At last! An ice-free port!
Tsar Nicholas writing in his diary about Port Arthur,
March 27, 1898
In 1903, the Russian Empire had an annual revenue of £214 million, of which £12.3 million was spent on the fleet. With a new battleship costing over £1 million in the late 1890s, Russia could afford to build or purchase up to three battleships per year. However, Russia had to maintain three separate fleets in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Pacific, which made it very difficult to mass its available naval resources against a single opponent. Unlike Japan, Russia had several potential enemies, including Germany and the Ottoman Empire, for which it had to retain forces in place to act as a deterrent. Under the “For the Needs of the Far East” Program adopted on January 8, 1898, the Naval Ministry changed its policy and decided to deploy greater assets to the Far East, including ten battleships, in order to support the Tsar’s expansionist policies. The Baltic and Black Sea fleets were reduced to defensive roles, with priority given to new construction for the Pacific Squadron. At the start of the Russo-Japanese War, Russia had 17 operational battleships: seven were stationed in the Pacific, one was en route to the Pacific, one was in the Mediterranean Sea, three were in the Baltic and five were in the Black Sea. In addition, five Borodino-class battleships were under construction in St Petersburg and were approaching completion.
The squadron at Port Arthur, under the command of Vice-Adm Oskar V. Stark, was the main component of Russian naval power in the Far East, although a powerful cruiser force was also based at Vladivostok. Sensing that war was approaching, Russia had sent a reinforcing squadron consisting of the battleship Oslyabya, two cruisers and five destroyers to Port Arthur, and by its outbreak it had reached the Red Sea. As a naval base, Port Arthur was poorly suited for use by a large fleet of battleships, since it had no dry docks for repair and maintenance; forcing Russian battleships to conduct an 18,000-mile return trip to St Petersburg for overhauls. Even worse, the harbor mouth was only 290m wide, which meant that one or two ships sunk in the right place could bottle up the port. Since the main channel was only 6m deep at low tide, Russian battleships with a draught of over 8m could only enter or leave the port during the brief periods of high tide. During peacetime exercises, it had taken the Port Arthur squadron two whole days to get all its warships out of the inner harbor.
Japan in 1904 was still a fairly poor country, dependent upon foreign loans and foreign naval yards to build its fleet. Japan’s national revenue was barely one-tenth of Russia’s – only £22.9 million in 1903 – but it was able to devote £2.5 million to its naval budget. Furthermore, due to the destruction of the Chinese fleet in 1895 and the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, Japan could focus all of its limited resources on preparing for war against a single opponent. Nevertheless, Japan so overspent on building up a fleet in 1896–1903 that the country was already in debt prior to the outbreak of war and had to cut back on further expansion. Thus, Japan’s navy was a powerful but fragile force that could not afford significant losses and it had to avoid being dragged into a war of attrition with the better-resourced Russian Navy.
Admiral Togo Heihachiro (1847–1934), Commander of the Combined Fleet since December 1903. Togo had seen considerable combat in the Satsuma Navy before joining the new Imperial Japanese Navy in 1871. He was sent to train in England and proved an adept student. During the Sino-Japanese War, Togo commanded the cruiser Naniwa and fought at the Battle of the Yalu River. After the war he was promoted to Vice-Admiral in 1898 and then Admiral in 1904. Togo was a tough and ruthless commander, who could be merciless to his opponents. (Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)
Although Japan could not yet build battleships, it did develop several naval bases that could repair such ships, giving it a major advantage over the Russian Pacific squadron in recovering from battle damage. In 1883, Lt Cdr Togo Heihachiro chose the quiet fishing village of Sasebo in Kyushu to be the new forward base for the IJN and it was activated in July 1889. By 1904, Sasebo was the main base for Vice-Adm Togo’s battleship fleet. Although Japan’s battleship fleet was outnumbered six to seven against the Russian Pacific Squadron, it had a two to one quantitative advantage in cruisers and a 47 to 42 edge in destroyers and torpedo boats.
A map indicating the main naval bases for each side and the locations of the major naval engagements.
