Foraging and Fighting: The Suffolk Campaign
Each company divided into messes of from four to six men; these messes constructed their own “doghouses.” John Stevens explained the process, starting with the selection of a good sized tree, eight to twelve inches in diameter, which was cut into sections seven to ten feet long, and then processed into slabs approximately eight inches thick. By building up the north end and two sides, and leaving the south end open, all to a height of approximately three feet, the soldiers would begin to construct a “pig pen.” Then a seven-foot post or tree fork was set in the center supporting a ridge pole for the structure. A covering was placed over the pole, usually an old piece of tent cloth, drawn tightly down to the logs on each side and made fast. Then the opening on the north end above the slabs was enclosed and all cracks sealed with mud to make the facade “wind tight.” Finally, leaves would be scattered about ten inches deep, creating a good, warm bed. One blanket was placed atop the leaves with others utilized for covering at night. The open, south end of the ediface accommodated a campfire; the reflection of its heat would strike the canvas and deflect downward toward the floor, thereby making the cabin warm and comfortable. In extremely cold weather, the fire could be kept going all day and the men would sit around it and talk, read newspapers and play poker in reasonable comfort.2
Fletcher indicated the construction projects proved difficult with the limited tools available to the men, and some lacked canvas for a roof. Fletcher’s mess constructed their shelter by digging a pit about 14 feet square and two feet deep, then “logging up” the sides. The roof was made of poles with supports to hold a good amount of earth thrown on top in a cone-shaped fashion, theoretically making it waterproof. Several nights later, Fletcher’s mess sat around “praising our ability as contsructors of warm quarters cheap.” Late that night, however, it rained and the men were awakened by dripping water, which “increased to hard rain” inside the hut. They were forced to sleep out of doors, and in the morning, “bailed our house out while the other fellows were having their laugh at our predicament.” After finding a tent fly to stretch over the dirt roof, they “passed the balance of the winter comfortably.”3
The brigade constructed a large, one story log cabin which functioned as a theater six days a week, and as a church on Sundays. Black-face minstrel shows were a favorite with the men; a group known as “Hood’s Minstrels,” comprised of men from the brigade, took top honors. Private W. H. Lewis wrote that the “Hood’s Negro Minstrels” performed “most every night to a crowded audience in our amphitheater,” with profits used to assist the sick and wounded of the brigade, as well as the suffering civilians of Fredericksburg. The 4th Texas Brass Band was also one of the favorite acts. On Christmas Eve, the band and the minstrels performed a special musical extravaganza before a packed house. Louise Wigfall, who attended the event, found it to be “supremely ridiculous.” Following the performance, General Hood invited General Robertson over to his headquarters for an oyster stew dinner. Christmas passed quietly, according to Pvt. A. B. Hood of Company I, as the prior evening’s performance constituted the only celebration of the holiday for most of the men.4
At one dollar per drink, explained Private Hood “[w]hiskey was too high to become noisy.” Lieutenant Cobb spent Christmas Day visiting the battlefield and the damaged town, which was still largely deserted. According to Cobb, “[a]t the base of Marye’s Hill were abundant evidence of the late severe struggle. The enemy’s pickets was quietly walking their post on the opposite bank of the river.” Returning from a similar battlefield tour, Nicholas Pomeroy and Joe Shepherd, both of Company A, discovered that Shepherd’s servant Dick had eaten all the food from the boxes the two men had received from home, spoiling the holiday spirit. Others had what they deemed an excellent Christmas. Sgt. Mark Smither wrote home that “[w]e have spent a very merry Christmas considering everything. We are pretty well clad, tolerably well fed and we are cheered up with the idea that our country is doing everything she can for us.”5
Little official activity occurred to pass the time, aside from occasional scouting parties, foraging and picket duty. According to Stevens, a typical day started with reveille at daybreak, a quick drum beat for about a half minute. The men donned their accouterments, then each company formed on line, and roll was called. Stacking arms, the men began preparing breakfast. Then the regimental surgeon attended those reporting for sick call at the medical wagon and “prescribed for them” from his assortment of pills and syrups. Later, the surgeons visited soldiers too sick to make it to the wagon. Then, at around 9:30 a.m., drill call, and each company formed up for company, regimental, or brigade drill (depending upon the day) until about 12:00 noon. On company drill days, each company drilled for two to two-and-a-half hours. On battalion drill days, the regiment formed on the color line and marched out into an open field, where the colonel put the regiment through its paces. The occasional brigade drill, or a division or corps-wide “review,” always brought out the generals decked out in full dress and put the troops on their best “bib and tucker,” as Stevens put it.6
After the first year of the war, the troops were seldom required to drill in the afternoon. An hour before sundown, the brigade would hold a “dress parade.” For this, the regiment formed and dressed, and orders were read to the troops by the adjutant in a loud, distinct voice. Subsequently, evening was free for recreational activities, such as cards, “news walking,” congregating at the sutler’s store, writing home, or reading.7
As the two huge armies were separated only by a river a few hundred yards wide, routine camp activities of the opposing side could easily be observed. On quiet nights, pickets could hear conversations on the opposite bank. Many nights Federal bands serenaded the Confederates with “Yankee Doodle,” and “The Battle Hymn of the Republic”; as for the Confederates, their bands graciously reciprocated with “Dixie,” and “The Bonnie Blue Flag.” Occasionally, the musicians of both sides would combine and give a joint rendition of songs of common adulation, such as “Home, Sweet Home.”8
Given this close proximity, it was only natural that a certain amount of fraternization between pickets would occur. A regular exchange of goods occurred across the Rappahannock, although officially prohibited, with negotiated and truces between the pickets. While the river was deep, it was narrow enough for the pickets to converse with each other and sail across small boats laden with exchangeable goods as cargo. Federal pickets often sent coffee over in exchange for tobacco; newspapers were exchanged in similar fashion. When boats were unavailable, the items would be affixed to rocks and thrown across the stream. Sometimes, the pickets would swim or row across to gossip, play cards, and exchange goods personally with their enemy.9
Mark Smither wrote his sister of a joke played on one of the men while he was serving on picket duty. As his friend Joel was walking his beat, humming happily, the ice cracked near him, and a men in the bushes commanded, “Come here sir! You are my prisoner!” Joel pretended to misunderstand and replied, “No, I wont take you prisoner,” whereupon a figure jumped out of the bushes yelling, “Come on boys’ let’s take him.” Joel cried out, “please don’t take me!” The apparition said he would not take him, indicating instead, “well then get out of our way, we must cross these lines.” As Joel led the shadowy figure toward the reserve post, one of the other jokesters asked Joel why he was deserting his post; Joel screamed, “Don’t you see that devil after me!” The jokester, now thoroughly concerned of the consequences of a false alarm in the camp replied:
‘Why, that is nobody but Mc.’ Joel turned and Mc coming up nearly dead with laughter Joel cried out ‘Why Mc: is that you! well that is a good joke, by zounds!’ and never I suppose since the days of the deluge, has the banks of the Rappahannock reechoed with so much laughter from both sides for the Yankee pickets hearing it all, were as much amused as our boys were.10
Burnside continued his efforts to negotiate another upstream crossing of the Rappahannock. To garner support, he sent Lincoln a letter advising the President that he could either support his efforts or let him return to civilian life. Lincoln gave him qualified backing in return, and on January 19, Burnside moved toward the fords over an ocean of mud, in a drizzle which soon became a downpour. After a futile attempt to gain the crossing the next day, the mired army was turned around and the famous “Mud March” was done, and so was Burnside.11
Burnside’s commanders had long been extremely critical of their leader, and with morale lower than ever, a number of them actually conspired against him, informing Lincoln and Stanton of his “incompetence” as leader of the Army of the Potomac. Joseph Hooker commented to a newspaperman that Lincoln was “an imbecile not only for keeping Burnside on but also in his own right.” Burnside had finally snapped at the dissention and disloyalty, and asked for an audience with Lincoln. Reaching the White House on January 24th, he demanded the dismissal of four of his commanders, including Hooker, and the relief of yet another six. On January 25, Burnside received a copy of General Order No. 8, prepared by Lincoln himself, relieving him of command, along with generals Sumner and Franklin, and appointing Joseph Hooker as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Commenting on Hooker’s infidelity to Burnside as well as to him, personally, Lincoln admitted that Hooker “does talk badly.” However, he stated, “He can fight. I think that is pretty well established,” and, according to Lincoln, Hooker was thus “what the army and the country needed in the present crisis.”12
With fighting in abeyance and military duties reduced considerably, the men had a significant amount of time on their hands to pass. Generally, the bitter cold weather was not conducive to many outdoor activities, especially among the men from Texas, who were unaccustomed dealing with such severe winters. Smither reported that by the end of January, the heavens dumped more snow than he had ever seen. It was, he admitted, “the largest snow here … I ever saw, it was nearly waist deep.” As another of the men put it, “It was a dreary camp and a dreary life.” With time on their hands and bad weather outside, the men generally opted for indoor pursuits. Gambling was always been a popular pastime for men in military service, and cards and dice flourished throughout the Army of Northern Virginia, particularly in winter camp. With communication on the Mississippi interrupted, the Texans received few letters from home. With few duties, they became quite idle and restless. “Idleness favors gamblers in the army, just as it makes paupers and tramps out of the some of its soldiers,” a Texan declared. The good many expert card players in the brigade managed to keep the greenhorns pretty well strapped.
