NOTES

CHAPTER 1: A TERRIFYING PROSPECT

1 “The History of Alamogordo,” www.alamogordo.com, accessed August 8, 2003.

2 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 652; Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Da Capo Press, 1983), p. 289; Kal Bird and Martin Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (New York: Knopf, 2005), p. 304.

3 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 652; Peter Wyden, Day One: Before Hiroshima and After (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 203; Gregg Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), pp. 128–129.

4 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 653.

5 Ibid., p. 668; Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves, Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Subject: The Test, July 18, 1945, pp. 9–10.

6 www.atomicarchive.com/Fission,” accessed September 5, 2003.

7 Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth Press, 2002), pp. 200–201, 205, 224, 365–366.

8 Groves, Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Subject: The Test, pp. 1–2.

9 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 672; Wyden, Day One, 213n; I. I. Rabi, Science: The Center of Culture (New York: World Publishing, 1970), p. 139.

10 Maurice Goldsmith, Frédéric Joliot-Curie: A Biography (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), p. 65; Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 262; Leo Mahoney, A History of the War Department Scientific Intelligence Mission (ALSOS), 1943–1945 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1993), p. 59; Kristie Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika: Scientific Research in Nazi Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 163.

11 R. V. Jones, “Introduction,” in Samuel A. Goudsmit, ALSOS (Los Angeles, Calif.: Tomash, 1983), p. ix; Goldsmith, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, pp. 67–68; David Bodanis, E=mc²: A Biography of the World’s Most Famous Equation (New York: Berkley, 2000), pp. 100–113; Jeremy Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2001), p. 11 n. 18. Also see Ruth Lewin Sime, “The Search for Transuranium Elements and the Discovery of Nuclear Fission,” Physics in Perspective, 2, 1 (March 2000), pp. 48–62. The Meitner-Frisch article was titled “Disintegration of Uranium by Neutrons: A New Type of Nuclear Reaction” (Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 856).

12 Goldsmith, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, pp. 71–72.

13 “Albert Einstein to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 2, 1939,” in Michael B. Stoff and Jonathan F. Fanton, The Manhattan Project: A Documentary Introduction to the Atomic Age (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), pp. 18–19.

14 “The Frisch-Peierls Memorandum, 1940,” in Philip L. Cantelon, Richard G. Hewlett, and Robert C. Williams (eds.), The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), pp. 11–15; Paul Lawrence Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project: A Study in German Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 101–102; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 75–79.

15 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, pp. 1, 364; Mark Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power, 1939–1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 17–18; Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project, p. 95.

16 Walker, German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power, p. 17; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 3; Thomas Powers, Heisenberg’s War: The Secret History of the German Bomb (New York: Knopf, 1993), p. 94; David Cassidy, Uncertainty: The Life and Science of Werner Heisenberg (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1992), pp. 419–420.

17 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, pp. 2, 363.

18 Cassidy, Uncertainty, pp. ix, 91–92, 215, 226, 228, 231, 242, 247; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 364. On the complementarity principle and the statistical interpretation of Schrödinger’s wave function, see Helge Kragh, Quantum Generations: A History of Physics in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 209–210, and Robert P. Crease and Charles C. Mann, The Second Creation: Makers of the Revolution in Twentieth-Century Physics (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1996), p. 61.

19 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, pp. 3, 24; “Albert Einstein to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 2, 1939,” pp. 10–11; Kragh, Quantum Generations, pp. 169, 183–185, 235, 260, 265, 271, 350–351; Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 168.

20 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 3.

21 David Cassidy, “Introduction,” in Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. xxiii; Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 168; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 16.

22 Cassidy, “Introduction,” p. xxiii; Cassidy, Uncertainty, p. 421.

23 Cassidy, Uncertainty, pp. 420–423; Cassidy, “Introduction,” pp. xxiv–xxv.

24 Lore R. David and I. A. Warheit, German Reports on Atomic Energy: A Bibliography of Unclassified Literature (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1952), passim; Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 167.

25 David and Warheit, German Reports on Atomic Energy, p. 10; Cassidy, “Introduction,” pp. xxiv–xxv; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 58.

26 David and Warheit, German Reports on Atomic Energy, p. 9; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 30.

27 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, pp. 33–34; Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project, p. 136; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 84; Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus, p. 63.

28 Cassidy, “Introduction,” p. xxvi; David and Warheit, German Reports on Atomic Energy, p. 13; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 13.

29 Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project, pp. 9–10; Cassidy, “Introduction,” p. xxv.

30 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 169.

31 Ibid.; William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), p. 903.

32 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 169; Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project, p. 173.

33 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 169; Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project, pp. 167–171.

34 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 170; “Vortragsfolge,” Samuel A. Goudsmit Papers, Box 25, Folder 13, American Institute of Physics, College Park, Md.; Cassidy, Uncertainty, pp. 444–445; Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project, pp. 174–175, 177–178; Werner Heisenberg, “A Lecture on Bomb Physics: February 1942,” Physics Today, August 1995, pp. 27–30.

35 Cassidy, Uncertainty, p. 444; Goudsmit, ALSOS, pp. 170–171; Heisenberg, “A Lecture on Bomb Physics.”

36 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 171.

37 Ibid., p. 174; Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project, p. 173; Cassidy, Uncertainty, pp. 451–452; Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 225.

38 Cassidy, Uncertainty, pp. 455–458; Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 173; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 40; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, p. 226; Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb, pp. 179–184. Whether Heisenberg, through his comments to Speer and other actions, sought to sabotage, for moral reasons, any German attempt to build an atomic bomb has been a subject of major controversy for decades, as are his motives in meeting with Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in September 1941. The two primary books on the issue, which reach diametrically opposite conclusions, are Powers, Heisenberg’s War, and Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project. The issue is also discussed in Hitler’s Uranium Club (which includes transcripts of conversations among the key German atomic scientists during their immediate postwar captivity in England), Cassidy’s Uncertainty, and John Cornwell’s Hitler’s Scientists: Science, War, and the Devil’s Pact (New York: Viking, 2003), and has been the subject of articles, letters, and exchanges in the New York Review of Books, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nature, and Physics Today.

I do not examine the issue in this book because I do not believe it is of great relevance from the point of view of those involved in collecting and analyzing intelligence on a possible German atomic bomb effort, or of those who approved the U.S.-British effort out of concern about the Germans might be doing. Analysis and policy decisions would have to be made on the basis of hard facts, or lack thereof, of what the Germans were doing, not trust in the benevolence of physicists who were under Hitler’s thumb. For what it’s worth, I do not believe that Heisenberg understood that an atomic bomb could be built but sought to sabotage, along with others, the German effort. See Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, pp. 113–140, especially p. 117, for Heisenberg’s reaction to Hiroshima, which does not seem to be the reaction of a scientist who knows an atomic bomb is feasible.

39 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, pp. 174–175; David and Warheit, German Reports on Atomic Energy, pp. 17–33. Since German Reports does not specify the month of publication, the January–August 1943 number is an estimate.

40 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 45.

41 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 187; H. A. Bethe and E. Teller to J. R. Oppenheimer, August 21, 1943, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, Box 20, H. A. Bethe Folder, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Rabi, Science, p. 141. The concern about a German atomic bomb was not restricted to those inside the Manhattan Project or even the U.S. government. In December 1943, articles in Newsweek and the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle raised the specter of a Nazi A-bomb. See James S. Murray, Memorandum for Officer in Charge, Subject: D.S.M. Project, December 16, 1943, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 165, NARA; “Uranium Seen as Key to New Secret Bombs,” Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, December 26, 1943.

42 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 405; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 185.

43 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 185.

44 Ibid., pp. 185–186.

45 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 217, 286.

46 Ibid., p. 218; Interview with Robert Furman, Rockville, Md., February 13, 2003; Goudsmit, ALSOS, p. 16.

47 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 218–219; Goudsmit, ALSOS, p. 16; Furman interview.

48 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, pp. 171, 244 n. 36; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 35; Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project, p. 143. On pp. 143–145 Rose discusses the apparent paradox of a German scientist both making a key discovery that increases the prospects of a German bomb and warning the Allies of Germany’s bomb project.

49 John V. H. Dippel, Two Against Hitler: Stealing the Nazi’s Best-Kept Secrets (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. x, 21, 29, 80–81.

50 Ibid., p. 93.

51 John Lansdale Jr., “Military Service” (unpublished manuscript, 1987), pp. 37, 40; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, pp. 288–289.

52 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 9, 54; Arthur H. Compton to Major A. V. Peterson, “Situation in Germany,” June 2, 1943, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1, NARA. On Compton’s work, and Nobel Prize, see Kragh, Quantum Generations, pp. 161, 194, 435.

53 Compton to Peterson, “Situation in Germany.”

54 Ibid.

55 F. H. Hinsley, E. E. Thomas, C. A. G. Simkins, and C. F. G. Ransom, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 932; F. H. Hinsley, E. E. Thomas, C. F. G. Ransom, and R. C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 124.

56 Hinsley, Thomas, Simkins, and Ransom, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 2, p. 932.

57 Hinsley, Thomas, Ransom, and Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 2, pp. 125–126; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 44; R. V. Jones, Reflections on Intelligence (London: Mandarin, 1990), p. 284.

58 Hinsley, Thomas, Simkins, and Ransom, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 3, Part 2, pp. 933–935, 938; Hinsley, Thomas, Ransom, and Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 2, p. 124; Arnold Kramish, The Griffin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), pp. 129–130.

59 Hinsley, Thomas, Ransom, and Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 2, pp. 123–124, 127; R. V. Jones, The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939–1945 (New York: Coward, McCann & Geohegan, 1978), p. 206; Charles Cruickshank, Special Operations Executive in Scandinavia: The Official History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 198–202; Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 149–151.

60 Jones, “Introduction,” p. xi; Jones, Reflections on Intelligence, p. 284.

61 Furman interview.

62 Ibid.

63 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 223.

64 Ibid.

65 J. R. Oppenheimer to Major Robert Furman, September 22, 1943, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers, Box 34, Robert Furman Folder, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 E-mail, Philip Morrison to author, January 21, 2003; “Philip Morrison,” web.mit.edu, accessed May 9, 2002; P. Morrison to S. K. Allison, September 23, 1943, and Samuel K. Allison to Brig. Gen. L. R. Groves, October 11, 1943, both in RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1, NARA.

71 Morrison to Allison, September 23, 1943.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid. On the other side of the Atlantic, Rudolf Peierls had done work similar to Morrison’s for the British. See Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 74.

74 Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1985), p. 282; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 214.

75 H. W. Dix to Colonel O’Conor, Subject: Joachimsthal, December 2, 1943; Lt. Col. H. W. Dix to Brig. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, January 11, 1944; and SI, Special Projects Section to W. H. Shepardson, Chief, SI, Subject: Azusa, Report of Present Status, January 24, 1944—all in RG 226, Entry 210, Box 431, Folder 2, NARA.

76 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 242; Jeremy Bernstein, “What Did Heisenberg Tell Bohr About the Bomb?” Scientific American, May 1995, pp. 92–97.

77 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 13; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 242–243; Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, p. 849.

78 Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (New York: Basic Books, 1983), passim.

79 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 227–228; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 290.

80 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 228; Richard Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America’s First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 204; Kragh, Quantum Generations, p. 239.

81 Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), p. 214; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 167, 272–273.

82 Grose, Gentleman Spy, p. 214; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 271.

83 Office of Strategic Services Official Dispatch (from Bern, Switzerland to Office of Strategic Services), March 24, 1944, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 219, Folder 1370, NARA; Office of Strategic Services, Official Dispatch (from Office of Strategic Services to Bern), November 30, 1943, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 219, Folder 1371, NARA; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, p. 48.

84 Office of Strategic Services Official Dispatch (from Bern, Switzerland, to Office of Strategic Services), May 11, 1944, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 219, Folder 1370, NARA.

85 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 294–295; Nicholas Dawidoff, The Catcher Was a Spy: The Mysterious Life of Moe Berg (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), pp. 17, 53.

86 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 295; “Moe Berg,” www.baseball-reference.com, accessed June 30, 2005; Dawidoff, The Catcher Was a Spy, p. 50.

87 Dawidoff, The Catcher Was a Spy, pp. 4, 21, 31–33, 36–37, 54–56, 61, 70, 82; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 294–295; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 290.

88 Dawidoff The Catcher Was a Spy, p. 214.

89 Ibid., pp. 161–162.

90 Office of Strategic Services Official Dispatch (from Bern, Switzerland, to Office of Strategic Services), April 3, 1944, RG 226, Entry 134, Box 219, Folder 1370, NARA.

91 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 287–288.

92 Luis W. Alvarez, Alvarez: Adventures of a Physicist (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 22–24, 38, 86; Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, pp. 143, 273, 349; Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb, p. 20; Peter D. Ward and Donald Brownlee, Rare Earth: Why Complex Life Is Uncommon in the Universe (New York: Copernicus, 2000), p. 164; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 222.

93 Alvarez, Alvarez, p. 120.

94 Ibid. Xenon is one of six noble gases (along with helium, neon, argon, krypton, and radon), all but one of which was discovered by Sir William Ramsey in the 1890s. These gases do not form compounds readily, and all have the maximum number of electrons in their outer shell, making them stable. See www.chemicalelements.com/groups/noblegases.html.

