8
Development Policy and Journalism: Between Standards Competition and Cooperation

“We respect the cultural identity of each of our partners, and it is by mutual agreement that we shape our projects. We attach great importance to the fact that they are always concrete, interactive and innovative. In our view, our work is only successful when our partners themselves want change and take charge of the implementation of reforms”¹.

Until recently, cooperation within the media field focused on the audiovisual sector, which is often under the close control of the governments of the South. It was carried out mainly on the basis of bilateralism, or within the framework of various intergovernment organizations: the Permanent Conference of the Mediterranean Audiovisual Operators (Copeam), the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU). Field NGOs were less present in Arab countries than in sub-Saharan Africa, and more focused on community media projects².

This fundamental trend still exists and the national audiovisual sector, largely under public broadcasting, is not outdated. However, if public service is considered necessary in the eyes of developmental actors, government monopolies are less so (Del Rio et al. 2012). In recent years, IGOs, primarily UNESCO, and a myriad of foreign NGOs and foundations have been making recommendations for a new media and journalism governance that can guarantee pluralism and economic viability of the media in countries in transition (Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Egypt). In the background, the challenge for these actors is also the determination of standards.

For UNESCO, if an audiovisual organization is controlled and financed by the government, then it cannot be a public service. “Although government broadcasting systems provide some public services, their control by governments, funding models, as well as a lack of independence and impartiality in both programming and management, prevent them from being identified as public service broadcasting” (Banerjee and Seneviratn 2005, p. 15). According to the international organization, a public audiovisual service is defined by the following four criteria: universality, diversity (gender, subjects, audiences), independence of political power and commercial pressures, and specificity, i.e. the ability to innovate and offer new content. Nevertheless, government monopolies, on the whole audiovisual sector, have not resisted the sirens of economic liberalization in the sector, which accelerated in the early 2000s³; public service radio and television now coexist with private media. At that time, bureaucratic and costly public bodies could not satisfy a more demanding public; more competitive national private channels and radios multiplied to offer a more attractive showcase for the national audiovisual sector. In addition, digital media tends to dominate the confluence of the media.

The many additional media (audiovisual private press and digital media) imply more policy space outside the traditional bilateral cooperation channels for development agencies. In the case of countries in crisis or in transition, as Iraq has been in since 2003⁴, and which Syria, Tunisia and Libya have been in since 2011, the decline of the media sectors has stimulated many initiatives. For example, following the collapse of the regime in Tunisia, more than 220 media projects have been launched by the European Union, UNESCO, the United Nations, and the l’Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, several European countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Switzerland), NGOs, foundations, more than 40 private or public media, universities, etc (EU 2013). Thus, cooperation diplomats are competing with or supported by an ever-increasing number of developmental actors. This is a boon for the public or private sectors benefiting from this support, which, in this competitive context, is part of a demand side policy.

We will see that these actions focus their attention on a sector that is more involved than ever: the journalism sector and online news media. The actions carried out cover both upstream training and the viability and sustainability of new pluralistic media. We will then see that the actions of diplomacy place Arab “civil societies”, hitherto indirect interlocutors of developmental policies, at the heart of cooperation and development mechanisms.

8.1. Different visions and cooperation agencies

Each Arab country has different links and history with its external partners. Relations with the former colonial power and the interplay of international relations explain France’s proximity, for example, to the Maghreb countries or Lebanon. But even in its “private preserve”, France must regain its presence because it is competing with other players. For example, a CFI document from 2011 states: “The media are at the heart of the strategies of traditional developmental aid actors, the United Kingdom, Germany, Northern Europe, the United States, but also, increasingly, new actors, such as Brazil, China, Turkey, South Africa, and more recently some Gulf countries” (CFI 2018). An official of the High Authority of Audiovisual Communication in Morocco confirmed this trend⁵; the media governance model for the Maghreb countries is now being reflected beyond French standards alone.

While cooperation policies shared the same objective, marked its presence, and maintained close relationships with the countries that benefited from them, they resulted in strategies that corresponded to diverse visions, heirs of histories that were each time unique. We will see that today the strategies for action are converging.

