1. INTRODUCTION
1. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, “For Better: Nuclear Weapons Preserve an Imperfect Peace,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York: Norton, 2003), 117; K. Subrahmanyam, “India and the International Nuclear Order,” in Nuclear India in the Twenty-first Century, ed. D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 83; John J. Mearsheimer, “Here We Go Again,” New York Times, May 17, 1998; Scott D. Sagan, “For Worse: Till Death Do Us Part,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Sagan and Waltz, 106–7; P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” in The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia, ed. Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2001), 16; Kanti Bajpai, “The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent,” in India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, ed. Amitabh Mattoo (New Delhi: HarAnand, 1999).
2. S. Paul Kapur and Šumit Ganguly, “The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future,” Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (July–August 2007): 645, 648–49.
4. From 2001 to 2006 the Indian defense budget increased by 60 percent, from $13.81 billion to $22.1 billion. Between 2007 and 2012 India is predicted to spend up to $40 billion on weapons procurement, including fighter aircraft, artillery, submarines, and armor. See Jane’s World Defense Industry, “JWDI Briefing: India’s Defence Industry,” September 18, 2007; Heather Timmons and Somini Sengupta, “Building a Modern Arsenal in India,” New York Times, August 31, 2007. See also Rodney W. Jones, “Conventional Military and Strategic Stability in South Asia,” South Asian Strategic Stability Unit Research Paper No. 1, March 2005.
5. See Foster Klug, “Senate Gives Final OK to U.S.-India Nuclear Deal,” Associated Press, October 2, 2008.
6. See Nahal Toosi, “Pakistan Likely to Stay on Course on War on Terror,” Associated Press, August 19, 2008.
7. One important exception is Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). For two early critiques of the inordinate reliance on deductive logic in the development of deterrence theory, see Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966), and Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
8. The classic statement remains Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981).
9. Jordan Seng, “Less Is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States,” Security Studies 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 50–92.
10. David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996–1997): 87–119.
2. THE HISTORY OF INDO-PAKISTANI CONFLICT
1. Radha Kumar, “The Troubled History of Partition,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 1 (January–February 1997).
2. Sir Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).
3. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1967).
4. Šumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, and New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).
5. Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (London; Routledge, 2006).
6. Francis Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces, 1860–1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).
7. The literature on the partition of the subcontinent is vast. See, for example, C. H. Phillips and Mary Doreen Wainwright, eds., The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1935–1947 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970); Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Mushirul Hasan, India’s Partition: Process, Strategy, and Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Yasmin Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
8. Ian Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 1917–1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). See also Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2007).
9. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (New York: Macmillan, 1956).
10. The question of Kashmir’s borders at the time of partition is controversial. For a discussion of the controversy and an assessment of the evidence, see Shereen Ilahi, ‘The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Fate of Kashmir,” India Review 2, no. 1 (January 2003): 77–102.
11. Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968).
12. The details pertaining to Pakistan’s involvement in the conflict can be found in Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Karachi: Pak Publishers, 1970). See also H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
13. For details see Andrew Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir (London: Penguin Global, 2008).
14. Šumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge and Washington, D.C.: Cambridge University Press and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997) 10–11.
15. On the dispatch of Indian troops, see Lionel Protip Sen, Slender Was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation, 1947–48 (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1969).
16. Note that precisely who made the decision to send Indian troops to Kashmir and at what juncture remains the subject of scholarly dispute. According to Alastair Lamb, Indian troops entered Kashmir before Maharaja Hari Singh had signed the Instrument of Accession. Lamb also alleges that the Instrument of Accession may not have been signed at all. Prem Shankar Jha seeks to refute these allegations through a close examination of British colonial archives and through interviews with key individuals who were present at the time of the accession. Chandrasekhar Dasgupta maintains that senior British military officers serving the Indian government, as well as Lord Louis Mountbatten, were loath to deploy the Indian Army in Kashmir after the tribal invasion. Their acquiescence came about only after Prime Minister Nehru and Home Affairs Minister Sardar Vallabhai Patel insisted that Kashmir’s defense was critical to India’s national security. Finally, Alex Von Tunzelmann maintains that Sardar Vallabhai Patel made the decision to send Indian troops to Kashmir to ensure its accession to India. See Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1991); Lamb, The Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir, 1947 (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1994); Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir, 1947: Rival Versions of History (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996); Chandrasekhar Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947–48 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002); Alex Von Tunzelmann, Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire (New York: Henry Holt, 2007).
17. Sen, Slender Was the Thread, 159–61.
18. Ganguly, Conflict Unending.
19. Raju G. C. Thomas, Indian Defense Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
20. Dasgupta, War and Diplomacy.
21. See Šumit Ganguly, “Deterrence Failure Revisited: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965,” Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 4 (December 1990): 77–93, and Ganguly, Conflict Unending.
22. Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (New York: Pall Mall, 1968).
23. Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, and Bangla Desh (New York: Praeger, 1975).
24. See Sisson and Rose, War and Secession.
25. See Ganguly, Conflict Unending.
26. See the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War, Report as Declassified by the Government of Pakistan, pt. 4, “Military Aspect” (Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 2000); Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, 43, 72; Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 71–72; S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 420–21.
27. See text of Simla Agreement, 204–6; Chari, “The Simla Agreement: An Indian Appraisal,” 61; and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Simla Agreement: Current Relevance?” 135, all in P. R. Chari and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, The Simla Agreement, 1972: Its Wasted Promise (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001).