95 Alvarez, Alvarez, p. 120.

96 Ibid.; Furman interview; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 223.

97 Maj. R. R. Furman to Mr. Luis Alvarez, May 12, 1944, LANL Archives.

98 Luis W. Alvarez to Maj. R. R. Furman, May 17, 1944, LANL Archives.

99 P. Morrison to S. K. Allison, “Report on the Enemy Materials Situation,” November 30, 1943/December 23, 1943, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1, NARA.

100 P. Morrison to S. K. Allison, “Report on Enemy Physics Literature: Survey Report P,” December 20, 1943, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1, NARA.

101 Ibid., p. 7.

102 “Summary,” December 22, 1943, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1, NARA.

103 Ibid.

104 Samuel K. Allison to Brig. Gen. L. R. Groves, January 7, 1944, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1, NARA.

105 Maj. R. R. Furman, Memorandum to Brig. Gen. L. R. Groves, Subject: Report on Enemy Activities, March 7, 1944, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1, NARA.

106 Ibid.

107 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 219–221.

108 Karl Cohen, “Report on German Literature on Isotope Separation,” March 27, 1944, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1, NARA. Oppenheimer was also concerned about German scientific articles that were a little too reassuring, and wrote to Furman earlier in the month to express his concerns. See Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 285.

109 Cohen, “Report on German Literature on Isotope Separation,” p. 9.

110 Harold C. Urey to Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves, April 4, 1944, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-1, NARA; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 380.

111 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 177.

112 Ibid.; Cassidy, Uncertainty, p. 487.

113 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, p. 176; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 335.

114 Cassidy, Uncertainty, p. 488.

115 Ibid., p. 489; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 336–337.

116 Morrison to Allison, “Report on Enemy Physics Literature.”

117 Macrakis, Surviving the Swastika, pp. 177–178.

118 Dawidoff, The Catcher Was a Spy, pp. 167–168.

119 Ibid., p. 169.

120 Ibid., pp. 172–173.

121 Ibid., pp. 173–175, 177–179.

122 Berg to Buxton, Shepardson, and Dix, June 12, 1944, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 431, Folder 2, NARA.

123 Ibid.

124 Dawidoff, The Catcher Was a Spy, pp. 181–182.

125 Ibid., pp. 184, 187–188.

126 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 375.

127 Ibid.

128 Charles A. Ziegler and David Jacobson, Spying Without Spies: Origins of America’s Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), p. 7.

129 Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 376–377.

130 Ibid., p. 377.

131 Dawidoff, The Catcher Was a Spy, pp. 194, 199–202. A letter from Howard Dix to William F. Quinn, the head of the Strategic Services Unit in 1946 (the successor to the OSS secret intelligence and counterintelligence branches), gives the date of the lecture as December 23. It does not mention that Berg had the option of killing Heisenberg. Letter, Howard Dix to Col. Wm. F. Quinn, September 30, 1946.

132 Dawidoff, The Catcher Was a Spy, pp. 191–194.

133 Ibid., pp. 202–207; Helmut Rechenberg, “Werner Heisenberg: The Columbus of Quantum Mechanics,” www.cerncourier.com/main/article/41/10/16, accessed October 8, 2003.

134 Lansdale, “Military Service,” pp. 37–38; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 190–191; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 285; Maj. Gen. G. V. Strong, Memorandum to Chief of Staff, [no title], Washington, D.C., September 25, 1943.

135 Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, pp. 605–606; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 192–193; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 286; Lansdale, “Military Service,” p. 38; Jones, Manhattan, p. 281.

136 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 192–193; Jones, Manhattan, pp. 281–282.

137 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 207; Jones, Manhattan, pp. 285–286; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, pp. 286–287.

138 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 208; Jones, Manhattan, p. 285; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 296.

139 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 296; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 314.

140 Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, pp. 46–47; Kragh, Quantum Generations, p. 163; Goudsmit, ALSOS, pp. 15, 47; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 352; Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), p. 171.

141 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 209–210.

142 Ibid., pp. 211–212.

143 Ibid., pp. 213–215; Goudsmit, ALSOS, p. 34; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 299.

144 Boris T. Pash, The ALSOS Mission (New York: Charter, 1969), pp. 83, 85–86; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 299.

145 Pash, The ALSOS Mission, pp. 91–92; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, pp. 299–300; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 219.

146 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 300; Jones, Manhattan, p. 287.

147 Pash, The ALSOS Mission, pp. 133–134. Perhaps Washington saw through the joke and realized they had an opportunity to acquire some French wine, quickly and cheaply.

148 Ibid., pp. 87, 130; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 300.

149 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 221–222; Goudsmit, ALSOS, p. 66; Pash, The ALSOS Mission, p. 156; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, pp. 300–301.

150 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 301; Goudsmit, ALSOS, pp. 67, 70–71; Pash, The ALSOS Mission, p. 156; Morrison e-mail.

151 S. A. Goudsmit and F. A. C. Wardenburg, Subject: TA-Strassburg Mission, December 8, 1944, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 166, NARA; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, p. 367. Information on Heisenberg and Weizsäcker being in Hechingen had been obtained by the OSS during the November 15–24 period from a Swiss source, Professor Edgar Meyer. The information was transmitted in full to Furman on December 20. OSS Bern, Report B-710, “Location of Forschungsstelle E.,” November 24, 1944; Colonel H. W. Dix to Major Robert R. Furman, December 20, 1944.

152 Goudsmit and Wardenburg, Subject: TA-Strassburg Mission.

153 Goudsmit, ALSOS, p. 75.

154 Ibid., pp. 88–90; Pash, The ALSOS Mission, pp. 156–157, 187, 197; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 231–233; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 303.

155 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 234; Lansdale, “Military Service,” p. 55; Jones, Manhattan, p. 290; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 303.

156 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 304.

157 Ibid.; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 241; Goudsmit, ALSOS, p. 98.

158 Goudsmit, ALSOS, p. 108; Groves, Now It Can Be Told, pp. 241–242; Pash, The ALSOS Mission, pp. 216–217; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, pp. 304–305.

159 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 305.

160 Ibid., p. 305.

161 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 242; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 306.

162 Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 244; Goudsmit, ALSOS, p. 121; Bernstein, Hitler’s Uranium Club, pp. 363–365; Powers, Heisenberg’s War, pp. 428–429.

CHAPTER 2: LIGHTNING STRIKES

1 Thomas Powers, Heisenberg’s War: The Secret History of the German Bomb (New York: Knopf, 1993), p. 292.

2 David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 9, 51–52; I. N. Golovin, I.V. Kurchatov: A Socialist-Realist Biography of the Soviet Nuclear Scientist (Bloomington, Ind.: Selbstverlag Press, 1968), p. 31; Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 32; Steven J. Zaloga, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945–1964 (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1993), p. 29.

3 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 52–53, 55; Yuli Khariton and Yuri Smirnov, “The Khariton Version,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1993, pp. 20–31 at p. 23.

4 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 29–33, 61.

5 Ibid., pp. 31, 36–38, 62; Arnold Kramish, Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 24; Golovin, I.V. Kurchatov, pp. 10–13; Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 29.

6 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 75.

7 Ibid., pp. 82–84; Jerrold Schecter and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 48; Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 163–164; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 118.

8 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 86, 96; Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 7; Yury A. Yudin, Manuscript on the History of the Soviet Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Infrastructure (Moscow: Ministry of Atomic Energy, n.d.), pp. 10, 49; Paul Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 68–69; Steven Zaloga, “The Soviet Nuclear Bomb Programme—The First Decade,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, April 1991, pp. 174–181 at 174–175; Helge Kragh, Quantum Generations: A History of Physics in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 437.

9 Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 69; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 93; Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 29–30, 48.

10 Steven Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), p. 7; Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 69; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 116, 134.

11 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 105–106; Yudin, Manuscript on the History of the Soviet Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Infrastructure, pp. 42–49; Henry De Wolf Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb Under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945).

The importance of foreign espionage in support of the Soviet atomic bomb program has been a source of considerable controversy for two reasons: the debate between former Soviet intelligence officers and Soviet weapons scientists over the role that espionage material played in the development of the initial Soviet bombs, and the controversy over which American and British citizens served as Soviet spies at Los Alamos or elsewhere during World War II. On the first subject, see the May 1993 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, specifically the articles by David Holloway (“Soviet Scientists Speak Out,” pp. 18–19), Yuli Khariton and Yuri Smirnov (“The Khariton Version,” pp. 20–31), and Sergei Leskov (“Dividing the Glory of the Fathers,” pp. 37–37).

While it is generally accepted that the Venona decrypts establish that more Americans and Britains provided classified information to Soviet intelligence than have been identified publicly, the controversy concerns whether some very prominent scientists, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, did so. The books making such charges include Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, and Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona Schecter, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994). Among the works challenging such allegations are Thomas Powers, Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda (New York: New York Review Books, 2002), pp. 59–79; David C. Cassidy, J. Robert Oppenheimer and the American Century (New York: Pi Press, 2004), pp. 198–200; Priscilla Johnson, “Flimsy Memories,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, pp. 30–36; and Hans A. Bethe, Kurt Gottfried, and Roald Z. Sagdeev, “Did Bohr Share Nuclear Secrets?” Scientific American, May 1995, pp. 84–90. In 1995 the FBI stated that there was no evidence to confirm the allegations that Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Niels Bohr, and Leo Szilard were witting sources of Soviet intelligence. In addition, the FBI stated that it had classified evidence indicating that such allegations were false. See The White House, Opening Statement by Chairman Les Aspin, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, “FBI Inquiry into Allegations of Atomic Scientist Espionage Made in Sudoplatov Book,” May 1, 1995.

Works that deal, in whole or part, with Soviet World War II atomic espionage operations include Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story (New York: HarperCollins, 1990); Andrew with Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield; John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, Bombshell: The Secret Story of America’s Unknown Atomic Spy Conspiracy (New York: Times Books, 1997); Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era (New York: Random House, 1998); Robert Chadwell Williams, Klaus Fuchs—Atom Spy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); H. Montgomery Hyde, The Atom Bomb Spies (New York: Ballantine, 1980); Rhodes, Dark Sun; and Michael Dobbs, “Code Name ‘Mlad,’ Atomic Bomb Spy,” Washington Post, September 25, 1996, pp. A1, A20–A21.

12 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 180–182; Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, p. 9; Golovin, I.V. Kurchatov, p. 56.

13 Pavel V. Oleynikov, “German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project,” Nonproliferation Review, 7, 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 1–30 at pp. 8–10; Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, pp. 7–8;

14 Holloway, Stalin and the Atomic Bomb, p. 190; Oleg Bukharin, Thomas B. Cochran, and Robert S. Norris, New Perspectives on Russia’s Ten Secret Cities (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1999), pp. 18–19, 28–29; Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, p. 8. For a history and status report on Soviet/Russian closed cities, see Richard H. Rowland, “Russia’s Secret Cities,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 37, 7 (July 1996), pp. 426–462.

15 Zaloga, “The Soviet Nuclear Bomb Programme,” p. 178; Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, p. 9; Podvig (ed.), Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 70; Holloway, Stalin and the Atomic Bomb, pp. 184, 186, 188; Yudin, Manuscript on the History of the Soviet Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Infrastructure, p. 17; Golovin, I.V. Kurchatov, p. 59.

16 Bukharin, Cochran, and Norris, New Perspectives on Russia’s Ten Secret Cities, p. 10; www.sandia.gov/ASCI/russia/sarov.html, accessed October 28, 2003 Holloway, Stalin and the Atomic Bomb, pp. 196–197, 202; Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 242–243, 285.

17 Oleynikov, “German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project,” pp. 10–12; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 190; Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “On the Soviet Nuclear Scent,” Studies in Intelligence, 11, 4 (Fall 1967), pp. 13–29 at p. 14.

18 Oleynikov, “German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project,” pp. 12–13; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 110, 190–191; Lowenhaupt, “On the Soviet Nuclear Scent,” p. 14; Kragh, Quantum Generations, pp. 56–57, 132.

19 Oleynikov, “German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project,” p. 13; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 57, 178, 191. For Riehl’s account, see Nikolaus Riehl and Frederick Seitz, Stalin’s Captive: Nikolaus Riehl and the Soviet Race for the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: American Chemical Society and Chemical Heritage Society, 1996).

20 Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, p. 10; Yudin, Manuscript on the History of the Soviet Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Infrastructure, pp. 15, 81.

21 Zaloga, “The Soviet Nuclear Bomb Programme,” p. 179; Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, p. 10; Holloway, Stalin and the Atomic Bomb, p. 138; Khariton and Smirnov, “The Khariton Version,” p. 20.

22 On Venona, see Haynes and Klehr, Venona; Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2000), pp. 3–28.

23 The worldwide interest of the Manhattan Engineer District’s Foreign Intelligence Section is demonstrated by a late 1945 memo outlining ten different areas of information that would provide leads about foreign nuclear activities, including the names, locations, positions, and activities of personnel; the names and locations of institutions involved in nuclear physics; the names, locations, and activities of large industrial firms that could be involved in atomic activities; the existence of large plants, particularly those that produced little output; and the location of plants producing heavy water, graphite, or carbon. See “Atomic Energy (Nuclear Physics),” December 11, 1945, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 170, Folder 32.60-A-1, NARA. Also see Lt. Col. P. de Silva, X-2, to Lt. Col. S. M. Skinner, SI, Subject: RAMONA (Spain), May 1, 1946, w/att: “Establishment of a German Laboratory in Spain,” RG 226, Entry 210, Box 431, Folder 2, NARA.

24 David F. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943–1947 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), pp. 43, 45.

