THE PLAN

Early in 1944 von Weichs lost two divisions to the Italian Front and four to Hungary, and needed to find out new ways of doing more with less. German strategy continued to revolve around the encirclement and annihilation of partisan concentrations. However, according to Brigadeführer Kumm search-and-clear operations were being replaced by more focused direct attacks and pursuit operations. He described how once a partisan unit was located through intelligence, a probing force would attempt to fix the enemy whilst flanking units ‘would pivot around the enemy, chasing them into the line of fire of the stationary unit’. Artillery fire would be called down ‘behind the partisans preventing their escape, forcing them to stand and fight’ and then be walked back thereby ‘constricting the ring until the surviving partisans broke for cover’. A lane was temporarily kept free of fire to encourage a breakout and ‘then bombing, artillery or machine gun fire’ would be called down on them and those that remained in the cauldron. With these new tactics the Germans tried to prevent the partisans from melting away into the mountains.

In March 1944 Tito pushed II and III Partisan Corps from Bosnia into southern Serbia. Bulgarian troops were overrun but von Weichs brought in reserves, including the 500th SS Parachute Battalion, and launched Operation Maibaum (Mayflower) to stop the partisans from retreating across the River Drina north-east of Sarajevo. On 6 April 26-year-old Hauptsturmführer Rybka, who had previously served in the 6th SS Nord Mountain Division, replaced Gilhofer, who was promoted and transferred to the 10th SS Frundsberg Division. The V SS Mountain Corps units, which included the SS Prinz Eugen Division, occupied river valleys and main roads, and pressed partisans up against the river Drina but many escaped across the mountains. On 10 May the operation ended and the paratroopers returned to barracks. Tito realized that he was not yet strong enough to operate in the rolling hills of the Serbian countryside.

On 6 May von Weichs ordered Rendulic to prepare 2nd Panzer Army for an offensive into the Knin-Jajce-Bihac-Banja Luka-liberated area. OKW told von Weichs to make Tito his focus and that unlike any previous attacks a parachute battalion would be provided to land at Drvar to capture him. On 10 May the SS officially released their parachute battalion for the operation. From his operational reserve Weichs committed the 92nd Motorized Regiment, the 202nd Panzer Company and the 4th Brandenburg Regiment.

The glider, flown by one pilot, could transport nine passengers in very cramped conditions. The wingspan was 22m. Regular supply flights in the Balkans were conducted and the maximum payload was 1,240kg. Pichler described how there was ‘instead of wheels, under the fuselage a type of sled runner made of wide wood, around which barbed wire was simply wrapped, in order to shorten the land area and to brake’. (Slovenian Museum of Contemporary History)

The operational commander would be Generalleutnant Leyser, the commander of the XV Mountain Corps. From his headquarters at Knin he would control SS, Army, Luftwaffe and Croat troops. The corps operations order of 21 May explained the main components of the plan. On 25 May the enemy was to be attacked ‘in an encircling operation using paratroops and our Air Force with the aim of destroying the enemy leadership, supply bases and headquarters in the area of Drvar-Petrovac and all enemy groups found in the area’. Because Tito was the target, the order considered ‘the success of the operation will be of the greatest significance for the conduct of the war in the interior of the country as well as in the coastal areas’.

In total, five motorized columns would converge on Drvar. From the east, 43 miles (70km) from Drvar, the 7th SS Prinz Eugen Division ‘with a regimental group and an assault battalion of panzergrenadiers under command, will smash through the enemy resistance east of the Sana river and will then advance on a broad front between the Sana and the Unac’. There they were ‘to take out supply bases as well as prevent the flight eastwards of the beaten enemy groups and headquarters’. Specifically from the north-east ‘the assault battalion with Panzer Company No. 202 under command will drive from Banja Luka towards Kljuc’ and from the south-east ‘the regimental group of 7th SS will drive from Jajce along the railways and roads’.