The hope of gain caused many a poor fellow to part with his roll of “Promise to Pay” that the Confederate Government had given him for standing on the firing line, killing, and taking chances of being killed. There is a strange, unaccountable fascination about gambling that those who never looked on a game of chance cannot realize.13
Men who had never picked up a deck of cards, placed in such surroundings with considerable time on their hands, soon became addicted to that sport of camp life and became easy prey for card sharks. Professionals carried their own special decks, which soon became “mouldy from manipulation and creased from chicanery,” as one soldier put it. Even when exposed, there were still sufficient untapped amateur suckers to make their profession a lucrative one. Each regiment had its top gamblers, and inter-regimental rivalry between the card sharks was quite common. To lay claim to the title of top gambler in Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, it was not unusual for the most successful card sharks of one regiment to challenge those of another regiment to a kind of round robin elimination contest. In such affairs, cheating was usually the norm.14
The men did not spend all their leisure time indoors, however. With snow on the ground for weeks at a time, when the temperature rose above freezing, soldiers engaged in a favorite pastime—snowballing. These contests normally followed snowfalls, which meant fairly regularly in December and January in northern Virginia. Nothing compared in size or intensity to the fight that occurred on January 29, 1863. Snow fell all day on the 28th, with drifts measuring up to several feet in places. The sun warmed up the newly fallen snow the next morning, producing ideal conditions for well-packed snowballs. “The boys had a fine time yesterday, fighting battles with snowballs,” Rufus Felder wrote home the next day. The 1st and 4th Texas regiments had initiated the fray, which became known as the “Great Snowball Battle,” by attacking the men of the 5th Texas near their campsite with ice balls. The 5th Texas, despite inferior numbers, took up the challenge, and “with a yell that would have shamed a gang of wolves on the prairies of Texas,” Smither told his sister, “we rallied and drove them clear back home.” Felder reported, “[T]he storm of battle raged with the utmost fury for two hours [until] both parties having become perfectly exhausted.” The Texans then combined forces and advanced on the unsuspecting 3rd Arkansas. They caught the “Porkers,” resting in their warm winter huts, completely off guard, and they soon surrendered.15
By now, too successful and too entertaining to abandon, the instigators decided to lead the entire Texas Brigade against Anderson’s Georgia Brigade, which was situated on a hill across Massaponax Creek some three-fourths of a mile distant. With haversacks full of ice and snowballs, officers deployed out in front, and battle flags unfurled and waving, the 1,500-strong Texas Brigade moved to do battle with the “goober grabbers.” Aroused by ringing notes from a bugler, and the spine tingling Rebel Yell, the Texans assaulted Anderson’s camp. But the Georgians had been forewarned, and the struggle seesawed for a half hour up and down the hill and back and forth across the creek. Finally, the Texas Brigade, reinforced by stragglers from earlier fights, surged across the creek, up and over a hill, and claimed victory. Swept back to their encampment, the Georgians’ commander gallantly surrendered his forces.16
Then two of Hood’s brigades combined forces and marched against McLaws’s division and Jenkins’s brigade of Pickett’s division, camped to their north. By now, over 9,000 soldiers were engaged in this immense snow brawl. Many of the officers had joined in the fight and were leading troops in tactical maneuvers. Fletcher described the scene:
Couriers could be seen going to and from, same as in battle, with horses at speed, so the word was passed to the front and as there was one encampment after another charged, the excitement was grand; regiment after regiment, brigade after brigade and division after division joined in, until it was said the whole of Longstreet’s corps had snow battled. When one tired he dropped out, and as I was one of the early participants, I did not see the ending; but it was reported that it ended about five miles from the place of beginning.
Commands, yells, and music filled the air as thousands of snow balls flew back and forth. When they hit and burst, the white missiles “created a cascade of snow above the contestants which almost obliterated the sun.” Old cloth, hats, caps, shoes, boots, pieces of shirts and fragments of haversacks littered the ground in every direction. Smither recalled:
[w]e captured the ‘4th, 15th, & 44th,’ Alabamas colors, the next day our Division (Hood’s) composed of the 4 Brigades I have mentioned attacked Genl McLaw’s Division We fought all day and after a desperate struggle succeeded in getting possession of their camps, the cheering could be heard across the river, and the opposite bank was crowded by yanks, dying to know what good news we were so jubilant over.
Felder also summed up the affair for his family back home:
We had not succeeded in effectively subduing them but held our ground. It is indeed a grand sight to see several thousand men drawn up in line of battle fighting with snow & with as much earnestness as if the fate of our country depended on the contest…. It is more interesting to look at these battles than a real one as there are no lives lost & but little blood shed.17
Val Giles later remarked that it might “appear a little ridiculous to some that a lot of grown-up men, many of them old men at that, would forget both dignity and years to become boys again, but on that occasion our oldest officers rallied to the shrill call of … [the] bugle and hurriedly prepared to receive the onslaught of the enemy.” Fletcher observed that “All were defeated; all were victorious,” in such contests. Just as war transformed these boys and men into battle-hardened veterans, so too it changed how they played. Unfortunately, play got too rough at times, and many suffered bruises and lacerations from rock-centered snowballs and ice balls; two men were badly injured, and a number of “captured” officers handled roughly. So when the high command learned of the affair, “general snowballing” was prohibited. Longstreet regretted having to “interfere with the amusements of the gallant soldiers who had driven the enemy from the valley of the Rappahannock,” but still required the sport to cease. Not surprisingly, snowballing continued that winter, however, but never on such a grand scale.18
Another outdoor activity the regiment continued thoroughly to enjoy was foraging. While around Fredericksburg, the men, known for their uncanny ability for “unauthorized procurement,” had plenty of time to ply their trade. While the rail line from Richmond provided some of the best food the regiment had enjoyed since July, the Texans craved variety beyond the daily issue of beef, bacon and biscuits. They always sought to supplement their routine government issue with something a little more exotic. “Rabbits, guinea hens, chickens, and shoats appeared to be the most popular targets for the Texans.” Plentiful at first, rabbits were easy prey, but soon became a scarce commodity around camp. Guinea hens were abundant in large coveys, but elusive, and thus “the gun was the only thing that could capture… [one],” according to Fletcher, “and as shooting was prohibited, the guinea was the only safe fowl in time of war.”19
Hood’s tent was located near Lee’s, and they often visited and reminisced of Texas and the days they had spent on the frontier. During one such visit, Lee voiced criticism of his army for “burning fence rails, killing pigs and committing sundry delinquencies of this character.” Defending his men, Hood asserted tongue in cheek that his men were innocent of such offences, and requested Lee send his chief of staff, Col. R. H. Chilton, to check the local fences and livestock. Lee paused his pacing in front of the camp fire, and with a twinkle in his eye, turned to Hood and said, “Ah, General Hood, when you Texans come about, the chickens have to roost mighty high.” Around this same time, one of Lee’s commanders was asked by a reporter what kind of fighters the Texans were, to which the reply was “The Texas boys are great fighters—none better. But they are purely hell on chickens and shoats.” Without doubt, the Texans had gained a far-reaching reputation for their foraging as well as their fighting abilities.20
In mid-February, the regiment’s relatively comfortable life in winter camp was interrupted, when a portion of the Federal army reportedly moved from the Rappahannock to Hampton Roads and Suffolk in southern Virginia. The concern on Lee’s part was that Hooker was planning another move on Richmond. On February 14, he ordered Pickett’s division to march for Richmond the next day. Hood’s division was placed in readiness for a similar movement, following further intelligence. On February 16, Lee directed Pickett to halt on the Chickahominy where he could block any move toward Richmond and still procure provisions and forage for his animals. Due to concern by President Davis and members of the Confederate congress, late on the 15th Lee also ordered Hood’s division to move to Hanover Junction. Thus, on February 17, the regiment moved out of its restful encampment at sunrise, in the midst of a blizzard, and proceeded south with the division. The first day the regiment made 12-14 miles on the march.21