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Japanese 1st Division (Vice-Admiral Togo Heihachiro) | |
| Ship | Class | Captain |
| Mikasa | Captain Ijichi Hikojiro | |
| Asahi | Captain Yamada Hikohachi1 Captain Nomoto Tsunaakira |
|
| Shikishima | Shikishima | Captain Teregaki Izo |
| Hatsuse | Captain Nakao Yu | |
| Fuji | Fuji | Captain Matsumoto Kazu |
| Yashima | Captain Sakamoto Hajime | |
 |
Russian 1st Pacific Squadron (Vice-Admiral Oskar V. Stark) | |
| Ship | Class | Captain |
| Petropavlovsk | Captain Nikolai M. Yakovlev | |
| Poltava | Petropavlovsk | Captain Ivan P. Uspenskiy |
| Sevastopol | Captain Nikolai K. Chernishev Captain Nikolai O. von Essen2 |
|
| Peresvyet | Peresvyet | Captain Vladimir A. Boysman |
| Pobeda | Captain Vladimir M. Zatsarenniy | |
| Tsesarevich | Captain Ivan C. Grigorovich3 Captain Andrei A. Eberhard4 Captain Nikolai M. Ivanov |
|
| Retvizan | Captain Eduard N. Shchensnovich | |
|
Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron (Vice-Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky) | |
| Ship | Class | Captain |
| Suvorov | Captain Vasiliy V. Ignatsius * | |
| Aleksandr III | Borodino | Captain Nikolai M. Bukhvostov* |
| Borodino | Captain Petr I. Serebrennikov * | |
| Orel | Captain Nikolai V. Jung* | |
| Oslyabya | Peresvyet | Captain Vladimir I. Bir* |
| Sissoi Veliki | Captain Mikhail V. Oserov | |
| Navarin | Captain Baron B. A. Fitingof* | |
|
Russian 3rd Pacific Squadron (Rear Admiral Nikolai I. Nebogatov) | |
| Ship | Class | Captain |
| Imperator Nikolai I | Captain V. V. Smirnov | |
| Ushakov | Captain V. N. Miklukha-Maklai* | |
| Senyavin | Admiral Ushakov | Captain S. J. Grigoryev |
| Apraksin | Captain N. G. Liwin | |
In terms of naval war plans, the Russians did not intend to conduct an offensive strategy if Japan restricted its operations to Korea. However, if Japanese forces moved against Port Arthur or Manchuria, the Russian Navy intended to use its cruisers to harass Japanese merchant shipping in the Sea of Japan, while its battleship fleet made local offensive sorties into the Yellow Sea to prevent the Japanese from landing near Port Arthur. While this strategy might seem unduly cautious, the Russian Navy had successfully used a combination of mines and torpedo attacks to neutralize the much stronger Turkish fleet in the Black Sea during the 1877 Russo-Turkish War. Port Arthur itself was well protected by mines and coastal artillery, as well as a large army garrison, which meant that the Pacific Squadron could survive there for some time in the event of hostilities. Since the Naval Ministry expected to send reinforcements to the Far East within 3–4 months of the outbreak of war, it made no sense to risk a major fleet action until the Russians could guarantee a significant numerical advantage in capital ships. As long as Stark’s battleships were secure in Port Arthur, there was little that Vice-Adm Togo could do to prevent the Russian attrition strategy from eventually achieving its objective.
The IJN’s war plan was offensive from the outset, setting the elimination of the Russian battleship fleet as its main objective. Once Japanese intelligence warned of the approach of the Oslyabya squadron, now in the Red Sea, Togo resolved to conduct a surprise attack with his 1st Fleet on the Port Arthur squadron as soon as possible. Vice-Adm Kamimura’s 2nd Fleet would watch the Straits of Tsushima and blockade the Russian cruiser force at Vladivostok.
1 Captain until June 6, 1904.
2 Replaced Chernishev on March 17, 1904.
3 Captain until March 27, 1904.
4 The Tsesarevich went through a string of commanders while it was under repair. Eberhard was only in command for 10 days. Ivanov took command on May 12, 1904.
*Denotes captain killed in action or died of wounds