From the west a regimental group (Battle Group William) from the 373rd (Croatian) Infantry Division located on the Una river was to ‘advance at best speed via Trubar to Drvar and there relieve, at whatever cost and on the same day, SS Paratroop Battalion 500 in Drvar’. For this important mission ‘battle group William is to be made as strong as possible (artillery, heavy weapons, Engineers)’. The battle group had the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 384th (Croatian) Infantry Regiment. The town of Srb was the closest start point to Drvar, being only some 15 miles (25km) away.

From the north near Bihac (31 miles [50km] from Drvar) 92nd Motorized Regiment with the 54th Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion, supported by a regimental group of the 2nd Croat Jäger Brigade, was to drive ‘in a southeasterly direction in order to capture Petrovac’. Once there the 92nd ‘will then move towards Drvar’ in order to ‘link up with the SS Parachute Battalion and the Battle Group William’. From the south 1st Brandenburg Regiment and the reconnaissance battalion from 1st Mountain Division were ordered to advance from Knin (40 miles [65km] from Drvar), attack through Bos. Grahovo and make for Drvar. In addition the 105th SS Reconnaissance Battalion by ‘driving via Bos. Grahovo towards Drvar, will prevent the escape southwards of the bandit groups, headquarters and military missions’.

500th SS Parachute Battalion (1,140 men)

Battalion Headquarters	(267)
Signal Platoon	42
Headquarters Company	66
HQ Motor Transport Platoon	30
Section II (Legal)	7
Parachute Maintenance Platoon	31
Supply Company	91
1st Parachute Rifle Company	(164)
Company Headquarters	33
Signals Section	11
Parachute Rifle Platoon	401
Parachute Rifle Platoon	40
Parachute Rifle Platoon	40
2nd Parachute Rifle Company	(164)
Company Headquarters	33
Signals Section	11
Parachute Rifle Platoon	40
Parachute Rifle Platoon	40
Parachute Rifle Platoon	40
3rd Parachute Rifle Company	(164)
Company Headquarters	33
Signals Section	11
Parachute Rifle Platoon	40
Parachute Rifle Platoon	40
Parachute Rifle Platoon	40
4th (Heavy Weapons) Company	(200)
Company Headquarters	33
Signals Section	11
Flamethrower Platoon	28 (2 flamethowers)
81mm Mortar Platoon	34 (4 mortars)
Heavy Machine Gun Platoon	38 (4 machine guns)
75mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon2	56 (4 guns)
Training Parachute Rifle Company	(181)
Company Headquarters	40
Signals Section	12
Parachute Rifle Platoon	43
Parachute Rifle Platoon	43
Parachute Rifle Platoon	43

1 Original source states that each parachute rifle platoon had 39 men, not 40

2 One source claims a mixture of 75mm and 105mm guns were available

The 500th SS Parachute Battalion was larger than a conventional Luftwaffe parachute battalion and possessed its own logistical support. The source for this table is Forgotten Legions: Obscure Formations of the Waffen SS by Antonio Munoz.

Only on 20 May was Rybka told of his battalion’s role and assembly areas. Corps orders stated:

SS Para Battalion 500 will drop on D-Day after Stukas have attacked Drvar, with the task of destroying completely and utterly Tito’s Main Headquarters. The Commander of our Air Forces in Croatia will order attacks, immediately preceding the landing, upon all identified enemy groups and headquarters, on security areas and anti-aircraft positions. Thereby the enemy will be forced to take cover from the aerial assault. Until D-Day minus 1 the SS Para Battalion will be located as follows. Rybka Group (Parachutists) with headquarters, No. 2 and 3 Companies and a platoon of No. 4 Company in Nagy Betskersk (314 men). The men of No. 4 Company, No. 1 Company, 40 men of the Benesch detachment, 6 men from the Abwehr as well as the Luftwaffe Liaison Troop (320 men) in Zagreb. The second wave of parachutists will be made up of No. 2 Company and the Papa Training Company. This group of 220 men will be located in Banja Luka.