A reading of the speeches of American diplomacy leaves no room for ambiguity: media cooperation aims to promote democracy (Waller 2007). This position has fueled American action since the Cold War from the launch of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Eastern Europe to fight communist regimes (Lepeuple 1995) to the support of cyber-dissidents in the 2000s⁶. The second area of intervention, especially in Arab countries, is, as we saw in a previous chapter, to correct the negative image that public opinion has of the United States. The Arabic-speaking media (Voice of America, Al Hurra, Radio Sawa) are the examples of this. Since the “old” debates on NWICO in the 1970s, to which American transnationals opposed the free flow of information, the private sector has been involved in these actions. It helps to promote “the free movement of cultural products in an unimpeded market” (Mattelart 1999b, p. 206) to quote Armand Mattelart. In this respect, the American strategy remains consistent and does not change.

The Scandinavian countries, France, Great Britain and Germany have different and distinct visions. However, the last three countries have in common that they have designated three historic national operators, the BBC, Deutsche Welle and France Télévisions, as central actors in media cooperation. These three showcases and operational institutions of media cooperation benefit from the mechanism, infrastructure, network and experts of these organizations.

BBC Media Action⁷ is a charitable association of the BBC World Service group which, structurally, operates independently. Created recently – 1999 – it is already a key player that has established itself as a result of its international expertise in the field of development and the network of the prestigious BBC. BBC Media Action is the heir to traditional development policies, and it is in line with a British approach that is well illustrated by the name of dedicated ministries: it is a question of “development” while France and Germany set up “cooperation” ministries (Pacquement 2010). This is the mission of BBC Media Action: “We believe in the power of media and communication to help reduce poverty and support people in understanding their rights. Our aim is to inform, connect and empower people around the world”⁸. However, its media approach is not simply instrumental; it is informed by field research by about 90 researchers from the United Kingdom and 28 different countries where it operates. “Our goal is to help people with their projects, not to make a difference; because we have to recognize that there is a reduction in Western influence. Things have changed a lot in the last 15 years”⁹; this is the observation of a BBC Action manager. Africa and Asia are its main areas of intervention, but BBC Action has invested more in Arab countries in the aftermath of the 2010–2011 uprisings. Unlike other developmental agencies, its training and expertise activities still focus mainly on audiovisual media, both online and offline, and with a network of experts in the various countries it also works with political decision-makers. In the philosophy of eponymous radio, the training courses it offers are given in the languages of the BBC.

In general, agencies and NGOs working in the media sector use experts or even academics to prepare media reports in their policy areas. These studies – most often available on their digital platforms – provide insights and collect valuable data in the field. Of course, unlike academic work, they sometimes include recommendations and meet certain editorial standards; they also induce a series of assumptions. However, it is regrettable that this gray literature (from Internews, BBC Action, Amnesty International, Global Voices, Deutsche Welle Akademie, Article 19, Canal France International or even UNESCO), which is a useful source of information for audiences and students, is dispersed.

Coming back to BBC Media Action, its activity reports are accurate, clear and calibrated according to pre-established evaluation standards. These documents, which include forecasts (or projections), policy evaluations and audits, are intended for the public and donors. The budget, which is constantly increasing, is relatively high compared to the Scandinavian countries or France. Public participation represents less than half of this budget. It is the parliament and not the Foreign Office that supports the organization with 40% of its total budget. In the year 2015, for example, it represented about £20 million out of a budget of over £47 million (in euros, about €22 million out of €52 million). The other donors are foundations, private patrons, and especially the European Union and international institutions (United Nations). The use of donors, such as the European Union, has an impact on the nature of projects and the modalities of action on the ground, as programs are defined in accordance with EU expectations and standards¹⁰.

Table 8.1. Evolution of BBC Media Action’s budget (in millions of £)

(source: BBC Media Action annual reports)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Resources	20.9	28.2	24.8	29.5	40	40.4	47.4
Growth in %		34.9%	-12.1%	19.0%	35.6%	1.0%	17.3%

Table 8.2. BBC Media Action budget by financial backer

(source: BBC Media Action)

Financial backer	2015 (in millions of £)
Department for International Development	17.3
In-kind donations	8.8
Bill&Melinda Gates Foundation	5.1
Foreign and Commonwealth Office	2.6
European Union	2.3
Others (United Nations, Sida, USAID, etc.)	11.3
Total	47.4

The Deutsche Welle Akademie (DDK) is an integral part of Deutsche Welle. Its budget is not available online, but Figure 8.2 shows an annual report that displays the relative weight of the various donors in the budget.

Unlike the BBC, its budget is almost entirely funded by public funds. Since its creation in 1965, the actions of the DDK have been clearly oriented towards the training of journalists in several ways: 18-month internships open to candidates without restriction on countries of origin, provided that they are bilingual (German-English), and a two-year master’s degree in journalism, this time for students from developing or emerging countries, is offered at Deutsche Welle’s headquarters in Bonn. Finally, media development projects are being carried out in some 50 countries, including eight Arab countries in 2015, such as the support of community media in rural areas in Tunisia for example. In the area of interest to us, it should be noted that Germany also intervenes through foundations: the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in particular.