25 Lt. Col. S. M. Skinner to Col. W. R. Shuler, January 30, 1946, and Brig. Gen. John B. Magruder, Director, SSU, to Maj. Gen. Leslie Groves, Subject: Liaison, January 7, 1946, both in RG 226, Entry 210, Box 431, Folder 2, NARA.

26 Lt. Col. S. M. Skinner to Col. W. R. Shuler, Subject: Activities of Scientists, January 30, 1946, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 431, Folder 2, NARA.

27 Lowenhaupt, “On the Soviet Nuclear Scent,” p. 15.

28 Strategic Services Unit/Germany, Report LC-545, “Reactions to the Question of the Jachymov Mines in Czechoslovak Government Circles,” March 5, 1946, and Strategic Services Unit/Germany, Report LC-555, “Visit to Jachymov Mines Early in March,” March 15, 1946, both in RG 77, Entry 22, Box 163, NARA.

29 Lt. Col. Edgar P. Dean, “New Reports on the Situation at Joachimsthal,” April 17, 1946, and [author unknown] to Eric Welsh, April 25, 1946, both in RG 77, Entry 22, Box 163, NARA. The unknown author challenged the claim that a large number of boxcars would be needed to remove the ore. He maintained that only two trucks per year would be needed. He also argued that rehabilitating the mine would not require any unusual activity noticeable to an outside observer. In addition, he stated that he had visited the mines in May 1945 and the machinery was going “full blast” and was “in good working order.” It was “inconceivable to believe that the machinery would have been left in a state in which it could deteriorate during a few months.”

30 Lt. Col. P. de Silva to Lt. Col. S. M. Skinner, Subject: Ramona (USSR-4), n.d., and Lt. Col. P. de Silva to Lt. Col. S. M. Skinner, Subject: Follow-up on RAMONA disseminations, May 20, 1946, both in RG 226, Entry 210, Box 431, Folder 2, NARA; Letter, Dino Brugioni to author, January 18, 2004.

31 Lt. Col. S. M. Skinner to Lt. Col. Richard H. Free, June 13, 1946, and Lt. Col. S. M. Skinner to Lt. Col. Richard H. Free, Subject: Manchuria, June 13, 1946, both in RG 226, Entry 210, Box 431, Folder 2, NARA.

32 H. S. Lowenhaupt, “Russian Mining Operations in the German-Czech Border Region,” December 5, 1946, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 163, NARA; Interview with Henry S. Lowenhaupt, Springfield, Va., April 15, 1999.

33 Lowenhaupt, “Russian Mining Operations in the German-Czech Border Region.”

34 Rudgers, Creating the Secret State, pp. 40, 118.

35 Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government, to 1950 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), pp. 161–162; Thomas Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1981), pp. 406–407, 471–472.

36 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 162; Hoyt S. Vandenberg, NIA 6, “Coordination of Intelligence Activities Related to Foreign Atomic Energy Developments and Potentialities,” August 13, 1946; “Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority,” August 21, 1946; Telegram from the President’s Chief of Staff (Leahy) to President Truman, August 21, 1946; and “Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority”—all in C. Thomas Thorne Jr. and David S. Patterson (eds.), Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 394–402, 412–416 at p. 415, respectively.

37 Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth Press, 2002), p. 467; Leslie Groves, Memorandum to the Atomic Energy Commission, Subject: Foreign Intelligence Set-up, November 21, 1946, in Thorne and Patterson (eds.), Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, pp. 458–460.

38 Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 165; “Minutes of the 9th Meeting of the National Intelligence Authority,” February 12, 1947, and Brig. Gen. E. K. Wright, DDCI, “Establishment and Functions of the Nuclear Energy Group, Scientific Branch, Office of Reports and Estimates,” March 28, 1947, both in Thorne and Patterson (eds.), Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, pp. 487–493 at p. 488 and pp. 503–505, respectively. The NIA directive specifying the director of central intelligence’s authority in the area of atomic intelligence was not issued until several weeks after Wright’s memo. See National Intelligence Authority Directive No. 9, “Coordination of Intelligence Activities Related to Foreign Atomic Energy Developments and Potentialities,” April 18, 1947, in Thorne and Patterson (eds.), Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, pp. 510–511.

39 Brig. Gen. E. K. Wright, DDCI, Memorandum, Subject: Additional Functions of the Office of Special Operations, March 5, 1948, CREST, NARA; George S. Jackson and Martin P. Clausen, Organizational History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1950–1953 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1957), pp. VI-3, VI-16, VI-16 n. 2; Ludwell Lee Montague, General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–February 1953 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 174; Sidney W. Souers, “Atomic Energy Intelligence,” July 1, 1947; John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 728.

40 Charles A. Ziegler and David Jacobson, Spying Without Spies: Origins of America’s Secret Nuclear Surveillance System (New York: Praeger, 1995), pp. 65, 92, 95, 150; Biography: Major General Albert F. Hegenberger, www.af.mil/news/biographies, accessed July 1, 2002. The military, field element of AFOAT-1 was known as the 1009th Special Weapons Squadron, of which Hegenberger was the commanding general. See Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection: The Creation, Development, and Operation of the United States Atomic Energy Detection System (Satellite Beach, Fla.: SAIC, 1997), pp. 4–5.

41 Col. Laurin L. Williams, War Department General Staff, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: Establishment of Proposed Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee, November 7, 1947; Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency, p. 230; Memorandum, W. Machle, Assistant Director, OSI to DCI, “Briefs on Nuclear Energy Intelligence Situation,” March 18, 1949; C. P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence, USAF, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Reports of the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee, July 28, 1949, CREST, NARA.

42 Lowenhaupt, “On the Soviet Nuclear Scent,” p. 17.

43 Ibid., p. 18; Paul Maddrell, “British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration During the Occupation of Germany,” Intelligence and National Security, 15, 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 74–94 at p. 77; Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “Chasing Bitterfield Calcium,” Studies in Intelligence 17, (Spring 1973), pp. 21–30.

44 Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), p. 391; Maddrell, “British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration,” p. 77; Brugioni letter.

45 Maddrell, “British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration,” p. 78.

46 James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America’s Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 47.

47 Rear Adm. R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum for: The Executive Secretary, NSC, Subject: Atomic Energy Program of the USSR, April 20, 1949; Louis Johnson, Memorandum for the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board, June 2, 1949; Adm. Louis Denfeld, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Atomic Energy Program of the USSR, June 30, 1949; Maj. Gen. C. P. Cabell, Chairman, USCIB, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Atomic Energy Program of the U.S.S.R., June 23, 1949—all in RG 330, Entry 199, Box 61, Folder CD 11-1-2, NARA; Matthew Aid, “The Russian Target: The U.K.-U.S. Cryptologic Effort Against the Soviet Union: 1945–1960,” paper prepared for the Annual Conference for the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., June 6–8, 2003, pp. 27–28.

48 Interview with Spurgeon Keeny, Washington, D.C., February 6, 2003. A somewhat different view of the vulnerability of Soviet communications concerning their nuclear program can be found in Oleg Bukharin, “US Atomic Energy Intelligence Against the Soviet Target,” Intelligence and National Security, 19, 4 (Winter 2004), pp. 655–679. According to Bukharin (p. 665), most communications between nuclear facilities and Moscow were by Teletype or telephone and involved the use of landlines or microwave systems rather than easier-to-intercept short-wave radio communications.

49 Central Intelligence Group, ORE 3/1, Soviet Capabilities for the Development and Production of Certain Types of Weapons and Equipment, October 31, 1946; Lawrence Aronsen, “Seeing Red: US Air Force Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1945–1949,” Intelligence and National Security, 16, 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 103–132; Service Members of the Joint Intelligence Committee, J.I.C. 395/1, “The Capabilities of the USSR in Regard to Atomic Weapons,” July 8, 1947.

50 Charles A. Ziegler, “Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Atomic Capability, 1945–1949: Myths, Monopolies, and Maskirovka,” Intelligence and National Security, 12, 4 (October 1997), pp. 1–24 at p. 13; Letter, R. H. Hillenkoetter to B. B. Hickenlooper, July 1, 1948, w/att: “Estimate of the Status of the Russian Atomic Energy Project,” July 1, 1948, RG 330, Entry 199, Box 61, Folder CD 11-1-2, NARA; R. N. Hillenkoetter, Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum for the President, Subject: Estimate of the Status of the Russian Atomic Energy Project, July 6, 1948, PSF, HTPL.

51 Keeny interview; Machle, “Briefs on Nuclear Energy Intelligence Situation.”

52 Machle, “Briefs on Nuclear Energy Intelligence Situation.”

53 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 13; “Beginnings of AFOAT-1,” document declassified for Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, CIA Accession Number CIA-030695-A.

54 Ziegler and Jacbson, Spying Without Spies, p. 38; J. M. Blair, D. H. Frisch, and S. Katcoff, LA-418, “Detection of Nuclear-Explosion Dust in the Atmosphere,” October 2, 1945, pp. 1–2 LANL Archives.

55 Blair, Frisch, and Katcoff, “Detection of Nuclear-Explosion Dust in the Atmosphere,” pp. 2–3; Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 11.

56 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 39; Blair, Frisch, and Katcoff, “Detection of Nuclear-Explosion Dust in the Atmosphere.”

57 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 41–44.

58 Ibid., p. 44.

59 Ibid., pp. 46–47.

60 Ibid., p. 48.

61 Ibid., pp. 49–50, 102; Maj. Philip J. Krueger, Memorandum for General Groves, Subject: Remote Air Sampling, September 18, 1946, LANL Archives. Ziegler and Jacobson (Spying Without Spies, p. 53) argue that Krueger’s conclusion about the ability to detect a blast was naïve since it didn’t take into account other potential causes of high radiation, such as a reactor accident. Further, they claim the measurements did not demonstrate that detection of an airburst at high altitudes, in contrast to the low-altitude Bikini detonation, was feasible. It is possible that a high-altitude detonation might not produce a large enough quantity of radioactive dust for collection at long range to permit “the identification of specific radioisotopes through chemical analysis.”

62 Doyle L. Northrup and Donald H. Rock, “The Detection of Joe-1,” Studies in Intelligence, 10, 4 (Fall 1966), pp. 23–33 at p. 24.

63 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 70; Greg Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), p. 169; Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General’s Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 514.

64 Lewis L. Strauss to Commissioners, Memorandum, April 11, 1947, Papers of Lewis L. Strauss, Box 68, Folder: Monitoring of Soviet Tests, HHPL; Strauss would continue to depict himself as the central figure in the creation of a long-range detection system, both in contemporaneous classified memos and in his memoirs. See Lewis L. Strauss, Memorandum for the Files, Subject: History of the Long-Range Detection Program, July 21, 1948, Papers of Lewis L. Strauss, Box 113, Folder: Tests and Testing, HHPL; Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 201–207.

65 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 73; Strauss, Men and Decisions, p. 202.

66 R. H. Hillenkoetter, Director CIG, Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Subject: Long Range Detection of Atomic Explosions, June 30, 1947.

67 Lauris Norstad, Director of Plans and Operations, Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Subject: Long-Range Detection of Atomic Explosions, September 3, 1947; Hillenkoetter, Memorandum for the Secretary of War, Subject: Long Range Detection of Atomic Explosions, June 30, 1947; David E. Lilienthal, Memorandum for Director, Central Intelligence Group, Subject: Long Range Detection of Atomic Explosions, July 10, 1947, Papers of Lewis L. Strauss, Box 68, HHPL; J. B. Conant, Chairman, Committee on Atomic Energy, to Dr. V. Bush, Chairman, Research and Development Board, Subject: The Long Range Detection of Atomic Bomb Explosions, January 2, 1948.

68 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 84–86.

69 Walter Todd, Deputy Director of Intelligence, “Long Range Detection of Atomic Explosions,” September 15, 1947; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Subject: Long Range Detection of Atomic Explosions, September 16, 1947.

70 Benson Saler, Charles A. Ziegler, and Charles B. Moore, UFO Crash at Roswell: The Genesis of a Modern Myth (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), pp. 74–75. The book explains how Mogul and other tests in the Roswell area helped create the myth of a UFO crash. Also see James McAndrew, The Roswell Report: Fact vs. Fiction in the New Mexico Desert (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995); James McAndrew, The Roswell Report: Case Closed (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997); Philip J. Klass, The Real Roswell Crashed-Saucer Coverup (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1997); B. D. Gildenburg, “The Cold War’s Classified Skyhook Program: A Participant’s Revelations,” Skeptical Inquirer, May/June 2004, pp. 38–42.

71 Saler, Ziegler, and Moore, UFO Crash at Roswell, pp. 75, 78–79.

72 Rhodes, Dark Sun, p. 320; Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 117.

73 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 118–119; Strauss, Men and Decisions, p. 206.

74 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 125–126; Department of the Air Force, Operation Fitzwilliam, Annex “A”: Design of Experiment for Fitzwilliam, May 11, 1948, pp. A-1, A-2.

75 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 128–129.

76 Letter, Arnold Ross to author, April 1, 1985.

77 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 129.

78 Ibid., p. 130.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., p. 131; J. F. Kalbach, LAMS-732, Attempt at Remote Detection of a Nuclear Explosion, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, June 7, 1948, p. 2.

81 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 133.

82 Ibid; Kalbach, Attempt at Remote Detection of a Nuclear Explosion, p. 2.

83 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 134.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid., p. 138; Strauss, “History of the Long-Range Detection Program,” p. 5. The statement that airborne methods could be used to detect an airburst depended on an unexpected discovery during the analysis of the debris collected during Fitzwilliam. Also, although airborne detection would not be useful if the Soviets engaged in underground testing, it was believed that they would opt for atmospheric testing. See Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 135–138.