The airborne landing was to commence at 0700. The Germans hoped surprise would enable the paratroopers to swiftly snatch Tito and pin down the partisan forces and headquarters personnel until ground units arrived. An Abwehr contingent (FAT 216 members under Leutnant Zavadil) and Brandenburgers under Leutnant Dowe with Bosnian interpreters would accompany the SS paratroopers and potentially were mission critical. If Tito was not quickly located these specialists were to exploit captured material and personnel to ascertain his whereabouts. A number of army and SS war reporters and photographers were to accompany the mission to record Tito’s capture for propaganda purposes.

On the evening of 23 May Rybka drew up his detailed battalion orders. He favoured a glider assault because if flown accurately they could bring in a body of armed men close to the target, achieving maximum surprise with the greatest strength. Despite the efforts to dispatch men quickly from aircraft, paratroops were more dispersed on landing, and had to collect heavy weapons, ammunition and equipment from canisters that had dropped separately.

However, glider units were light on the ground. Up until early 1944 Towing Group 1 with 15 glider tugs and 37 gliders, split into 3 squadrons, was available in the Balkans. 1st and 2nd Squadron each consisted of 17 DFS 230 gliders. 3rd Squadron, stationed in Salonika, was smaller, consisting of three larger Go 242 gliders that were unsuitable for the Rösselsprung operation. Towing aircraft consisted of four Henschel 126 for 1st Squadron, six Heinkel 45 biplanes for 2nd Squadron (replaced by Ju-87 dive bombers for Rösselsprung) and five Heinkel III for 3rd Squadron.

In February further glider units were brought into the Balkans. 3rd Gruppe from Geschwader 1, comprising 12 Henschel 126 and five Avia towing aircraft, and 17 DFS 230 gliders, arrived from Nancy and on 7 May was transported to Krusevac. In March 1944 2nd Gruppe, consisting of eight Ju-87 dive-bombers used as towing aircraft and eight DFS 230 gliders, arrived in Zagreb from Strasbourg and Mannheim. Despite this reinforcement there were not enough gliders to bring in Rybka’s battalion and some of his men would have to land by parachute. However, the situation with air transport aircraft was not much better and Rybka was told that after dropping the first wave transports would have to fly to Banja Luka airfield to pick up a second wave, which could not arrive over Drvar until midday.

Since autumn 1943 1st Squadron of DFS 230 gliders had been operating out of Belgrade and in November was joined by the 2nd Squadron, formed from personnel who had served in the Mediterranean and undergone six months’ training that included diving and the use of the brake parachute. In March 1944, when Belgrade became overcrowded, the gliders moved to Samos airfield in the Banat. (Slovenian Museum of Contemporary History)

In the first wave, 320 men would come in by glider and 314 by parachute. Rybka decided to deploy the parachutists in three main groups, Red (85 men), Green (95 men) and Blue (100 men), to capture and secure the town. With his headquarters staff Rybka would drop with Red group. The troops transported by glider were divided into six groups and each given specific objectives, which had been identified by the intelligence staff, as follows:

Panther Group: 110 men to capture Objective Citadel, presumed to be Tito’s headquarters, in the south-western part of town.

Griefer (Attacker) Group: 40 men to capture Objective London, the British Military Mission, 1 mile south-west of town.

Sturmer (Stormer) Group: 50 men to capture Objective Warsaw, the Russian Military Mission, 1 mile north of town.

Brecher (Breaker) Group: 50 men to capture Objective America, the American Military Mission, 1 mile south of town.

Beisser (Biter) Group: 20 men to seize an outpost radio station south-west of town and then assist Griefer.

Draufganger (Daredevil) Group: 50 paratroopers to capture Objective Western Cross, a suspected partisan radio communications centre to the north-west of town. Another 20 men composed of Zavadil’s FAT, Brandenburger intelligence officers, Luftwaffe signallers and ethnic German interpreters would join this group.

If Tito was captured a swastika flag would be displayed, if the assault failed a red flare would be fired, the signal for Green parachute group and Sturmer glider group to join Panther for a second attack. Draufganger had the specific mission of questioning detainees and exploiting any information found in the communications centre. The building was near a prominent crossroads and easily recognizable from the air. The second wave of 220 men under the command of Hauptsturmführer Obermeier consisting of the Field Reserve Company and part of 2nd Company, accompanied by two gliders bringing in supplies, were due to arrive over Drvar at 1200. Their chosen landing zone was meadows to the south-west of town.

