Chapter Thirteen

Unwitting Tools of the Mafia

That the Mafia was back in action in Sicily was confirmed by early reports from Civil Affairs Police Officers (CAPOs). At their meeting held at AMG HQ in Palermo on 8 September 1943, a Major Smith gave a brief talk on the Mafia. ‘Reports from local people’, said Smith, ‘indicated that Mafia activities had begun again now that the Fascists had gone, and it was necessary to take a firm line at the beginning. In Provinces there were a number of Mafia members released from prison, and some were still in prison.’ It was suggested that as many as possible of these Mafiosi should be deported. At a second meeting of CAPOs, held a month later, it was recommended that the Mafia be dealt with on an island-wide basis. Any information about their activities should be directed to AMG HQ for a co-ordinated response.

A more complete picture of Mafia activity in Sicily was provided by a report prepared by an American Military Intelligence Officer, Captain W. E. Scotten, in late October 1943. He had served for three years as American Vice-Consul in Palermo and was called upon by the Commissioner of Public Safety at AMG HQ in Palermo to provide an account of the threat posed by the Mafia to the task of Allied occupation.

The Commissioner and his department wanted some evidence to hand to a higher authority so they could get full backing to deal with the Mafia. Copies of Scotten’s memorandum were handed to Brigadier General MacSherry, Lord Rennell’s American deputy, and to Harold Macmillan, British Resident Minister at Allied HQ in Algiers.

In his six-page memorandum, Scotten gives a detailed history of the Mafia in Sicily so as to explain their grip on the island:

Whatever may have been the necessity or justification for Mafia in any given epoch, in our times it had degenerated into a criminal system, the object of which was to commit extortion and theft with impunity. To accomplish this, no method or means was neglected, ranging from threats and terrorism to outright murder, arson, kidnapping, and mayhem.

In order to protect itself, the Mafia had formed an alliance with various major landowners and this meant it became involved in island politics:

As a matter of fact, Mafia, before the advent of Fascism, had reached the position of holding the balance of political power in Sicily. It could control elections, and it was courted by political personages and parties.

Cesare Mori’s campaign against the Mafia had failed to root it out. His attack was directed mainly at its lower ranks and had sought to destroy the more notorious bandits and their gangs. It was headlining stuff:

But the higher level of Mafia was not appreciably interfered with. According to the statement of many serious people in Sicily, Mori was ordered by Rome to slacken his efforts when it became apparent that a complete housecleaning would involve too many high-ranking professional and business people and even influential members of the Party . . .

Thus it should be said that Mafia was only driven underground under Fascism; it was never stamped out in any sense of the word . . . Furthermore, to [my] certain knowledge, there were innumerable rackets, big and small, functioning under Mafia control, which the Fascist regime appeared either to tolerate or to be unable to wipe out. It seems as though the regime was satisfied with the suppression of the more outrageous aspects of the system and thenceforth refused to admit officially that Mafia existed any longer in the island.

It was a subtle and perceptive analysis of the Mafia’s relationship with Fascism. In his research, Scotten spoke to CIC officers, the Political Intelligence Section in AMG, and local Sicilians. The feeling he got was that the Mafia was re-asserting itself:

Reports are constantly flowing in, especially from the operatives of the CIC, that Mafia is becoming increasingly bold in many areas. Already our own courts have been obliged to deal with flagrant outbreaks in the province of Agrigento.

There was still a window of opportunity to crush the mobsters. Scotten recommended swift and uncompromising measures before they regained their old strength. He feared the Mafiosi were arming themselves with modern weapons harvested from recent battlefields. The military hardware included machine guns, trench mortars, land mines, field radios, even light field artillery, all hidden away in caves and secret stores. Worryingly, he believed that many senior Allied officers had already fallen under the influence of the Mafia:

[Sicilians] claim there are numerous cases of our own CAOs and interpreters of Sicilian origin and ancestry, whose family connections or antecedents in the United States have led them directly into the sphere of Mafia. They maintain that higher ranking officers have succumbed to the blandishments of the landed gentry, who are in close association with Mafia . . . They affirm that our officers are being misled and blinded by corrupt or influenced interpreters and advisors, to the extent that they are in danger of becoming the unwitting tools of Mafia.

