Chapter Fifteen

Splitting the Allies

In the Mafia’s war of independence in Sicily, their first small victory was to create a split between the Americans and the British. Irritation with their British allies was entering the thought processes of certain Americans as a group of Allied intelligence officers gathered for a meeting in Palermo on 12 January 1944. Among the agencies represented were JICA (Joint Intelligence Collection Agency) and the OSS. Joseph Russo, commanding officer of the OSS SI Palermo Station, was present at the meeting under the cover of Experimental Department G-3. The notes taken from the meeting reveal a sense of drift among the intelligence agencies. Having occupied the island, they were not quite sure what they should be doing next. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed to give permission for the resumption of political activities on the island from 1 January. So where did that leave the Allied forces?

The great problem [complained the intelligence officers] in any kind of political intelligence work in Sicily is the absence of a political policy set down by the Allies . . . Nothing is known about the kind and form of civilian government for Sicily that will be supported, or at least encouraged, by the Allies. It is impossible to counteract such rumors as ‘the British favor an autonomous Sicily, while the Americans don’t’ without a statement of policy by the Allies.

Separatist politicians played on this sense of divergence in the Allied policy towards them. Andrea Finocchiaro Aprile was the front-runner in the Separatist movement and the favourite candidate of the Mafia and the Sicilian aristocracy. In a speech at Misilmere, he claimed that the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, had made remarks indicating his support for Separatism in Sicily. This left the Americans in a tricky situation. Did they go along with the British commitment or oppose it?

The mood of resentment was clear among US intelligence officers at the Palermo meeting. The JICA representative said that they had spoken to Finocchiaro Aprile and that he had told them he would consider a union with Italy after a period of complete independence, provided the Italian government was not a monarchy, was not Communist, and was not under the control of the Catholic Church.

Not that the Separatists were themselves a united front. Aside from Finocchiaro Aprile, US intelligence identified two other Separatist factions. One was La Giovanna Sicilia, led by Duca di Salomone, who had broken with Finocchiaro Aprile, accusing the latter of being an opportunist politician. He preferred to work more closely with the US administration. Then there was a group of small businessmen who resented paying tax to the mainland government, without any benefit to themselves in Sicily.

But the 65-year-old Finocchiaro Aprile, elegantly dressed with a goatee beard, was the main adversary for the Allies. Trained as a lawyer and an academic by profession, he was a highly skilled orator. He had entered politics in 1913 as deputy for the Corleone region – a Mafia stronghold. During the 1930s, he maintained an anti-Fascist position, even defending the legal rights of Jews being persecuted in northern Italy, but he also managed to shield himself against Mussolini’s wrath by praising many of his foreign policy achievements. His links with Mussolini later discredited him in the eyes of many Americans.

In 1941, Finocchiaro Aprile became president of Sicilia e Liberta, an anti-Fascist group embraced by early Separatists. The following year, he took over existing separatist factions and told Sicilians to prepare for an Allied invasion and victory. On his assumption of leadership, he chose to incorporate a whole range of political views and was proud of the fact that supporters of Separatism ranged from conservatives and liberals to socialists and communists. Subsequently, his political promises remained vague, promising a better life for all Sicilians after independence.

Despite his frequently professed belief that the Allies backed an independent Sicily, it did not stop Finocchiaro Aprile from also being their most vociferous critic. His newspaper L’Indipendenza Siciliana published personal attacks on AMG officials and was shut down after its second issue by the Allies, although they preferred such matters of political censorship to be handled by regional prefects. It was also worrying for the Allies that local libraries were featuring books both about Fascism and Separatism.

JICA’s Stability Report for January 1944 reported a slight reduction in black-market prices. For JICA, this seemed to be the key to the entire Sicilian situation:

The recent imports of grain, the regularity with which rationed bread is distributed, and finally, the proposed pasta ration, have caused grain speculators to lower their prices considerably. If the black market on food could be stamped out, conditions in Sicily would be tremendously improved because the average citizen (the working class and the farm laborer), are more interested in food than in politics.

This move in the right economic direction appeared to have come too late to reverse the Separatist political climate:

Apparently, the Separatist Movement is growing stronger [said JICA]. Led by very active men who enjoy great financial and social prestige, Separatist propaganda is being spread throughout Sicily in a strong effort to attract adherents.