28. See S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), 64–66.
29. The All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference was Kashmir’s leading political party.
30. Šumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay,” International Security 21, no. 2 (1996): 80, 84–85, 99; V. P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2006), 143–45, 147, 158–60, 164, 167–68, 170, 283; Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir, 65–73; Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, 113–18; Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 137–38; Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 51, 97–101, 107–35.
31. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, 121, 134; John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Extremist Groups Renew Activity in Pakistan; Support of Kashmir Militants Is at Odds with War on Terrorism,” Washington Post, February 8, 2003; Malik, Kashmir, 295–98; Sheikh Mushtaq, “Kashmir Violence Dips to All-Time Low,” Reuters, April 1, 2007; and www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/The-Battle-Deaths-Dataset-version-30/.
32. For the full text of the NPT, see www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf. The NPT is the foundation of a broader nonproliferation regime consisting of bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to prevent proliferation by monitoring and limiting the transfer of nuclear materials and technology and by preventing nuclear testing.
33. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 45–88.
34. See Reiss, Bridled Ambition; William C. Potter, “The Politics of Denuclearization: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine,” Occasional Paper No. 22, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., April 1995.
35. See Šumit Ganguly, “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 148–77.
36. See Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security 32, no. 4 (1999): 178–204.
37. Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (September–October 1998).
38. See Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 124, 131–32; Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent.
39. Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1988), 70.
40. Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), 188.
41. Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981).
42. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 106–7. See also P. R. Chari, “Nuclear Restraint, Nuclear Risk Reduction, and the Security-Insecurity Paradox in South Asia,” in The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinksmanship in South Asia, ed. Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2001), 16. See also Kanti Bajpai, “The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent,” in India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, ed. Amitabh Mattoo (New Delhi: HarAnand, 1999); Samina Ahmed, “Security Dilemmas of Nuclear-Armed Pakistan,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2001): 781–93.
43. Waltz, “For Better,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Sagan and Waltz, 117.
44. Sagan, “For the Worse,” in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, Sagan and Waltz, 91–92.
3. COMPETING ARGUMENTS ABOUT SOUTH ASIAN PROLIFERATION
1. Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation in South Asia,” Asian Survey 41, no. 6 (November–December 2001): 1064–86.
2. Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
3. John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1988).
4. Lyle Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters,” China Quarterly 168 (December 2001): 985–97.
5. The United States, on the other hand, had considered a preemptive strike against the incipient Chinese nuclear weapons program. See William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–64,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000–2001): 54–99.
6. On the significance of the nuclear revolution, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
7. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981).
8. On organizational proclivities, see Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
9. Robert Jervis,” The Utility of Nuclear Deterrence,” International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 218–24.
10. John Mueller, “ The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 3–17.
11. Šumit Ganguly, “Wars without End? The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts,” Annals of the American Academy of Social and Political Science (1995): 541, 167–78.
12. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (London: Asia Publishing House, 1966).
13. Husain Haqqani, “Partition Is History, Leave It in the Past,” India Express, June 9, 2005.
14. Šumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: Indo-Pakistani Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
15. Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (New York: Routledge, 2007).
16. Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).
17. The concept of a “limited probe” is drawn from Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); for an alternative argument about Pakistan’s motivations underlying the Kargil probe, see Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008).
18. Šumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: Indo-Pakistani Crises under the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).
19. For a discussion of both these crises, see Šumit Ganguly and R. Harrison Wagner, “India and Pakistan: Bargaining in the Shadow of Nuclear War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 3 (September 2004): 479–507.
20. Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007–8): 158–90.
21. On Pakistan’s stated nuclear thresholds, see Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan (Como: Landau Network, 2002).
22. On the concept of “false optimism,” see Steven Van Evera, The Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); on Pakistan’s strategic myopia, see Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003).
23. On the Pakistani elite views of nuclear weapons, see Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
24. On the likely human and economic costs of a nuclear exchange in South Asia, see Tom Shanker, “12 Million Could Die at Once in an India-Pakistan Nuclear War,” New York Times, May 27, 2002; Bill Nichols, “Nuclear Clash Would Batter World Financial Markets,” USA Today, June 4, 2002.
25. On the nuclear taboo, see Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
26. See Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
4. SOUTH ASIA’S NUCLEAR PAST
1. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
2. Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 2001), 196–97.
3. As early as 1966, reacting to Pakistan’s long-standing conventional military weakness vis-à-vis India, Pakistani prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously promised that Pakistanis would “eat grass” if necessary to ensure their achievement of a nuclear weapons capability. However, the Bangladesh war and the Indian PNE created even stronger incentives for Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons. See Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security, 32, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 183.
4. See S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007); Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
5. A. G. Noorani, “India’s Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee,” Asian Survey 7, no. 7 (July 1967): 490–502.
6. Ashok Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision-Making (New York: Praeger, 1976).
7. Šumit Ganguly, “Why India Joined the Nuclear Club,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 39, no. 4 (April 1983): 30–33.
8. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000).
9. Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2007).
10. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985).
11. Vivek Chadha, Low-Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis (New Delhi: Sage, 2005).
12. This was India’s largest military exercise to date and comparable in size to those of the Warsaw Pact or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in scope and dimensions. See the discussion in Šumit Ganguly, “Getting Down to Brass Tacks, The World and I (May 1987): 100–104.
13. Kanti Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Šumit Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and the Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995).
14. Šumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
15. On Pakistan’s role in the Afghan insurgency, see Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan, the Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower (Haverton: Casemate, 2001).