By the 19th, Lt. Cobb reported that the regiment had arrived at Hanover Junction, only to learn that was no longer its destination. On the 20th, the regiment made another 20 miles toward Richmond. Veterans of the march remember it as one of the most grueling of the war. Watson Williams wrote home that the snow “is deeper than I ever saw it. But I will pass over this miserable march for it will not mend the matter by telling you of the suffering we underwent.” The men marched three days with heavy packs through snow, sleet and rain, with the roads quagmires of half-frozen mud and slush, and the creeks swollen to three times their normal width. Stevens was one of those who dropped out along the way. Suffering immensely from the cold, he and a comrade joined a captain of another company and put up in a house where they were furnished a warm room and a roaring fire. After they “had a good supper” cooked by a hired man, the pair spent a restful night and struck out cross country on the railroad the next morning, arriving in Richmond well ahead of the rest of the command.22
The 5th Texas reached Richmond at 9:00 a.m. on February 21, marched through the city the next day, crossed the James River on the lower bridge (Mayo’s Bridge), and then proceeded south about three miles. Here they camped for several days. When his captain learned that he had evaded the terrible march, he was “dissatisfied,” but Stevens confessed, “I would rather have taken a severe reprimand than to have made the terrible march.”23
The regiment, as part of Hood’s division, was given a tumultuous welcome as it marched through Richmond on Washington’s Birthday. Being the first troops of Lee’s army to visit Richmond since the battles of Second Manassas, Antietam, and Fredericksburg, the residents accorded them heros’ welcomes. The soldiers, too, were delighted to return to an urban environment with all of its luxuries and vices. A. B. Hood wrote home that, as the regiment marched on through the city, “the sidewalks were jammed with handkerchief waving onlookers who plied them with whiskey and tobacco.” The Texans presented quite a show in return on their march. Uninhibited as usual, and led by the bands of the 4th Texas and 3rd Arkansas, playing “Dixie” and the “Marseillaise Hymn,” they marched down Broad Street, “screaming, halloring and yelling like so many demons.” Bantering with the crowd as they marched, the Texans made particular sport of women wearing large hats, requesting that they “get down out of them hats.”24
On February 28, the regiment moved seven miles below the city to Falling Creek, near Drewry’s Bluff, and established a campsite on the south bank of a creek about 100 yards west of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. This would be home until early April. The men were pleased with the change in location, which provided easy access to the Texas Depot, where the private property of all members of the command was stored for safekeeping. Additionally, Hood was “exceedingly liberal in granting passes,” enabling the men to make frequent visits to the city and its panoply of recreations. Finally, proximity to the army’s main supply depot had distinct advantages. General Hood was such “a favorite with both civil and military authorities, [that] his requisitions on the quartermaster department were honored to such an extent that the ragged were clothed and the bare-footed shod,” according to Joseph Polley.25
Hats, one of few essential items for the soldier, were exceedingly scarce, easy to lose, and wore out. Next to his rifle, a hat was probably the most useful item an infantryman possessed. It kept the sun, rain, snow, and sleet off his weather-beaten face and neck. It served to dip water, to drink from, and to wash in It also doubled as a fan and drove away flies and was good to swat mosquitoes with because it was always within reach. When necessity demanded, it could even be used as a shoe. Like shoes, however, they never seemed in sufficient supply to meet the needs of all the troops. Government issue hats were generally made of inferior material and wore out quickly. A Texan fortunate to still have an “issue hat” at this stage in the war had his hair most likely sprouting through the holes in its crown, and had a brim “as pliable and serrated as a fighting hound’s ear.” With another summer’s campaign impending, the Texans thus took it upon themselves to resolve the problem of procuring new headgear in a unique manner.
The regiment’s campsite along the railroad proved to be an ideal location for initiating its hat procurement operation. A high railroad bridge across the creek insured that trains slowed at a point most suitable for the scheme’s execution. All those needing a hat, and many “helpers,” would form a line on one side of the track shortly before a train arrived, each armed with a prod made from the tops of young pines. As the train approached the grade and slowed down, the hidden Texans would shoot off their rifles and raise the fearsome Rebel Yell. Startled and curious passengers raised the windows and stuck out their heads to see what the noise was all about. It was then that the hand-held prods came into play, knocking hats off the bewildered passengers. With their new headgear in hand, the Texans “skedaddled” through the woods back to camp as carloads of irate passengers disappeared over the bridge toward Richmond.
At first, complaints by the hatless “victims,” consisting of “plain, unassuming citizens,” were dismissed by authorities as the victims of a practical joke. However, the “fedora foraging,” as one soldier put it, was reported with such frequency and success that almost every man in the brigade owned a new hat. When a brigadier general and members of his staff, however, traveling together with at least six members of the Confederate Congress, returned from some junket and lost their “cocked and stovepipe hats at the same place and in the same high-handed way,” a formal complaint brought the practice to a screeching halt. Thereafter, a guard was stationed at the bridge to prevent further hat thefts.26
After Sharpsburg, Lee had requested Texas Senator Louis Wigfall to secure more Texas regiments for the Army of Northern Virginia, with visions of forming an entire Texas division. Wigfall’s effort to secure additional Texas troops, or even if he attempted any, is unknown. Hood fruitlessly inquired of the senator on November 17 whether “the new regiments [were then] on their way to Richmond.” In late January, a number of brigade officers petitioned the Texas senators and congressional representatives, seeking “ten more regiments from Texas be brought here so as to have a Texas Division.” For whatever reason, perhaps reluctance on the part of Governor Lubbock to furnish troops so far from the State or because they were needed at home, no additional units were ever furnished.27
On March 16, Lee informed Longstreet that Hooker appeared to be preparing a move across the Rappahannock to the south, and that the army therefore needed to “be prepared to concentrate to meet him wherever he should advance in force,” presumably along that river. Lee also requested Hood’s division be ready to return to the Fredericksburg area. The very next day, he directed that Hood be sent back north, however, as a portion of Hooker’s force was reportedly preparing to cross the Rappahannock at United States and Kelly’s Fords. Thus, on March 18, the 5th Texas struck its tents, loaded its wagons and proceeded to march north along the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. Cobb wrote that “every man was urgent to procure something to eat as we had hurried off without breakfast & without provisions in our haversack.” That night, he wrote that the brigade was “doubtless on the eve of entering upon another active campaign. Many of our gallant boys will fall, sealing their devotion to their country with their blood. May He who ruleth the nations be our shield, inspire us with courage & strength to drive the invader from Southern soil for ever!”28
The regiment moved north on the Brook Turnpike in the direction of Ashland. As they passed through Richmond, the famous diarist, Mary Boykin Chesnut, noted the “rags and tags” the men wore and the deplorable condition of their footwear. Furthering their “tramp-like appearance,” the men had tied tin pans and pots to their waists, and stuck bread and bacon on the ends of their bayonets. Despite the weather and their appalling appearance, however, Mrs. Chesnut noted that these Texans “laughed and shouted and cheered as they marched by.” They jawed with spectators all along the turnpike, although their remarks were for the most part “respectful [and] light.” It was only when they spotted neat, freshly groomed and uniformed soldiers among the women and children that they begin taunting. “Ladies, send those puny conscripts on to their regiments.” They derided officers as well: “Captain, either take off your shoulder straps or come on to the Rappahannock. Maybe you did not know there was fighting going on there.” Some of the taunting victims grumbled at their treatment but were warned not to respond because, “[t]hose rough and ready Texans will make you rue it, if you give them a chance.”29
The regiment marched all day on March 19 under threatening skies, covering about 22 miles along the way. When it got within a few miles of Ashland, however, General Lee recalled the division after having assured himself that no danger threatened the Southern capital. By this time night was falling, so Hood ordered the command into camp. While reasonably warm during the day, by dusk the sky was completely clouded over and a brisk wind blew in from the north. By midnight, snow began to fall, and by daybreak the ground was covered with three to four inches of fresh snow. Lining up at 8:00 a.m., the regiment began retracing its march to the Richmond camp it had just vacated in the midst of yet another heavy snowstorm. According to Stevens, the “snow [was] nearly knee deep” on the march, “and I am once more bare-footed. Now I guess you think I suffered. Not a bit then—but have suffered ever since—now, walking streets of Hillsboro—both feet are diseased from the effects of that day.” The weather was too cold for the regiment to rest more than five minutes at a time during the difficult march. Lieutenant Cobb reported that the day was the harshest snow storm the regiment had yet encountered, with more than 18 inches piled high on the ground by the time the weary Texans finally reached Richmond.30