86 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 144, 147–150, 153–158.

87 Ibid., pp. 176, 186.

88 Ibid., p. 186–187, 199; Northrup and Rock, “The Detection of Joe-1,” p. 28.

89 Herbert Friedman, Luther B. Lockhart, and Irving H. Blifford, “Detecting the Soviet Bomb: Joe-1 in a Rainbarrel,” Physics Today, 49, 11 (November 1996), pp. 38–41; Northup and Rock, “The Detection of Joe-1,” p. 28; Ziegler and Jacobsen, Spying Without Spies, pp. 191–193.

90 Ziegler and Jacobsen, Spying Without Spies, pp. 195–196; Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence (New York: Overlook Press, 2001), pp. 228–229.

91 Ziegler and Jacobsen, Spying Without Spies, pp. 121–125, 187.

92 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 214–215; C. J. Chivers, “It Was Once Ground Zero, Now Little but Danger Is Left,” New York Times, March 3, 2005, p. A4.

93 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 214–215.

94 Ibid., pp. 216–217. There is some disagreement as to whether the bomb was detonated at six in the morning, according to Kurchatov’s original plan, or a few hours earlier. See Lester Machta, “Finding the Site of the First Soviet Nuclear Test in 1949,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 73, 11 (November 1992), pp. 1797–1806 at p. 1802n.

95 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 218.

96 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 201; Charles C. Bates and John F. Fuller, America’s Weather Warriors (College Station: Texas A&M University, 1986), p. 137.

97 Northrup and Rock, “The Detection of Joe-1,” p. 23.

98 Ibid., pp. 23, 29–30; Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 204–205; Mary Welch, “AFTAC Celebrates 50 Years of Long Range Detection,” Monitor, October 1997, pp. 8–32 at p. 9.

99 Northrup and Rock, “The Detection of Joe-1,” pp. 23, 30–31; Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 206; W. C. Penney, “An Interim Report of British Work on Joe,” September 22, 1949, PSF, HTPL.

100 Northrup and Rock, The Detection of Joe-1,” pp. 30–31; Friedman, Lockhart, and Blifford, “Detecting the Soviet Bomb,” p. 41.

101 Northrup and Rock, “The Detection of Joe-1,” p. 31.

102 Ibid.; Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 205–208.

103 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 207.

104 Ibid., pp. 207–208; David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol. 2, The Atomic Energy Years, 1945–1950 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 570n.

105 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 208–209; Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb, p. 200.

106 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 211; Doyle L. Northrup, Technical Director, AFOAT-1, Memorandum for Major General Nelson, Technical Memorandum No. 37, Subject: Atomic Detection System Alert No. 112, September 19, 1949, PSF, HTPL; Letter, V. Bush, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Robert Bacher, and W. S. Parsons to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, September 20, 1949. The final Los Alamos analysis was not completed until early October. See R. W. Spence, “Identification of Radioactivity in Special Samples,” Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, October 4, 1949.

107 Machta, “Finding the Site of the First Soviet Nuclear Test in 1949,” p. 1797; Interview with Lester Hubert, September 15, 2004; “Dr. Lester Machta, Founding Director of ARL (1919–2001),” www.arlnoaa.gov, accessed January 2, 2004.

108 Machta, “Finding the Site of the First Soviet Nuclear Test in 1949,” p. 1803; U.S. Weather Bureau, U.S. Weather Bureau Report on Alert Number 112 of the Atomic Detection System, September 29, 1949, pp. 2–3, 6–8, PSF, HTPL; “Dr. Lester Machta, Founding Director of ARL (1919–2001).”

109 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 211; Robert J. Donovan, The Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), p. 99; Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume II, 1947–1949 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1964), p. 253; Letter, Bush, Oppenheimer, Bacher, and Parsons to Vandenberg, September 20, 1949.

110 Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Hoyt S. Vandenberg to the Secretary of Defense on Long Range Detection of Atomic Explosions, September 20, 1949, PSF, HTPL; Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, pp. 210–211; Northrup and Rock, “The Detection of Joe-1,” p. 32. That same day, a CIA memorandum reported that the “current estimate of the Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee is that the earliest possible date by which the USSR might be expected to produce an atomic bomb is mid-1950 and the most probable date is mid-1953.” The authors were still using the JNEIC July estimate. See CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 225, Subject: Estimate of Status of Atomic Warfare in the USSR, September 20, 1949, in Michael Warner (ed.), The CIA Under Harry Truman (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1994), pp. 319–320.

111 Ziegler and Jacobson, Spying Without Spies, p. 211; Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 523–524; Peter W. King and Herbert W. Friedman, NRL Report CN-3536, Part I: Collection and Identification of Fission Products of Foreign Origin, September 22, 1949; Northrup and Rock, “The Detection of Joe-1,” p. 33; “Statement by the President on Announcing the First Atomic Explosion in the USSR, September 23, 1949,” in Philip L. Cantelon, Richard G. Hewlett, and Robert C. Williams (eds.), The American Atom: A Documentary History of Nuclear Policies from the Discovery of Fission to the Present (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), p. 112.

112 Edward T. Folliard, “Truman Reveals Red A-Blast; No Widespread Alarm Felt; Stockpiling May Be Speeded,” Washington Post, September 24, 1949, pp. 1, 3; N. S. Haseltine, “U.S. Learned of Blast Through ‘Mechanical Means,’” Washington Post, September 24, 1949, pp. 1, 2; Anthony Leviero, “Atom Blast in Russia Disclosed; Truman Again Asks U.N. Control; Vishinsky Proposes Peace Pact,” New York Times, September 24, 1949, pp. 1–2; William L. Laurence, “Soviet Achievement Ahead of Predictions by 3 Years,” New York Times, September 24, 1949, pp. 1–2.

113 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Report of the Central Intelligence Agency: Construction Rider on Appropriations Measures, October 17, 1947, pp. 7–8.

114 Ibid., pp. 46, 54, 61; Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume II, p. 486.

115 Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 32-50, The Effect of the Soviet Possession of Atomic Bombs on the Security of the United States, June 9, 1950, p. 2; Bradley and Blair, A General’s Life, pp. 514–515.

116 Dino A. Brugioni, “The Kyshtym Connection,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1990, p. 12.

117 Lowenhaupt, “On the Soviet Nuclear Scent,” p. 20; Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, The CIA Semi-Annual Report, August 16, 1951; Herken Brotherhood of the Bomb (hereafter BoB) Documents, Box 10, National Security Archive.

118 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, The CIA Semi-Annual Report, n.p.

119 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, p. 97; Memorandum for General Maude, Subject: Proposed U.S./U.K. Cooperation within Area 5 of the Technical Cooperation Program, May 4, 1951, RG 341, Entry 214, NARA.

120 Brig. Gen. R. C. Maude, Chief, AFOAT-1, Doyle Northrup, Technical Director, AFOAT-1, Memorandum for: Mr. Robert Lebaron, Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, Subject: Notes on Technical Cooperation with British and Canadians in the Field of Atomic Energy Intelligence, March 27, 1951.

121 Rear Adm. R. H. Hillenkoetter, DCI, Memorandum for: Executive Secretary, National Security Council, Subject: Atomic Energy Intelligence, June 28, 1950; R. C. Maude, Northrup, Memorandum for: Mr. Robert Lebaron, Subject: Notes on Technical Cooperation with British and Canadians in the Field of Atomic Energy Intelligence; “AE 207/1.1,” p. 1, attachment to Joint Panel on Technical Objective IO-7, Memorandum to the Chairman, RDB [Research and Development Board] Committee on Atomic Energy, Subject: Review of DOD Program for Long Range Detection of Atomic Operations, July 1, 1951.

122 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, pp. 72, 84; Mary Welch, “AFTAC Celebrates 50 Years of Long Range Detection,” The Monitor, October 1997, pp. 8–32 at p. 12; Letter to Hon. Walter Howe, American Ambassador, Santiago, October 22, 1958.

123 Olav Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 193; Max Van Rossum Daum, Lt. Col. USAF, Acting Chief, Intelligence Branch, to Deputy Chief, AFOAT-1, Proposed Site for GFU at Thule, Greenland, September 10, 1951. Just a few months earlier, in July, William P. Snow, the counselor of the U.S. embassy in Oslo, received a Top Secret cable concerning “a rather delicate problem.” R. Gordon Arneson, a special assistant to the secretary of state, wanted to know if Snow could arrange to see Norwegian foreign minister Lange to inform him of the U.S. desire to establish a series of acoustic and seismic detection stations on Norwegian soil. Apparently, this strategy for raising the question was abandoned. Arneson’s memo also informed Snow that the detection stations could be operated by personnel from the U.S. Weather Bureau, if that would make the stations more acceptable to Norway. The special assistant further noted that the United States wanted to get an agreement in principle within a month to four weeks, and for “the real purpose of the equipment to be known only to a minimum number of Norwegians.” See R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary to William P. Snow, Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, July 11, 1951.

124 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 198, 219.

125 Ibid., pp. 219–220; Podvig (ed.), Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 485.

126 Athelstan Spilhaus, Research and Development Board, Memorandum for Chief, AFOAT-1, Subject: Review of Dogface Data, October 3, 1951. Apparently the code name for Joe-2 was Dogface; “Attachment A,” to Joint Panel on Technical Objective IO-7, Memorandum to the Chairman, RDB Committee on Atomic Energy/Chairman, RDB Committee on Geophysics and Geography, Subject: Review of DOD Program for Long Range Detection of Atomic Operations, July 1, 1951. The four atomic tests that the United States conducted, collectively designated Greenhouse, at Eniwetok atoll between April 8 and May 25, 1951, resulted in “increased optimism” with respect to the ability of acoustic systems to detect and fix the location of atomic explosions at considerable distances. The sound from the first three explosions, whose yields ranged from 47 to 225 kilotons, was detected as far away as 2,400 miles. Usable seismic signals were also recorded during the test. See Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, pp. 33–34; Charles P. Boner, Memorandum for Chairman, RDB Committee on Atomic Energy/Chairman, RDB Committee on Geophysics and Geography, Subject: Review of DoD Program for Long Range Detection of Atomic Operations. A test of aerial sampling, designated Green Run, was conducted in December 1949 and relied on releases from the Hanford facility. See General Accounting Office (GAO), Examples of Post World War II Radiation Releases at U.S. Nuclear Sites (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1993).

127 Spilhaus, Subject: Review of Dogface Data.

128 Podvig (ed.), Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 99; Bukharin, Cochran, and Norris, New Perspectives on Russia’s Ten Secret Cities, pp. 22–27.

129 Podvig (ed.), Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 100, 106–107; Bukharin, Cochran, and Norris, New Perspectives on Russia’s Ten Secret Cities, p. 30.

130 Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, pp. 193–194.

131 Welch, “AFTAC Celebrates 50 Years of Long Range Detection,” p. 12; AFOIN-1X, Memorandum for the Record, January 14, 1953, RG 341, Entry 214, File 4-6A to 4-191, NARA.

132 Joint Message Form, from: HQ USAF AFOIN to: USAIRA Tehran, Iran, Subject: B/65, July 30, 1952, RG 341, Entry 214, File No. 2-24400 to 2-24499, NARA; Memorandum for: Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Subject: (Top Secret), AFOAT-1 Operations in Iran, August 1, 1952, RG 341, Entry 214, File No. 2-24400 to 2-24499, NARA.

133 Maj. Gen. John A. Samford, “Commendation of Brigadier General D. J. Keirn,” September 22, 1952, RG 341, Entry 214, File 2-35202, NARA; “Major General Donald J. Keirn,” at www.af.mil/bios, accessed December 2, 2003.

134 Harry S. Truman, Memorandum for the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, Subject: Communications Intelligence Activities, October 24, 1952; Center for Cryptologic History, The Origins of NSA (Ft. Meade, Md.: NSA, n.d.), p. 4; National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 9, Communications Intelligence, December 29, 1952.

135 Hans A. Bethe, “Comments on the History of the H-Bomb,” Los Alamos Science, Fall 1982, pp. 43–53; “The Hydrogen Bomb: The Secret,” and “The Hydrogen Bomb: Schematic,” and “ www.atomicarchive.com, accessed June 9, 2005; Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb, pp. 217–218, 222.

136 Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb, p. 236; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 302–303. For Ulam’s highly sanitized account, see S. M. Ulam, Adventures of a Mathematician (New York: Scribner’s, 1976), pp. 209–224.

137 Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb, p. 257; Lewis L. Strauss, “A Chronology of the Thermonuclear Weapon Program to November 1952,” August 14, 1953, Lewis L. Strauss Papers, Box 106, HHPL.

138 German A. Goncharov, “Beginnings of the Soviet H-Bomb Program,” Physics Today, 49, 11 (November 1996), pp. 50–55 at p. 50; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 50, 448.

139 Goncharov, “Beginnings of the Soviet H-Bomb Program,” p. 50.

140 Ibid., pp. 51–52.

141 Ibid., pp. 51–53; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 297, 451; Kragh, Quantum Generations, p. 436. Cerenkov electromagnetic radiation, usually a bluish light, is emitted by a beam of high-energy particles passing through a transparent medium at a speed greater than the speed of light in that medium. The effect consists of the radiation causing a shock wave in the electromagnetic medium. See http://teachers.web.cern.ch.