The location of Tito’s headquarters was thought to be a cemetery on a slightly raised position at Slobica Glavica. Aerial photographs had shown a walled position, several anti-aircraft machine guns and an American jeep, which analysts thought indicated the presence of a headquarters. Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre, a Canadian military officer, has opined that the planners of the operation did not use Skorzeny’s information, which came from Tetaric and specified the headquarters were located in a cave overlooking the town, because Skorzeny failed to liaise with either Kirchner or Zavadil.

Skorzeny’s advice was to cancel Rösselsprung. Agents told him that Tito knew the location of his headquarters had been betrayed. Tetaric had indeed been recaptured and on 27 March divulged what he had told the Germans before being shot. Skorzeny was right to presume the partisans expected an attack, but whilst Tito fully expected an offensive against Drvar, his chief of staff Jovanovic persuaded him an airborne drop was not likely. However, as a precautionary measure his personal quarters were moved to another cave at Bastasi, 2½ miles west of Drvar, in which he would sleep, returning to his Drvar cave during the day to work. No agents were providing up-to-date information on Tito’s whereabouts, he was not being kept under surveillance and this new development was unknown to the Germans. By sheer chance on 24 May Tito decided to stay in Drvar to celebrate his birthday the next day with the Communist Youth League of Yugoslavia, which had just finished its conference. Dedijer, Tito’s biographer and fellow partisan, suggested that the Germans were aware of Tito’s birthday and deliberately launched a raid on that day, but the German historian Karl-Dieter Wolff dismissed this theory and stated that records pointed to alternative birth dates – Zagreb police had information it was 12 March and the Italian Ministry of Interior 7 May.

The Ju-52 transport aircraft, used to ferry personnel and supplies, was the workhorse of the Luftwaffe and much in demand in the mountainous Balkans. For airborne operations 12 paratroopers with their arms containers could be carried; however, for Rösselsprung only 2nd Gruppe of Transportgeschwader 4 with approximately 40 Ju-52 transport planes had been available. (Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-700-0256-38, Fotograf: Richard Muck)

Partisan Defences

Drvar, located between the steep Jasenovac Mountains to the north and high wooded hills to the south, was well protected. Although three major roads and a railway led to the town it could only be accessed speedily via a dirt road from Petrovac and approaches were defended by well-fortified positions. The Unac river also shielded the town on three sides and two timber factories and rail yards dominated its eastern side. Luftwaffe bombing raids had forced out most of its population of 1,500, and only 200 civilians remained. Also around the town were communist representatives attending the conference, and personnel from the AVNOJ headquarters and the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, perhaps amounting to some 800 people but most of who were lacking in combat experience and had at most the odd rifle and pistol available. An engineering brigade of two weak battalions was also present but the men were mainly labourers who were unused to combat. Prinz Eugen’s intelligence officer knew the partisan officer-cadet school was at the nearby village of Sipovljani and Tito’s escort battalion of four companies were close by (three companies were present at Drvar, with another at Bastasi). In the wider operational area I, V and VIII Partisan Corps had been identified (six partisan divisions – 12,000 men). I Corps, under Popovic with 1st and 6th Divisions, was closest to Drvar, with corps headquarters in Mokri Nogi, 4 miles down the valley; their nearest formation to Drvar was 3rd Brigade of the 6th Division with four battalions at Kamenica 3 miles away. However, these battalions with approximately 200 men each were nowhere near full strength. V Corps under Slavko Radic was some 10 miles away centred on Petrovac, with 4th Division north-west of Drvar and 39th Division north-east of Drvar. VIII Corps was south-east of Drvar with 9th Division available.