16. Quoted in Stanley A. Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times (New York: Oxford University Press), 194, 195, see also 191–92; Mehrunnisa Ali, “The Simla and Tashkent Agreements,” in Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy, ed. Mehrunnisa Ali (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 87.
17. See Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 51; Šumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay,” International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 80.
18. See Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 137, 186.
19. Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent.
20. Interview with Benazir Bhutto, Dubai, United Arab Emirates, August 2004.
22. Šumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, and New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 92.
23. See P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen Philip Cohen, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 2–4, 138.
24. This summary draws on detailed accounts of the 1990 crisis in Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, and Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics, and Strategy in South Asia.
25. Mark Fineman, “Attacks Spark War Fears between India, Pakistan,” Toronto Star, April 15, 1990, A24.
26. See Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 147–48.
27. Ibid, 150–52; Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia, 104–14.
28. See the discussion in Michael Krepon and Mishi Faruqee, eds., “Conflict Prevention and Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia: The 1990 Crisis,” Occasional Paper No. 17, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., April 1994.
29. Mark Fineman, “Nervous Pakistanis Watch the ‘Wall’ and Indian Troops,” Los Angeles Times, April 20, 1990.
30. Salamat Ali, “Avoiding Action,” Far Eastern Economic Review (May 3, 1990): 26.
31. P. R. Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff: The Role of the United States (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995).
32. “If Pushed Beyond a Point by Pakistan, We Will Retaliate,” India Today, April 30, 1990, 76.
33. Beg, as quoted in Owen Bennett-Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 215.
34. K. Subrahmanyam, “Capping, Managing, or Eliminating Nuclear Weapons?” in South Asia after the Cold War, ed. Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 184.
35. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 166.
36. Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia, 111.
37. Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 94.
38. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 62, 59.
39. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation, 148–49.
40. Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia, 90–91.
41. Interview with former Indian Army chief of staff Satish Nambiar, New Delhi, India, August 2004.
42. Personal communication, S. K. Singh, January 2005.
43. Interview with Benazir Bhutto, August 2004.
44. Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics, and Security in South Asia, 8. See also George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 311.
45. The separatists had sought to establish the independent Sikh state of Khalistan. India accused Pakistan of supplying the insurgents with money and materiel, and the Pakistanis denied doing so. The issue gave rise to an Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff, known as Brasstacks, from late 1986 to early 1987.
46. See Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent.
47. In the twenty-five years between independence and the end of the Bangladesh conflict, India and Pakistan fought wars: in 1947–48, 1965, and 1971.
48. See V. P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2006); Kargil Review Committee, From Surprise to Reckoning (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000); Amarinder Singh, A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights, 1999 (New Delhi: Motibagh Palace Patiala, 2001); Y. M. Bammi, Kargil, 1999: The Impregnable Conquered (India: Gorkha Publishers, 2002); Ashok Krishna, “The Kargil War,” in Kargil: The Tables Turned, ed. Ashok Krishna and P. R. Chari (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2001), 77–138; Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, 225n9.
49. Praveen Swami, The Kargil War (New Delhi: Leftword Books, 1999).
50. For a Pakistani account of the motivations underlying the Kargil conflict see Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008).
51. Ashutosh Misra, “Siachen Glacier Flashpoint: As Study of Indian-Pakistani Relations,” Durham Middle East Paper No. 65, June 2000, University of Durham, Centre for Middle East and Islamic Studies.
52. Interview with senior Indian military officer, San Francisco, California, November 2000.
53. Šumit Ganguly, interviews with midlevel IAF officers, Washington, D.C., December 2000.
54. These lapses are explicitly acknowledged in the public version of the Indian government’s Kargil Review Committee Report, 2000.
55. For a discussion of the nuclear danger in South Asia, see Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004).
56. Šumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 161.
57. For an argument about the role of American diplomacy, see Bruce Reidel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House (Philadelphia: Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 2002).
58. On the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Siachen Glacier, see V. R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conflict without End (New Delhi: Viking, 2002).
59. Interview with Bhutto.
60. Interview with President Pervez Musharraf, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, April 2004. Note that Musharraf maintained that local mujahideen had executed the Kargil operation, with Pakistan Army forces becoming involved only after India’s counterattack had begun.
61. Interview with Jalil Jilani, Islamabad, Pakistan, April 2004. Unlike Musharraf, Jilani conceded that Pakistan Army troops had actually launched the Kargil incursions.
62. Ibid. Pakistan’s nuclear capacity was not the only factor that emboldened its leaders to undertake the Kargil operation. The Pakistanis believed that retaking the Kargil heights would be prohibitively difficult for India. And they hoped that the international community would tolerate the Kargil operation, given Pakistan’s perilous position vis-à-vis a conventionally powerful, newly nuclear India. On Pakistani tactical considerations, see M. S. Qazi, “High Temperatures at High Mountains,” Pakistan Institute for Air Defence Studies Home Page, http://www.piads.com.pk/users/piads/qazi1.html; Sardar F. S. Lodi, “India’s Kargil Operations: An Analysis,” Defence Journal 3, no. 10 (November 1999): 2–3; Shireen Mazari, “Re-examining Kargil,” Defence Journal 3, no. 11 (June 2000): 1, www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/reexamining.htm; Javed Nasir, “Calling the Indian Army Chief’s Bluff,” Defence Journal 3, no. 2 (February–March 1999): 25; Mirza Aslam Beg, “Kargil Withdrawal and ‘Rogue’ Army Image,” Defence Journal 3, no. 8 (September 1999), http://defencejournal.com/sept99/kargil.htm; Ayaz Ahmed Khan, “Indian Offensive in the Kargil Sector,” Defence Journal 3, no. 5 (June 1999): 7–8; Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999,” Royal United Service Institution Journal 147, no. 2 (April 2002): 2–3. On international opinion see Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 122; Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), 38; Shireen Mazari, “Kargil: Misguided Perceptions,” Pakistan Institute for Air Defence Studies, http://www.piads.com.pk/users/piads/mazari1.html; Mirza Aslam Beg, “Deterrence, Defence, and Development,” Defence Journal 3, no. 6 (July 1999): 4–6; interview with Friday Times editor Ejaz Haider, Lahore, Pakistan, April 2004.
