Chapter Sixteen

The 49th State

That the Mafia was violently involved in supporting the Separatist movement was demonstrated by an incident in Villalba, home town of Calogero Vizzini. Don Calo was the Mafioso who had supposedly proved so useful in removing Axis troops before the Allied advance towards Cammarata. He was town mayor now, appointed by the Allies from the end of July 1943. ‘When Don Calo Vizzini was made mayor of the town’, said an anonymous witness, ‘almost the entire population was assembled in the square. Speaking in poor Italian, this American lieutenant said, “This is your master”.’ And that was that.

Don Calo had always ruled the town, but this made it official in the eyes of AMG and the grateful Americans. It was a process of Allied recognition that happened throughout the island. Lord Rennell later acknowledged this was a fault of Allied government:

With the people clamouring to be rid of a Fascist Podesta, many of my officers fell into the trap of selecting the most forthcoming self-advertiser, or following the advice of their self-appointed interpreters who had learned some English in the course of a stay in the USA. The result was not always happy.

They invariably chose a local Mafia ‘boss’, or his shadow, who in one or two cases had graduated in an American gangster environment. All that could be said of some of these men was that they were as definitely anti-Fascist as they were undesirable from every other point of view. The difficulty in early days of an occupation for a foreign element to weigh up the value or danger of local characters must be clear to anyone who has given the subject a moment’s thought.

Luigi Lumia, resident of Villalba, agreed. ‘During those days’, he recalled, ‘when there was complete disintegration of authority and no form of organised power, the Mafia appeared to the Allies as the only force capable of looking after the people.’

On 2 September 1944, Don Calo – Mayor of Villalba – played host to Finocchiaro Aprile, the Separatist leader. In the main Piazza Madrice, Finocchiaro Aprile gave a speech on the virtues of an independent island nation and the crimes wrought by previous centuries of foreign rule.

At the end of the speech, his followers gave out badges with a number forty-nine on it to show that Sicily could be the forty-ninth state of the United States. Other badges showed a green silhouette of Sicily in the middle of the Stars and Stripes.

On 16 September, another political party got a completely different reception. They were Communists and among them was Michele Pantaleone whose family lived in houses looking over the Piazza Madrice. Don Calo had allowed them to give speeches only on condition that they did not mention land reform, the large estates, or the Mafia, and that no peasants were allowed into the square to hear them. To ensure that his rules were obeyed, Don Calo stood in the middle of the square holding a stick while his gun-toting henchmen leaned against the walls of the surrounding buildings.

The star speaker was Girolamo Li Causi. Since August 1944, he had become the leader of the Communists in Sicily and, with his talent for fiery speech-making, was Finocchiaro Aprile’s main political rival on the island. Although the Communists had at first aided the Separatists, under Li Causi they rejected them and instead supported autonomy. As he begun to talk in the town square, the Communist leader ignored the restrictions imposed on him and railed against the ancient burdens endured by Sicilian peasants and how the Mafia had only made the situation worse. ‘Do not be fooled by those landowners’, said Li Causi, ‘that offer you a sliver of land for your support . . .’

Don Calo ordered his priest brother to ring the bells of the church on the piazza to drown out Li Causi, but this only attracted curious peasants and citizens who started to fill the square. Li Causi carried on addressing the audience, despite the pealing bells. It was too much for Don Calo. ‘It’s a lie!’ shouted the Mafioso chief. This was taken as a command by his gangsters to stop the meeting – and they started shooting at the crowd and the speakers. The Communists returned fire with their pistols and hurled grenades. Fourteen people fell wounded.

‘Stop, you miserable wretches!’ shouted Li Causi, but he fell too, shot in the knee. Michele Pantaleone grabbed the wounded politician and hauled him on to his shoulders. As he ran out of the square, bullets tore up the plaster behind him. From behind the wall of a nearby bank, Pantaleone pulled out his own gun and fired three shots in the air. Eventually, the local Carabinieri intervened and restored order. It was a turning point for the young left-winger. He was now committed to a life-long battle against the Mafia.

