EMERGING ALLIANCE IN EUROPE—George Friedman, Stratfor.com, June 12, 2014— . . . The term “Intermarium” itself comes from a Polish general and founder of modern Poland, General Pilsudski. He was dealing with the same geopolitical problem that exists now. He had a Russia, a Soviet Union that was in the 1920s, increasingly assertive and pressing on his frontiers and the frontiers of the rest of what we now call Central Europe. Behind him he had a Germany that at that time was unclear with its intentions. Poland had emerged from World War I with these two empires clearing the way, so his question was how to preserve Polish independence.
He had really two strategies since he wasn’t strong enough to defeat them. One had somebody from the outside guarantee their security and that was France for him, but he didn’t really trust that this would be sufficient, so he imagined an alliance that ran from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, including countries at the time like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and possibly Turkey. This group would serve to contain Russia and would have, instead of an east-west orientation, a north-south orientation . . .
But what I started thinking about was the fact that today Russia was reasserting itself, was going to be reclaiming its priority within the former Soviet Union, repressing on them, and the fact that Germany is once again uncertain. I thought this might be something that would emerge and in a kind of very early protostage, that seems to be what is happening right now . . .
NATO: TOP COMMANDER WARNS AGAINST CRIMEA METHODS IN ALLIED COUNTRIES—© Stratfor.com, August 18, 2014—If Russia does in a NATO state what it did in Crimea, it would be considered an act of war against the alliance, Philip Breedlove, NATO’s top military commander, said Aug. 17, EU Observer reported Aug. 18, citing Die Welt.
Breedlove said NATO nations are prepared for the intervention of armed military without insignia who seek to create unrest, as well as separatists who give military advice and help destabilize a country. If NATO sees such an approach in an allied country and deems it an aggression, it will entail a military response, he said.
NATO: SEVEN MEMBER STATES CREATING NEW RESPONSE FORCE FOR UKRAINE CRISIS—© Stratfor.com, August 30, 2014—Seven NATO member states will create a new response force of 10,000 troops to improve the group’s capabilities as the crisis in Ukraine continues, RIA Novosti reported Aug. 30. Britain will join Denmark, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Norway, and the Netherlands in contributing air, land, and sea units, while Canada may join in . . .
RUSSIA: POLAND WILL ONLY RECEIVE MINIMAL AMOUNTS OF NATURAL GAS FROM GAZPROM—© Stratfor.com, Tuesday, September 16, 2014—Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled energy company, is only capable of supplying Poland with the minimal contracted amount of natural gas and not the quantity requested, a Gazprom spokesperson said, The Warsaw Voice reported Sept. 16.
The spokesperson did not say why the company was reducing natural gas levels to the country. Last week, Poland claimed it was receiving 45 percent less natural gas than expected, but current levels represent an estimated 20 percent drop. Austria and Slovakia have also reportedly experienced a drop in Russian energy imports.
RUSSIA’S AIR POWER CONSOLIDATES CONTROL IN UKRAINE—December 3, 2014 | 1913 GMT—Russia has deployed a significant number of air defense systems to eastern Ukraine, reports from local sources and the Ukrainian security services say. Medium ranged Buk M1M2 air defense systems cover most of the separatist held areas, and shorter ranged systems such as the Pantsir S1, Osa, and Tor cluster around the strategic supply lines running from the Russian border into the main cities of Luhansk and Donetsk. The systems combine to create a layered air defense infrastructure that prevents the Ukrainian air force from using its assets over separatist held areas.
Even though a Sept. 5 cease-fire agreement explicitly rules out Ukrainian air operations over separatist held areas, and the Ukrainian military has not attempted any such operations since then, the Russian move to establish this air defense presence indicates strong commitment to defending the separatist held territory.
The deployment of these air defense systems, as well as measures by artillery units to prevent the Ukrainian military from massing forces for an attack on separatist held areas, seem to serve a mostly defensive objective. However, separatist units continue to fight to expand their territorial hold over smaller areas along certain positions on the front line. They have continued to encircle and then take over Ukrainian checkpoints in areas near Luhansk, while bitter fighting between both sides continues at the Donetsk airport. The Ukrainian military’s positions at Debaltseve, a strategic town that controls the main highway directly connecting Donetsk and Luhansk, have also been contested. As the separatist and Russian forces seek to consolidate their positions there, they may still make significant attempts to seize this location.
Even though the cease-fire has not been completely implemented and skirmishes continue to break out along the front line, the shape and posture of Russian reinforcements do not necessarily indicate a further escalation of the conflict between Ukrainian forces and separatists. Instead, Russia seems to be consolidating the gains made prior to the cease-fire declaration, securing the separatists’ hold on the territory they currently control . . .