As a result of this long and cold march, explained Polley, the men became fueled with “a natural longing to partake of the viands, liquid and otherwise, so easily to be procured in Richmond since a learned justice of the peace there had decided that the military authorities had fractured the constitutions of both the State of Virginia and the Southern Confederacy when they prohibited the sale of liquor by the drink.” As General Robertson’s men drew near to the city, wet and tired from tramping through wet snown all day mingled with bitter cold, there was much straggling—not to the rear, but this time to the front. Once inside the city, the brigade virtually disintegrated—every non-teetoaler soldier executing a flank movement to right or left through the swinging doors lining both sides of Broad Street. So suddenly and inexplicably had the ranks depleted, that when “Aunt Pollie” looked back through the shower of yet fast-falling snowflakes at the attenuated gaggle of shadowy figures still following in his wake, he could only exclaim, “Where the blankety blank is the Texas Brigade?”31
Robertson was about to send details to track down the miscreants, when Hood intervened and dissuaded him. Hood understood these Texans and their need to be indulged occasionally. “Let ‘em go, General – let ‘em go,” he told Robertson, “they deserve a little indulgence, and you’ll get them back in time for the next battle.” Once the men had “rewarded” themselves after the miserable march back to the capital, they encamped at their recently abandoned grounds awaiting the orders to the next fight.32
The horrendous winter of 1862-63 had forced Lee’s men to subsist on substantially reduced rations. So scarce was food and forage for the army and its horses that men were forced to hunt sassafras buds and wild onions to ward off scurvy, while horses died from lack of grass and grain. Lee intended therefore to combine Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions from the Army of Northern Virginia with Confederate forces already in southern Virginia and North Carolina. This combined force had two objectives. First, pinning down the sizeable Union garrison at Suffolk, Virginia, by demonstrating against Norfolk and prompting Hooker to send a portion of his army southward. And second, to undertake a massive foraging expedition west and south of Suffolk, Virginia to procure desperately needed food and forage for the Army of Northern Virginia.33
On March 28th, the regiment received orders to cook all rations on hand and send their surplus baggage to Richmond for the move to Suffolk, some 110 miles distant. It abandoned camp at Falling Creek on April 2, reaching Petersburg late the next day, where it bivouacked east of the city. The march south resumed on April 8, down the Jerusalem Plank Road through Hawkinsville, Littleton, Barn Tavern and Jerusalem, and then across the Blackwater River on a pontoon bridge at Franklin, 20 miles southwest of Suffolk. Franklin became a temporary depot to store excess personal equipment and supplies.34
After skirmishes with Longstreet’s forces along the Blackwater River, the Federal infantry had fallen back on Suffolk. Federal cavalry patrols along the Roanoke and Seaboard Railroad under command of Col. Samuel P. Spear, an old friend of Hood’s from their U. S. cavalry days in Texas, continually harassed the Texans along the railroad. Spear’s troopers hung around the head of the Confederate column all day attempting to ascertain its relative strength, occasionally firing into the column. Finally, the Yankees captured one of Hood’s scouts. Following Hood’s instructions, the captured soldier disclosed that Longstreet’s entire corps of 40,000 men (actually only 16,000-18,000) was nearby and poised to retake Norfolk. Spear paroled the scout and dispatched him with a message for Hood to “d__n his long bow-legged heart, [and that] he wanted to meet him in a fair open field and he’d give him h_ll,” interspersed with much rougher language; Hood was greatly amused. In a more civil invitation, Spear said would be glad to meet and have social chat, if such a thing were permissible.35
The Texans marched toward Suffolk all day on April 10, guarding their flanks carefully. At times, only 300-400 yards separated them from Federal infantry protecting the area. Hood remained with the advance guard, despite repeated efforts by Federal sharpshooters to kill him. Approaching the city at dusk on April 11, the regiment moved forward in line of battle. Dennis A. Rowe of Company K, son of an early settler and scion of a prominent Polk County family, accidentally discharged his rifle, blowing off his middle finger and thus becoming the campaign’s only casualty to date. The men proceeded to entrench along the west bank of the Nansemond River, north of Suffolk. Early the next morning, they maneuvered from one point to another, and by making threatening demonstrations exaggerated the size of their force. All the while, a significant portion of the force was busy foraging for supplies throughout the countryside.36
Suffolk, currently occupied by two Federal divisions of over 25,000 men under Maj. Gen. John J. Peck and Brig. Gen. George W. Getty, was located on the Nansemond River, a tidal stream with many sandbars and tributaries emptying into the James River at Hampton Roads. The Norfolk & Petersburg and the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroads intersected just to its west. The area, located on flat landscape, had no natural defenses, but Peck had constructed formidable, rectangular fortifications encircling the town—a series of nine forts and several heavy batteries. Earthworks and trenches connected these strong points, along a solid defensive perimeter eight miles long. A flotilla of gunboats operating on the Nansemond from Suffolk to Hampton Roads augmented these extensive land defenses. Peck was prepared to fight to the last man, he wrote, even given the “great preponderance of artillery as well as other branches,” the Confederates enjoyed (his combined force actually outnumbered Longstreet by a third, but Peck thought he faced 35,000 men with 120 pieces of artillery.)37
Longstreet considered a direct assault on the town’s defenses futile A long siege would free the surrounding counties of Union troops, thereby allowing for the gathering of commissary and quartermaster supplies—his primary goal. Old Pete told Seddon that while he could reduce the town “in 2 or 3 days,” he didn’t believe it worth the “powder and ball,” let alone the cost in Confederate casualties—5,000, he estimated. So, instead, he invested the town with a line about two to three miles from the Union line of breastworks and parallel to them on three sides, extending 15 miles from the Nansemond River on the north to the Great Dismal Swamp on the south. Hood’s division occupied the left or northern wing, Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French’s division, from the Department of South Virginia, the center, and Pickett’s division the right wing. Longstreet held this long, concave front with a minimum of troops, freeing additional manpower for his all important foraging activities in the rear. His commissary officers were purchasing everything in sight, and soon long wagon trains of wagon trains of goods and forage were winding westward day and night to depots along the Norfolk & Petersburg Railroad. To everyone’s delight, “supplies appeared inexhaustible in this region scarcely touched by war till now.”38
On April 11, following several probes, Longstreet determined Peck’s defenses vulnerable to an assault from the north. Two days later Confederate sharpshooters on the west bank of the Nansemond forced two Union gunboats, Stepping Stones and Mount Washington, to run aground near the Norfleet farm, about two-plus miles north of the town. The rising tide next morning freed the stranded gunboats, which proceeded south toward town. However, rounding a sharp bend near the Norfleet House, Confederate guns concealed in the woods emerged again into the newly constructed battery and opened fire. Hit in the starboard boiler, Mount Washington ran into the river bank, but Stepping Stones soon pulled her free. The gunboats labored downstream, with the disabled Mount Washington in tow until opposite Hill’s Point, where, at about 11:30 a.m., Mount Washington again stuck in a sandbar.
At Hill’s Point, where the Western Branch flowed from the west into the Nansemond River, Confederates had moved five cannon (three 12-pounder Napoleons and two 24-pounder howitzers) into an 1861 fort (a rework of a War of 1812 redoubt) about eight miles downriver from Suffolk. This fort, Fort Huger, was one of a cluster of five forts in the area. From here the Confederates continued pounding the crippled vessel until the tide rose and refloated it, whereupon its sister ship was finally able to tow it safely downstream with 20 casualties onboard, including five killed.39
Meanwhile Hood was responsible for pushing toward the Nansemond east of town. His moves prompted Getty to reconnoiter the river bank, and he encouraged Peck to excavate new works to prevent the Confederates from crossing the river. Peck agreed, and Getty thereafter supervised additional earthwork construction which shut the only remaining open door to Suffolk just in the nick of time. At the same time, Hood was under orders from Longstreet to “burn and destroy all the wharves and landings on the Nansemond and also on the James that [he could] reach.” Undoubtedly, the brigade, positioned on the left near the river, participated in this activity.