This description of the Villalba massacre is told by Carlo Levi in his preface to Pantaleone’s book The Mafia and Politics. OSS made its own report on the fight at Villalba and it exposed a different dimension to the clash:

The two families of Farina-Vizzini and Pantaleone have been on unfriendly terms for ages. The feeling between the two families became more acute recently because both aspired to rent the ex-Micciche property, belonging to the Princess di Trabia. This property, owing to its location near the town, is very desirable. The case was decided in favor of the Vizzini-Farina family.

The decision angered the Pantaleone clan, and the two families became political rivals. Michele Pantaleone hoped to strike a blow against the Vizzini by inviting Li Causi to talk in their town. He even went so far, according to the OSS, as to get him to mention the Micciche affair. It was this reference that caused Don Calo to shout ‘It’s a lie!’ The OSS therefore considered this a personal feud and not a demonstration of political conflict. ‘It is advisable’, concluded OSS, ‘to give the incident as little publicity as possible.’

Pantaleone declined to do this and gave it immortality in his book. And, of course, one should not assume that the OSS was unbiased in its reporting of the incident. Their version is too sympathetic towards Vizzini and was strongly influenced by the Mafioso’s personal connections with the OSS in Palermo. In fact, its acceptance of the Vizzini angle demonstrated its closeness to the Mafia and a willingness to protect them.

Pantaleone believed the Mafia’s association with the Separatist movement suited their aims perfectly:

A few months after the liberation of Sicily the Mafia decided to support the right-wing of the Separatist movement. One reason was the influence of the Sicilo-Americans with the Mafia chiefs, with whom they had established strong and profitable connections. Besides, the Mafia feared that a national democratic government might modify the island’s social structure, whereas a Separatist victory would mark the Mafia’s identification with the island’s ruling class.

He claimed that the island’s Mafiosi had attended the first meeting in Palermo of the Separatist movement on 9 December 1943. The twenty-eight leading members present had agreed the use of violence, if necessary, to disrupt rival political meetings.

Pantaleone attended a speech given by Finocchiaro Aprile at Bagheria in early 1944. The practised speaker opened his remarks by quoting letters he had written to ‘dear Winnie’ and ‘dear Delano’ telling the Allied leaders about Sicily’s need for independence. He then made it clear where he stood in relationship to the old Mafiosi. ‘If there was not a Mafia already’, said Finocchiaro Aprile, ‘one would have to invent one. I am a friend of the Mafia, even though personally I am against crime and violence.’

This speech, according to Pantaleone, appealed immensely to the Mafiosi of Palermo and convinced them to join the Separatist movement. Don Calo Vizzini’s involvement with the Separatists also began in late 1943 when he attended a conference in Catania. He was seen as an intruder by the left-wing Separatist Antonino Varvaro, who asked him on what authority he claimed to represent the Caltanissetta region. ‘You shouldn’t bother too much about membership cards’, said Don Calo. ‘When your lordship gives me the hint, I’ll have all the Camere del Lavoro [trade union headquarters] in the province burnt down.’

As a result of the Mafia’s involvement in the movement, Finocchiaro Aprile was allowed to give speeches in the provinces under their control, such as Caltanissetta and Agrigento. Those opposing him could be sure of a rough welcome. When a minister in the Italian government visited Palermo in March 1944 to put the case for national unity, he was pelted with rotten fruit and vegetables. That was relatively mild. In Villalba, you could be shot.

A conversation between British Vice-Consul Manley and Sicilian High Commissioner Salvatore Aldisio in December 1944 confirmed Allied suspicion that the Mafia was closely involved with the Separatists. ‘Aldisio told me’, said Manley, ‘that some of the brigand bands in Sicily were supported by elements of the Mafia who were also supporting the Separatists, and that the Separatists through the support given them by the Mafia had access if necessary to the bands.’