As early as November 1943, the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS believed the presence of AMG itself on the island was encouraging the Separatist movement:

There is more than plausible ground for believing that if we – the Allies – willed it, we could do almost anything in Sicily, and with excellent prospects of success. We could, if we willed it, even create a separatist and independent Sicily, and without even appearing to be responsible for such a development.

The substance of this OSS report was a criticism of Lord Rennell and his own report on Separatism, which the OSS considered vague and informal, but it also revealed a suspicion that British intentions were to allow a separatist Sicily in order to gain an independent British military base. It was a suspicion that chimed with the Separatist leaders’ own conviction that they had the support of the Allies.

In the heart of Mafia country, in the town of Corleone, before an audience of 2,000, Finocchiaro Aprile gave a speech on 23 January 1944 in which he claimed that Sicilian-born Americans would demand that their government support Sicilian independence. He also repeated his assertion that British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden had declared his own government’s understanding that most Sicilians wanted independence from Italy.

Even the Sicilian Christian Democrat party were thinking that this might be a bandwagon well worth climbing aboard. In a pamphlet distributed in January, they denounced the monarchy and asked that the island be granted self-determination in order to protect it from communism and dictatorship.

That the Separatists considered the Christian Democrats their main rivals for the conservative vote was revealed in a rally on 14 May held at the Bellini Theatre in Palermo. An Italian journalist was there and contributed to a JICA report on it. He noted that a Separatist speaker called Di Martino took to the rostrum first:

Di Martino started off by an attack on the Christian Democratic Party. After having explained how the Christian Democratic Party was the direct offspring of the late ‘Partito Popolare’, alone responsible for the coming to power of fascism, he stated that the Christian Democratic Party was harbouring ex-Fascists among its members.

‘Any ex-Fascist who is not admitted to join any other party,’ said Di Martino, ‘is welcome in the Christian Democratic Party.’ This caused a noisy protest from Christian Democrats who had turned up to the meeting. Someone then shouted out that many Communists were ex-Fascists too, which angered the Communists in the crowd. ‘This is not true’, said Di Martino, who then proceeded to attack the ‘Christian Democratic minister of the Interior, Salvatore Aldisio for keeping in office as director of “Public Safety” Senator Senise, who held the same office during the Fascist regime . . .’

It appeared the Separatists preferred to offer a friendly hand to the Communists rather than the Christian Democrats. In the meantime, they enjoyed the discomfort of the divided Allies.

On 11 February 1944, the Allies handed back administration of Sicily to the Italian government, but Allied administrative bodies remained in place and exerted a strong influence through the Allied Control Commission (ACC). On the Italian mainland, Naples remained an AMG enclave until December 1945 when the Allies finally quit the country.

A native governor of Sicily was appointed by the Allies. He was Francesco Musotto. The OSS noted the process of selection. ‘The selection of a native governor brought forth suggestions from all quarters’, said an OSS report of 10 January 1944, ‘the separatists included, with the conservatives of the Mafia (not the so-called delinquent class) winning out.’ The various parties approached Poletti with their candidates. Finocchiaro Aprile favoured a prominent member of his party, but, according to the OSS, Poletti had already made up his mind:

Meanwhile, it seems Poletti had beforehand made a choice in the person of Musotto. His close association with various top-flight, well-to-do families prominent in the upper Mafia supported the belief that Musotto was the candidate suggested by this source. Up to now Musotto is the Poletti-approved candidate, though still unappointed, with the field closed to all others and his eventual appointment taken for granted.

Francesco Musotto was a former prefect of Palermo who fell out of favour with Mussolini. During the 1920s, according to the OSS, he returned to his business as a lawyer:

. . . his clientele being drawn from the Mafia. He was engaged as defence counsel in the Mafia prosecutions ordered in Sicily by Mussolini. His relations with the upper Mafia are good, and his connections with the lower Mafia can be taken for granted. The argument is made that the appointment was a smart one in view of his background and connections.

Such networking did little to impress local Sicilians who considered it further proof of Mafia infiltration of the AMG.

The British Royal Navy had its own intelligence-gathering section and in February 1944 it made a report on the situation in the east of the island. ‘The Italians are gradually taking possession of Sicily’, said Captain H. F. Waight, ‘and troops are arriving to take over duties of guards etc . . .’