While the firing continued from Norfleet House, Getty observed the action from across the river and contemplated ways to neutralize the troublesome Confederate battery. He spotted two sites, both covered with brush and small trees that would be ideal for “masked batteries.” During the night of April 14, he built two of these: Battery Morris and Battery Kimball. At daybreak, Battery Morris opened fire on the Norfleet House battery, sparking a lively duel, until Battery Kimball joined the fray with an enfilading fire. Eventually, the Confederate battery was silenced. Downstream, however, Confederate gunners in Fort Huger, still threatened any Federal vessels daring to journey upstream.40
Despite Longstreet’s precautions, however, Fort Huger was vulnerable. At daylight on Sunday, April 19, the 5th Texas entered the rifle pits along Western Branch near the fort and endured heavy fire from Yankee sharpshooters the rest of the day. Lieutenant Cobb ruefully mused how “unfortunate that this day” men should be “engaged in work of destruction rather than … in services more in consonance with the sanctity of the Sabbath!” At 10:00 a.m., five Union gunboats, intent on capturing Fort Huger, came within range of Knob Hill, a Confederate gun emplacement two-thirds of a mile from the fort. The Confederate guns there and at Fort Huger dueled the gunboats for over five hours. At 5:00 p.m., Stepping Stones, with a detachment of Union infantry aboard, steamed upriver past Knob Hill and Fort Huger under protection of the intense artillery fire. About 300 yards beyond Fort Huger, the gunboat turned into the swampy ground on the west bank and discharged its infantrymen. The bluecoats hurried across a cornfield toward the vulnerable open rear of the fort. Though the 150-man garrison from the 44th Alabama opened fire, the Federals advanced so quickly they lost only four men killed and 10 wounded. The Confederates reported one killed, with the rest captured along with the fort’s five guns.41
Lieutenant Roswell H. Lawson, commanding the Union force, spent the night consolidating his position and preparing for a Confederate counterattack. He dug new gun emplacements and rifle pits and received reinforcements to serve the captured guns. Relieved at dusk, the 5th Texas had just reached its campsite when the brigade was alerted for an unusual night assault to retake the fort and began moving via the Norfleet House toward the fort. After a close reconnaissance of the area, though, Generals Hood and French decided an attack not worth the potential cost. Thus, all that occurred was a slight probe by the 55th North Carolina, which was quickly replused. The regiment spent the next two days in the woods near the fort, occasionally taking fire from Union gunboats and the fort itself. The Federals resolved any lingering doubts as to the Confederates’ proper course of action by removing the guns and prisoners on the evening of April 20. Once the evacuation was confirmed by Hood’s scouts, the regiment returned to its former campsite on April 21.42
Longstreet was furious at French for the loss of Fort Huger. The latter tried to duck responsibility by claiming that he was not responsible for defending the emplacements, Hood was. Hood believed accountability for the river batteries well beyond his purview. Consequently no commander paid attention to the affairs at Fort Huger. Longstreet thought French’s expectations for Hood to protect the batteries “strange” since the batteries were under French’s exclusive control, and he been told twice to use the 55th North Carolina for that purpose. (Longstreet also blamed Colonel Connally, commander of the 55th North Carolina, for his half-hearted attempt to retake the fort. Connally claimed nothing could have lived through the enemy’s artillery fire. Old Pete disagreed, citing his own analysis involving the number of shots coming from the fort per minute with the distance the attackers had to travel.)43
While no major battles were fought in the Suffolk area, the regiment nonetheless took daily sniper and artillery fire from the Union gunboats. Under these trying conditions, the Texans constructed a formidable siege line, including forts, trenches, abatis works, and rifle pits. They also performed routine picket and outpost duty. Both weather and the nature of the terrain discouraged building an extensive line of fortifications. Rain frequently soaked the open, low, and flat piney woods, halting digging, flooding the rifle pits and trenches, and forcing the troops to wade from their campsites to duty station. But the men were still able to construct a line of fortifications impressive enough to elicit praise from their adversaries.44
Indeed, General Peck marveled at the Confederates’ speed and efficiency in constructing their massive defense line. The fortifications ran for “10 miles of batteries, covered ways, and rifle pits … the artillery was protected by embrasures; the parapets were from 12 to 15 feet in thickness well revetted, while the covered-ways were from 8 to 10 feet.” One of Peck’s subordinates, Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon, described the extent of this construction:
Everywhere in front, from the Nansemond to the swamp, they had thrown up heavy intrenchments for infantry. On all the roads batteries for artillery, in embrasure, well revetted, with ditches wide and deep, and abatis skillfully laid and thickly interwoven, rendered a sortie almost hopeless. Not only one line of such defenses covered the enemy’s front but on some roads three, four, and even five parallel lines of formidable works were formed, indicating in the clearest manner a strengthened base from which the approaches were to be made and upon which the enemy could retire if forced back in their attack.45
The Suffolk operations represented the first major commitment by a large body of troops to trench warfare in the Civil War. The rifle pits that constituted the Confederate forward line often came to within just 200 yards of the opposing Federal works. Volunteers manned the rifle pits since Federal artillery and sharpshooters completely dominated the area between the lines from higher ground. Given the extent of the fire that could be concentrated against these exposed pits, they could only be approached and entered safely only in the darkness. General Hood assigned 10 to 12 men to each pit and issued each man 125 rounds of ammunition. Their mission was simple: harass Yankee artillery crews to cease firing and force their sharpshooters to seek cover.46
While the number of casualties was slim in this siege operation, one death in the ranks of the regiment proved irreplaceable. Rising star Capt. Isaac “Ike” Newton Moreland Turner was killed on April 14 inside Fort Huger. Turner, the son of a veteran of the Texas war for independence, had been elected captain of the Polk County Flying Artillery, later Company K and, at the age of 22, became the youngest commander in the entire Texas Brigade. With the loss of all field grade officers at both Second Manassas and Sharpsburg, Turner had temporarily assumed command of the entire regiment and was breveted major following the horrendous battle of Sharpsburg, with the understanding that the rank would become permanent when he successfully organized a battalion of Texas sharpshooters.47
At the time of his death, Turner was in charge of four companies of infantry and an artillery battery defending the entrance to the Nansemond River. The four companies he commanded made up a special battalion of Texas sharpshooters that he and Brig. Gen. Robertson had carefully assembled. Previously, Turner had led 150 such Texas scouts at the battle of Malvern Hill. At Fredericksburg, he had been individually honored by a dress parade “for gallantry in marching his company to the rear under fire, in perfect order and in line of march.” He was, it was said, “a brave and daring officer, quick to observe any advantage in position, prompt to take action thereunder, frequently assuming command of part or all of his regiment during the engagement when his superiors in rank were disabled or captured.” Ironically, Turner was standing atop a parapet at Fort Huger when he was struck by a ball from a sharpshooter across the river. Lying mortally wounded in the fort with his men gathered around him, he rasped his last request: “Men, if you can, please take me home to my mother, for I fear she will worry so about me.” They carried him to a field hospital where he died the following day.48
Capt. Isaac Newton Moreland Turner Patty Shreve
No one could honor Turner’s request amidst the fighting. The best his men could do was to see that his brother Charles, also a member of Company K, accompanied Ike’s body by rail for burial on his family’s old plantation near Milledgeville, Georgia. The entire brigade lamented his untimely death, particularly General Hood, who exclaimed, “he would sooner have lost any [other] officer in his command.” Hood considered Turner “a gifted outpost officer of … pre-eminent qualities.” Hood told General Lee that a “more noble and brave soldier had not fallen during the war.” After Turner’s death, Robertson’s grand plans for a battalion of Texas sharpshooters also died.49
Following Turner’s death, a member of the 4th Texas swam across the river toward the tall bulrushes on the opposite bank. With a “block of matches he secured on top of his head,” he set fire to the bulrushes driving the sharpshooters from their cover and returned to his lines unscathed. Private John W. Gordon of the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry spoke for many when he wrote, “If ever a man deserved promotion for gallantry and a niche in the Temple of Fame, this Texan did.” Unfortunately, no one thought to record his name at the time.50
The capture of Fort Huger represented the turning point of the siege, for it demonstrated the vulnerability of the Confederate river batteries. Failure of the Rebel navy to provide any support for Longstreet meant that he would have little future opportunity to challenge Federal control of the river. Therefore, he dropped any further aggressive movements along the river in favor of his primary foraging mission. Peck received 9,000 reinforcements immediately after the fall of Fort Huger, and he conducted several large demonstrations over the next few days. On April 24, 5,000 Federals from Fort Dix drove the Confederates out of their advanced picket lines.51
On April 30, the Texas pickets reported an enemy force of from 25-30 men debarked from Union gunboats. The 5th Texas formed up and sent out skirmishers that evening, to check this Union probe, according to Lieutenant Cobb, and after locating the party, chased them away with a couple volleys. The Texans then entered the empty fort. Another Federal force of 5,000 crossed the river on May 3, advanced along Providence Church Road, driving Hood’s picket line even farther inward. Cobb was ordered to take charge of Company F and move it to the left to hold the position commanding a portion of the low ground abutting the river. Toward noon, enemy skirmishers concealed by the woods until 300 yards away advanced on the fort to his right along the river bank, quickly answering Cobb’s fire with small arms and an artillery piece. With few men and no natural obstacles to prevent a flanking movement, Cobb ordered his party back to a fence running perpendicular to Hood’s main line. Colonel Robert M. Powell, commanding the regiment, then sent word to Brigadier General Robertson, after which three companies of the regiment deployed to the right and three to the left, while four remained within the breastworks. As the Yankees on the advanced to within 600 yards of their position, the companies on the left opened fire. “I never saw Yanks run so in my life,” Smither wrote later. After dark, Cobb’s force and the other companies withdrew and reformed with the regiment.52
While effectively containing the Federals with these limited sorties, Longstreet continued his foraging operation in the Virginia Tidewater and along the North Carolina border. It was the largest such operation by the South during the war. The effort focused on the counties east of the Chowan River in North Carolina and the Blackwater region of Virginia. Hundreds of men from both Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions and a fleet of wagons were employed in this massive operation. Secretary Seddon suggested Longstreet impress transport wagons and teams from the local farmers to augment the rundown Confederate vehicles and overworked draft animals. Longstreet gladly followed this recommendation, as many of these Tidewater farmers seemed in league with the Federal quartermasters who had been working in the area. These opportunists had also benefited from the competitive bidding wars among various Confederate procurement agencies, which inflated the price of their goods. Thorough Confederate impressment parties seized any wagons or animals the Federals had missed or rejected. Similarly, they rooted out many first class vehicles and horses secreted by their owners in the coastal swamps. The impressment teams paid the farmers for forage, grain, and meat in Confederate currency at local market prices. But the draft animals and wagons they used to cart off the food and fodder were usually simply appropriated without reimbursement.53
Longstreet had set May 3 for the end of their campaign for scouring the region of its stores. However, his lack of a definitive military victory against the Federals still rankled him. Taking Suffolk began to appeal more to him as an achievable and necessary objective. Old Pete wrote Lee, telling him what he had in mind. Lee replied on April 27th that Hooker was far too strong and active for him to weaken his army further by sending Longstreet additional troops. Lee did, however, give his war chief latitude: “[Y]ou must act according to your good judgment. If a damaging blow could be struck there or elsewhere of course it would be advantageous.” Consequently, Longstreet, while hauling out the last of the precious wagonloads of hogs, corn and herring, now turned his thoughts to the tactical details of an assault that might bestow some glory on his mission.54 Then on April 30 a wire from Adjutant General Cooper, relaying a dispatch from Lee, disrupted Longstreet’s work. Hooker had crossed over the Rappahannock in great strength, both above and below Fredericksburg, and appeared to be “in earnest.” Cooper told Longstreet to move his command “without delay” and rejoin General Lee. The 1863 summer offensive against Richmond had begun.