**Figure 8.2.** *DDK, 2012 – relative shares of the various financial backers*

*(source: DDk.com). For a color version of this figure, see www.iste.co.uk/guaaybess/media.zip*

The Scandinavian countries are among the most active in the field of media cooperation. As pioneers, they entered the field of digital media long before the so-called “Web 2.0 revolutions” in Arab countries to support young and new media through projects related to digital media and the training of web journalists. For example, Denmark, through the IMS (International Media Support), has supported, the Arab Working Group for Arab Media Monitoring in Tunisia since 2003, a group of young people from different Arab countries who had the ambition to monitor media coverage of the 2004 Tunisian presidential elections. On this basis, the group continued its work of monitoring the Arab media before becoming an association under Tunisian law in 2012. Jordanian independent online information platform ARIJ and, two years later, 7iber.com are, in the same way, supported by the IMS in 2005 and 2007¹¹. The website 7iber.com (“7iber” could be translated as “ink”) and ARIJ are also places where Arab journalists can meet and be trained. The ARIJ (Association of Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism), as its name suggests, has the role of promoting investigative journalism¹². Projects on online media and investigative journalism, supported by European partners, increased after the Arab uprisings.

The three Scandinavian countries have a common cooperation policy through the IMS. Its budget of almost €21 million may seem modest compared to BBC Media Action’s, but again it depends almost exclusively on public funding from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

Table 8.3. IMS budget, 2015

Financial backers	2015	Euros
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	40%	8,334,430
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	38%	8,055,166
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	15%	3,049,083
Other sources of funding	7%	1,529,911
Total	100%	20,968

Finally, France is represented by Canal France International (CFI), which is the “French agency for media cooperation”¹³. CFI was a subsidiary of the France Télévisions group until 2017 when it became a subsidiary of France Médias Monde (France 24, RFI, Monte Carlo Doualiya). The French position was less ideologically strong than the American position. “The French approach was “romantic”; we met in limited settings such as the Copeam. We were discussing the cause of this or that category of the population and other very “nice” themes. But this mode of operation has reached its limits, if only because it is very costly”¹⁴. Indeed, France had a tradition of favoring a bilateral cooperation policy and, unlike the Scandinavian countries, few changes had been observed before the “Arab revolutions”. There is no doubt that CFI will make a remarkable contribution to the development and cooperation policy and practices of the Arab countries. Today, it is one of the most involved actors in Arab countries. Its media action is less openly linked to development issues in Arab countries (e.g. media and health, education, or ecology) – it is more so in sub-Saharan Africa. It is more present in the expertise, training and networking of talent, as we will see below.

Since 2009, CFI has been coordinating France’s very rich external audiovisual system (France 24, TV5 Monde, Radio France Internationale, Radio Monte Carlo Daoulya) and benefits from the expertise of the Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA), an audiovisual resource and archiving center. Despite a decrease in public subsidies, the agency is still largely dependent on public funds (subsidies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, additional public orders to meet specific requirements). As shown in Table 8.4, a small part of the budget comes from multilateral donors, namely UNESCO and the European Union.

The CFI budget evolved as follows between 2009 and 2015:

Table 8.4. CFI budget from 2009 to 2015

(sources: CFI activity reports)

	Budget in thousands of euros
Budget	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Subsidy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	15,690	16,401	14,170	15,000	13,370	11,140	10,328
Public orders	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	Nd	1180	443
Multilateral donors	930	460	580	210	380	850	872
Contribution of beneficiaries	180	290	300	900	850	350	292

8.2. Cooperation policies “from the bottom up”

The evolution of France’s media policies shows the importance now given to what diplomats call “civil society”, which, in practice, refers to a policy that is directly addressed to individuals or small structures – associative, private or even public – rather than to large public operators such as audiovisual production and broadcasting organizations. CFI follows the approach of the Agence Française de Développement which, since 2012, has been giving an increasing share of its aid to NGOs, in other words Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). In this respect, it is in line with the American strategy presented by Hillary Clinton in 2010. Her innovation adviser Alec Ross summarized the digital diplomacy in action as follows: “One thesis statement I want to emphasize is how networks disrupt the exercise of power. They devolve power from the nation-state – from governments and large institutions – to individuals and small institutions. The overarching pattern is the redistribution of power from governments and large institutions to people and small institutions”¹⁵.