But Captain Waight was very concerned with the fate that awaited the Sicilians:

The whole country is run by graft. There is no sense of honesty. Attempts are made to bribe by indirect methods. British Government Stores appear to be looked upon as legitimate prey and pilfering and deliberate robbery of storehouses is very prevalent which involves British personnel.

Royal Navy Lieutenant-Commander L. V. Mason was another who noted a deterioration in law and order:

Instances of theft and pilfering are becoming increasingly frequent and recent large scale incidents in this respect are viewed with growing concern at Army Headquarters. In one such incident, an unruly mob endeavoured to break into an Army Ordnance depot and the guard had to open fire, killing one and wounding others before they could be dispersed.

These incidents are believed to be the work of an organised gang, but so far it has been impossible to trace the ringleaders.

That there was a gathering wave of violent discontent with the presence of Allied troops in the island was revealed in an incident in April 1944. A unit of some 1,300 French paratroopers had arrived in the town of Xitta, near Trapani, in the westernmost tip of Sicily. Rather than sleep in tents, they set about requisitioning buildings for their use. The people of Xitta and nearby Trapani claimed that the French acted in a boorish manner. They ate at restaurants and refused to pay the bill. They took over the homes of local citizens without going through the proper requisition procedure. When they got drunk, they chased the local women. The Sicilians responded by insulting the soldiers and throwing stones at them.

On 9 April, the deteriorating situation took a turn for the worse. At 6 o’clock in the evening, some French soldiers attempted to grab a local woman. Local men intervened and moments later, the French claimed, they came under fire. The paratroopers retreated, only to come back, one and a half hours later, fully armed with pistols, rifles and machine guns. They fired wildly in the air and a young man was killed in his bedroom by a stray shot. Four paratroopers then broke into the house of Michele Schifano. He claimed to be ill at the time and his wife and family fled before the soldiers. Mrs Schifano hid in a closet, but the soldiers shot through the door and she was killed.

Fearful of armed reprisals, the French swamped the town and put it under siege. They set up road blocks at both ends of Xitta and machine guns were placed at strategic points. The local police were ordered out. Twenty local civilians were taken into custody by the French and beaten.

Only after an American CIC detachment intervened were the prisoners released and the French ordered to leave the town. They had to be told twice before they finally went. It was suggested they sleep in tents outside the town, but after a few days the restrictions were lifted.

In this incident there were echoes of the notorious thirteenth-century Sicilian Vespers uprising in which Sicilians slaughtered their French occupiers. The Mafia frequently claimed their historical roots stretched back to this act of defiance and vengeance. In Xitta and Trapani, the brutal actions of the Allied French paratroopers compounded a local sense of injustice that only the Mafia could avenge.

As the Allies discussed what to do next about the Separatists, Finocchiaro Aprile pressed on with his campaign with speeches and rallies across Sicily. In July 1944, on the anniversary of the Allied liberation of Sicily, he ramped up the tension by making a direct appeal in a letter to Prime Minister Winston Churchill:

I have pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of the National Committee, representing the whole of the Sicilian people, the expression of the most sincere affection and the most profound gratitude, together with the assurance that we shall never forget the valuable aid given by Great Britain to Sicily.

With the niceties out of the way, Finocchiaro Aprile quickly proceeded to business:

As I previously pointed out to you, I repeat that Sicily can and will no longer remain united to Italy. We have suffered too many wrongs, too many acts of violence, excesses and abuses to which we have had to submit for the situation created in 1860 to persist. We have firmly decided, even at the cost of having to take up arms, to win our independence and form a sovereign State of Sicily under a republican regime.

Finocchiaro Aprile hoped that Britain would fully support this desire for independence, but there was a threat here that even without British support the Sicilians were willing to take military action. There is no copy of Churchill’s reply to this letter in the British Foreign Office file.