The result was that Sicilians had lost confidence in the Allies’ ability to deal with the Mafia. That encouraged the Mafia to attempt ever more daring crimes, such as large-scale hijacking and looting of food and other articles from Allied-controlled warehouses. It was a vicious circle, with the crimes conducted under the very noses of the military. For many Sicilians, Scotten could see that the situation was possibly worse under the Allies than it had been under the Fascists:

Under Fascism there was shortage and rationing of food and a black market, but the food ration was actually forthcoming and the black market was partially controlled, whereas today the ration is unobtainable much of the time and the black market in food has gotten completely out of hand . . . Under Fascism, Mafia, if not entirely suppressed, was at least held very much in check, whereas at present it is growing at an alarming rate and is even enjoying a favoured position under AMG.

In conclusion, Scotten submitted that the Mafia presented the Allies with their most pressing problem – a situation that could not be fully appreciated by anyone who did not live on the island. But how should the Allies deal with the Mafia? Scotten believed there were three possible answers: direct and prompt action to bring the Mafia under control; a negotiated truce with the Mafia leaders; or the abandonment of any attempt to control the mobsters, with the creation of protected enclaves around Allied military bases. Encouragingly, he stated:

The first course would appear to be the only one consistent with the expressed objectives of military government. It would require the most cautious and secret preparations, strong reinforcement of the Carabinieri with allied military personnel, and concerted and simultaneous arrest, regardless of personalities and political connections, of between five and six hundred leaders, and their deportation without any semblance of trial for detainment for the duration of the war.

Cesare Mori would have been proud of the American Military Intelligence officer! Alarmingly, however, Scotten spent more space discussing the second option – a truce in which the AMG concentrated on prosecuting the war effort and left the island to the control of the Mafia, just so long as they desisted from taking food supplies intended for the local population and were tackled when they committed any common crimes.

The third course [said Scotten], is the course of least resistance. It is the course of weakness and will so be interpreted by the enemy, by the rest of Italy, by other enemy-occupied countries who are watching the experiment of AMG, and by the home populations. It may well mean the abandonment of the island to criminal rule for a long time to come. On the other hand, its chance of success is certain.

Scotten’s clear preference for the first course of action was a rallying call to the Allies to do the right thing and fight a crusade against the Mafia in Sicily. But it was never going to happen. Troops were needed to fight the war against the Germans – not the Mafia. The Allies would never commit such resources to a major campaign directed at criminals. This was not their job – their job was to win the war. Scotten may well have been disappointed by the lack of official interest in his solution, but it did demonstrate there was a strong feeling in the Allied intelligence community against the Mafia – it did not seek any accommodation with it. In this respect, Scotten mirrored Lord Rennell’s own views.

An American intelligence report of 3 December 1943 drew attention to the growing political problems on the island:

The political situation in Sicily is a threatening one. Recently, demonstrations and disturbances have been taking place in many of the island’s large centers. Those disturbances have not been pro-Allied in character, but have been staged in favor of the extremist parties, communist or fascist.

These demonstrations had broken out in Palermo, Monreale, Trebia, Agrigento, Licata, Termini Imerese, Canicatti and Raffadali. They were thought to be primarily caused by a shortage of food and other necessities, but public anger could easily be turned to a political end. A break down in law and order was also considered to be another problem facing the Allied government in Sicily. One of the reasons for this, said the report, was that a lack of respect for the government was fed by the sight of members of the Mafia taking up positions of power thanks to the apparent support of the Allies.

Interestingly, this suggests that the assumption of power by the Mafia was not seen as a popular move by the local population – but a cause for concern. To counter this lack of support, the Mafia turned to their own political cause – independence for Sicilians. ‘The Separatists had a recent rally in Palermo’, noted the American analysis, ‘but according to reports the turn out was not large, and as yet this group has not captured any large section of popular support.’

Other political parties sought to push their own view of events. The manifestos of the left-wing Labour Front and the centrist Christian Democrats both deplored an increase in violence and lawlessness. The Labour Front urged the Allied government to ‘eliminate Fascists, Mafia members, and King’s party men from positions of authority.’ According to the left, the Mafia were viewed as part of a right-wing problem.

One aspect of the difficulties faced by Allied authorities in maintaining law and order was the lack of resources available for the local police, said the intelligence report:

The Carabinieri are paid about 175 lira a week, or $1.75. A small loaf of bread on the black market costs 50 cents. Regularly distributed bread is often unobtainable. The result is that the maintainers of law and order must break the law themselves in order to live and feed their families. Naturally this leads to lack of respect for law and order, and plays in to the hands of the political parties which might wish to foster disturbances for their own ends.