A report by JICA in January 1945 analysed further the links between the Mafia and the Separatists. It said that Finocchiaro Aprile had been visited by several key Mafiosi, including the mayor of Piana dei Greci, Don Ciccio Cuccia, the same Mafioso who had humiliated Mussolini during his visit to Sicily in 1924 and been imprisoned by Mori.

At the present time [continued the JICA report], it can be said that the Mafia exponents represent to Separatism what the Catholic clergy represents to the Christian Democrats. In other words, the Mafia leaders of rural centers are the Separatist propaganda agents in their bailiwick. This explains why Finocchiaro Aprile frequently speaks highly of the Mafia and why he emphasized the difference between Mafia and delinquency.

JICA then criticised the attempts of the Separatists to claim the support of the Allies. JICA had heard a rumour that Britain was secretly sponsoring the Separatists because it wanted to maintain tight control over the Malta Channel, but they knew of no real evidence of such claims. Similarly, the involvement of America was suggested by the use of campaign buttons showing an American flag overprinted with a map of Sicily. The US State Department responded to this by secretly asking the Italian authorities on the island to prohibit any further use of the insignia. Said JICA:

One of the alleged leaders of [the Separatist] movement is reported to be a certain Don Calogero Vizzini, allegedly a Mafia leader from Caltanissetta. The extent of his relations and sympathies with Finocchiaro Aprile still remains a mystery.

The extent of their relationship was revealed more clearly to the Allies in a US Naval Intelligence report, coming a little later, which said that, on 30 January 1945 several Separatist representatives arrived in Palermo and wanted to speak urgently to Finocchiaro Aprile. They were told that their leader was absent from the Separatist HQ because he was at a dinner engagement with Calogero Vizzini and other Mafiosi.

Separatism and the Mafia, it appeared, were merging.

December 1944 brought more bad news for the government of Sicily. Separatist threats of action were about to be dramatically fulfilled. Following on from earlier disturbances in Palermo, there was now a hunger for a major assault on the authorities. During 11 – 17 December, students at the city’s university demonstrated every day. Much of the anger was aimed at the Italian government’s demand for Sicilians to join the army to help the Allies fight the war.

‘Sicilians, ex-service men of all ranks’, said one poster, ‘Do Not Register for Military Service! Do not allow the name of Mercenary to be added to those of Traitor and Vanquished . . . Sicilians, now is the time to demonstrate that you are no longer sheep.’

In Palermo, on 11 December, a mob set fire to the tax office, destroying most of the documents inside. Hand grenades were thrown at the town hall and telephone and telegraph communications were cut. Order was restored by the Carabinieri, but they reported being fired on by the crowd.

On 14 December in the town of Palma di Montechiaro, in the province of Agrigento, a crowd of a thousand paraded with rifles, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. In a well-organised uprising, they occupied outlying points of the town, cut communications and then turned on the town’s administration, setting fire to municipal offices and making a point to destroy documents inside, including property registers. The mob proceeded to the law courts, where they seized stored weapons, then set fire to the tax offices, destroying further documents at the Bank of Sicily and the post office. Finally, they held up a bus from Agrigento and robbed the passengers. A truck loaded with pasta was also looted.

Police and army reinforcements arrived later in the day but they were unable to gain control, even though some of the citizens invited them into their homes to fire at criminals from their windows. Shooting went on for several hours and the town centre was not secured until the following day. Fighting went on until the 17th.

Some of the armed protestors were said to have been carrying red flags but this may well have been a ruse by the Mafia to cover their own orchestration of the events. The town had a bad reputation for law and order and was at the heart of the Mafia-held province of Agrigento.

Further north, in western Sicily, the town of Alcamo, not far from Castellammare del Golfo, was the scene of another major incident. The Allied authorities had shut down several flour mills and bakeries in the area in order to crack down on local criminal speculation on the price of grain. The result of this had been to double the price of bread on the black market. Perhaps in retaliation to this strike at Mafiosi-run mills, a Separatist agitator, a student known as Milazzo, was encouraged to give a speech to other students protesting at the Italian government’s conscription plans.

