The Seventh Offensive came close to neutralizing Tito. Drvar may have been in a ‘liberated area’ but was vulnerable, at places only 15 miles from German ground forces, and the Germans positioned themselves in an encircling ring around it. An attack similar to Operations Weiss and Schwarz was put together, but this time Italian and Croatian units were not relied on to guard the perimeter. However, unlike previous attacks, the forces were smaller and the Germans were gambling they would be sufficient to deal with breaks into or out of the ring.
Since late 1943 the Germans, now fully realizing the importance of Tito to the partisan movement, had sought information about the location of his personal quarters in order for Special Forces to target him. The Germans selected an airborne drop. Intelligence from human intelligence sources was abundant but may not have been collated properly and the identification of the cemetery as his likely headquarters was based on the analysis of aerial photographs. Skorzeny was only brought into theatre for a few weeks and may well have been considered an outsider. If he had been told that Tito’s cave was across the Unac this information was not passed on to the FAT or the Brandenburgers. Otherwise the cave would surely have been one of the initial objectives and a landing zone on top of the ridge would have been chosen. Whilst the cave, halfway up the ridge and behind a river, was well protected from an attack from the town, a landing on the top of the ridge followed by an advance down the slope would have left Tito with few options.
Even since late 1943 a smaller raid by Special Forces disguised as partisans on Tito’s headquarters had been contemplated. Such an attack would have relied upon precise human intelligence for its successful resolution. Reliance on a small group of men did not sit well with the German generals and was never selected as the method of attack. However, a surveillance mission to confirm human source information and fill in intelligence gaps for the 2nd Panzer Army Ic could have been an option prior to an offensive being mounted. Deployment of Brandenburgers to have eyes on Drvar might have led to the confirmation of Tito’s whereabouts prior to initiating the airborne assault. The Ic needed the trust of the commanding general if such a surveillance mission was to be mounted.
Given the imprecise nature of the intelligence available to the planners the insertion of a battalion of paratroopers to conduct the strike mission offered greater prospects for success than an ambitious hit squad. A larger force could compensate for minor intelligence or operational inadequacies. The larger the force landed in Drvar the less the Germans needed to be completely reliant on information about Tito’s precise location. However, there are limits and only through sheer luck was Tito at Drvar on 25 May, rather than at his new, usual night-time residence at Bastasi, 3 miles away (a location unknown to the Germans). Because he was not under surveillance the Germans were gambling on whether Tito would be at Drvar at all.
Turning to the airborne attack, the insufficient number of transport planes and gliders initially looked like a disadvantage for Rybka; however, the availability of a company in reserve actually gave him greater flexibility. There is no evidence to suggest that Rybka envisaged a different drop zone for them and once Tito’s location was identified, Rybka’s decision not to redirect the second wave on to the ridge above the cave ended all hope of success for the airborne drop. As Renhold pointed out, the second wave, dropped where it was, made virtually no impact. When, during the operation, Tito’s true location became apparent too much time was lost redeploying for an attack and too many paratroopers were kept behind to defend the perimeter and landing zone for the second drop.
Unlike most modern-day counterparts the airborne operation was hastily put together, in part for reasons of operational security. If the senior officers of the 500th SS Parachute Battalion were informed earlier about what was being considered more time to consider the plan would have been available. Because the unit was not part of a higher formation, like the Brandenburgers, staff support was lacking. If a Luftwaffe paratrooper formation was used then more time and effort would probably have been expended on the plan. However, because Bletchley Park found Luftwaffe signals the easiest to break, that plan might well have been fatally compromised. A higher volume of signals chatter between staffs could have compromised the operation. The Germans knew the partisans had their own agents and considered the fewer that knew of the airborne drop the better. Their cautiousness had an unexpected knock-on effect and helped prevent the Allies finding out about the mission, too.
The Fieseler Storch was a small monoplane that excelled as an observation and medical evacuation platform in mountainous terrain. Its bulbous cockpit made for a high degree of ground observation and its undercarriage absorbed the shock of short landings, enabling high vertical descents. Bombs could also be dropped. (Bundesarchiv Bild 101I11- Wisniewski - 27, Fotograf: Wisniewski)
Kumm insisted only mountain troops had any hope of defeating the partisans. Motorized formations were constrained by partisans obstructing roads and destroying bridges, and were at a disadvantage because ‘the enemy simply withdraws into the mountains from roads upon which the motorized formations are advancing, in order to reappear in the rear and disrupt their rear area communications.’ (Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-204-1720-04, Fotograf: Przibilla)
Rybka was a young commander given a huge responsibility. The landing zones, so close to their chosen objectives, were laudable and bold but given the limited intelligence too much focus was given to Objective Citadel. The plan evolved on misconceptions on precisely where in Drvar Tito was located and relied too much on the fidelity of the intelligence assessments that concluded his quarters were located at the cemetery. Whether this was on Rybka’s recommendation or not is unclear; perhaps the Luftwaffe commanders transporting his unit influenced where the men should land and paid more attention to the aerial photographs taken by their colleagues than Human Intelligence reports. However, Rybka was the unit commander and given the German style of mission command we can presume his decision would have been final. He failed to compensate for limited intelligence. Given its imperfect nature a wider cordon should have been established to interdict all potential escape routes from Drvar. Perhaps the first wave was not large enough for this task and his focused approach, gambling on the fidelity of available intelligence, was the only choice he really had.