142 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 451; Goncharov, “Beginnings of the Soviet H-Bomb Program,” p. 54; Rhodes, Dark Sun, pp. 305–306.

143 German A. Goncharov, “The Race Accelerates,” Physics Today, 49, 11 (November 1996), pp. 56–61 at p. 56; Goncharov, “On the History of the Creation of the Soviet Hydrogen Bomb,” Physics-Upsekhi, 40, 8 (August 1997), pp. 859–867 at p. 862.

144 Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, pp. 299, 305, 449. Tritium had an additional draw-back. Its production required sacrificing the production of much larger quantities of plutonium that could be used in fission bombs.

145 Ibid., p. 306; Goncharov, “The Race Accelerates,” p. 57; Central Intelligence Agency, “The Purge of L.P. Beria,” July 10, 1953, www.foia.cia.gov.

146 Goncharov, “The Race Accelerates,” p. 57; Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York: Knopf, 1990), pp. 173–174.

147 Sakharov, Memoirs, p. 174.

148 Thomas K. Finletter, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Action Necessary to Achieve an H-Bomb Capability, March 22, 1952; Extracts from Memo re SSG No. 215, by Chief, Military Capabilities Branch, to Chief, Targets Division, October 3, 1952; Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, Special Air Intelligence Estimate, Subject: An Analysis of Malenkov’s H Bomb Statement, August 11, 1953—all in Herken BoB Documents, Box 7, Folder: USAF HQ documents, National Security Archive; Robert D. Little, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, CIA/SI 13-52, National Scientific Intelligence Estimate, Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program, January 8, 1953; A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943–1953, Volume II, Part II (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Historical Division, n.d.), p. 253.

149 Lewis L. Strauss, Memorandum for the Files of Lewis Strauss, August 19, 1953, Strauss Papers, Box 68, HHPL. The NRL Rainbarrel project continued through this test. See Friedman, Lockhart, and Blifford, “Detecting the Soviet Bomb,” p. 41.

150 Strauss, Memorandum for the Files of Lewis Strauss.

151 Lilse A. Rose and Neil H. Peterson, Foreign Relations of the United States, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 1186 n. 1.

152 Hans Bethe, Analysis of Joe-4, September 11, 1953, p. 1; Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, p. 29; John A. McCone, Memorandum for: Military Representative of the President, Subject: Distribution of the Report of the Foreign Weapons Evaluation (Bethe) Panel (Meeting held 16–17 December 1961), n.d., CREST, NARA; Jeremy Bernstein, Hans Bethe: Prophet of Energy (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 4.

153 Bethe, Analysis of Joe-4, pp. 4–5.

154 Ibid., pp. 5–7; Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, pp. 33–34, 263 n. 19; Bethe, “Comments on the History of the H-Bomb,” p. 53; Interview with Richard Garwin, July 24, 2004. Bethe’s assertion has been questioned by key Soviet scientists—see Khariton and Smirnov, “Khariton Version,” as well as Goncharov, “Beginnings of the Soviet H-Bomb Program.” The main cause of the dispute seems to be a difference of standards rather than an argument over the facts. See Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 308.

CHAPTER 3: THE VIEW FROM ABOVE

1 Pavel Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), p. 485; Steven Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), p. 29.

2 Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2 (Austin, Tex.: Aerofax, 1983), p. 16; Harry Kinney and Bob Trimble, “Flying the Stratosphere,” Air Classics, 9, 10 (October 1973), pp. 26ff.

3 Central Intelligence Agency, NIE 11-3A-54, Summary: The Soviet Atomic Energy Program to Mid-1957, February 16, 1954, pp. 1–2.

4 Ibid., pp. 1–3.

5 Ibid., p. 3.

6 Oleg Bukharin, Thomas B. Cochran, and Robert S. Norris, New Perspectives on Russia’s Ten Secret Cities (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1999), p. 34; Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 466–467; Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995), p. 47. Zaloga gives the date of the decree as July 31, and the official title as 6th State Central Proving Ground. See Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, pp. 70, 268 n. 20.

7 Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 441–442.

8 Sherman Kent, Assistant Director, National Estimates, Memorandum for: The Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: A Broader Approach to Annual NIE on the Soviet Nuclear Program, August 1, 1955, RG 263, Box 185, Folder 9, NARA.

9 F. A. Valente, Memorandum for: Mr. Gerard C. Smith, Dr. A. K. Brewer, Col. Geo. E. McCord, Subject: Section 73 (Atomic Energy), NIS 26 (USSR), March 21, 1955 w/att: Central Intelligence Agency, Chapter VII-NIS 26, Section 73: Atomic Energy, n.d., www.foai.ucia.gov.

10 Central Intelligence Agency, Chapter VII-NIS 26, Section 73, pp. B-1–B-8, F-1–F-8.

11 Ibid., pp. A-2–A-4, E-9, E-15; Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 418.

12 Central Intelligence Agency, Chapter VII-NIS 26, Section 73, p. K-1.

13 Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “On the Soviet Nuclear Scent,” Studies in Intelligence, 11, 4 (Fall 1967), pp. 13–29 at pp. 18–19, 27–28.

14 Ibid., pp. 27–28.

15 Ibid., pp. 27–29; Cochran, Norris, and Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb, p. 183.

16 Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 441–442, 466, 486–487.

17 Ibid., pp. 95–96, 104; Central Intelligence Agency, Chapter VII-NIS 26, Section 73, p. E-16; Bukharin, Cochran, and Norris, New Perspectives on Russia’s Ten Secret Cities, pp. 13, 25; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 322.

18 Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs (New York: Knopf, 1990), pp. 182–190.

19 German A. Goncharov, “The Race Accelerates,” Physics Today, 49, 11 (November 1996), pp. 56–61 at p. 58; G. A. Goncharov, “American and Soviet H-Bomb Development Programmes: Historical Background,” Physics-Uspekhi, 39, 10 (October 1996), pp. 1033–1044 at p. 1041. On the origins of Soviet H-bomb ideas and the possible role of espionage, also see G. A. Goncharov, “On the History of Creation of the Soviet Hydrogen Bomb,” Physics-Upsekhi, 40, 8 (August 1997), pp. 859–867, and V. E. Adamski and Yu N. Smirnov, “Once Again on the Creation of the Soviet Hydrogen Bomb,” Physics-Upsekhi, 40, 8 (August 1997), pp. 855–858.

20 Goncharov, “The Race Accelerates,” pp. 59, 61.

21 Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 190–191.

22 Ibid., pp. 191–192.

23 R. Gordon Arneson, Memorandum for Col. Jack A. Gibbs, Deputy Chief, AFOAT-1, Office for Atomic Energy, DCS/O, March 26, 1954.

24 Gerard C. Smith to Colonel Jack A. Gibbs, Deputy Chief, AFOAT-1, Office for Atomic Energy, DCS/O, n.d.; P. J. Farley, Memorandum for File, Subject: Requirement for New Seismic Stations, December 15, 1954; Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary to L. Corrin Strong, June 3, 1955; AFOAT-1, History of the Atomic Energy Detection System, 1955 (Washington, D.C.: AFOAT-1, n.d.), p. 13.

25 Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary, to L. Corrin Strong, June 3, 1955; Olav Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 195–196.

26 Desmond Ball, A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1980), pp. 83–84, 87; Mary Welch, “AFTAC Celebrates 50 Years of Long Range Detection,” The Monitor, October 1997, pp. 8–32 at pp. 12–13. The personnel at each site were given a team designation and assigned a team number: Pole Mountain (Team 110), Douglas (Team 141), Encampment (Team 142), Larson AFB (Team 155), Thule (Team 220), Ankara (Team 301), Camp King (Team 313A). The Teams later became Detachments. The stations themselves were designated by code names. Code names assigned to the Ankara, Thule, and Clark Air Force Base stations were Slip Stream, Polka Dot, and Fish Hawk, respectively. For Team numbers, see Welch, “AFTAC Celebrates 50 Years of Long Range Detection,” pp. 12–13. For code names, see AFOAT-1, History of the Atomic Energy Detection System, 1955, pp. 16–17, 19.

27 AFOAT-1, History of the Atomic Energy Detection System, 1955, pp. 13, 16, 58–59; “Russian Nuclear Explosions,” n.d. but circa August 4, 1955, DEFE 13/414, UKNA.

28 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection: The Creation, Development, and Operation of the United States Atomic Energy Detection System (Satellite Beach, Fla.: SAIC, 1997), p. 61; AFOAT-1, History of the Atomic Energy Detection System, 1955, pp. 22–25.

29 AFOAT-1, History of the Atomic Energy Detection System, 1955, p. 5; “Russian Nuclear Explosions”; Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 486.

30 AFOAT-1, History of the Atomic Energy Detection System, 1955, pp. 6–7; Selwyn Lloyd to Prime Minister, September 23, 1955, DEFE 13/414, UKNA. The British preliminary estimate of the yield was 10 to 15 kilotons.

31 AFOAT-1, History of the Atomic Energy Detection System, 1955, pp. 7–8; Selwyn Lloyd to Prime Minister, November 7, 1955, DEFE 13/414, UKNA.

32 AFOAT-1, History of the Atomic Energy Detection System, 1955, pp. 8–9.

33 Ibid., pp. 25–26, 28. The AFOAT-1 history mentions the code name—Oilskin—for a November test that was a B-36 target, but does not give the date or Joe number.

34 Central Intelligence Agency, SE 36/1, Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US Through Mid-1955, August 3, 1953, p. 2, in National Security Archive, The Soviet Estimate: US Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947–1991 (Alexandria, Va.: Chadwick-Healey, 1995), Document 00149.

35 Sir Frederick Brundrett to Minister, January 17, 1955, DEFE 13/60, UKNA.

36 Ibid. There was also tension during the same period over what the British felt were premature U.S. announcements or leaks concerning Soviet tests. In an October 1954 memo to the prime minister, Harold Macmillan wrote that the “recent statement by the Atomic Energy Commission on the Russian atomic explosions was made against our wishes,” explaining that “we may be asked whether these explosions were detected by us as well as by the Americans. To answer such questions must necessarily help the Russians to assess our capabilities of detection.” In August 1955 the prime minister received another memo noting recent Soviet nuclear detonations and telling him that while U.S. and British atomic intelligence authorities would prefer no publicity given the uncertainties involved in the data, “we have . . . learnt by past experience that there may be a danger of a leak on the other side of the Atlantic.” See Harold Macmillan to Prime Minister, October 28, 1954, DEFE 13/60, UKNA; Selwyn Lloyd to Prime Minister, August 4, 1955, DEFE 13/414, UKNA.

37 In January 1961 Kenneth Strong, the director of the British Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB), which maintained the small Technical Research Unit to conduct atomic intelligence analysis, sent a memo to his boss, the minister of defense. He noted that “our exchanges with our opposite numbers in the U.S. are now so good that for the first time for some years British and American estimates of the amounts of Soviet produced plutonium and U-235 are nearly identical as it would be reasonable to expect. . . . For some years past the CIA estimate has been considerably higher than the British one.” See K. W. D. Strong, JIB, “The Soviet Atomic Energy Programme: Note for Minister of Defence,” January 25, 1961, DEFE 13/342, UKNA.

38 Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 487–488; Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary, to Hon. Horace A. Hildreth, American Ambassador, Karchi, Pakistan, February 14, 1956; Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, p. 119; Memorandum for the File, Subject: AFOAT-Iran, March 22, 1956; Philip J. Farley, Memorandum for File: AFOAT-Iran, June 27, 1956; Philip J. Farley, Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary to G. Hayden Raynor, Counselor of Embassy, Oslo, September 21, 1956; Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–1970, p. 196.

39 Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989), p. 27; Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), pp. 104–105.

40 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001), pp. 12–13.

41 Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 105, 109; Pocock, Dragon Lady, pp. 27–28; Chris Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane: Toward the Unknown (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 2000), p. 51.

42 Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2 (Austin, Tex.: Aerofax, 1983), pp. 27, 30; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 135, 139.

43 Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 135, 139, 143; Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “Mission to Birch Woods,” Studies in Intelligence, 12, 4 (Fall 1968), pp. 1–12 at p. 3.

44 Lowenhaupt, “Mission to Birch Woods,” pp. 3–5.

45 Ibid., pp. 5–6; Donald E. Welzenbach, “Observation Balloons and Reconnaissance Satellites,” Studies in Intelligence, 30, 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 21–28. On the Genetrix program, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: Morrow, 1987), pp. 129–139.

46 Lowenhaupt, “Mission to Birch Woods,” pp. 4, 9.

47 Ibid., pp. 6–7.

48 Ibid., p. 7.

49 Ibid., pp. 7–8.

50 Ibid., p. 8.

51 Ibid., pp. 8–9.

52 Ibid., p. 9; Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane, p. 105; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 138.

53 Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane, p. 105; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 138–139; Lowenhaupt, “Mission to Birch Woods,” p. 9; Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 488–490.

54 Lowenhaupt, “Mission to Birch Woods,” p. 10; Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “Ravelling Russia’s Reactors,” Studies in Intelligence, 16, 4 (Fall 1972), pp. 65–79 at p. 65; James Q. Reber, Memorandum for: Project Director, Subject: Presidential Briefings on TALENT Materials, October 9, 1957, CREST, NARA.

55 Lowenhaupt, “Mission to Birch Woods,” p. 10.

56 Lowenhaupt, “Ravelling Russia’s Reactors,” pp. 65–79.

57 Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 488–491.

58 Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane, pp. 116, 120. Polmar refers to the U-2A-1S as WU-2As. See Norman Polmar, Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified (Osceolo, Wis.: Motor Books International, 2001), p. 171.