However, all this planning almost instantly changed. When he received Cooper’s message, Longstreet’s wagons were still far down the Chowan River, some 30 miles below Suffolk. Longstreet inquired by telegraph whether he should abandon the precious wagons and their cargoes and risk a quick withdrawal of his troops, which in turn would have the Federals hot on his heels. Cooper responded to the query on May 1 that Old Pete should “secure all possible dispatch without incurring loss of trains or unnecessary hazard of troops.” The orders were good news for Confederate foraging efforts, but it simultaneously hampered Lee, because the vital reinforcements he needed would necessarily be delayed.55
On May 2, once all of Longstreet’s foraging wagons were successfully across the north bank of the Blackwater River, he ordered his troops to leave the Suffolk area. The orders specified that Hood’s division march west on the Blackwater Road after dark on May 3, cross the Blackwater on a pontoon bridge at Franklin, and pull up the bridge behind it to prevent its use by the enemy. The Texas Brigade served again as the rear guard, leaving its trenches late on May 3. On the morning of the 4th, the Texans skirmished sharply with advance Union elements pursuing the Southern columns, and then crossed the Blackwater that afternoon, then took up the bridge. Leaving French to defend the rear, Hood and Pickett’s divisions boarded trains on the Norfolk & Petersburg Railroad at Ivor Station, arriving at Petersburg the next day at 4:00 p.m. Dawn of May 6 found the 5th Texas on the march for the James, leg-weary but still eager. Longstreet himself was in Richmond before noon that day preparing to rush both divisions northward by rail to the great battle already raging along the banks of the Rappahannock. But the following day, Lee wired Old Pete that the “emergency that made your presence so desirable has passed for the present … [do] not distress your troops by a forced movement to join me.” Instead, he was to proceed at a normal marching pace.56
The siege of Suffolk, in the words of Capt. Hazard Stevens of Getty’s staff, “was more distinguished for digging than for fighting.” The Federal forts and entrenchments were so effectively surrounded and protected from assault “that to accomplish their capture was out of the question,” Joseph Polley later wrote. “Hence, while the Texas Brigade did a great deal of picketing, skirmishing, and scouting it engaged in no battles, and its losses were slight—the most notable and the most regretted being that of the daring Captain Ike Turner of the Fifth Texas.” Total casualties were modest, with the Federals losing 260 men and Longstreet about 1,400 (including those captured at Fort Huger). An exasperated Hood had little use for this “buttoned-up style of warfare.” He had written to Lee at the end of April that “here we are in front of the enemy again. The Yankees have a very strong position, and of course they increase the strength of their position daily. I presume we shall leave here so soon as we gather all the bacon in the county…. it is my desire to return to you. If any troops come to the Rappahannock please don’t forget me.” He was obviously thoroughly bored with the whole affair.57
While the regiment’s tenure around Suffolk lacked heavy engagements, it fought plenty of skirmishes, which often produced casualties. Of course a bullet wound in a skirmish had the same impact on its recipient as one suffered in a major battle. But a soldier’s motivation to expose himself on picket duty or skirmish line, paled compared to his willingness to lay down his life in a great battle. One of the regiment’s Irish soldiers sent out on a skirmish mission quickly bounded back on the “Treble quick.” His lieutenant immediately chastised him, “I’d rather die, Mike, than run out of a fight in such a cowardly manner.” The Irishman quickly “fixed upon the officer a witheringly sarcastic look and replied: ‘The hail you would, Leftenent—the hail you would, sor, whin there was only a skirmish line of us boys an’ two regiments and a batthery of them!’”58
As it again passed through Richmond on May 8, another handkerchief-waving welcome by the ladies of the city greeted the 5th Texas. Marching northwestward, the regiment made 35 miles in two days, arriving at Frederick Hall on the Virginia Central Railroad about 2:00 p.m. on May 10. Upon arrival, it learned the “melancholy tiding” of Stonewall Jackson’s death. “[S]adness is upon us all,” Lieutenant Cobb wrote. “We feel this dispensation of Providence as a national calamity.” Nonetheless, the regiment set out towards Louisa Court House, arriving at Orange Court House on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad on May 16. Marching northeast to the vicinity of Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan, it encamped with the rest of the brigade a mile west of the river in a grove of large chestnut trees situated on a low ridge of hills. Though without their tents, and on rocky ground, the Texans’ the proximity to water, shade trees, and the high elevation, made the area ideally suitable for a bivouac. The Texans had been separated from the Army of Northern Virginia for three months. Lee ruefully regretted that had Hood’s and Pickett’s divisions been with him at Chancellorsville, Hooker would have been “demolished.” Fortunately, the reason for their absence had paid handsome dividends for his army, especially in light of the aggressive plans he envisioned for the coming months.59
The Texans’ foraging efforts proved truly remarkable, especially in light of the demands the coming summer would place upon the army. Captain Williams reported home:
Immense quantities of corn and fodder and all sorts of forage for horses have been gathered up and stored at safe places. [A friend] … tells me that they have got more corn than he ever saw before and I have heard from authority, that I do not doubt, that between two and one-half and three million pounds of bacon have been collected and secured. This amount, if given to Hood’s Division alone, could last a year and nearly a half.
John Stevens wrote that “[w]e just swim in bacon. Big rations—and all the time we have an immense wagon train hauling out bacon, corn, wheat, flour and great droves of beeves. It’s a big haul we are making.” Thomas J. Goree of Longstreet’s staff, and a fellow member of the regiment, observed that the army had “obtained a sufficiency of bacon to supply our own and General Lee’s army for two months.” On April 27, Longstreet had advised Secretary Seddon that the area was so rich in meat and grain that it would “require [yet] another month to haul out the supplies.” Given the depleted state of the Rappahannock-Rapidan area, Old Pete’s packed forage trains must have presented a delectable sight to Lee’s hungry men and scrawny horses when they arrived.60
Driven by the sheer number of horses impressed during April’s operations in the Tidewater, the Richmond authorities were now considering mounting Hood’s whole division, or at least the Texas Brigade. Longstreet eagerly fueled this fire as a means of pursuing the Federal cavalry operating in central Virginia. One of the brigade’s regiments, the 3rd Arkansas, had several of its companies temporarily mounted when Longstreet returned to the Richmond area around May 7. As mounted infantry they were being used to guard the railroads north of the capital against Federal cavalry raids. However, on June 2, after joining Hood at Culpeper Court House, their horses were taken away and given to the artillery.61
Seeing their fellow members temporarily mounted raised the Texans’ hopes that they, too, might receive horses. Many had harbored this dream since joining the Army of Northern Virginia. Their hopes had naturally diminished as the war progressed, with the shortage of horses slowing the formation of new cavalry units. The increased supply of fresh horses from Longstreet’s wide-ranging efforts around Suffolk inspired new hope and an opportunity to make their desires known. Many officers and men of the brigade took it upon themselves to sign a petition in mid-June and present it to President Davis. In it, they requested that he “convert the three Texas regiments now in Virginia to cavalry.” It was rumored that Davis was amenable to the request, but he failed to act upon it. The rumors were so persistent, however, that they reached the Federal high command. Brigadier General John Buford reported to General Hooker on June 5 that he received information that 800 Texans under Hood’s command had in fact been mounted. Soon, the Federals were convinced Hood’s entire division had been mounted. Unfortunately, the Texans’ wishes proved unsatisfied, and they remained infantrymen until the end—destined to walk, not ride, into the pages of history.62
While the 5th Texas awaited word of its next campaign, the rank and file had time for more pleasurable pursuits. The Texans could not remain anywhere for long without exercising their innate foraging skills against surrounding farms. After eating “high on the hog” for weeks on the bounty from their foraging activities in the Suffolk area, the men craved more variety and turned their attention to chicken, a favorite of foragers from biblical times. One member of the regiment developed a foraging reputation vis-à-vis chickens while still in Texas. He was from Company F and known only as “Tobacco Boy.” He had a sophisticated technique for raiding a chicken house, including the selection, silencing, and rapid plucking of the fowl. The accepted procedure called for a raiding party of a least three men—one to watch, one to kill, and one to sack. Tobacco Boy’s techniques thus gained wide-spread circulation amongst the Texas Brigade, and enabled the men to systematically strip the area of any living creature faintly resembling a chicken.63
Polley reported the men getting homesick for Texas during this time, citing one particular soldier who exclaimed, “I wish to God I was at home.” “Oh, yes,” Polley replied, “you want to see the girl you left behind you, don’t you?” The soldier replied, “No, indeed, but I want something to eat.” Polley, also “hungry” himself, “unanimously acquiesced in the sentiment.” It was not the quantity of the rations, as much as the “intolerable sameness,” he complained, of alternating between bread and meat every day.64
Aside from preparing for reviews and nocturnal raids on chicken coups, the Texans enjoyed an uneventful, leisurely pace awaiting orders for the summer campaign. Various recreational activities interspersed the necessities of camp life and occasional picket duty. Fishing was popular, with many making a dragnet of brush, thereby attempting to sieve the streams wholesale. Others spread their blankets in the shade and engaged in one of the army’s favorite pastimes—poker. Still others engaged in bathing and diving into a swimming hole. Cognizant that the oncoming summer would not pass without at least one major battle, and that their days of leisure were numbered, the men made the best of a brief respite.65
They would not have to wait long.