Also in December 1943, a meeting of AMG officers took place in Palermo. It was called to discuss one topic – security in western Sicily. Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. Snook of the Public Safety Division (which had commissioned Scotten’s memorandum) gave an introductory run down on the problems they faced:

The main threat to security is the lack of food. This lack of food leads to general unrest and is exploited by criminal and political factions. At present the Carabinieri have the people under control. The Carabinieri are being strengthened and prepared for possible serious uprisings. It is not contemplated to call for the assistance of troops against unruly crowds unless the Carabinieri can no longer cope with the situation.

However, the Carabinieri had their own problems. They had restricted communication facilities and limited transport. It meant they could not get in force to any one spot to meet an emergency. They were also out-gunned. ‘The accessibility of explosives in the form of hand grenades etc to civilians’, warned Snook, ‘complicates the security enforcement.’

To anticipate any upcoming problems, AMG was setting up a data-gathering network to report on crime, political movements and other factors which might tend to lead to unrest. Snook reminded everyone that basic AMG policy virtually prohibited all political activity and they must adhere to that. It was noted that the Christian Democrats were attracting the wealthy and professional classes, as well as a number of former Fascists. The party had not been officially recognised by the AMG, and civilian officials continued to be chosen on the basis of individual merit rather than on their party affiliations. But, admitted another intelligence officer at the meeting, ‘This party stands in best with AMG.’

In contrast, the Independent Sicily party was criticised for being the only party not to have issued a manifesto recommending calm and support for AMG. Despite their wish not to get involved, AMG was being drawn into a political quagmire.

On 10 December 1943, Captain Scotten produced a second analysis of the political and criminal situation in Sicily. This time it came through his Security Intelligence Subsection at AMG HQ in Palermo:

The professional politicians of the pre-Fascist era are few in number, aging and cynical . . . They are cautious, noncommittal and are following a policy of waiting to see which way the wind blows. Some are flirting with the remnants of the old political Mafia. A few are already committed to the Christian-Democrats.

Scotten then described the role of major landed proprietors in the wake of the Allied invasion:

Though they are few in number, they have at hand a powerful instrument in the form of Mafia, with which they have been of necessity allied since time immemorial. Without attempting to define what Mafia is or not, it will suffice to say that Mafia may be described as a system of political racketeering on the higher levels and criminal racketeering on the lower levels.

Scotten saw signs that the landed proprietors and their Separatist associates were preparing an alliance with the Mafia. It was at an early stage, however, as he thought the old Mafia leaders did not want to be caught on the wrong side and were negotiating with other political parties, including even the left.

This analysis was a pale echo of Scotten’s concerns expressed more strongly and directly in his October memorandum – in which he urged direct action before it was too late. ‘In the eyes of the Sicilians’, he had said earlier, ‘the AMG has allowed itself to become surrounded with separatist friends and advisors and has consistently appointed to public office either outright separatists or persons of separatist sympathy.’ He gave examples of these as the prefect and the mayor of Palermo.

‘According to some sources’, he alleged, ‘at least 80% of the appointments made by the AMG in this area have been of this class. In their opinion the AMG has not only placed itself at a disadvantage to deal with Mafia, it has even gone so far as to play into its hands.’

Two months later, however, Scotten’s criticism of the Allies’ relationship with the Mafia was watered down and so were his recommendations for action. Had his associates, working primarily within the Public Safety Division at AMG HQ, been silenced by the more complex politics of SCAO Lieutenant Colonel Charles Poletti and other Italian-Americans?

While the majority of those working in the Allied government in Sicily were clearly aware of the threat posed by the Mafia and sought to do something about it, there was one small Allied agency that took a more Machiavellian approach. That was the OSS.

Towards the end of the campaign, the OSS produced its own report on its activities in the island – for the eyes only of OSS operatives in Algiers. It was credited to Experimental Department G-3, a cover name for the OSS. No writer is named but it is likely that the author was Joseph Russo. A newspaper journalist from Connecticut, he became commanding officer of the OSS SI Palermo Station after fighting ended in the island and attended meetings under the title ‘Exp Det G-3’.