59 Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane, pp. 120–121.

60 Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–1970, pp. 196–198.

61 “Materials Relating to the USSR’s Unilateral Suspension of Nuclear Weapons Tests,” pp. 1–3, Papers of Lewis L. Strauss, Box 106, HHPL.

62 Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “Decryption of a Picture,” Studies in Intelligence, 1, 3 (Summer 1957), pp. 41–53 at p. 41.

63 Ibid., pp. 41–53.

64 Ibid., pp. 41, 52.

65 Henry S. Lowenhaupt, “Somewhere in Siberia,” Studies in Intelligence, 15, 1 (Winter 1971), pp. 35–51 at p. 35; Murrey Marder, “Reds Avow No Secrecy in A-Talks,” Washington Post and Times Herald, September 2, 1958, pp. A1, A14; Murrey Marder, “Cooperation on Fusion Power Urged by U.S., Soviet Scientists at Geneva,” Washington Post and Times-Herald, September 3, 1958, pp. A1, A7.

66 Lowenhaupt, “Somewhere in Siberia,” p. 35.

67 Ibid.; Darrell Garwood, “Reds Built Big Nuclear Power Plant in Siberia,” Washington Post and Times Herald, September 9, 1958, p. A6.

68 Lowenhaupt, “Somewhere in Siberia,” pp. 37–38.

69 Ibid., p. 38.

70 Ibid., pp. 39–40, 43–44.

71 Ibid., pp. 39, 41; Photographic Intelligence Center, CIA, Photographic Intelligence Brief B-39-58, October 31, 1958, CREST, NARA.

72 Lowenhaupt, “Somewhere in Siberia,” pp. 42–43.

73 Ibid., pp. 35, 43.

74 Department of Energy, DOE-NV-209-REV 15, United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992, December 2000, pp. vii, 17, www.nv.doe.gov.

75 Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane, pp. 152–153; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 162–163.

76 Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane, p. 153; Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 163; National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, USSR: Nuclear Accident near Kyshtym in 1957–1958, October 1981, p. 4.

77 Raymond Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2001), pp. 2–3, 8, 39; “Raymond L. Garthoff,” www.brookings.org/scholars/rgarthoff.htm, accessed January 5, 2004.

78 Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War, pp. 85–86; Raymond L. Garthoff, “Intelligence Aspects of Cold War Scientific Exchanges: US-USSR Atomic Energy Exchange Visits in 1959,” Intelligence and National Security, 15, 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 1–13 at p. 2.

79 Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War, pp. 77, 90, 109; Garthoff, “Intelligence Aspects of Cold War Scientific Exchanges,” p. 2.

80 Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War, pp. 91–92; Garthoff, “Intelligence Aspects of Cold War Scientific Exchanges,” pp. 4–5.

81 Garthoff, A Journey Through the Cold War, pp. 93, 99; Garthoff, “Intelligence Aspects of Cold War Scientific Exchanges,” p. 6.

82 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, p. 5.

83 Ibid., p. 12; United States Air Force Oral History Program, Interview #K239.0512-685 of Doyle Northrup, July 24, 1973, Patrick Air Force Base, Fla., pp. 30–31.

84 Glenn Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 14–15; Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 491–493; William D. Hall, “3-Power A-Test Talks Set Oct. 31; Senators Warn on China Loophole,” Washington Post and Times Herald, September 12, 1958, p. A17.

85 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, pp. 61, 73–74; Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–1970, p. 199.

86 Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary, to John J. Muccio, Ambassador to Iceland, March 4, 1959; H. O. Ekern, S/AE, Memorandum for the Files, Subject: Exploration of Additional Arrangements for AFOAT Sites, March 31, 1959; P. Rutter, S/AE, Memorandum for the File, Subject: AFTAC Station Requirements in Thailand, Ceylon, and Ecuador, December 2, 1959.

87 P. Rutter, S/AE, Memorandum for the File, Subject: AFTAC Expansion Program, October 9, 1959 w/att.; Peter Rutter, S/AE, Subject: Air Force Requirements for Establishment of Backscatter Radar Station, October 9, 1959; Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, p. 121. The nations and territories listed in the attachment to Rutter’s October 9 memo included Australia, Pakistan, Libya, Canada, Philippines, Tahiti, South Africa, South Georgia, Liberia, Ecuador, Ceylon, Macquarie, Kerguelan Island, Hawaii, Fiji, Mascarene Island, Lower California, Puerto Rico, French West Africa, Argentina, New Zealand, Easter Island, Brazil, Uruguay, Thailand, Norway, Iceland, Chile, Pitcairn Island, Mariana Island, Azores, Ascension, Bouvet Island, Turkey, and Japan.

88 Richelson, The Wizards of Langley, pp. 24–25.

89 Robert McDonald (ed.), CORONA: Between the Sun and the Earth, the First NRO Reconnaissance Eye in Space (Bethesda, Md.: American Society for Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 1997), pp. 301–302, 305–306; Dino A. Brugioni, “The Kyshtym Connection,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1990, p. 12; Jonathan McDowell, “Launch Listings,” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Lodgson, and Brian Latell, Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), p. 236.

90 Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, “List of High Priority Targets,” August 18, 1960; Letter from Dino Brugioni to author, January 18, 2004.

91 Central Intelligence Agency, Photographic Intelligence Center, Atomic Energy Complex: Novosibirsk, USSR, February 1961, CREST, NARA.

92 Central Intelligence Agency, National Photographic Interpretation Center, Uranium Mining Intelligence and Mining Complex: Mayli-Say, USSR, June 1961, p. 9, CREST, NARA; Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, USSR: Nuclear Accident near Kyshtym in 1957-1958, October 1981, p. 4.

93 Central Intelligence Agency, Report No. CS-K-3/465,141, Subject: Miscellaneous Information on Nuclear Installations in the USSR, February 16, 1961, in Zhores Medvedev, Nuclear Disaster in the Urals (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), pp. 186–188; Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, USSR: Nuclear Accident near Kyshtym in 1957–1958, p. 4.

94 National Intelligence Estimates 11-2A-56 (September 5, 1956), 11-2-57 (May 7, 1957), 11-2A-58 (February 4, 1958), 11-2A-59 (August 18, 1959), and 11-2A-60 (June 21, 1960), all titled The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, are now available in the National Intelligence Council collection of declassified documents, available at its Web site: www.cia.gov/nic.

95 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-2-61, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, October 5, 1961, passim.

96 Ibid., pp. 2, 17, 18n; Cochran, Norris, and Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb, p. 186.

97 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-2-61 The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, p. 18; Cochran, Norris, and Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb, p. 36.

98 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-2-61, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, p. 23; Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 104; Private information.

99 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-2-61, The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, p. 23. Any treatment of Novaya Zemlya has been redacted from the sanitized version.

100 “Is Russia Fooling U.S. on A-Bomb Tests?” U.S. News & World Report, December 19, 1960, pp. 72–76 at p. 72; Herbert Scoville Jr., Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Comments on U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT Interview with John McCone, December 20, 1960, CREST, NARA.

101 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 11-7-57, Feasibility and Likelihood of Soviet Evasion of a Nuclear Test Moratorium, December 10, 1957, p. 4, in National Security Archive, The Soviet Estimate, Document No. 00208.

102 Ibid., pp. 4–5. The issue of possible Soviet evasion was addressed in later estimates: Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 11-9-59, Probable Soviet Position on Nuclear Weapons Testing, September 8, 1959, and Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 11-9A-59, Probable Soviet Position on Nuclear Weapons Testing, September 8, 1959, both in National Security Archive, The Soviet Estimate, Documents 00232 and 00233, respectively.

103 Scoville, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Comments on U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT Interview with John McCone.

104 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-9-61, The Possibility of Soviet Nuclear Testing During the Moratorium, April 25, 1961, pp. 1–3.

105 Ibid., p. 3.

106 Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 77.

107 Herbert Scoville Jr., Chairman, JAEIC Statement, 1430 Hours, September 1, 1961; Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 493.

108 Podvig (ed.), Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 493–499; Herbert Scoville Jr., Chairman, JAEIC, “Statement, 1230 Hours, 4 November 1961,” November 4, 1961.

109 Strobe Talbott (ed.), Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 71; Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, pp. 71–72.

110 Sakharov, Memoirs, pp. 219–220.

111 Ibid., p. 221; Victor Adamsky and Yuri Smirnov, “Moscow’s Biggest Bomb: The 50- Megaton Test of October 1961,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 3, 19–21 at p. 3.

112 Jerry E. Knotts and Patrick O’Malley, The Big Safari Story (privately printed, n.d.), p. 7; Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, p. 91.

113 William E. Burrows, By Any Means Necessary: America’s Secret Air War in the Cold War (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2001), p. 282.

114 Knotts and O’Malley, The Big Safari Story, p. 7; Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, p. 114; United States Air Force Oral History Program Interview #K239.0512-685 with Doyle Northrup, p. 40.

115 Talbot (ed.), Khrushchev Remembers, p. 71.

116 Knotts and O’Malley, The Big Safari Story, p. 7; John F. Kennedy to Robert McNamara, November 10, 1961, reproduced in Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, p. 92.

117 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-14-61, The Soviet Strategic Military Posture, 1961–1967, November 1961, in Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947–1991 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 2001), pp. 230–238 at pp. 234–235.

118 Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), pp. 25, 184.

119 James Fetzer, “Clinging to Containment: China Policy,” in Thomas G. Patterson (ed.), Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–63 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 178–197 at p. 182.

CHAPTER 4: MAO’S EXPLO SIVE THOUGHTS

1 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 37–38, 44; Robert S. Norris, Andrew Burrows, and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 328.

2 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 38; Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China—An Investigative History (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), pp. 83–84.

3 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 11–39; Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 16–42; Xiaobing Li, “PLA Attacks and Amphibious Operations During the Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954–55 and 1958,” in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt, Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949 (Armonk, N.Y.; M. E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 143–172.

4 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 46–47.

5 Ibid., pp. 48–49, 54–59.

6 Ibid., pp. 90, 140–141; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 338, 340; “Selections from CHINA TODAY: National Defense S&T Undertakings,” Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-CST-94-009, May 23, 1994, p. 13.

7 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 76–81, 86.

8 Ibid., pp. 85, 95.

9 Ibid., pp. 90–92.

10 Ibid., p. 97; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 338, 345.

11 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 115–116.

12 Ibid., p. 111; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 339; “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 16.

13 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 111.

14 Ibid., p. 175.

15 Ibid., pp. 175–176.

16 Ibid., p. 176.

17 Ibid.; “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 23.

18 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 176–177.

19 Ibid., p. 177; “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 24.

20 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 39, 41, 41n.

21 Ibid., pp. 60–72; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 100-3-60, Sino-Soviet Relations, August 9, 1960, in National Intelligence Council, Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China During the Era of Mao, 1948–1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), pp. 218–247 at 222, 225; Central Intelligence Agency, China: Plutonium Production Reactor Problems, January 1988, p. 1; Odd Arne Westad, Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–63 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 157–159, 206–207; Jin Zhitao, Wang Shibo, Xu Yunjian, sun Zongyong, Tian Hongyao, and Lue Jie, “The ‘Two Bombs’ Star That Will Never Fall—The Republic’s Father of ‘Two Bombs and One Satellite,’ Remembering Guo Yonghuai,” Beijing Renmin Ribao, December 27, 2000, pp. 11ff (translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-CHI-2000-1227); Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 11-12-66, The Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations, December 1, 1966, p. 3. Also see Victor Gobarev, “Soviet Policy Toward China: Developing Nuclear Weapons, 1949–1969,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 12, 4 (December 1999), pp. 17–53.

22 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 328–329; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 44, 47, 148; “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 13.

23 Jin et al., “The ‘Two Bombs’ Star That Will Never Fall”; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 328.

24 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 329; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 44, 99.

25 Interview with Karl Weber, Oakton, Va., May 5, 1999. On the programs to use modified P-2Vs for reconnaissance of China (designated ST/POLLY and then ST/SPIN), see Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001), pp. 20, 96–97.

26 Donald P. Steury, “Introduction,” in Donald P. Steury, Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. ix–xxv at pp. ix–x.

27 Sherman Kent, AD/NE, Memorandum for the Director, Subject: Chinese Communist Capabilities for Developing an Effective Atomic Weapons Program and Weapons Delivery Program, June 24, 1955, pp. 2–3.

28 Geography Division, Office of Research and Reports, Central Intelligence Agency, Project Initiation Memorandum, October 3, 1960, CREST, NARA.

29 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 13-60, Communist China, December 6, 1960, p. 13; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 13-2-60, The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program, December 13, 1960. In an interview published in U.S. News & World Report on December 19, AEC chairman John McCone stated that “we have no evidence on China’s weapons development program,” a comment that OSI chief Herbert Scoville characterized as being an “underestimate [of] intelligence knowledge on this subject.” See “Interview with John A. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission: Is Russia Fooling U.S. on A-Bomb Tests?” U.S. News & World Report, December 19, 1960, pp. 72–76 at p. 75; Herbert Scoville Jr., Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Comments on U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT Interview with John A. McCone, December 20, 1960, CREST, NARA.

30 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 13-2-60, The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program, pp. 1–2; John M. Steeves, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to Roger Hilsman, Director, INR, “National Intelligence Estimate on Implications of Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability,” April 12, 1961; Robert A. McDonald, “CORONA: Success for Space Reconnaissance, A Look into the Cold War and a Revolution for Intelligence,” Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, 60, 6 (June 1995), pp. 689–720 at p. 700.