63. Interview with Mazari; Mazari, “Kashmir: Looking for Viable Options,” 64; Shireen Mazari, “Low-Intensity Conflicts: The New War in South Asia,” Defence Journal 3, no. 6 (July 1999): 41.
64. Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 122.
65. Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 191.
66. Rajesh Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006), 73–74; Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 160–62.
67. Interview with former Indian Army chief of staff V. P. Malik, New Delhi, India, April 2004. On India’s battle for international opinion, see also Maleeha Lodhi, “The Kargil Crisis: Anatomy of a Debacle,” Newsline (July 1999); Tellis, Fair, and Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella, 21–28; Irfan Husain, “Kargil: The Morning After,” Dawn (Karachi) April 29, 2000.
68. Interview with G. Parthasarathy, New Delhi, India, December 2007 and August 2004.
69. Interview with Malik.
70. Interview with Brajesh Mishra, New Delhi, India, May 2005.
71. Interview with George Fernandes, New Delhi, India, August 2004.
72. Interview with A. B. Vajpayee, New Delhi, India, June 2006.
73. Interview with Malik.
74. Indian leaders’ accounts here could be seen as self-serving. It would be equally advantageous, however, for the Indians to deny that they ever considered crossing the LOC during the Kargil conflict. This would enable them to claim that they were not deterred from horizontal escalation by Pakistan’s nuclear capacity and would help bolster their reputation for restraint. Also note that Indian leaders do not completely dismiss the deterrent effects of Pakistani nuclear weapons; they admit to having ruled out full-scale war during Kargil because of Pakistan’s nuclear capacity. Thus it is likely that if they had been similarly deterred from crossing the LOC, Indian leaders would be willing to acknowledge it.
75. See S. Paul Kapur, “Nuclear Proliferation, the Kargil Conflict, and South Asian Security,” Security Studies 13, no. 1 (Autumn 2003): 99. Note that Lieutenant General Khalid Kidwai, director of the Pakistan Army’s Strategic Plans Division, specified loss of “a large part of [Pakistani] territory” as grounds for nuclear use. See Landau Network, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf.
76. See Tellis, Fair, and Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella, x; Husain, “Kargil: The Morning After”; Zahid Husain, “On the Brink,” Newsline, June 1999; Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 104; Irfan Husain, “The Cost of Kargil,” Dawn, August 14, 1999; Husain, “Kargil: The Morning After”; Shireen M. Mazari, “Kargil: Misguided Perceptions,” Pakistan Institute for Air Defence Studies, http://www.piads.com.pk/users/piads/mazari1.html; Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 16; Tellis, Fair, and Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella, 41, 55; “Statement of Nawaz Sharif in ATC-1,” Dawn, March 9, 2000; Husain, “Kargil: The Morning After.”
77. See Sayantan Chakravarty, “The Plot Unravels,” India Today, December 31, 2001, 6–8.
78. For detailed discussions of the 2001–2002 crisis, see V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003); Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” Report No. 57, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., September 2006; Šumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, “The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (Summer 2005).
79. See president of Pakistan Pervez Musharraf’s address to the nation, January 12, 2002, http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:wcLOJejbcwoJ:www.millat.com/president/1020200475758AMword%2520file.pdf+musharraf+address+to+nation+january+12+2002&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us; Alan Sipress and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Powell ‘Encouraged’ by India Visit,” Washington Post, January 19, 2002, A19; Robert Marquand, “Powell Tiptoes Indo-Pak Divide,” Christian Science Monitor, January 18, 2002, 6; “India-Pakistan Standoff Easing, Powell Says,” Boston Globe, January 18, 2002, A3.
80. Interview with Mishra; Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 80.
81. The victims were mostly women and children, the family members of Indian military personnel. See Raj Chengappa and Shishir Gupta, “The Mood to Hit Back,” India Today, May 27, 2002, 27–30.
82. David E. Sanger and Kurt Eichenwald, “Citing India Attack, U.S. Aims At Assets of Group in Pakistan,” New York Times, December 21, 2001, and John F. Burns and Celia W. Dugger, “India Builds Up Forces as Bush Urges Calm,” New York Times, December 30, 2001.
83. Celia W. Dugger, “India Raises the Pitch in Criticism of Pakistan,” New York Times, December 19, 2001.
85. Celia W. Dugger, “India Welcomes Pakistani Steps, but Stays Alert,” New York Times, January 14, 2002.
86. Todd S. Purdum, “Powell Lauds Pakistan’s Efforts against Extremism,” New York Times, January 17, 2002.
87. Šumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, “The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April–June 2005): 290–324.