Beside Tito is his chief of staff, Jovanovic, who advised a parachute attack on Drvar was unlikely. Jovanovic was a professional army officer of Montenegrin descent. Pro-Russian in outlook, he would be shot in 1947 by border guards whilst trying to flee Yugoslavia after Tito’s break with the Soviet Union. (Cody Images)

The Allied Missions were all present at Drvar. In February 1944 MacLean had parachuted back into Bosnia with Randolph Churchill, the Prime Minister’s son. He carried a letter of support from Winston Churchill that stated the Chetniks would no longer receive arms. MacLean described Drvar as ‘a few gutted houses clustered round the gaunt ruins of what had once been a factory’ around which ‘in a wide green valley, lay open fields with farmhouses and copses’. The British mission ‘looked out over the valley onto a range of hills that rose abruptly into a cliff from a river which flowed at its foot’. The American Office of Strategic Services, which conceded Yugoslavia was in the British sphere of influence, viewed MacLean’s mission as political and sent an independent intelligence-gathering mission to Drvar. In February a Soviet mission also arrived, by Horsa glider, with General Korneyev (who had been the chief of staff at Stalingrad) and General Gorschkov, a Russian partisan leader, on board; according to MacLean they expected to take charge of the Yugoslav partisan movement. Whilst British and American soldiers acted as military instructors at the partisan officer cadet school, Soviet instructors were lecturing Communist Youth organization members who would become commissars.

Tito had occupied a house in town but because of the threat of aerial bombardment relocated to a large cave about 60ft above ground, halfway up a cliff face, which had a small waterfall at the back and ‘commanded a fine view of the valley’. Tito’s biographer, Phyllis Auty, described the headquarters, a ‘well nigh impregnable position just outside the town’, as follows:

In a natural cleft in the rock three flights of wooden steps led to a place where the opening widened into a natural cave, inside which rooms had been constructed with a veranda in front commanding a fine view across the valley. Great wooden beams supported the construction and inside in Tito’s office the walls were lined, and the windows curtained with parachute silk, while a huge British military map of Yugoslavia covered a wall behind his desk.

In the cave Tito’s secretaries Olga and Zdenka were constant companions, as was his friend Kardelj, his intelligence and security officer Rankovic, his two bodyguards and his captured German Alsatian called Tiger.

MacLean became concerned that the increase in the size of the headquarters, which now included the executive and administrative bodies of the new provisional government, and even Zagreb dancers, hampered mobility and security. He felt that the Germans would always be able to concentrate an overwhelming weight of troops and ammunition to force Tito to move. However, some of Tito’s advisers suggested digging in at Drvar. Tito asked for supplies – mines, guns, even tanks – to assist a defence. Arguing that partisan forces should retain their mobility, MacLean advised against this approach and advocated keeping the enemy engaged elsewhere. In his memoirs he claimed he had received reports of gliders and troop carriers at Zagreb and wrote how captured documents and intercepts talked of Brandenburgers dressed up as partisans coming to kill Tito. Another plan that came to light was a raid by ski troops from the 1st Mountain Division. German aircraft were often heard and seen flying overhead, sometimes conducting bombing and strafing runs, at other times taking photographs, which gave credence to these concerns.

Tito knew the Germans were preparing an attack on Drvar but misjudged what it would be. A new department called the OZNA acted as a central repository for intelligence and assessed German intentions and dispositions. A translator working for the Ic of 118th Jäger Division reported to OZNA that a German offensive was being planned; however, he did not know the exact place or time. Then on 4 May partisans from the 11th Brigade captured a Chetnik document, which included a map with exact locations for some of the military and political organizations based in Drvar as well as the Allied missions. On 18 May the 39th Division noticed strong movements of troops from Bihac, but falsely assessed their target as Petrovac airfield. Then on 21 May 4th Division observed German forces moving near Knin and Bihac and presumed their target would be Drvar. 6th Brigade even telephoned the duty officer at Drvar and reported that a large number of German aircraft had landed at an auxiliary airfield at Bihac. The warning the duty officer circulated was that all units should expect a heavy aerial bombardment.