The OSS report was written in Palermo on 13 August 1943. It recognised the presence of two political parties, one favouring complete separatism, led by Finocchiaro Aprile, and the other called Partito d’Azione, devoted to more regional representation. The OSS favoured the latter. ‘It is our suspicion’, said the OSS, ‘that the separatist movement is being in part sponsored by the British. It is our opinion that the Partito d’Azione has a sounder platform and a better element directing its activities . . . The British have so far failed to infiltrate this group.’ Again, we have here the peculiarly OSS concern expressed by Max Corvo that the British were the major problem for America in the Mediterranean. The report then turned to the Mafia:

In connection with all Sicilian activities it must be constantly kept in mind that the Mafia plays an important role. La Mafia in turn is divided into two branches, – one, the upper branch which is composed of intellectuals and professionals, and two, the lower branch, in which are found elements willing to perform strong-arm work, (even including petty thieves and criminals). Only the Mafia is able to bring about suppression of black market practices and influence the ‘contadini’ who constitute a majority of the population.

The OSS then made a sensational claim – it had the Mafia in its pocket:

We at the present time can claim the Partito d’Azione in Sicily and the Mafia. We have had conferences with their leaders and a bargain has been struck that they will be doing as we direct or suggest. A bargain once made here is not easily broken.

So much for Max Corvo saying that the OSS should not deal with the Mafia. The OSS report continued:

As evidence of their good faith, they have submitted to us the names of their leaders . . . We lent a sympathetic ear to their troubles and assured them, however feeble our cooperation, that it was theirs for the asking. We have employed a number of these people as informants. Some have refused to accept any compensation. Through them, and as soon as traffic will permit, we will have an intelligence network established throughout the island. We have acted with the utmost of secrecy, and we are known only to five persons.

No doubt, it is true that the rest of AMG was ignorant of this deal. But the boast of the OSS was rather hollow for we now know that the Mafia were strongly behind the Separatist movement – not Partito d’Azione. It was also foolishly optimistic to think the Mafia could so easily be controlled by a handful of OSS agents.

The report then returned to that favourite OSS occupation – outwitting the British – and the deal with the Mafia is considered to be useful in their overall strategy:

Because of British policy, we consider it extremely important that we continue our relations as established, not only in Sicily, but wherever we may go. It is British policy to tap every organization, political or otherwise. This we know definitely is being done and it is being done with the purpose of guiding and influencing political action in Italy . . . Furthermore, it is the American that the Sicilian loves; it is the American that he wants to see remain here and not the British. This last statement is not made with any bias on our part.

Of course not. Finally, the OSS had harsh words for the American governor of Palermo:

Whether Lt Col Poletti is acting under orders or not, he definitely is not running the city of New York or the state of New York. He does not understand the Sicilian situation, the people or its internal politics. As long as he remains in office, he will continue to make mistakes and serious mistakes.

Some would say that Poletti understood the ways of the Sicilians too well.

The OSS then tried to explain its own tough words. ‘We also know from personal observation the attitude taken by Col Poletti on the Sicilian situation. We do not say that he acts with malice but rather because of a misunderstanding of the situation.’

The back-stabbing between Poletti and the OSS continued long after the war. In a BBC TV interview in 1993, Joseph Russo was asked who was responsible for appointing Mafiosi to key positions throughout Sicily. Russo answered with one name: ‘Poletti.’ In this interview, Russo was also open about his relationship with the Mafia:

When I got to Sicily and took over, the first thing I did I started looking for the malavita – the criminals – and it turned out they were mostly Mafiosi. They liked my name and the fact that my father was born in Corleone – the hot-seat of the Mafia. I got to know these people – the high Mafiosi – and they were big. They got to be real big. It didn’t take them long to re-cement their solidarity – the gang. I knew every one of them . . .

Russo claimed that top Mafiosi, including Don Calogero Vizzini of Villalba, visited his office at least once a month. They wanted to talk about the political situation on the island and wondered if the Americans were going to do anything about the Communists. Russo said they were now their Allies in the war and they had nothing planned. For the Mafia bosses, it was a disappointing answer and probably pushed them to devising their own solution.

Throughout his filmed interview with the BBC, Russo was clearly holding back much more information than he was willing to divulge. Even fifty years after the events, he was still very conscious that some of his wartime Mafia contacts were still alive and he did not want to offend them. Such was the depth of the relationship between the Mafia and the OSS.

If food shortages and the activities of the black market were widely blamed for a dramatic rise in crime in Sicily then, by the end of 1943, the Allies had put a lot of effort into improving the supply situation. Bread was handed out daily to Sicilians. The delivery of vegetables, fruit and even some meat to all market places was assured. It helped to reduce some of the tense atmosphere in the island but, despite this, the black market still flourished.