Milazzo stood before the crowd in the central Piazza Ciullo. They were bearing placards saying ‘Down with the Monarchy’ and ‘Down with the Army’. ‘We will not go to war’, said Milazzo, ‘until we know why we are going. We are sick of war – the concentration camps of England, America and Russia and Germany are full of our prisoners of war. Therefore we will not present ourselves for military service.’ Milazzo then protested at the closure of the flour mills and the crowd roared their approval, demanding bread and the re-opening of the mills. The commissioner of public safety intervened and tried to calm the crowd but Milazzo said they would all meet in the square the next day.

During the night, anticipating trouble, Carabiniere Captain Miraglia telephoned for reinforcements from Trapani. The prefect of Trapani responded the next morning by calling for the mills to be re-opened, but it was too late for the citizens of Alcamo. At 9.00 a.m. on 18 December, a crowd of 6,000 people gathered in the Piazza Ciullo. Avvocato Cassara, President of the Alcamo section of the Separatist Youth League, stood on a balcony above the square and started to stir up the crowd. He condemned local taxes and the crowd responded by shouting ‘Burn down the tax offices.’

Captain Miraglia begged Cassara to calm the crowd, but the situation was out of control. An angry mob marched off to attack municipal buildings, including the town hall, tax offices and magistrates’ offices. Furniture and documents were pulled out of the offices and burned. The mob then turned on the Magazini Granai del Popolo, where they looted stores of grain, chemical fertiliser and American tinned food. Finally, an assault was attempted on the inter-provincial police office but was stopped by the Carabinieri led by Captain Miraglia. The crowd fired at the police and threw hand grenades. The police returned fire. The crowd dispersed and, later in the day, reinforcements of police and Italian soldiers arrived from Trapani. Several arrests were made as the troops secured the town and sent out patrols.

A US Naval Intelligence report from Palermo gave details of the riot at Alcamo to AFHQ:

It is impossible to exaggerate the seriousness of the present situation in Sicily. No one is prepared to make even a suggestion as to how the matter can be kept under control. If the calling of Sicilians to military service and the threatened ending of the flour supply occur simultaneously, no constructive steps can be taken that will reconcile the opposing Sicilian and Italian interests. Actual assumption of military control of the area by Allied Governments will be the only solution.

The Allies had no taste for relocating soldiers back to Sicily. They had their hands full with the conquest of Hitler and the Nazis in western Europe. The Mafia and the Separatists knew this full well and 1945 would bring even more violence as they attempted to win their war of independence.

In the first week of January 1945, Italian Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi was forced to address his fellow government ministers in Rome on the trouble in Sicily. ‘The underlying causes of the disorders may be laid to the Separatist and the hidden Fascist elements in the Island’, he said. ‘The situation at present is seemingly quiet, but still tense. Further incidents may break out at the slightest provocation.’ They did.

New words were used to describe the wave of violent incidents in Sicily in early 1945. US Naval Intelligence described rioters and lawbreakers as ‘insurgents’ and ‘rebels’ – and the level of violence was growing, with casualties to match.

A naval report sent to AFHQ on 8 January 1945 described a catalogue of escalating assaults. Italian troops were needed across the island to deal with outbreaks of violence. In Ragusa, 1 officer, 1 NCO and 2 soldiers were shot dead, 15 were wounded and 9 missing. Ten insurgents were killed and 50 wounded. Only the arrival of an artillery regiment escorted by a tank and armoured car quietened the situation. At Comiso, a Captain Sabatini was kidnapped by rebels and an Italian column of machine gunners had to blast their way into the town. The promise of action by Finocchiaro Aprile and his Mafia-backed Separatists, made back on 26 October 1944, seemed to be coming true.

In that same month, General Castellana had arrived in Sicily to take charge of a reactivated Aosta Division. He was very frank with the OSS when he spoke with its officers in Palermo. ‘It is reported that General Castellana’, said the OSS, ‘is convinced that the strongest political social force to be reckoned with is the Mafia. He is extremely anxious to establish cordial relations with high Mafia leaders.’