Overall defensive measures were limited. At the end of February the 2nd Brigade of 6th Division had been sent to Drvar. Trenches were dug and several camouflaged machine-gun positions were set up. On 28 April the 3rd Brigade replaced the unit; however, on 15 May was itself deployed west to Trubar based on false information of an impending German advance on the town. That left Tito’s escort battalion in Drvar, which for immediate defence against aerial attack possessed six AAA guns but the weapons had no sights and often jammed, and four were considered unserviceable.

Tito was aware that a German offensive was likely and with MacLean worked out the priority for airdrops. Many were made around Petrovac and some near Drvar itself or Mokro Nogi. PIAT mortars arrived, which were effective against houses and strong points. Because German aircraft operated relatively freely, partisans were forced to move supplies at night. Flying over Drvar, with its high-sided hills and frequent cloud, was not easy; some aircraft could barely edge into the valley before banking away, which may have led many to discount the threat of an airborne landing. Promisingly there were signs of a growing Allied air presence. Flying Fortresses could be seen flying overhead, then one day their escorting fighters appeared. British SOE/SIS liaison teams, in order to attack targets that partisans had identified, began to call in aircraft from Bari.

In April MacLean was asked to a meeting in Cairo to discuss air supply and took with him a partisan delegate; both were picked up from Petrovac airstrip and command of the British mission was delegated to Vivien Street. On 22 May Street observed a German Fieseler Storch flying at 2,000 feet. It loitered for 30 minutes, flying up and down the valley out of small-arms range. Street warned Tito that an aerial bombardment might soon follow and moved to ‘a little house in the hills a mile or two from the town’. The American mission also moved further away. On 23 May Tito gave the opening address to the Anti-Fascist Youth conference. The next day, the eve of his 52nd birthday, he sat down with Kardelj in his cave, thinking he was safe from aerial attack below 40–50ft of rock.

Partisans benefited from a windfall of equipment after the Italian surrender in September 1943. Here a small Italian CV-35 tank that mounted a machine gun in a one-man turret is shown in partisan hands. There was a platoon of these tanks at Drvar, which came as a surprise to the paratroopers, and were a danger because of their lack of anti-tank weapons. (Cody Images)

Final German Preparations

On 21 May von Weichs submitted the Rösselsprung plan to OKW and Hitler gave his official approval. In the evening of 22 May the SS paratroopers, told to be in place by noon on 24 May, began to move to their assembly areas, unaware of the mission that awaited them. Those going to Nagy Betskersk in Hungary with Untersturmführer Hasselwanter drove to Belgrade and then took a train to their destination; those destined for Zagreb with Untersturmführer Witzemann took the railway; and those for Banja Luka with Hauptsturmführer Obermeier also took the Zagreb train, alighting at Nova Gradiska before driving to the airfield. Men wore standard infantry uniforms during transit and concealed their airborne equipment. On 24 May a detailed briefing occurred at Zagreb, which Rybka attended; also present were Chetnik and Ustaše leaders. The plan was distributed along with aerial photographs showing the objectives. Rybka returned to brief his men that evening, for the first time telling them their target.

TITO

Tito was born in 1892 with the name Josip Broz, in Kumrovec, Croatia, close to the Slovenian border. He served a three-year apprenticeship as a mechanic before leaving home at 18 to work all over the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had a strong sense of family responsibility and sent money home. He believed in the international brotherhood of workers rather than Croatian nationalism and whilst in Zagreb joined the metalworkers’ union and Socialist Democratic Party. He loved books and was punished for reading whilst attending machinery. In 1913 he was conscripted and coped easily with the rigours of military service; within a year he was the youngest NCO in his regiment.

In his twenties Tito experienced war, imprisonment and revolution. In the Great War he commanded a reconnaissance platoon on the Eastern Front that raided behind enemy lines to bring back prisoners for questioning. On 25 March 1915 Russian Circassian cavalry caught his regiment in the open and he was wounded in the back whilst fending off another attacker. Taken prisoner, he spent a year in hospital in Russia near Kazan, surviving pneumonia and typhus. He was in charge of a multinational group of prisoners set to work on a railway line in the Urals but when he was discovered altering work records of his colleagues to their advantage, he was beaten by Cossacks. A Bolshevik who tended his wounds told him to go to Petrograd; whilst there he was arrested, questioned in prison, and then put back on a train to the Urals. He escaped and after the Bolshevik Revolution temporarily joined the Red Cossacks in Omsk but when the Whites took the town he took to the steppes with nomadic Khirgiz tribesmen. He was not a committed Red Guard at this time, and found a Russian girl to marry.