88. Celia W. Dugger, “Gunmen Kill 30, Including 10 children, in Kashmir,” New York Times, May 15, 2002; Edward Luce and Farhan Bokhari, “Bombers Kill 33 in Kashmir as U.S. Envoy Visits India,” Financial Times, May 15, 2002.
89. Edward Luce. “Back to the Brink,” Financial Times, May 14, 2002.
90. Basharat Peer, “Vajpayee Blows Hot and Cold in Kashmir,” India Abroad, May 31, 2002.
91. For a discussion of India’s concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, see V. Sudarshan and Ajith Pillai, “Game of Patience,” Outlook, May 27, 2008, 35–39.
92. Praveen Swami, “A War to End a War: Causes and Outcomes of the 2001–2002 India-Pakistan Crisis,” in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb, ed. Šumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur (New York: Routledge, 2008), 144–61.
93. See, for example, Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, 170; Basrur, Minimum Deterrence, 94–99.
94. Interview with Brajesh Mishra; Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 80.
95. Interview with V. K. Sood, New Delhi, India, August 2004.
96. Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 80, 82, 87; V. Sudarshan and Ajith Pillai, “Game of Patience,” Outlook (Mumbai), May 27, 2002; interview with retired Indian generals, New Delhi, India, August 2004.
97. Interview with Vajpayee.
98. Interview with Fernandes.
99. Interview with Mishra. Note that Pakistan did not return the twenty fugitives that India had demanded.
5. SOUTH ASIA’S NUCLEAR PRESENT AND FUTURE
1. Interview with Brigadier (ret.) Gurmeet Kanwal, additional director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, August 2008.
2. See Šumit Ganguly, “Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise?” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July–August 2006): 48; “Guns to Fall Silent on Indo-Pak Borders,” Daily Times, November 26, 2003; “India, Pakistan Agree on Opening of New Bus Link, Trade Routes,” Press Trust of India, January 18, 2006; “Indo-Pak Agreement on Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons—Full Text,” www.hindu.com/nic/nuclear.htm; “India, Pakistan to Form Joint Group to Tackle Crime,” PakTribune, March 23, 2006.
3. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 2006–2007, 6, 143. See also Press Trust of India, “Kashmir Violence Drops 50 Pc,” October 5, 2005; Agence France Presse, “Kashmir Violence Falls to Record Low: Police,” July 12, 2007; Reuters, “Kashmir Violence Falls to All-Time Low—Official,” April 1, 2007.
4. Agence France Press, “Indian Troops Quit Kashmir Buildings as Violence Dips,” October 31, 2007.
5. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report, 2006–2007, 6, 143.
6. Agence France Presse, “Kashmiri Violence Falls.”
7. Interview with senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, India, December 2007. See also Agence France Presse, “Calm in Indian Kashmir, but Pakistan Still Eyed with Suspicion,” February 23, 2008.
8. Interview with managing editor of India Today Raj Chengappa, New Delhi, India, December 2007. See also Ganguly, “Will Kashmir Stop India’s Rise?” 48–50; Robert G. Wirsing, “Precarious Partnership: Pakistan’s Response to U.S. Security Policies,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 30, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 74; Stephen Philip Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 14.
9. Praveen Swami, “A War to End a War: The Causes and Outcomes of the 2001–2002 India-Pakistan Crisis,” in Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb, ed. Šumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, 144–61 (London: Routledge, 2008).
10. See the discussion of the prospects and limitations of the Indian strategy of coercive diplomacy in Šumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, “The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies 14, no. 2 (April–June 2005): 290–324.
11. Ka. S. Manjunath, Seema Sridhar, and Beryl Anand. Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue 2000–2005: A Profile (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2006).
13. Ashley J. Tellis, “The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining the U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan,” Washington Quarterly, 31:4 (2008): 21–42.
14. S. Paul Kapur and Šumit Ganguly, “U.S. Should Stay out of Pakistan-India Dispute over Kashmir,” San Jose Mercury News, December 4, 2008.
15. Axelrod refers to the “shadow of the future,” the possibility of future interactions among self-interested actors as a basis for promoting cooperation in an anarchic context. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
16. On Indian doubts, based on historical experience, about the utility of American intervention in resolving the Kashmir dispute, see Šumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
17. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
18. Šumit Ganguly, “The Kashmir Conundrum,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 4 (July–August 2006): 45–57.
19. Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004 (New York: Routledge, 2007).
20. Šumit Ganguly, “Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay: Explaining the Crisis in Kashmir,” International Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 76–107.
21. Randeep Ramesh, “India Calls on UN to Ban Charity It Claims Is Front for Terror Group,” Guardian, December 11, 2008.
22. V. R. Raghavan, “Nuclear Deterrence: An Indian Perspective,” presentation at Wilton Park Conference, Steyning, West Sussex, UK, October, 12–14, 2006, www.delhipolicygroup.com/Nuclear_Deterrence_An_Indian_Perspective.htm. See also Lawrence Freedman, “Nuclear Deterrence May Still Have a Role to Play,” Financial Times, December 1, 2006; Russell J. Leng, “Realpolitik and Learning in the India-Pakistan Rivalry,” in The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry, ed. T. V. Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 126–27; Swami, “A War to End a War,” 144–61.
23. Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir (New York: Free Press, 2006), 201–4; Stephen Philip Cohen, “The Nation and the State of Pakistan,” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 115–16; Samina Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy: Voices of Moderation?” Contemporary South Asia 12, no. 2 (June 2003): 12; Jessie Lloyd and Nathan Nankivell, “India, Pakistan, and the Legacy of September 11,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15, no. 2 (2002): 281; Wirsing, “Precarious Partnership,” 71–72. Since 2002 Pakistan has received $1.9 billion in U.S. security assistance and $2.4 billion in U.S. economic aid. See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Development, Foreign Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection, “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Pakistan,” testimony of Richard A. Boucher, assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs, December 6, 2007.
24. Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy” 12, 15; Katherine Butler, “Toppling Musharraf,” Independent, February 20, 2006. On the assassination attempts see Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 244–62.
25. U.S. Department of State, “Pakistan,” in Country Reports on Terrorism, 2007.
26. M. Ilyas Khan, “Pakistan Army’s Tribal Quagmire,” BBC News, October 9, 2007.
27. “Pakistan Welcomes New PM’s Policies,” BBC Monitoring, South Asia, April 1, 2008.
28. Agence France Presse, “Calm in Kashmir”; interview with Raj Chengappa.
29. Vali Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in Pakistan,” Middle East Journal 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 202.
30. Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai, India: Planning for Industrialization (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
31. T. N. Srinivasan, Eight Lectures on India’s Economic Reforms (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).
32. Šumit Ganguly, “India Walks a Middle Path in Gulf Conflict,” Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, March 4, 1991.
33. See S. Paul Kapur and Šumit Ganguly, “The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future,” Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (July–August 2007): 648–49.
35. See Asian Development Bank, “South Asia’s Growth to Remain Strong in 2007–2008, Says ADB,” www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2007/11669-south-asian-developments-outlooks/; Asian Development Bank, “Country Reports: Key Indicators, India,” www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2006/pdf/IND.pdf; Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, “India,” available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/IN.html; K. R. Srivats, “GDP Growth Rate to be 4.8-5.5% in 2009-10,” Business Line, March 25, 2009. The pun “Hindu growth rate” plays on the term “secular growth rate.” It was coined by the Indian economist Raj Krishna.
37. “India’s First Priority is Spurring Economic Growth: Manmohan,” Asian News International, July 9, 2008.
39. Adil Zainulbhai, “Equitable Growth Not Just a Dream,” Financial Times (Asia Edition), November 29, 2006.
40. Government of India, “Economic Survey, 2006–2007,” http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2006-07/esmain.htm; Jeremy Page, “India’s Economy Fails to Benefit Children,” Times (London), February 22, 2007. See also “Data and Dogma: The Great Indian Poverty Debate,” World Bank Research Observer 20, no. 2 (Fall 2005).
41. World Bank, “India Country Overview 2009.”
42. Manmohan Singh, “Opening Remarks at the 54th Meeting of the National Development Council,” December 19, 2007.
43. Guy de Jonquieres, “Just Rolling Back India’s State Is Not Enough,” Financial Times, February 1, 2007; Jo Johnson, “India: Where All Is Not Yet Equal,” Financial Times, March 14, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/dba09a56-ce5f-11db-b5c8-000b5df10621,dwp_uuid=d98c5ce6-ce5f-11db-b5c8-000b5df10621.html?nclick_check=1.
45. Bindu Shajan Perappadan, “Air Pollution Showing Alarming Trends,” Hindu, November 23, 2005.
46. Johnson, “India: Where All Is Not Yet Equal”; “Rs 50,000 Crore Worth Farm Produce [Going to] Waste Every Year,” Hindu, June 20, 2005; Shalini S. Dagar, “The Missing Chain,” Business Today, May 20, 2007; Government of India, “Economic Survey, 2006–2007.”
47. Kapur and Ganguly, “The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations,” 655.
48. Shivshankar Menon, “India-Pakistan: Understanding the Conflict Dynamics,” speech at Jamia Millia Islamia, April 11, 2007. See also “India-Pakistan: Understanding the Conflict Dynamics,” speech by Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon at Jamia Millia Islamia, April 11, 2007; “Pranab for Peace with Pak,” Statesman, October 26, 2006; “Terror Threatens S. Asia: Growth Undermined and Health Care and Education Robbed of Funds, Says PM Singh,” Straights Times, August 16, 2006.
49. See Amelia Gentleman, “Delhi Police Say Suspect Was Attack Mastermind,” International Herald Tribune, November 13, 2005; “LeT, JeM, SIMI Helped Execute Terror Plan,” Times of India, October 1, 2006.
52. “Enough Is Enough,” Times of India, October 31, 2005.
53. “Media Salute Delhi’s Spirit,” BBC News, October 31, 2005.
55. Interview with senior Indian diplomat closely involved with the Indo-Pakistani peace process, December 2007; interviews with senior U.S. military officials, New Delhi, India, December 2007 and May 2005; Michael Krepon, “The Meaning of the Mumbai Blasts,” Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C., August 7, 2006; Walter Andersen, “The Indo-Pakistani Powder Keg,” Globe and Mail, July 19, 2006; John H. Gill, “India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus?” in Strategic Asia, 2005–2006: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 266.