1 Mark Smither to Elizabeth Smither, December 28, 1862, in SHSP. The brigade’s name for their camp was “Camp Hope.”
2 Stevens, Reminiscences, 92-93; Lasswell, Rags and Hope, 167; Mark Smither to Elizabeth Smither, December 28, 1862, in SHSP; Simpson, Gaines’ Mill to Appomattox, 115.
3 Fletcher, Rebel Private, 68.
4 Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 213; W. H. Lewis to Mother, January 2, 1862, in Parker, Touched By Fire, 51-52. Some of the performances on Christmas Eve included “We are a band of brothers” sung by three “make-believe darkies” dressed entirely in black, with tall black hats and crepe hatbands, “looking more like a deputation from a corps of undertakers than anything else—and was intended, I suppose, as a burlesque upon Puritanism.” Wright, A Southern Girl in ’61, 115-16.
5 A. B. Hood to Wife, January 9, 1863, CRC; Cobb, diary, December 25, 1862, in UNC; Pomeroy, “War Memoirs,” 49; Robertson, Touched With Valor, 41; Mark Smither to Elizabeth Smither, December 28, 1862, in SHSP.
6 Stevens, Reminiscences, 93-95.
7 Ibid. On one occasion, a member of the regiment whom Stevens never named was found guilty of some offense of the articles of war, punishable by whipping. The individual, “normally a good soldier,” was stripped to the waist and whipped with 39 lashes. The men of the regiment thought the punishment too severe as the man was considered a good soldier and was “brave and manly.” While not condoning his conduct, no one wanted to see the man whipped. He was sent home and was subsequently elected as a state senator and became an outstanding member of his community. Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 204-205.
8 Sorrell, Confederate Staff Officer, 134-35; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 207-08.
9 Watson Dugat Williams to Jesse Laura Bryan, February 8, 1863, in CRC; George E. Smith, “In the Ranks at Fredericksburg,” B&L, 3:142; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 208. It was common for the pickets to arrange “no firing” agreements, particularly when the two sides were in a static situation, such as a winter encampment. Orders from General Lee finally stopped such accommodations, but not until they had existed most of the winter. Sorrell, Confederate Staff Officer, 134; Robert Selph Henry, The Story of the Confederacy (Indianapolis, IN, 1936), 215.
10 Mark Smither to Sister, February 11, 1863, in SHSP.
11 Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2:128-30; Marvel, Burnside, 208-13.
12 Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2:128-30; Couch, “Sumner’s ‘Right Grand Division,’” 118-19; Marvel, Burnside, 208-13. Lincoln admonished Hooker in a private letter immediately after his appointment, advising “Fighting Joe”: “I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.” Wilmer L. Jones, Generals in Blue and Gray: Lincoln’s Generals (Westport, CT, 2004), 23.
13 Lasswell, Rags and Hope, 157-58; Smither, Letter of February 11, 1863, to Sister in SHSP.
14 Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 211-12; Lasswell, Rags and Hope, 159-61.
15 Watson Williams to Jesse Bryan, January 30, 1863; Mark Smither to Sister, February 11, 1863, in SHSP; Rufus Felder to Sister, January 30, 1863, in CRC; Moore, Men of the Bayou City Guards, 64-65.
16 Watson Williams to Jesse Bryan, January 30, 1863; Lasswell. Rags and Hope, 168-69; Fletcher, Rebel Private, 63; Wright, A Southern Girl in ’61, 115-16.
17 Fletcher, Rebel Private, 68-69; Lasswell, Rags and Hope, 168-69; Mark Smither to Sister, February 11, 1863, in SHSP; Simpson, Gaines’ Mill to Appomattox, 116-17; Rufus Felder to Sister, January 30, 1863, in CRC.
18 Lasswell, Rags and Hope, 168, 170; Chicoine, Confederates of Chappell Hill, 157; Fletcher, Rebel Private, 69; Simpson, Gaines’ Mill to Appomattox, 117. Other massive snowball fights occurred in Virginia and elsewhere that winter among the Confederate forces. See John F. Carey, “Rebel and Yank Snowball Wars: Fighting Winter Boredom, Civil War Stories of Inspiration,” accessed February 19, 2012, https://civilwarstoriesofinspiration.wordpress.com/catagory/snowball-fights/.
19 Fletcher, Rebel Private, 70; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 209.
20 Hood, Advance and Retreat, 51; Simpson, Gaines’ Mill to Appomattox, 115; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 210.
21 OR 18, 876-77, 880; Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 140; Stevens, Reminiscences, 95; Fletcher, Rebel Private, 71; Watson Williams to Jessie Laura Bryan, February 23, 1863, in CRC; Cobb, diary, February 19, 1863, in UNC.
22 Watson Williams to Jessie Laura Bryan, February 23, 1863; Cobb, diary February 20 & 21, 1863, in UNC; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 214; A. B. Hood to Mother, March 2, 1863, in CRC; Stevens, Reminiscences, 95.
23 Cobb, diary, February 21, 1863, in UNC; Stevens, Reminiscences, 95; Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 140.
24 A. B. Hood to Wife, March 2, 1863, in CRC; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 215.
25 A. B. Hood to Wife, March 2, 1863, in CRC; Cobb Diary, February 21, 28, 1863, in UNC; Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 140-42. This was the first occasion that the Texas Brigade found itself camped south of the James River. Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 216.
26 Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 140; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 216-18.
27 Watson Williams to Jessie Bryan, October 18, 1862, January 26, 1863 and February 27, 1863, in CRC; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guards, 218-19; Wright, A Southern Girl in ’61, 94-95. Williams wrote that a number of officers of the brigade refused to sign the petition, and others signed reluctantly, deeming the plea to be merely a method for current high ranking officers of the brigade to enhance their power and increase their rank. Moreover, many Texans in the brigade were not anxious to have troops who had been captured, and thus might have a propensity to be taken again, serving in their ranks, and thus potentially sully their reputation. Williams had written that “[o]ur little brigade has made itself known here and unless the new regiments were fully our equals I would not want them to come.” The subject came up again in March, 1863, when a number of Texas regiments captured at Fort Hindman in Arkansas Post were to be exchanged. These men had been held prisoners at Camp Douglas, Illinois, and Camp Chase, Ohio, and in early April were sent to Virginia to be exchanged for a similar number of Federal prisoners. Obviously, this would have been the opportune time to augment Lee’s ranks with more Texas regiments, if such a proposal were ever to be seriously considered. The war department took no such action, however. In May, the troops were sent to Tennessee. Watson Williams to Jessie Bryan, March 1 and October 18, 1862, January 26, 1863, in CRC.
28 OR 18, 922-925; Cobb, diary, March 20, 1862, in UNC; Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 141.
29 Mary B. Chesnut, A Diary From Dixie, by Mary Boykin Chesnut, Isabella D. Morton and Myrta L. Avary, eds. (New York, NY, 1906), 231; OR 18, 922-23, 925; Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2:255; Stevens, Reminiscences, 95; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 220-21.