Colonel Byron R. Switzer was chief of the Joint Intelligence Collecting Agency (JICA) in Sicily and he made it his business to get a feeling for what was going on in the island. His Italian-speaking team talked to a number of leading Sicilians and, sharing an AMG tendency, these included a regional president of the Christian Democrats.

In a Weekly Stability Report for 20 December 1943, JICA praised the efforts of the Allies for getting food to the Sicilians, but it couldn’t overcome their illegal entrepreneurial instincts:

The Black Market continues to flourish with practically the entire Sicilian population either buying or selling. It has been reported that in the country most of the peasants have purchased and hidden away quantities of grain amounting to three or four quintals. This is being made into bread a little at a time and the peasants either bring this bread to the large cities themselves, or sell it to others who are travelling to the city.

In the early morning at markets and railway stations in Palermo, black marketeers stood around clutching a dozen loaves. They sold to any and everyone, including the police. Having sold the bread, they proceeded to their daily jobs. The peasants were lucky to have this extra source of income. Those working in the Sicilian sulphur industry were not so fortunate.

In the sulphur mining regions of Sicily [said JICA], the economic situation is extremely bad. Many of the mines have not been in operation through lack of machinery and most families have been reduced to poverty and misery. Delinquency in these regions is reported to be on a larger scale than in any other sections of the island.

In the week of 10 December 1943, a major figure from the mainland Italian government visited Sicily. Secretary of the Interior, Minister Reale, had come to get first-hand information on the political situation in the island. He spent all day in his hotel talking to those Sicilians who represented the Separatist movement. Outside were representatives of other Sicilian parties. They had united to denounce the Separatists and form a Liberty Front against them. These included socialists, reformists and monarchists.

That Minister Reale considered the men of the Separatist movement more important than those politicians waiting outside was underlined by the fact that he kept them waiting all day for an interview. When these members were finally allowed in to see Reale, they accused the Separatists of being ‘vulgar politicians in the pay of large land-holders, all ex-Fascists, reactionaries and protectors of the Mafia’. The Liberty Front were particularly incensed at the idea that the Prefect of Palermo, Francesco Musotto, should be proposed as High Commissioner of Sicily. They accused him of being a Separatist.

JICA reported all this, but gave Musotto the benefit of the doubt, claiming that he was not himself a Separatist, although he did have many friends who were. The institution of a Commissioner of Sicily, admitted JICA, was interpreted as a semi-official step towards Separatism encouraged by the AMG. It was a bad error. Such moves only fuelled the cause of the Separatists and the people behind them – the Mafia. JICA concluded:

In the political field, all parties have united against the Separatists. Though few in number, the Separatists are all so wealthy that by using underhanded means they have tried to create the impression that they have a large following. It is this group of opportunists that could be most harmful since they are in position to become potential leaders of any revolutionary movement that might arise.

The Mafia were very well aware that this was the situation they found themselves in. With bluff and behind-the-scenes influence they had managed to get the Badoglio government to take them seriously. It was now time to ramp up the pressure on the Allies – and that meant more violence.

Christmas 1943 in Sicily was a reason for celebration. Mussolini’s Fascist regime was gone and the island was free of war. That had passed on to the Italian mainland where the Allies had fought a savage battle at Salerno and then slowly pushed on against fierce defensive actions by the Germans. By the end of the year, the Allied advance had petered out beneath a thousand-year-old monastery called Monte Cassino.

In Palermo and other Sicilian cities, the Allies had got food into the shops. They were even planning to give a free pasta meal to all civilians once a week in the New Year. According to AMG rules, the use of wheat flour for the making of pastries was forbidden, but with Christmas approaching, sweet pastries were seen piled in the bakeries and none of the authorities seemed to mind.

American and British officers based in Sicily probably hoped for a quiet Christmas. At least, they were not on the freezing front line in Italy, but criminal forces did not take a holiday.

In the New Year, a contingent of Italian soldiers was guarding an Allied fuel dump containing petrol and diesel oil. As they chatted in the dark to relieve the tedium of guard duty, they were suddenly attacked by local gangsters hurling hand grenades. They took shelter, returned fire and the thieves disappeared. It was no surprise to hear that the stolen fuel was to be sold on the black market.

The guard details were reinforced and it didn’t occur again, but it was a chilling demonstration of criminal power. The gangsters were armed with military weapons and were not afraid of a confrontation with soldiers.

It was a grim indication of what was to come in 1944.