In September 1920, with his wife and baby son, he came home to the new kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and enrolled in the new Socialist Workers Party. The party was banned on 30 December 1920, despite receiving 12.4 per cent of the vote. After being implicated in bomb plots and political assassinations, severe penalties for communists were announced. However, from 1923 he was an activist and whilst working in the Kraljenica shipyard organized strikes and roused workers through public speaking. By 1927 he was in Belgrade and a full-time Communist party activist. Arrested by the authorities and sentenced, he was bailed on appeal but absconded. In 1928 he took over as Secretary of the Central Committee in Zagreb and distributed arms clandestinely.

Tito learnt the value of trusted associates. He was captured again after being betrayed and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, a time he spent reading widely and discussing politics with other activists. After his release in 1934 Tito breached a judicial order restricting him to his hometown and again became a wanted man. The police had infiltrated the Communist party and the need for secrecy was paramount. Operating undercover out of Vienna, Tito acted as liaison between the Central Committee of the party, now forced abroad, and party members still in Yugoslavia. He crossed the border numerous times under false identities. The relationship with his wife broke down and he courted a string of mistresses.

Tito’s reputation went from strength to strength. In 1936 he organized Yugoslav recruits for the communists fighting in the Spanish Civil War; false names and papers were found for 1,500 volunteers. A new government security drive then pushed him to Moscow, where he was Yugoslav representative on the Communist International (COMINTERN). Surviving the Stalinist purges, upon his return home he was made Secretary General of the party. He was no ideologue and made practical, rational decisions. The name Tito was a nickname that came from ‘that is the problem, this is the solution’. He brought new life into the party, advanced younger members, ended factionalism, widened the recruitment base and brought back the Central Committee from abroad to operate clandestinely.

Tito’s earlier experiences building up an underground movement whilst under persistent surveillance served him well during the partisan war. After spending many months with him in the field MacLean identified his attributes: ‘… leadership, courage, realism, ruthless determination and singleness of purpose, resourcefulness, adaptability and plain common sense. Where there were important decisions to be made … he took them … however precarious the situation … When the partisans were on the move, he moved with them, covering immense distances on horseback or on foot … he would join the members of his headquarters staff in a convivial meal or a game of chess … He had the gift, when he chose, of putting his cares aside and relaxing completely. Then he would laugh and joke as if he had not a worry in the world.’

In 1944 partisans sung ballads glorifying him; he had successfully led them through the wilderness for three years and his decisive leadership on the battlefield was credited as saving the movement. In 1943 Churchill told MacLean to ‘find out who was killing the most Germans’. Tito’s partisans were the answer. Communism gave the partisans in general and Tito in particular a singleness of purpose and ruthless determination, which threatened to unhinge the German position in the Balkans.

In early 1944 Tito was 51 years old and MacLean noticed ‘very thin after the rigours of 2 years on the move and long periods of inadequate food’. He was ‘clean shaven, with tanned regular features and iron grey hair … a very firm mouth and alert blue eyes’. His skin ‘stretched tight over the bone structure of his face, was parchment coloured from exposure to all weathers’. Beside him is his captured German Alsatian, Tiger. (Cody Images)

The main focus for all sections of the Battalion is Tito’s Oberster Stab [headquarters]. As soon as it is known exactly where the Stab is located, all sections of the Battalion who land in close proximity to this chief objective must immediately and ruthlessly eliminate above all the Tito’s Oberster Stab. Important persons should preferably fall into our hands living. Written material is to be kept. In the buildings of the Stab fires are to be absolutely avoided, so that men of the intelligence service can come into possession of valuable material.