30 Cobb, diary, March 20, 1863, in UNC; OR 18, 925, 927; Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 142.
31 Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 142-43; Stevens, Reminiscences, 95.
32 Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 143. According to James Cobb, the teetotalers made it back to the campsite in the afternoon, accomplishing the march in eight hours. Cobb, diary, March 20, 1863, in UNC.
33 OR 18, 921-22, 942-44; Stevens, Reminiscences, 97; Thomas L. Breiner, “Pork Belly Politics or How Longstreet Brought Home the Bacon: James Longstreet and the Suffolk Campaign,” Cincinnati Civil War Round Table, September 16, 1999, accessed October 13, 2009, http://www.cincinnaticwrt.org/data/ccwrt_history/talks_text/breiner_longstreet_suffolk.html; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York, NY, 1988), 638-39. Longstreet had been appointed by Secretary of War Seddon to unify the commands of what previously had been the divisions of Richmond, Southern Virginia, North Carolina and the Cape Fear River District, into the new Department of Virginia and North Carolina. OR 18, 921; OR 51, pt. 2. 697. See also Steven A. Cormier, The Siege of Suffolk: The Forgotten Campaign, April 11-May 4, 1863 (Lynchburg, VA, 1987), 13-15, 323; Jeffery D. Wert, General James Longstreet The Confederacy’s Most Controversial General: A Biography (New York, NY, 1993), 228-29, 234, 236.
34 Cobb, diary, April 2, 3, and 8, 1963, in UNC; Watson Williams to Jesse Bryan, March 28, 1863, in CRC; Stevens, Reminiscences, 97. The marching distance from Petersburg to Suffolk was about 80 miles. Richmond was approximately 18 miles north of Petersburg.
35 Stevens, Reminiscences, 97-98.
36 Ibid., 98-99; OR 18, 275; Muster Rolls, Cos. A and B, 5th Texas, Feb. 28-April 30, 1863 in TSA; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 225. For more information on Rowe, see Appendix B.
37 OR 18, 282, 606-607, 619; Mark M. Boatner, Civil War Dictionary (New York, NY, 1959), 817. See also Earl J. Hess, Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2005), 209.
38 OR 18, 996, 1002, 1009, 1010; Salmon, Virginia Battlefield Guide, 158, 168-69; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 225-26; Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2:258-59; Hess, Field Armies, 209.
39 OR 18, 276, 324-25, 610; Salmon, Virginia Battlefield Guide, 170-71.
40 Salmon, Virginia Battlefield Guide, 170; Wert, Longstreet, 234; Cormier, Siege of Suffolk, 184; OR 18, 277, 331, 338, 997 and OR 51, pt. 2, 695; Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, 2:485.
41 Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2:258-59; Salmon, Virginia Battlefield Guide, 172; Cormier, Siege of Suffolk, 184, 251; OR 18, 283, 324-27, 336, 338-40.
42 OR 18, 268, 276, 324-26, 338-49; Salmon, Virginia Battlefield Guide, 172; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 226-27; Wert, Longstreet, 234; Cormier, Siege of Suffolk, 184, 251; Cobb, diary, April 19-21, 1863, in UNC; Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, 2: 486; Pomeroy, “War Memoirs,” 49-50; Stevens, Reminiscences, 99.
43 OR 18, 326-27; Hess, Field Armies, 212. Captains Leigh R. Terrell and John Cussons of Law’s staff reported Connally was responsible for the loss, whereupon Connally and his officers challenged them to a duel. After two rounds involving shotguns and Mississippi rifles at 40 paces, the matter was settled and the duel abandoned. Percy Dyer, The Gallant Hood, (Indianapolis, IN 1950), 174; Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, 2:487-90.
44 OR 18, 277-78; Pomeroy, “War Memoirs,” 49; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 227-28.
45 OR 18, 278, 323-24; Hess, Field Armies, 231.
46 OR 18, 323; Hess, Field Armies, 231; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 228-29.
47 OR 51, pt. 2, 697; Randy Hill, “A Southern Homecoming,” accessed September 29, 2009, http://usads.ms11.net/randy.html; Peebles, There Never Were Such Men Before, 493-94; Emma Haynes, History of Polk County, 98; Thomas J. Goree, Longstreet’s Aide, 216n18. For more on Turner, see Appendix B.
48 Peebles, There Never Were Such Men Before, 493-94; Haynes, History of Polk County, 98.
49 Peebles, There Never Were Such Men Before, 493-94; Cobb, diary, April 14, 1863, in UNC; Hayes, History of Polk County, 98; Goree, Longstreet’s Aide, 216n18; OR 51, pt.2, 699; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 52; Robertson, Touched With Valor, 46-47. Exactly 132 years after his death, Turner was given “full military honors” and laid to rest in his family cemetery 20 miles from Livingston, Texas, next to his mother. See Hill, “A Southern Homecoming,” accessed October 10, 2010, http://usads.ms11.net/randy.html and “Capt. Isaac newton Morton Turner, C.S.A.,” accessed, October 12, 2010, http://www.stoppingpoints.com/texas/sights.cgi?marker=Captain+Isaac+newton+Moreland+Turner%2C+C.+S.+A.&cnty=polk. For more on Turner, see Appendix B.
50 John W. Gordon, “Pleasant Days in Wartime,” CV, 37:95; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 229.
51 Hess, Field Armies, 212; Mark Smither to Elizabeth Smither, May, 12, 1863, in SHSP.
52 Hess, Field Armies, 212-13; Cobb, diary, April 30, and May 3, 1863; Mark Smither to Elizabeth Smither, May 12, 1863, in SHSP.
53 OR 18, 958-59, 988, 997-99, 1002, 1026; Sorrell, Confederate Staff Officer, 145; Stevens, Reminiscences, 99; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 231-32.
54 OR 18, 1024-25, 1032, 1034; Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2:260-61; Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 146.
55 OR 18, 1032, 1034, 1038, 1040; Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 146; Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2:260-61.
56 OR 18, 278, 324, 1034, 1037-38, 1049; Mark Smither to Elizabeth Smither, May 12, 1863, SHSP; Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2: 261; Stevens, Reminiscences, 99; Cobb, diary, May 3, 1863, in UNC; Hess, Field Armies, 213-14.
57 OR 18, 1034, OR 51, pt. 2, 697; Hess, Field Armies, 213; Polley, Hood’s Texas Brigade, 143; Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2:259. Pickett, on the other hand, was far from bored. He was courting twenty-year-old LaSalle Corbell, who became his third wife in September 1863, and was therefore content with the inactivity, which gave him the opportunity to ride to her home in Chuckatuck, Virginia, almost nightly often without Longstreet’s knowledge or permission. Lesley J. Gordon, General George E. Pickett in Life and Legend (Chapel Hill, NC, 2002), 98, 123, 194; Foote, Civil War Narrative, 2:259.
58 Joseph Polley, “The ‘Charming Nellie’ Letters,” in CV (1896) 4:346.
59 OR 18, 1049, 1052; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 53; Wright, A Southern Girl in ‘61, 130; Mark Smither to Elizabeth Smither, May 12, 1863, in SHSP; Watson Williams to Jesse Bryan, May 30, 1863, in CRC; West, Texan In Search of a Fight, 53. The battle of Chancellorsville was fought May 1-4, 1863, and Lee won an astonishing tactical victory. The Army of the Potomac lost over 17,000 men out of approximately 130,000. Lee, who had less than 61,000 effectives in the field, lost 13,000, including Stonewall Jackson, mortally wounded by his own men while performing reconnaissance for the next day’s fight. Boatner, Civil War Dictionary, 140.
60 OR 18, 1025; Watson Williams to Jesse Bryan, May 2, 1863, in CRC; Stevens, Reminiscences, 99. For more on Thomas Goree, see Appendix B.
61 OR 18, 1047, OR 51, pt. 2, 704; Calvin Collier, They’ll Do To Tie To: 3rd Arkansas Infantry Regiment, CSA (Little Rock, AR, 1959), 123; Mark Smither to Elizabeth Smither, May 12, 1863, in SHSP; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 235-36.
62 Mark Smither to Elizabeth Smither, May 12 and June 14, 1863, in SHSP; Simpson, Gaines’ Mill to Appomattox, 282; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 236-38.
63 West, Texan Looking For a Fight, 54-55; Fletcher, Rebel Private, 57-58; Watson Williams to Jesse Bryan, May 30, 1863, in CRC; Polley, “Charming Nellie Letters,” CV, 4:345; Polley, Letters to Charming Nellie, 112.
64 Polley, Letters to Charming Nellie, 112.
65 Watson Williams to Jesse Bryan, May 30, 1863, in CRC; West, Texan In Search of A Fight, 53; Simpson, Lee’s Grenadier Guard, 242-43.