The consideration of civil society, which is the characteristic of American politics of influence, has been emulated in the spirit of the World Summit on the Information Society, by others following the impetus given by the Arab “revolutions”. It seems that the uprisings took place at a favorable time.

On the one hand, the world is not closed; without presupposing its magical effect, a transnational public opinion on certain subjects has emerged thanks to NICTs. For Bertrand Bardie, “this new presence of opinion, multifaceted and complex, is thus the expression of the revenge of societies on governments, of the proliferation of social relations that intertwine with the game of gladiators, of the uncertainty of a power that comes up against protean social resistance. Above all, it heralds strong trends that are restructuring the international game and shaking up the walls of geopolitics. Converging opinions, expressions of the governed and transnational social movements, also guide international politics by creating spaces of uncertainty, autonomous games, and forms of limiting the scope of the possible” (Badie 2005, p. 25). The mobilizations of bloggers and cyberactivists during the Arab uprisings made it possible to activate and highlight a network of solidarity, that of “mediactivists” to use an expression of Dominique Cardon and Fabien Granjon (2013). NGOs such as Amnesty International or Reporters Without Borders (RWB) mobilized in the mid-2000s to defend the young bloggers arrested; the “blogger” category appeared in 2006 when the two NGOs defended the 22-year-old Egyptian blogger, Kareem Amer, who had been imprisoned for writing “anti-religious” statements on his blog. Cyberactivist organizations have also been mobilized since 2010, in Tunisia or Egypt, for example, to thwart the regime’s blocking of social networks and even the Internet. The Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protest movement has spread to dozens of cities, and – irony of history – seen two famous Egyptian bloggers – and founding members of the April 6 dissident movement, Asma Mahfouz and Ahmed Maher – support their American counterparts’ struggle against Wall Street. These struggles are widely publicized throughout the world. Who has not heard the cyber-militants, from wherever they are, greet the mobilizations, whether they take place, in Tehran, Madrid, Tahrir Square, Wall Street or Ankara? The research shows the echo of the Arab Spring among young people in Latin America, Ukraine and Sénégal¹⁶. The intertwining of the different geographical levels and the multiplicity of actors, sometimes linked to private companies, civil society and/or governments, are still blurring the lines.

On the other hand, the weakening of the government in a context of economic crisis is evident. In the media sector, businessmen are taking the lead (see Chapter 4). Are the clientilistic links between the regimes and the latter always in favor of the former? In any case, whether in favor of private actors or associative structures, the gravity from which government institutions suffer in authoritarian countries pleads for action “from below”. While attacks on journalists persist in many countries, in contrast, countries in transition (Tunisia¹⁷) provide flexibility that allows cooperation agencies to design and implement development programs more easily. It should be noted, however, that as a result of Arab social movements, changes have been observed beyond these bastions in transition, as this American professor of journalism at the University of Oman noted. “Critics of public policy and government practices in the Emirate of Oman have been disseminated through Twitter, YouTube, Internet forums, blogs, Facebook, e-mails, and mobile phones. These criticisms seem to have spread widely and lasted much longer than previously thought” (O’Rourke 2011).

Thus, government-controlled media are part of a world that is crumbling: sociologically, users (readers, Internet users, audience) have changed. More autonomous, they are also more critical. Their media practices, which are more individualized and volatile, have evolved. The “laws of the market” require a content that can capture their attention; the public media are experiencing this cruelly. In 2009, the global advertising market was affected by the crisis and was still becoming too small to allow new media to enter the market, which had led, for example, to the suspension of new media authorizations in Morocco by the authorities.

8.3. Media development assistance: the convergence of practices and standards

In this tense economic context, the Western governments’ policy of influence is intended to be both effective and as inexpensive as possible. In order to meet this dual challenge, the programs of public cooperation agencies will have to rely on new sources of funding, foremost among which are international organizations and the European Union. This is already the case with BBC Action, which, by resorting to commercial activities, is part of a British tradition of financing charities (Perouse De Monclos 2015, p. 63). This is less the case for the others like CFI, IMS or Deutsche Welle Akademie.

However, as we have seen, the EU, through its calls for tenders, encourages the joint participation of these major operators in cooperation programs. This necessarily leads to emulation and a certain convergence of the various strategies. This evolution is perceptible in the light of French projects over time (see section 8.4). CFI’s annual reports – published via a particularly rich digital platform – are increasingly structured in the same way as those of major development organizations such as BBC Action Media. But convergence is not simply formal, since CFI’s actions, without abandoning a bilateral component, are more oriented towards civil societies or individuals – or young “opinion leaders” – from the South, in the same way as American or British strategies. And, again, in line (actively or not) with the recommendations of the UN and WSIS.

