a like reduction of the duties granted by the present law to American merchants, and thereby more closely cement the benevolent ties which unite the two nations." The reference here was to provisions, already objected to by the French, favoring American vessels against those of all other countries in the matter of tonnage and

22 May 19, 1793 (Ford, VI, 260).

23 Decree of Feb. 19, 1793, enclosed in Genet to TJ, May 23, 1793 (A.S.P.F.R.,

1,147).

import duties.-'* At the time Jefferson had thought the position of the French unwarranted on the ground of the existing treaty, but he was personally willing to relax provisions in their favor as an act of friendship in return for commercial favors already granted, or on the basis of a new reciprocal arrangement. He would have liked to work out such a reciprocal arrangement with the new envoy, whose professions of good will he did not yet doubt. In this particular matter Hamilton \vas nearer right than Jeiferson uas. He regarded Genet's offers as a snare into which he hoped the government would never fall, and Knox agreed with him.-^ We now know, as Jefferson did not, that in return for concessions, the French expected the United States to tighten its commercial and political ties with them to a degree that was incompatible with national independence. It appears, therefore, that he was fortunate in escaping commercial negotiations for a new treaty.-^

The next two or three weeks, while Genet was cavorting with his Republican admirers in Philadelphia and Jefferson was still trying to take him at his face value as an evangel of freedom, were the period when the Secretary of State suffered his greatest emotional tension. There were signs of strain even in his relations with the President, whom he still revered and whose judgment he generally admired. The week after Genet's arrival he drafted at Washington's request a letter to the Provisory Executive Council of France regarding the recall of Ternant. In this Washington questioned his use of the expression "our republic," saying it was not in the customary official style. The document which was finally sent was very friendly in tone, but the words "our republic" were changed to "the United States." -^ This was not because of any lack of devotion on Washington's part to the republican form of government, which he regarded as safe in the United States. What he really was disturbed about was the threat of anarchy, which he scented in Freneau's newspaper.-^ This notably well-balanced man would not have liked the exuberance of the Republicans in any case,

24 See Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 328-331.

25 TJ to Madison, May 27, 1793 (Ford, VI, 268-269).

26 In a letter of June 2, 1793 to Madison (Ford, VI, 278) he said that the division of the executive council on the question of a new commercial treaty with France was 4 to r against it and that he proposed delaying that question until Randolph got back from a trip to Virginia, which he hoped would impress Randolph about public sentiment toward the French. The question was not afterwards taken up, ostensibly because the Senate was not in session.

27 May 24, 1793 (Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 468-69). For TJ's account of his conversation with Washington, see Anas, May 23 (Ford, I, 230-31). His friendly letter to Ternant, dated May 22, is in Ford, VI, 263.

28 See above, p. 89.

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Courtesy of the Albanij Institute of History and Art and the Frick Art Reference Library

Gexet after He Became a Solid Ciuzen

Portrait of the Former Missionary of Revohitiov Painted hy

Ezra Avies about 1S()9-1SI0, when He Was Living in

Rensselaer County, New York

and sonic of their barbs were now being directed against him personally.

Jefferson had no sympathy with personal attacks on the President, but the fears he centered on the word "monarchy" amounted almost to an obsession. He expressed them rather more moderately than usual in a private letter to Harry Innes of Kentucky: "This summer is of immense importance to the future condition of mankind all over the earth, and not a little so to ours. For though its issue should not be marked by any direct change in our constitution, it will influence the tone and principles of its administration so as to lead it to something very different in the one event from what it would be in the other." -^ Driven by the logic of circumstances and the force of reason to the espousal of fair neutrality, he was determined that this policy should not weaken the cause of republicanism at home by injuring it abroad. Therefore, his own course lay between Scylla and Charybdis and it could not help being tortuous.

One question which Genet brought up very promptly was that of advances on the American debt to France, and on this Jefferson's stand was realistic and moderate.^^ The United States was under no obligation to anticipate payments, and the President was not authorized to do so unless this should seem advantageous. The executive officers were unanimously opposed to any change in the form of payments, and Jefferson spelled out a number of very practical objections to the French proposals.^^ He believed, however, that a refusal without assigning reasons, such as Hamilton favored, "would have a very dry and unpleasant aspect indeed." He himself saw no objection to anticipating the payments for the current year, if convenient for the Treasury, but beyond that he would not go. Beyond that the government did not go, and Washington accepted Jefferson's judgment regarding the form of communication.''^ The credit for forestalling certain of Genet's ventures by refusing to make advance payments on the debt belongs to the executive officers as a group. Only with respect to friendliness of tone toward France was this a real issue between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State.