31 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 13-2-60, The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program, pp. 2–3. As was often the case, the air force’s assistant chief of staff for intelligence was more pessimistic, writing in a footnote (p. 3n) that China would “probably detonate its first nuclear device in 1962, and possibly as early as late 1961.”

32 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “A Strategic Analysis of the Impact of the Acquisition by Communist China of a Nuclear Capability,” June 26, 1961, in Edward C. Keefer, David W. Mabon, and Harriet Dashiell Schwar (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 84–85; George McGhee to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability,” September 13, 1961, pp. 1–2.

33 McGhee to Rusk, “Anticipatory Action Pending Chinese Demonstration of a Nuclear Capability,” pp. 2–3.

34 William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960–1964,” International Security, 25, 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 54–99 at p. 62.

35 Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 232; “Daily Brief,” Central Intelligence Bulletin, October 14, 1961, p. 1, CREST, NARA.

36 Chief, CIA/PID (NPIC), Memorandum for: Director, NPIC, Subject: Information Concerning the PI Effort on the Chinese Atomic Energy Program, March 28, 1963, Attachment B, CREST, NARA; McDonald, “CORONA,” pp. 689–720 at p. 700.

37 Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989), pp. 90–93.

38 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 13-2-62, Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities, April 25, 1962, p. 12.

39 Ibid., pp. 3, 11.

40 R. L. Blachy, L. Goure, S. T. Hosmer, A. L. Hsieh, B. F. Jaeger, P. F. Langer, and M. G. Weiner, Implications of a Communist Chinese Nuclear Capability: A Briefing (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, August 1962), pp. v, 1–2.

41 Dean Rusk, Memorandum for: M—Mr. McGhee, “Program to Influence World Opinion with Respect to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation,” September 20, 1962 w/att: Program to Influence World Opinion with Respect to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation, CREST, NARA; George C. McGhee, Memorandum for the Honorable John A. McCone, Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: Program to Influence World Opinion with Respect to a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation, September 25, 1962, CREST, NARA.

42 Interview with Robert Johnson, Washington, D.C., May 9, 2003; Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 63.

43 Johnson interview; Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 63.

44 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 103, 131–132, 134; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 332.

45 “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 16; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 54, 159.

46 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 141.

47 Ibid., pp. 97, 99, 103; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 333. In late 1963, OSI completed a study on the institute. See Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, The Communist Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy, December 16, 1963.

48 “Editorial Note,” in Keefer, Mabon, and Schwar (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63, Volume XXII, p. 339.

49 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Summary and Appraisal of Latest Evidence on Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities,” July 10, 1963, p. 1; Jonathan McDowell, “Launch Listings,” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), p. 238; Chief, CIA/PID (NPIC), Memorandum for: Director, NPIC, Subject: Information Concerning the PI Effort on the Chinese Atomic Energy Program, Attachments B, C; Memorandum, “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” February 27, 1963, in Mary S. McAuliffe (ed.), CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), pp. 127–137 at pp. 127–128. According to the above-cited memo for the director of the NPIC, at the end of March 1963 approximately 35 percent of China had been covered by aerial photography, while 85 to 90 percent had been covered by Corona launches since August 1960 (although 40 percent of that coverage had been obscured by scattered to heavy clouds).

50 National Imagery and Mapping Agency, America’s Eyes: What We Were Seeing, September 2002, pp. 2–3; Interview with Dino Brugioni, January 23, 2003; Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), p. 77.

51 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-2-63, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, July 24, 1963, p. 4.

52 Ibid.; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 134–135.

53 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Summary and Appraisal of Latest Evidence on Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities,” Annex 3.

54 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-2-63, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, p. 5.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., pp. 5–6.

57 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Summary and Appraisal of Latest Evidence on Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities,” Annex 3.

58 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-2-63, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, p. 1; Burr and Richelson, “Whether to “Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 65. See Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, “The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting,” in H. Bradford Westerfield (ed.), Inside the CIA’s Private World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 238–254, for a discussion of the estimate’s errors and their cause.

59 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-2-63, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, p. 10.

60 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 76; Johnson interview.

61 “Editorial Note,” in Keefer, Mabon, and Schwar (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63, Volume XXII, p. 339.

62 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” pp. 67–71; Telegram to Moscow Embassy, July 15, 1963, and Moscow Embassy telegram to State Department, July 27, 1963, both in David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 801, 860. About a week before his departure, Sherman Kent, still the head of the Office of National Estimates, had sent him a short memo noting that “the Soviets must realize that when the Chinese have such a [nuclear] capability, it might be directed westward against the USSR as well as eastward against the US.” Sherman Kent, Memorandum for: Averell Harriman, Subject: What the Soviets Must Be Thinking as They Perceive the Chinese Communists Working Towards an Initial Advanced Weapons Capability—Nuclear Weapons and Missiles, July 8, 1963, in Mabon and Patterson (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63, Volume VII, pp. 771–772.

63 U.S. Embassy, Moscow, telegram to State Department, July 27, 1963, in Mabon and Patterson (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume VII, p. 860; Kendrick Oliver, Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998), pp. 205–206; Vladislav Zubok, “Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp: Deng Xiaoping and the Russians, 1956–1963,” Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project, 10 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 152–162; Tyler, A Great Wall, p. 58.

64 “The President’s News Conference of August 1, 1963,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 616; Harriet Dashiell Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXX, China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), p. 24 n. 7.

65 William E. Colby, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, “Meeting of General Chiang Ching-kuo with the President, September 10, 1963,” September 19, 1963, pp. 3, 11.

66 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” pp. 72–73.

67 Ibid., p. 73.

68 Benjamin Read to McGeorge Bundy, “The President’s Meeting with Chinese Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo on September 23 at 11:30 A.M.,” September 18, 1965, w/att: Background Paper, “U.S.-GRC Consultations Concerning Possible Action Against the Mainland,” and Memorandum for the Record: “Understandings Reached During Chiang-Ching Kuo’s Visit.”

69 George Rathjens, ACDA, Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, December 14, 1964; Walt Rostow, Memorandum for the President, “The Implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability,” April 17, 1964; Maxwell Taylor, Chairman JCS, Memorandum for: Gen. LeMay, Gen. Wheeler, Adm. McDonald, and Gen. Shoup, “Chinese Nuclear Development,” November 18, 1963; Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” pp. 74–75; Interview with Albert Wheelon, Washington, D.C., April 9, 1997.

70 Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68 Volume XXX, p. 24 n. 7; Robert Johnson to Walt Rostow, “Direct Action Against Chicom Nuclear Facilities,” February 12, 1964, cited in Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 74.

71 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 75.

72 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 136.

73 Ibid., pp. 166–168; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 333.

74 “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 17; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 333; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 168.

75 “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 17; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 169.

76 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 126n, 169, 184; Defense Intelligence Agency, Biographic Sketch: Zhang Aiping, July 1979.

77 “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 17.

78 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 183–184. The “596” designation was derived from the year and month that Soviet assistance ceased. See Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 337.

79 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” pp. 83–84; Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Bulletin, March 18, 1964, p. 4, CREST, NARA.

80 National Photographic Interpretation Center, Mission GRC 176, September 25, 1963, October 1963, pp. 13–14, 17.

81 Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 98; M. S. Kohli and Kenneth Conboy, Spies in the Himalayas: Secret Missions and Perilous Climbs (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), pp. 23–25; Interview with Richard Bissell, Farmington, Conn., March 16, 1984; Wheelon interview.

82 Day, Logsdon, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, p. 233; McDowell, “Launch Listings,” in Day, Logsdon, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, p. 238; McDonald, “CORONA,” p. 716; [James Q. Reber], Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Additional KH-4 Coverage of China, April 17, 1964, CREST, NARA.

83 Day, Logsdon, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, p. 233; McDowell, “Launch Listings,” p. 238; McDonald, “CORONA,” p. 716; Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, p. 357; National Imagery and Mapping Agency, America’s Eyes, pp. 2–3; Dwayne A. Day, “A Failed Phoenix: The KH-6 LANYARD Reconnaissance Satellite,” Spaceflight, 39, 5 (May 1997), pp. 170–174 at p. 173.

84 National Photographic Interpretation Center, NPIC/R-740/64, Probable Atomic Energy Complex Under Construction near Chih-Chin-Hsia, China, August 1964, p. 7, CREST, NARA. National Photographic Interpretation Center, NPIC/R-155/64, Oak—Part I, Mission 1004-2, 19-22 February 1964, February 1964, p. 17, CREST, NARA.

85 John McCone, Memorandum for the Record, July 24, 1964, in Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXX, p. 70; Central Intelligence Agency, “Communist Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” July 22, 1964.

86 National Photographic Interpretation Center, NPIC/R-740/64, Probable Atomic Energy Complex Under Construction near Chin-Chin-Hsia, China, pp. 1, 7. The previous report on the complex was National Photographic Interpretation Center, R-335/63, Suspect Atomic Energy Complex Under Construction near Yu-men, China, December 1963. A subsequent report was National Photographic Interpretation Center, NPIC/R-860/64, Probable Atomic Energy Complex Under Construction near Chih-Chin-Hsia, China, October 1964, CREST, NARA.

87 National Photographic Interpretation Center, NPIC/R-740/64, Probable Atomic Energy Complex Under Construction near Chin-Chin-Hsia, China, pp. 1–5.

88 McDowell, “Launch Listings,” p. 238.

89 Frederic C. E. Oder, James C. Fitzpatrick, and Paul Worthman, The CORONA Story (Washington, D.C.: National Reconnaissance Office, 1997), p. 155; Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-4-64, The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion, August 26, 1964, in Kevin Ruffner (ed.), CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), pp. 239–244 at p. 239.

90 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-4-64, “The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” p. 239.

91 Ibid., p. 241.

92 Ibid., pp. 241–242.

93 Ibid., pp. 242–243; Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’,” p. 85. In April 1964 the American consul in Hong Kong told a Japanese diplomat who inquired whether the United States had any evidence about such a connection, that the United States doubted France would assist China in that way. See Am Consul Hong Kong to Department of State, A-857, Subject: French Unwillingness to Supply Heavy Water to Communist China, April 10, 1964. The issue was of enough concern three years later that the chef du cabinet in the Ministry of Science, Space, and Atomic Affairs found it necessary to assure U.S. diplomats that there was “zero cooperation between the French and Chicoms on nuclear matters, military or nonmilitary.” See Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 85 n. 88. SNIE 13-4-64 contained a paragraph on the issue, but seven of the eight lines are blacked out in the released version.

94 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-4-64, “The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” pp. 243–244.

95 Wheelon interview; Telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, September 16, 1999.

96 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 86.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid., p. 87; John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Memorandum of Discussion at Luncheon—September 15th, Secretary Rusk’s Dining Room, September 15, 1964, in Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, pp. 95–96; McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum for the Record, September 15, 1964.

99 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 87; McCone, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Memorandum of Discussion at Luncheon, September 15, 1964; Bundy, Memorandum for the Record, September 15, 1964. See also the discussion by Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 250; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 210–211.

100 McCone, Memorandum for the Record, September 17, 1964.

101 Interview with Thomas L. Hughes, Washington, D.C., September 8, 2004. In an October 5 memo, McCone recounts a meeting that day with Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy. According to the memo, McCone presented KH-4 imagery and stated that U-2 photography would provide more precise information on the last stages of construction at Lop Nur, which might aid in estimating the timing of the test. However, McCone records that he told them that unless the president and Rusk believed information concerning the time of detonation was important, he could not recommend the mission on the grounds that it was a deep penetration that pushed the U-2 to its limit and would cover no other important targets. Rusk stated his opposition, according to McCone, on the grounds that the information was not of significant importance and the mission would involve overflying Burma and India. A CIA telegram to Taipei stated that the primary reasons were the election, satellite-obtained data, and Rusk’s September 29 statement about an upcoming Chinese test. See John McCone, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Discussion with the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and Mr. McGeorge Bundy—Monday, 5 October 4:45 p.m. October 5, 1964, in Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXX, p. 106 (including no. 2).

102 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 87.

103 Memcon, September 25, 1964, in Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXX, pp. 104–105.

104 David E. Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 254; Lyle L. Goldstein, “When China Was a ‘Rogue State’: The Impact of China’s Nuclear Weapons Program on US-China Relations During the 1960s,” Journal of Contemporary China, 12, 37 (November 2003), pp. 739–764 at p. 752. For Johnson’s emphasis on avoiding conflict with China over Vietnam, see Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the Vietnam War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), pp. 125, 142–143.

105 Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence Donald Chamberlain to Deputy DCI Marshall Carter, “Estimated Imminence of a Chinese Nuclear Test,” October 15, 1964, in Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXX, pp. 107–08. For the Malian delegation and reports of an October 1 test, see “The Secretary’s Staff Meeting,” October 28 and November 27, 1964. A Malian delegation visited China on June 19–July 4 and met with Mao and Zhou, among other senior officials. A Gambit launch of August 14 resulted in a good KH-7 image of Lop Nur being obtained on August 16 and returned to earth on August 23—too late to use in the August 1964 special estimate. A KH-4A launched on September 14 returned the first of its two film buckets on September 19, possibly permitting its exploitation and the dissemination of results by September 25. See McDowell, “Launched Listings,” p. 238; Richelson, American’s Secret Eyes in Space, p. 357.