In this perspective, the policies implemented are “inclusive” policies, in the words of the CFI managers and project; in other words, the experts or “developmental actors”, to use Anne Le Naellou’s happy expression, are local NGOs or those who work closely with their counterparts in the South (Le Naëlou 2013). This has three major advantages: it is a bottom-up policy, therefore free of the burdens of government apparatus; it makes it possible to identify the leaders of tomorrow, the “smugglers”; and, finally, these policies are less expensive. In the field of media, the rationalization of official development assistance spending has been evident since the 20th Century. In short, these development projects are more focused on “the field” than on protocol-based cooperation actions and without tangible results.

8.4. Concerted actions and expertise: the case of Canal France International

“The network of embassies and the clientilistic relationships that dominated not so long ago no longer constitute the canonical basis for exchanges and cooperation in the field of audiovisual media”¹⁸. The government-to-government (bilateral) relationship model no longer predominates and Western cooperation agencies directly cooperate with project leaders through calls for tenders. It is not inappropriate to point out that these calls for tenders are widely relayed as they are now distributed via digital media, in addition to the usual information networks (embassies, cultural centers, etc.).

As mentioned, two mechanisms are preferred: project-based cooperation or outsourcing to other actors. In any case, expertise is the key word in development and cooperation actions and is also a central aspect of influencing policy. We will explain this through some examples of projects promoted by European actors.

After extending its cooperation action to private media in 2008, Canal France International increased its expertise and training missions for media and professionals from developing countries. It should be noted that the team, which was young, was set up by a new management team in 2008, at a time when CFI was becoming the French developmental actor. At the same time, the French agency had put an end to the free access to audiovisual productions and expert missions. Particularly explicit on the adoption of a new paradigm of cooperation, here is the editorial of the 2009 activity report of CFI’s management (then Etienne Fiatte): “After the clarification decided in 2009 by the public authorities, CFI is now a recognized actor in French official development assistance policy, specializing in supporting the modernization of the media in the countries of the South. A clarification and a new approach to media cooperation, which first resulted in 2009 for CFI in an in-depth reorganization of the company, carried out with the aim of turning more towards our “customers”, i.e. the media, companies and professionals in the South (…). Clarification, a new approach, which must also be reflected in modernized relations with our partners in the South, and in particular in genuine reciprocity of commitments. Greater attention to their needs, systematic upstream consultation on the proposed programs, and in return a contribution, even symbolic, to the cost of the services provided by CFI”¹⁹.

CFI’s initiatives were modest in the Arab journalism field until the “revolutions”; then its dynamism placed the French institution among the dominant European players with BBC Media Action, Deutsche Welle Akademie and the IMS (Denmark, Sweden, Finland). CFI promoted several projects through calls for proposals targeting young journalists and, increasingly, young bloggers or web journalists. Examples include the Ebtikar-Media project, which aims to promote online media in various Arab countries and, in the long term, the creation of a network of web journalists. The objective is also to identify talent, which in turn will feed into CFI’s network of experts. In line with a recent trend, this project is funded by the European Union.

Indeed, European funding encourages projects with young people on the one hand, and with new media on the other hand, hence the emergence of many initiatives, often joint, by European operators. One example is Waled el Baled, launched in 2011 in Egypt with the NGO WanIfra (World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers). It is a network of local digital newspapers in terms of coverage. There is also support for independent media such as Inkyfada in Tunisia or Madamasr created in 2013 in Egypt. Ironically, these last two media have some similarities since Inkyfada is an online newspaper that includes among its leaders defectors from Nawaat, which in Ben Ali’s time was the free media organization par excellence; while Madamasr welcomes elders from Masry Al Youm, which in Mubarak’s time was the independent media organization par excellence. These two newspapers are also supported by the NGO Wan-Ifra.