Despite successfully escaping from Drvar Tito was still vulnerable. The wider Rösselsprung operation could have intercepted his route to safety but for the defence put up by the partisans, in particular the 1st Proletarian Division that was facing the 7th SS Prinz Eugen Division. A ‘lessons learnt’ paper written by Kumm accurately identified the problems the division experienced. The warning order for the operation was only issued at 2100 on 24 May and the assembly of the 13th SS Mountain Regiment by truck through the night took time and was rushed. Regulations for the transmission of orders, as well as the provision of signals equipment, which was ‘in no way sufficient for the corresponding requirements’ were also criticized. Direct contact between the division and XV Mountain Corps was not established until the day of the attack. Communication between the division and its attached panzergrenadier battalion at Banja Luka was not achieved before the start of the operation and established only when a Fieseler Storch flew in a liaison officer. Poor knowledge of the positions of friendly units impeded economy of effort and led to friendly-fire casualties. In one instance the 7th SS Reconnaissance Battalion was stalled by heavy fire from soldiers of the 92nd Motorized Regiment. Coordination suffered, higher headquarters sometimes redirected attacks without informing their neighbours. However, some positive measures were being implemented; divisional headquarters were in contact with the point unit through the ‘assignment of a radio troop to establish direct communications from the division to the main effort battalion’.
Kumm highlighted the importance of air support in the mountains. Whilst over 400 air sorties were flown on the first day of the operation Kumm criticized the Luftwaffe for not subsequently making much of an appearance, but praised the smaller Croatian air force which ‘took off at any time the division requested’. (A somewhat harsh rebuke if he knew about the damage done to airfields by Allied bombing.) The lack of sorties hampered aerial intelligence collection, which Kumm accepted ‘can save the troops unnecessary marches and force dispositions’ and often during partisan warfare ‘must replace ground reconnaissance’. Fire support available to the troops also suffered. Kumm recognized how fighter-bomber sorties ‘particularly in the mountains, can have a destructive effect on enemy march column, which often pass through mountain trails and extend for kilometres at a time’. There was a constant need for Fieseler Storch aircraft to evacuate casualties. The planes could make landings in most clearings, as occurred at Drvar, in areas where many motor vehicles could not access; however, according to Kumm they were ‘only available during the beginning of the operation’. He wrote how the lack of these planes had ‘a damaging effect on the morale of the gebirgsjäger’. Bringing in supplies by air was also recognized as an important necessity ‘for the combat strength of the troops’ and two Ju-52s were kept at constant readiness to provide supplies. He stressed the importance of fire discipline to conserve ammunition and ordered troops not to engage the enemy beyond 400 yards.
During Rösselsprung Kumm noticed increased partisan use of artillery, anti-tank guns and other heavy weapons, and recognized the effective contribution made by Allied airpower especially against ‘motorized columns on the narrow, barren mountain roads’. Previously limited to the ‘ineffective bombardment of cities and villages’, from the second day of the operation ‘the enemy was able to effectively interdict all motorized elements and supply traffic during the daytime’ and ‘enjoyed good success in engaging motorized columns and individual vehicles’. However this did not take the form of direct cooperation on the battlefield and there were occasions when Allied aircraft attacked partisans, mistaking them for Germans.
German commanders realized partisans survived because they prepared escape routes in advance, avoided combat on the roads and sought sanctuary in the mountains. Kumm concluded that only mountain troops stood any chance of successfully hunting them down. He thought ‘an active pursuit must be taken until the enemy is exhausted and destroyed’. Once reconnaissance forces and intelligence staffs had worked out their direction of withdrawal, tactical reserves had to be brought up quickly to maintain the pursuit, for which sufficient motor transport was required. For the most part Lieutenant General Leyser stuck to this principle; however, the cordon was weak in places and vulnerable to breaking under determined counterattacks. The Germans had insufficient troop numbers to cover all escape routes and the insertion of an airborne battalion on to Tito’s headquarters was an attempt to compensate for the limited reach of their ground forces.