The US Psychological Warfare Board (PWB) was in no doubt about who was behind the insurgency. In a report to AFHQ on 10 January 1945, it listed among the causes for rebellion the fear that Sicilians would be called up to serve in the Far East, and the continuing rationing of bread and pasta. All these reasons were ‘enflamed by Separatists, Fascists, and MAFIA [their capitals].’ Despite any lingering connections between Allied intelligence agents and their Mafia helpers of eighteen months before, the Mafiosi were now being seen more as the problem than the solution. The PWB had to admit its more subtle uses of propaganda were failing and it recommended strongly that the Italians assert their authority with police round-ups of Fascist and Mafia elements. This was a call for a return to the days of Cesare Mori and his retate.

The PWB also wanted to clarify the Allied position on Sicilian Separatism. ‘London, Washington be asked produce new statement’, said its report, ‘condemning mob law categorically denying Allied support for Separatism.’

As the Allies debated what to do next, there was a further dimension to the trouble erupting in western Sicily. Armed criminal bands were joining the insurgency and leading raids across the region. On 27 January 1945, a band of forty armed men held up a train running on the Licata – Agrigento line at Contrada Saladino in Camastra. They robbed the passengers and disappeared. On another train, suspected of carrying rebel arms, seventeen people were arrested. On them were found fourteen rifles, a pistol, two hand-grenades and a stock of ammunition. On 15 January, three Carabinieri patrolling Sciacca were shot at by four men. One of the Carabinieri was killed. The raiders ran away.

The authorities had little choice but to go back to Mori’s tactics and on 10 February, in Agrigento, a round-up netted seventy-four Sicilians who were arrested on suspicion of using weapons and being involved in the Camastra train hold-up.

On 15 February, US Naval Intelligence said that ‘Emissaries from Palermo province reported that armed bands, in full “war” equipment, with arms, ammunition, supplies, logistic and medical services, were making their way to the vicinity of the town of Corleone.’

Corleone was notorious as a main centre of the local Mafia.

Salvatore Aldisio, a Christian Democrat and High Commissioner for Sicily, summed up events in the island in a secret report to the Italian Ministry of the Interior of 21 February 1945:

The disorders which occurred in Sicily during the month of December degenerated into armed revolts in the provinces of Agrigento and Ragusa during the month of January . . . Order was restored everywhere on 13 January. Various battles between the troops and rebels were inevitable, as a result of which 12 Carabinieri, 1 officer, 1 NCO and 2 soldiers met their death in Ragusa while 15 other troops were wounded. Among the rebels 13 dead and 50 wounded are reported . . .

The last revolt took place at Palazzo Adriano in Palermo on 25 January when 700 rebels fired machine guns at Carabinieri barracks, damaging neighbouring homes. The troops responded fiercely and stopped the rebels from occupying the barracks. Aldisio put the blame for this violence on the Separatists.

Feeling emboldened by the action, the Separatist Movement had held a convention in its Palermo headquarters on 15/16 January. This made an announcement calling for the administration of the island to be taken away from the Italian government and handed to them, or at least to the Allied authorities.

In his report, Aldisio made a veiled reference to the Mafia, calling them:

Capitalistic interests of no slight importance . . . [They are] known to sponsor the movement for the purpose of centralising power in their own hands and remaining masters of the situation in Sicily, once the economic ties with the government is broken. This would give rise to a feudal regime with an anti-democratic system of privileges from which the sponsors alone would derive the benefits.

Food shortages and lawlessness added fuel to the fire, said Aldisio. Criminals were getting bolder and attacking long distance bus routes and trains. He feared the growth of heavily armed bands of ex-prisoners operating across the country. Finally, he named one of the prime figures he believed was responsible for the deteriorating situation. ‘The band led by Giuliano’, he said, ‘blamed for numerous crimes committed in the Partinico area, continues to reign.’

Salvatore Giuliano – it was a name that would strike terror in everyone on the island – including the Mafia.