56. Interview with Gurmeet Kanwall, December 2007.
57. On this issue, see my discussion of India’s Cold Start doctrine below.
58. The November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks occurred as this book was being completed. Available evidence indicates that Lashkar-e-Toiba was behind the operation. This would seem to be considerably more provocative than previous attacks by Pakistan-backed militants. The 2001 Parliament assault, for example, killed only a handful of people and was over in the space of a morning. The Mumbai attacks, by contrast, killed and wounded hundreds of people, continued for approximately three days, and struck India’s financial nerve center, thereby threatening to undermine the country’s recent economic progress. Thus far, the Manmohan Singh government has managed to resist pressures for retaliation against Pakistan. For an extended discussion of the Mumbai attacks, see chapter 6.
59. See Jane’s World Defense Industry, “JWDI Briefing: India’s Defence Industry,” September 18, 2007; Heather Timmons and Somini Sengupta, “Building a Modern Arsenal in India,” New York Times, August 31, 2007. See also Rodney W. Jones, “Conventional Military and Strategic Stability in South Asia,” South Asian Strategic Stability Unit Research Paper No. 1, March 2005.
60. “India Rejects Pakistan’s Call on Defence Budget Freeze,” Indian Express, June 11, 2008.
61. Carin Zissis, “India’s Energy Crunch,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, October 23, 2007.
62. Vibhuti Haté, “India’s Energy Dilemma,” South Asia Monitor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 7, 2006.
63. See “Booming India Steps Up Strategic Maritime Role,” Lloyd’s List, June 4, 2008, and Gurpreet Singh Khurana, “Interpreting India’s Naval Strategy,” Straits Times, July 16, 2007.
64. Interview with assistant editor of India Today Sundeep Unnithan, New Delhi, India, December 2007.
65. Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7; Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 95–100.
66. See Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2005), 14–16.
67. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2008 (London: Routledge, 2008), 341–46, 349–51.
68. Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1997), 20–21; interview with Gurmeet Kanwal, director of Centre for Land Warfare Studies New Delhi, India, December 2007.
69. Interview with Unnithan, December 2007.
70. Interview with senior U.S. defense official, U.S. embassy, New Delhi, India, December 2007. For critical analyses of Parakram see, for example, V. K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003); Praveen Swami, “Beating the Retreat,” Frontline, October 26–November 8, 2002.
71. This brief overview does not purport fully to explain the complexities of India’s Cold Start doctrine. It draws on the following sources: interviews in New Delhi in December 2007 with several of Cold Start’s intellectual architects, including former army training command director and army vice chief of staff Vijay Oberoi; head of Center for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution, and member of Indian National Security Council Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation, Arun Sahgal; director of Centre for Land Warfare Studies, Gurmeet Kanwal; and senior American defense officials in New Delhi; Colonel Amarjit Singh, “Strategy and Doctrine: A Case for Convergence,” presentation at Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India; Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007–8); Subhash Kapila, “India’s New ‘Cold Start’ War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed,” parts 1 and 2, South Asia Analysis Group Papers No. 991, May 4, 2004, and No. 1013, June 1, 2004; Tariq M. Ashraf, “Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces,” Military Review (November–December 2004): 53–62.
72. Indian planners will have to overcome a number of organizational and resource-related obstacles before they can fully implement Cold Start. See Ladwig, “A Cold Start,” 1, 15–26.
73. Ashraf, “Doctrinal Reawakening,” 59.
74. Interview with Oberoi. See also “Cold Start to New Doctrine,” Times of India, April 14, 2004.
75. Interviews with Brigadier General Khawar Hanif and Major General Muhammad Mustafa Khan, Monterey, California, June 2008. See also Shaukat Qadir, “Cold Start: The Nuclear Side,” Daily Times, May 16, 2004; and Ladwig, “A Cold Start,” 10.
76. Interviews with Unnithan and senior U.S. defense official; Kapila, “India’s New ‘Cold Start.’”
77. Interviews with Kanwal and Sahgal.
78. Interview with senior U.S. defense official. See also Ladwig, “A Cold Start,” 10–14; Gill, “India and Pakistan” 266; Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan,” 12.
79. Benazir Bhutto’s assassination is a case in point. See Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Sees Qaeda Link in Death of Bhutto,” New York Times, January 19, 2008.
80. Cited in Kanchan Lakshman, “The Expanding Jihad,” South Asia Intelligence Review 6, no. 32 (February 18, 2008).
82. Interview with Chengappa.
83. See Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy” 15; Gill, “India and Pakistan” 266; “Jihad and the State of Pakistan,” Friday Times, March 2, 2007. See also Steve Coll, “The Stand-off: How Jihadi Groups Helped Provoke the Twenty-first Century’s First Nuclear Crisis,” New Yorker, February 13, 2006.
6. THREE POINTS OF AGREEMENT
1. See Ashley J. Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship,” International Security 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 113–51; White House, “Announcement of Withdrawal from ABM Treaty,” December 13, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html.
3. Rajat Pandit, “India on Way to Joining Exclusive BMD Club,” Times of India, November 26, 2007.
4. “Indian President Stresses Need for Missile Defense Systems,” BBC Monitoring, South Asia, February 24, 2007.
5. Randeep Ramesh, “India ‘Star Wars’ Plan Risks New Arms Race,” Guardian, December 14, 2007.
6. Peter J. Brown, “China Can’t Stop India’s Missile System,” Asia Times, January 16, 2009.
7. Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties,” 138–44.
8. Rajesh Basrur, “Missile Defense and South Asia: An Indian Perspective,” in The Impact of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia, ed. Michael Krepon and Chris Gagné, Report No. 46 (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2002), 18.