A few days later, Finocchiaro Aprile must have been delighted to read a generally positive article about Sicily and the Separatist movement in the London Times. It called Finocchiaro Aprile ‘an old gentleman of plausible charm’ and said ‘When asked what place they expect an independent Sicily to take in the Europe of the future they remark ingeniously that they would gladly accept British protection.’ With such an article appearing in The Times, it is little wonder that some Americans and Italians thought the British actively supported Separatism

Sir Noel Charles, British High Commissioner in Rome, spoke to the Italian Under-Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and got an uncomfortable view of the situation. ‘Marchese Visconti stated what I have already heard from different sources’, said Sir Noel Charles in a telegram to the Foreign Office back in London, ‘that Separationists are asserting that their movement has the support of Great Britain and the United States; they say that the Allies cannot openly come out in their favour because of the war.’ Marchese Visconti told Sir Noel that, of course, the Italian government knew the Allies had nothing to do with the Separatists but ignorant people in Sicily continued to believe it. The implication was that some statement was needed to kill the rumours. To underline the seriousness of the threat, the Marchese Visconti also divulged his belief that the Separatists had linked up with the Mafia and they were terrorising the peasants into supporting the cause.

Six days later, Sir Noel submitted a more detailed report to Churchill’s Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden at the Foreign Office. In it, he quoted Finocchiaro Aprile boasting to Italian newspapers about how the Allies were protecting him. ‘I want to make public the fact’, said Finocchiaro Aprile, ‘that when [Prime Minister] Bonomi wanted to arrest me, the Allied authorities laughed. The reason I am here today is because the Allies wish it.’

The flurry of correspondence between Italy and the Foreign Office in London culminated in a lengthy memorandum, The Sicilian Separatist Movement, written by Harold C. Swan, Consul-General at Naples:

The big landowners are the prime – if not the only movers of the free Sicily project . . . Led by Avvocato Finocchiaro Aprile of Palermo and Barone Delmonte of Catania, encouraged by the fact that all political parties in Sicily are in a renewed state of infancy, the Separatist Movement has every hope of rising to dominance within the island and of absorbing, by promises fair and foul, the other neo-political factions . . .

It is my impression that the landed gentry who to prosper did not hesitate in the past to go into close and lucrative partnership with the nefarious Mafia, are encouraging the recrudescence of that terrorist organisation . . .

It was an alarming analysis for which Swan felt the Allies bore some responsibility for encouraging the Separatists. He said there seemed to be little doubt that the Separatist movement had received support from some American officers, who even let them have meetings on US bases:

These meetings invariably had a strong pro-Ally flavour, the Stars and Stripes and Union Jack being prominently displayed on the platform; expressions of cordiality and loyalty towards the United Nations were an ever-warm feature of the speeches. All this, plus the attendance at the meetings of American officers, would seem to lend some degree of truth to the Italian Government’s contention that the Allies are giving aid and comfort to the Separatist . . .

So the Americans were convinced it was the British who were encouraging the Separatists and the British blamed the Americans. For Swan, the finger pointed to Colonel Poletti, but he couldn’t find any evidence. ‘I was unable to obtain confirmation’, said Swan, ‘of one rumour that Colonel Poletti was an actual instigator of the movement . . .’ If only he had seen an earlier letter written by Lucio Tasca on 31 August 1944 in which the leading Separatist and Mafioso thanked Poletti as a ‘dearest friend, for the assistance and help you have always given our country, which I hope you will continue to assist for the conquest of its supreme good and that is . . . Independence!’ It was an intimate communication that indicated a strong friendship between the two.

As for the role of the British, Swan believed there was little proof of their involvement and noted that some senior officers had banned Separatist meetings. With an air of Foreign Office arrogance, Swan tried to reason why the Americans should be so drawn to the Separatists:

It is somewhat difficult to see why the Americans lend particular favour to the Movement. They can have scant commercial interest in the matter . . . It therefore seems probable that the innate snobbishness which so frequently leads the average American to seek the companionship of the bearers of high-sounding titles may be a not diminutive factor in the situation – and the Sicilian landowners are, of course, not infrequently the possessors of ancient and impressive titles of nobility.

Inevitably, the OSS considered any British support of Sicilian Separatism to be part of a larger strategic plan to keep Italy weak. This was made clear in an OSS report of August 1944:

The apparent tendency of British policy as a whole is to reduce Italy to a position of complete, military, political, and economic dependence on Great Britain . . . The fundamental objective of this policy appears to be the elimination of any future Italian threat to the Mediterranean – Red Sea – Indian Ocean line of British imperial communications.