Action in the field of training and support for media creation is finding a very promising outlet through genuine exchange and cooperation projects, i.e. through the sharing and feedback of experiences. Expertise and training are delegated to journalists from France Télévisions or France Medias Monde – some of whom are Arabic-speaking – and also to private media which can enjoy obvious legitimacy in France. For example, Mediapart’s founders were able to participate in journalist training under the coordination of CFI. This French online newspaper, a pure play company, whose business model is based on readers’ subscriptions, is an exception in the context of the press crisis. Since 2008, the young daily, already a “reference” newspaper headed by Edwy Plenel, has owed its financial health to the investigative journalism that characterizes it and the debates of ideas it hosts around online programs. Mediapart, the French model, is the right institution to meet the expectations of CFI and its “clients” in the South. Its experienced journalists – including François Bonnet, co-founder of Mediapart – have participated in training courses (in Mauritania, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco). The surveys carried out by apprentice journalists in this context may have focused on sensitive issues such as child labor or corruption. Mediapart’s expertise is sought by the directors of emerging pure play companies, such as Ali Amar, co-founder of the Moroccan online newspaper ledesk.com. Other French media are involved in the training of journalists: Rue89 in particular, which has been training in web journalism in partnership with the Ecole Supérieure de Journalisme de Lille since 2010. Radio France International, as part of its program “l’atelier des medias” (the media workshop), is at the origin of the “Mondoblog” project, a platform of French-speaking bloggers.

These are examples of partnerships that eventually give shape to a network of young journalists. Another example is the Bondy Blog, an online information medium, run by young apprentice French journalists from working-class neighborhoods. Bondy Blog participated in the establishment of Tunisie Bondy Blog, a journalists’ training center in Gafsa, Tunisia, thanks to funding from the European Union and with the partnership of the Tunisian online newspaper Nawaat.

Thus, the transnationalization of media and media flows has visible effects in the field of journalism and cooperation. Digital media affect and redefine journalists’ professional practices and media usage at a global level. The breaking news of the major information networks are no longer surrounded by the attribute of freshness and exclusivity, and their audiences have taken a critical distance from them, particularly in the event of crises, conflicts or geopolitical tensions. Discourses on the need to do field work, to do slow journalism, to encourage investigation and to support the digital revolution with appropriate and always up-to-date training are heard all over the world and are translated into reality through this type of action.

These abundant projects illustrate a new paradigm in cooperation in the field of journalism. Young people are targeted and identified. Networks are being set up, and synergies are being encouraged through the use of joint projects and the organization of meetings and forums. “We play the business card, not the national card. We probably have values, but we don’t wear them on our sleeves, we act. Bringing together seemingly different visions of the world is not a luxury these days”; this statement by a CFI manager reflects a new approach, apparently more modest, but as close as possible to the individuals of the target societies.

Let us focus on a particularly enlightening indicator of a new form of exchange: the consideration of the Arabic language. Recently, communication – online or via flyers – and calls for projects concerning Arab countries have become systematically bilingual. CFI-led projects, for example, can be Arabic-speaking, although the use of translation is a difficulty and an additional cost. “We make the usage of Arabic language systematic because we don’t want to talk only to people who look like us”. While, at the end of the 2000s, an Egyptian student could be refused an internship at France 24 because she was wearing a veil²⁰, young smiling women, wearing or not wearing the headscarf, appear on CFI’s visuals. The use of Arabic may concern French-speaking countries (Maghreb countries, Lebanon) and, here again, reflects a concern to meet the expectations of aid recipients in a competitive context where English and Arabic predominate. This is all the more important as the projects focus on digital media.

Indeed, French is the ninth most popular language on the Internet (with 109 million Francophones on the Internet in 2016), while English dominates with a total of 948 million Anglophones on the Internet. Arabic is the fourth most popular language (after English, Chinese and Spanish) with a total of 168.4 million Arab speakers in 2016.

**Figure 8.4.** *Communication from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the usage of the Arabic language and announcing the launch of a new Facebook account.*

8.5. Conclusion

The events that have marked geopolitics, budgetary restrictions and the reduced stability of some Arab governments have led to profound changes in relations between the countries on the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean in the field of the media. This does not mean that cooperation no longer exists. On the contrary, more fluid, it is now very close to its initial vocation. In the 1960s, some Northern countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands) set up “ministries for cooperation and development” (Pacquement 2010). Jacques Foubert showed that, ten years after their creation, the powers were struggling to put into practice real cooperation with the countries of the South (Foubert 1973). Today, more distant from a pattern inherited from colonial history and relations with governments alone, the cooperation agencies of different countries, sometimes partners, often competitors, are aware of the importance of reaching new generations through projects, forums and various actions they initiate. In a global environment where people are interconnected, these actions seem to be detached from the vision of “traditional” populations that needed to be modernized or a reified “Arab street”. A question remains: doesn’t this (over)representation of connected, young, civil societies constitute a new ideology?