9. Strictly speaking, counterforce capabilities would include both counterforce nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense. For explanatory purposes, however, we discuss counterforce nuclear weapons and BMD separately here.
10. See Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 224; Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 70. Note that, given the enormous numbers of warheads on each side, it is doubtful that either the United States or the Soviet Union could ever have acquired a significant damage limitation capacity, even with major investments in counterforce. See Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, 32–35; Barry R. Posen and Stephen Van Evera, “Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment,” International Security 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 25–27.
11. See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 164–65; Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, 245–49; 252–54.
12. For a detailed discussion of this logic in the Cold War context, see Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, 116–24. For a discussion of BMD’s effects in the context of U.S. strategic relations with Russia, China, and “rogue” states, see Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security 26, no. 1 (Sumer 2001): 40–92.
13. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, 116–24.
14. Paul Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 20, 2008, 2. India, by contrast, is estimated to have about 70 nuclear warheads. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November–December 2008): 38.
15. Siddharth Srivastava, “India and the U.S. Talk Missile Defense,” Asia Times, January 15, 2009.
16. Ramesh, “India ‘Star Wars’ Plan Risks New Arms Race.”
17. Dinshaw Mistry, “Military Technology, National Power, and Regional Security: The Strategic Significance of India’s Nuclear, Missile, Space, and Missile Defense Forces,” in South Asia’s Nuclear Security Dilemma, ed. Lowell Dittmer (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), 69.
18. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July–August 2008): 42.
19. See Mistry, “The Strategic Significance of India’s Nuclear Forces,” 68–69; Rahul Bedi, “Arms Race Fear as U.S. Plans Missile Shield in India,” Daily Telegraph, February 28, 2008.
20. For a careful assessment of China’s record on this score, see Evan S. Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China’s Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980–2004 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007)
21. India and Pakistan fought a bloody border war in 1962. The two countries’ border disagreement remains unresolved. See Steven A. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
22. For example, Indian policy makers were forced to go to some lengths to repair the rupture in Sino-Indian relations following the 1998 Indian nuclear tests. See John W. Garver, “The Restoration of Sino-Indian Comity Following India’s Nuclear Tests,” China Quarterly 168 (December 2001): 865–89.
23. Prachi Pinglay, “How Mumbai Attacks Unfolded,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/south_asia/7757500.stm; see also Yaroslav Trofimov, Geeta Anand, Peter Wonacott, and Matthew Rosenberg, “India Security Faulted as Survivors Tell of Terror,” Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2008.
24. James Lamont, “India Under Fire,” Financial Times, December 2, 2008.
25. James Lamont and Farhan Bokhari, “India Calls on Pakistan to Hand Over Criminals,” Financial Times, December 3, 2008. See also Jane Perlez and Robert F. Worth, “India Tracing Terror Attack to 2 Militants,” New York Times, December 5, 2008, and Praveen Swami, “Mumbai Massacre Story Unfolds in Terrorist’s Interrogation,” Hindu, December 2, 2008.
27. Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti, and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s Spies Aided Group Tied to Mumbai Siege,” New York Times, December 8, 2008.
28. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For details concerning the ISI’s involvement in Afghanistan, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).
29. See S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International Security 33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 91–92; Mark Sappenfield, “In Northwestern Pakistan, Where Militants Rule,” Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 2008.
31. On Indian unpreparedness, see Robert F. Worth, “Lack of Preparedness Comes Brutally to Light,” New York Times, December 4, 2008; see also Šumit Ganguly, “Delhi’s Three Fatal Flaws,” Newsweek, December 8, 2008, 19; Sudip Mazumdar, “Flunking the Intelligence Test,” Newsweek, November 29, 2008.
32. For a discussion of possible Indian options see Siddharth Srivastava, “India Sets Sights on Pakistani Camps,” Asia Times, December 6, 2008.
33. On the transitory features of the terrorist training camps, see Josh Meyer, “Terror Camps Scatter, Persist,” Los Angeles Times, June 20, 2005.
34. See chapter 3 in Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent.
35. See chapter 6 in Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent
36. Note that India’s Cold Start doctrine seeks to solve this problem by launching attacks serious enough to inflict significant costs on the Pakistanis, but not so threatening as to trigger a Pakistani nuclear response. It is not clear that the Indians will be able to strike this delicate balance. And, in any event, Cold Start’s implementation remains far in the future. It thus does little to address India’s current problem with Pakistan-based militancy.
37. See David E. Sanger, “Strife in Pakistan Raises U.S. Doubts over Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, May 4, 2009; Fahran Bokhari and James Lamont, “Obama Says Pakistan Nukes in Safe Hands,” Financial Times, April 30, 2009; Kerr and Nikitin, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons”; Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned,” Washington Post, November 11, 2007; Šumit Ganguly, “Nuclear Nonstarter,” Newsweek, May 6, 2009, www.newsweek.com/id/195984.
38. For Pakistan’s initial reaction, see Farhan Bokhari and James Lamont, “ Pakistan Warns of Threat to Terror War,” Financial Times, December 21, 2008; for subsequent reactions, see Dean Nelson, “Pakistan Blinks in India Standoff,” Times, December 14, 2008; see also Farhan Bokhari and James Lamont, “Pakistan Battles Its Islamist Offspring,” Financial Times, December 13/14, 2008.
39. See K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 25, 2008, 48–51.
40. On the overhaul of the security and intelligence services, see Alan Beattie, “Security Reform Needs Singh to Change Style,” Financial Times, December 2, 2008.