According to the OSS, Britain was pursuing this aim by allying itself with monarchist-conservative forces in Italy. Showing a complete blindness to forthcoming Cold War politics, the OSS report recommended that Britain should follow a more disinterested path such as that embraced by the American and Soviet governments, ‘which are less directly interested in Italian affairs . . . It is doubtful whether Russia wishes to convert Italy into a Communist state.’ Such a naive view of Soviet intentions would change considerably over the coming years, but it is striking how the OSS was blind to that threat as late as 1944, preferring to direct its suspicions towards the British.

As Finocchiaro Aprile considered his next step, law and order in Sicily and respect for the Allied authorities broke down further. The island was struck by a major crime wave. Just in the province of Palermo, the annual rate of homicide leapt from 84 in 1943 to 245 in 1944; the number of robberies from 148 to 646.

‘The secret criminal organisation known as the Mafia has sprung up again in Sicily in a new and vigorous form’, said an American newspaper report of 30 October 1944, ‘with hold-ups and kidnappings becoming a common occurrence, according to latest reports from Palermo.’ The situation was so serious, said the report, that Sicilians feared to travel on highways at night as bandits were halting cars, taking money and jewels, and even forcing victims to undress.

Palermo police headquarters was said to have identified eight major Mafia gangs who were acting independently of each other. They cited an example of a wealthy local landlord, Vittorio di Salvo, who was kidnapped while driving and held for six days until he paid a 2,500,000 lire ransom. He then assumed, as in the old days, that having paid up he would be safe from any further Mafia attacks. Not at all, said the gang, they were acting alone and couldn’t guarantee protection from any other mobsters.

On 19 October, there was a serious incident in Palermo. After four days of general discontent and protest, a crowd assembled in the centre of the city and marched on the prefect’s offices. The crowd consisted mainly of local government workers demanding bread and higher wages. When they reached the prefecture, they started throwing stones and broke several windows in the building. This was the signal the Italian soldiers had been waiting for. They unleashed a hail of fire on the crowd. Their weapons included machine guns and hand grenades.

Joseph Russo, commanding officer of the OSS SI Palermo Station, sent a report to Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ):

Casualties on Palermo noonday massacre officially estimated at 162. Death toll 16 with figure expected to rise. Number of civilians wounded 137, Italian military 11. 50% of casualties are children. Figures do not include injuries in stampede. Most wounds in back from shrapnel. Several decapitations.

Russo then warned of an outbreak of disorder after nightfall as mobsters promised a vendetta against the soldiers considered responsible for the massacre. If the Mafiosi in Palermo were not responsible for stirring up the crowd, then they could be depended on to avenge the injustice.

That the Separatists and the Mafia considered the time was ripe for more concerted action against the Allies was revealed by a JICA intelligence report of a key Separatist meeting:

On 26th October, Finocchiaro Aprile, Leader of the Separatist Movement in Sicily, met with other Separatist Leaders, including Varvaro, Lucio Tasca, Pameduri, Dott Gallo (from Catania) and Atty Arrigo, in Varvaro’s office in Palermo. At this meeting, they are reported to have decided that the time had come to take more active measures than before in support of the Separatist principles.

They agreed to spread the word across the island and mobilise their forces. One of the reasons for taking action had been the riot in Palermo, which had triggered left-wing support for their cause. Another reason for action was reported by Separatist Lucio Tasca who had spoken to the Questore of Palermo that morning. Tasca told his comrades that the Questore had received orders to prosecute the Separatist leaders on charges of endangering the security of the state. Finocchiaro Aprile interrupted Tasca and said ‘the time has come’.

JICA warned that some sort of ‘putsch’ would be attempted over the next ten days. US Commodore Ellery Stone, Acting Chief Commissioner at AFHQ, considered the threat important enough to pass it on to Ivanoe Bonomi, the new Italian Prime Minister. He quoted the JICA report:

[The Separatist leaders] are reported to have decided that, since their arrest might be imminent, it would be well to take the bull by the horns and try to establish de facto independence before the unitarian forces could bring in additional armed forces. The Separatists are also said to be banking on the fact that there are virtually no Allied troops left in Sicily, and that the Allies are reported to be in no position to send troops to Sicily at present to keep order . . .

It must be kept in mind that the Separatists sometimes deliberately spread false reports of their planned actions, in order to stir up public agitation and confuse the law enforcement agencies. Whether the foregoing is merely another example of those tactics or whether they really mean business this time remains to be seen.

It was put up or shut up for the Separatists and their Mafia backers. The time for armed rebellion had come.