At the airfields the packing of parachutes and weapons containers had been carried out that afternoon. By evening ‘equipment, ammunition and weapons were checked and the tugs were lined up on the airfield ready for takeoff’. (Tommy Natedal via Marc Rikmenspoel)

Rybka concluded by saying: ‘Don’t waste ammunition, don’t stop for the wounded. Press on to the objective.’

Leutnant Sieg, a glider pilot from 2nd Gruppe that would lead the pilots bringing in Panther group, also attended the Zagreb briefing.

On 24 May I drove with my group commander, Captain Jahnke, to Agram [Zagreb] to the Airborne Command Croatia for a briefing on operation Rösselsprung. The briefing was attended by almost all participants in the mission, the commanders of the flying units, Hauptsturmführer Rybka, who was to lead SS Paratroop Battalion 500, the leaders of the Chetniks and Ustaše and many others. Under the greatest secrecy the plans of the operation were discussed with reference to aerial photographs.

Pilots were told to land their gliders as close as possible to their targets, even at risk of damage. Sieg then returned to his base where they ‘were immediately given precise instructions; likewise the pilots of the glider tugs were informed of the exact flight path, altitude and other operational requirements’.

Relieving forces were moving up to their start lines with elements of the 7th SS Prinz Eugen Division last in place early the following day. At the airfields on the morning of the drop the paratroopers were on parade at 0430. Unterscharführer Pichler with Rybka in Zagreb told how they had been

… accommodated in a school near the airport. No one was permitted to leave or make any contact. None of us, except Witzemann, knew what assignment was before us. We spent one night in the school and were awoken very early around 0400 or 0500 hrs, and the entire Kompanie had to gather in a schoolroom. Here we first learned from our Kompaniechef which mission was flown. From two-tone glasses we could clearly see the aerial photographs of Drvar. On the aerial photographs we saw lines and drawn in points and each group and each Zug [section] was precisely split up over the landing points, direction of attack, etc. While the Schutzen-Kompanien jumped with chutes, primarily the 4. Kompanie was dropped for the most part with transport gliders.

Leutnant Sieg described the events in the early morning.

The men of SS Paratroop Battalion 500 moved to our positions and awaited instructions to embark. A short flight and mission briefing, synchronisation of watches and engines were started. At 05:55 hrs the machines towing the fully loaded transport gliders rumbled ponderously over the ground; the undercarriage was discarded at the end of the field.

Air support for the operation, for 1944, was abundant. Ground-attack aircraft had been specially brought in. On 21 May 1st Gruppe of Stukageschwader 2 had been ordered to move from its airfield near Galatz in Rumania and arrive in Zagreb by 23 May. On 22 May 2nd Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 51 (20–30 Me 109 fighters) had also been ordered to Zagreb, as was 4th Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 27 in Hungary, which was told to be there by the evening of 23 May. Airfield Regional Control in Zagreb told Banja Luka airfield to arrange accommodation for 200 men, and Bihac airfield was to ensure bomb craters on its runway were filled in and to provide accommodation for 100 men. All these orders had been intercepted, decoded at Bletchley Park and sent to General Headquarters in Cairo. However, Allied intelligence staffs had not determined the true purpose of Rösselsprung. No references to the airborne drop had been made. According to ULTRA historian Ralph Bennett, ‘German security had been tight enough to obscure the relationship between the various preparatory measures’. MacLean’s biographer, Frank McLynn, believes that there were enough reports to complete the jigsaw but that not one headquarters had them all. He thought, ‘a single person in possession of all the material from Yugoslavia reaching Bari and Bletchley would have known the attack was coming. But there was no such person.’ ULTRA analysts knew one set of facts, Bari analysts the other. The German airborne attack would achieve its intended surprise.

Leutnant Sieg described how: ‘Across the border strongpoint Mokrotz and the Save valley our formation droned, next to us and above us He 46s and CR 42s of Nachtschlachtgruppe 7, the Croatian Luftwaffe Legion with its machines, dive-bomber squadrons and fighter aircraft.’ (Michaelis-Verlag Berlin)