106 Burr and Richelson, “Whether to “Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” pp. 89–90.

107 Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, Subject: Photographic Coverage Contemplated During the Next Six Months of Significant ChiCom Targets, October 2, 1964.

108 McDowell “Launch Listings,” p. 240; Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, p. 357; Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence Donald Chamberlain to Deputy DCI Marshall Carter, “Estimated Imminence of a Chinese Nuclear Test,” in Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXX, pp. 107–108; John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, October 17, 1964, in Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXX, pp. 110–111; “Classification of Intelligence Information,” attachment to: Howard J. Osborn, Memorandum for: Legislative Counsel, Subject: Proposal DCI Statement Before the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Armed Services Committee, House of Representatives (Nedzi Committee), March 21, 1972, CREST, NARA. Gambit satellites photographed Baotou on March 12 and April 25, 1964, while Jiuquan was covered on April 27 and September 26. Lanzhou apparently was not covered in 1964.

109 Chamberlain to Carter, “Estimated Imminence of a Chinese Nuclear Test,” pp. 107–108.

110 “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 29; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 185–186.

111 “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 29; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 187; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 328.

112 “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 29; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 187; “Nuclear Pursuits,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1991, p. 49.

113 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 187–188.

114 Ibid., pp. 188–189; “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 30; “Statement by China on Its A-Explosion,” Washington Post, October 17, 1964, p. A10; “Red China Sets Off Atomic Explosion; Soviet Paper Condemns Khrushchev,” Washington Post, October 17, 1964, p. 1; “China Tests Atomic Bomb, Asks Summit Talk on Ban; Johnson Minimizes Peril,” New York Times, October 17, 1964, p. 1. The October 17 Times also carried a story by science writer Walter Sullivan that indicated the plutonium assumption was widespread outside of the CIA—“Use of Plutonium Hints at Handicap” (p. 11). Sullivan’s story also demonstrated that the Tackle operation, although not its code name, was no secret. He wrote, “Specialists here are uncertain of the exact location of the test site, although it is almost certainly known to those with access to photographs taken by U-2 aircraft flown over China by Chinese Nationalist pilots from Taiwan.”

115 Air Force Technical Applications Center, History of the Air Force Technical Applications Center, 1 July–31 December 1964, n.d., pp. 9, 11, 15; “Selections from CHINA TODAY,” p. 30.

116 “Johnson’s Statement on Chinese A-Blast,” Washington Post, October 17, 1964, p. A10; State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to National Security Assistant McGeorge Bundy, “Standby Statement for Chinese Communist Nuclear Test,” September 30, 1964; Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’ ” p. 92; Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 469.

117 Department of State/Department of Defense, Message, Subject: Project CLEAR SKY, October 16, 1964.

118 Air Force Technical Applications Center, History of the Air Force Technical Applications Center, 1 July–31 December 1964, p. 25.

119 Ibid.; Glenn T. Seaborg with Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 116.

120 McCone, Memorandum for the Record, October 17, 1964, p. 110.

121 Ibid., p. 111.

122 V. Gupta and D. Rich, “Locating the Detonation Point of China’s First Nuclear Explosive Test on 16 October 1964,” International Journal of Remote Sensing, 17, 10 (1996), pp. 1969–1974; Burr and Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle,’” p. 91; See also Seaborg with Loeb, Stemming the Tide, p. 116.

123 Journals of Glenn Seaborg, Vols. 7–9 (Berkeley, Calif.: Lawrence Berkeley, Laboratory, 1989), pp. 254–261; Seaborg with Loeb, Stemming the Tide, pp. 116–117.

124 Rathjens, Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, December 14, 1964, pp. 5–7.

125 Pocock, Dragon Lady, pp. 100–101; R. E. Lawrence and Harry W. Woo, “Infrared Imagery in Overhead Reconnaissance,” Studies in Intelligence, 11, 3 (Summer 1967), pp. 17–40 at p. 23; Central Intelligence Agency, U-2 Reconnaissance Mission C025C, Flown 8 January 1965, 1965, pp. 1–2.

126 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 13-2-65, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, January 27, 1965, pp. 1–2, 6–7.

127 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Second Chinese Nuclear Test,” Weekly Review, May 21, 1965, pp. 7, 9.

128 From: [deleted], Memorandum for: Deputy Director for Intelligence, Subject: Photo-Satellite Reconnaissance 1965, October 5, 1965, CREST, NARA.

129 Central Intelligence Agency, Chronology of Reactor Construction, Chin-Chin-Hsia Atomic Energy Complex, September 1965, p. 1, CREST, NARA. The twenty-two missions figure is from a date that has been deleted from the declassified version of the document. Given that five Gambit/KH-7 missions were flown prior to the report’s being prepared, three of which were undertaken after the October 16, 1964, detonation, the twenty-two missions probably refer to those between that event and the time the report was prepared.

130 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection (Satellite Beach, Fla.: SAIC, 1997), p. 119.

131 Ibid., pp. 63–64. Other detection techniques that were in use in 1965 included atmospheric fluorescence (pp. 137–138), which recorded nuclear explosion–induced fluorescence in the upper atmosphere; magnetic (p. 95), which relied on recording fluctuations in the earth’s magnetic field caused by high-altitude nuclear detonations; vertical incidence (pp. 133–134), which detected nuclear explosions at high altitudes by measuring the disturbances in the ionosphere within a sixty-degree cone over the detection facility; and surface-based resonance scatter (p. 89), which relied on optical filtering equipment to detect certain atoms and ions of debris that would be trapped in the atmosphere as the result of a high-altitude nuclear explosion.

132 E-mail, Matthew Aid to author, December 17, 2003.

133 Ibid.; U.S. Army Security Agency, Annual Historical Summary: United States Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1966 (Arlington, Va.: ASA, n.d.), pp. 96–97, 106–107, 117, 154–155, 158, 163, 166; U.S. Army Security Agency, Annual Historical Summary: United States Army Security Agency, Fiscal Year 1967 (Arlington, Va.: ASA, 1971), p. 179. In July 1965 the Red Wind program was redesignated Blue Zephyr, and then terminated as an operational intelligence effort. Only Dawn Star sites were designated as Signal Research Units (SRUs), while only Red Wind sites were designated Signals Operations Units (SOUs).

134 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, p. 123; John R. London III, “Vela—A Space System Success Story.” Paper presented at the 42nd Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, October 5–11, 1991, Montreal, Canada; Charles C. Bates, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Address before the Annual Conference of the Division of Earth Sciences, National Research Council, Subject: The Goals of Project VELA, April 29, 1961, Papers of Lee DuBridge, Box 175, Folder 175.1, California Institute of Technology Archives.

135 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, pp. 123–124; London, “Vela,” pp. 2, 7; Sidney Singer, “The Vela Satellite Program for Detection of High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations,” Proceedings of the IEEE, 53, 12 (December 1965), pp. 1935–1948 at p. 1935.

136 William F. Raborn and Glenn Seaborg (signators), Memorandum of Understanding Between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency Concerning Work to Be Performed at the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, August 3, 1965; Ann Parker, “Knowing the Enemy, Anticipating the Threat,” Science and Technology Review, July/August 2002, pp. 24–31 at p. 25.

137 Albert D. Wheelon, DDS&T, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Formation of a Nuclear Intelligence Panel, October 29, 1965, CREST, NARA; Memorandum for: Mr. Duckett, Subject: Scientific Advisory Panels, October 11, 1966, CREST, NARA.

138 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 333; Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Weekly Surveyor, May 23, 1966.

139 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 333; Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 202; Central Intelligence Agency, “Chinese Demonstrate Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capability,” Weekly Summary, November 4, 1966, pp. 5–6.

140 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-8-66, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, November 3, 1966, pp. 1–2. The earlier 1966 estimate was Director of Central Intelligence, Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, July 1, 1966. That estimate continued to wrestle with the issue of where the U-235 for China’s nuclear tests came from. It noted that “in theory” the Lanzhou facility “could by itself produce uranium of sufficient enrichment, make a nuclear device. But because it appears too small to hold a complete gaseous diffusion cascade using normal size stages it would have been necessary for the Chinese to crowd in a large number of small stages. It is highly unlikely that the Chinese had the technical capability to do this during the years that [Lanzhou] was being built.” It still suggested that the final stage of enrichment might have been handled by electromagnetic separation at an undetected facility. A year later in the 1967 estimate (NIE 13-8-67, Communist China’s Strategic Weapons Program, August 3, 1967), the estimators would write (on p. 4) that “we are now less confident of our estimate that the Chinese are using the electromagnetic process to ‘top off’ the U-235 production that has been partially enriched in the gaseous diffusion cascade at [Lanzhou].” The 1966 estimate did correctly note that China’s primary production center was under construction near Yumen (Jiuquan), probably consisting of a large plutonium production reactor, a plutonium separation plant, and a third facility believed to contain a small experimental reactor and possibly a pilot chemical separation plant (pp. 6–7).

141 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 196.

142 Ibid., pp. 199–201.

143 Ibid., pp. 200–201; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 333; Central Intelligence Agency, “Chinese Explode Fifth Nuclear Device,” Weekly Summary, January 6, 1967, p. 7.

144 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, pp. 205–206.

145 Ibid., p. 206; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 334; Central Intelligence Agency, “Chinese Communists Test Thermonuclear Weapon,” Weekly Summary, June 23, 1967, p. 8; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 13-8-67, Communist China’s Strategic Weapons Program, p. 1.

146 Hsichun Mike Hua, “The Black Cat Squadron,” Air Power History, Spring 2002, pp. 4–19 at p. 16; Chris Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2: The Complete Illustrated History of the “Dragon Lady” (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 2005), p. 246. Interview with former CIA official.

147 Hua, “The Black Cat Squadron,” p. 16; Interview with former CIA official. Use of the Tabasco sensor may have been the result of a major effort to generate a requirement for its use. The purpose of January 1967 meeting involving OSI and JAEIC chairman Donald Chamberlain, the chairman of COMOR, and representatives of the Office of Research and Development, which developed Tabasco along with Sandia Laboratories, was to “determine what actions are required to generate a requirement, to which OSA can respond, for the Project [deleted] operational mission.” The memo reporting on the purpose of the meeting also included a “short description of the [7 characters deleted] equipment and its function.” See Memorandum for the Record, IDEA-0047-67, Subject: Project [deleted], January 27, 1967, CREST, NARA. The IDEA indicates Idealist, the current, at the time, code name for CIA U-2 operations.

148 Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, pp. 358–359; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 334; E-mail, Tim Brown to author, February 3, 2004; Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2, p. 251.

149 McDowell, “Launch Listings,” p. 242; Day, Logdson, and Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky, pp. 231–233.

150 London, “Vela,” p. 7. Scientific Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, p. 125.

151 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 334.

152 George C. Denney Jr. to the Secretary, Subject: Chinese Nuclear Test May Have Been a Failure, December 29, 1967. Denney also noted that China had not announced the test, contrary to its usual practice. In addition, he pointed out that there were other reasons to believe that any test would have been planned to produce a large yield—the desire for “a spectacle to end another year of cultural revolution activity, a desire to steal some of the USSR’s 50th anniversary thunder, and to pay homage to Mao two days before his birthday.” In April 1968 a memorandum to holders of NIE 13-8-67 also proclaimed that “Peking’s official silence concerning the test,” as well as other factors, “point toward failure.” See Director of Central Intelligence Memorandum to Holders, National Intelligence Estimate 13-8-67, Communist China’s Strategic Weapons Program, April 4, 1968, p. 4.

153 Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 120; Norman Polmar, Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified (Osceola, Wis.: MBI Publishing, 2001), p. 206.

154 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 103.

155 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 350; Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Frontier,” China Quarterly, 115 (September 1988), pp. 351–386.

CHAPTER 5: AN ELATED GENERAL, A SMILING BUDDHA

1 Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Da Capo, 1983), pp. 33–34; Bertrand Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p. 296.

2 Maurice Goldsmith, Frédéric Joliot-Curie: A Biography (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), pp. 75–79, 84–85.

3 Ibid., pp. 84–88; Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1964), pp. 49–50; Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals, pp. 76–80.

4 Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945, p. 49; Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals, pp. 57–59, 287; Goldsmith, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, pp. 92, 99; Robert S. Norris, Andrew Burrows, and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 182.

5 Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals, p. 296.

6 Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, La Piscine: The French Secret Service Since 1944 (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 32–33.

7 Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals, pp. 214–217, 242, 288; Goldsmith, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, p. 137; Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (South Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth Press, 2002), pp. 332–333.

8 Goldsmith, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, p. 140; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 182; Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 7, 11, 18; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 321.

9 Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals, p. 295.

10 Ibid., pp. 325, 328; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 182.

11 Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals, p. 294; Goldsmith, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, p. 149.

12 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 183.

13 Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals, p. 335.

14 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 183; Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic, p. 41.

15 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 183; John Prados, Operation Vulture (New York: Ibooks, 2002), pp. 200–228.

16 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 183; Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic, p. 43.

17 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 183–184; Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic, pp. 116, 171; Wynfred Joshua, New Perspectives in U.S.-French Nuclear Relations (Stanford: Stanford Research Institute, 1972), p. 10; Ambassade de France, White Paper, “France’s First Atomic Explosion,” February 1960, p. 9; George A. Kelly, “The Political Background of the French A-Bomb,” Orbis, IV, 3 (Fall 1960), pp. 284–306 at p. 297.

18 Ambassade de France, White Paper, “France’s First Atomic Explosion,” p. 16; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 184; Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic, pp. 173, 182.

19 Jean-Marc Regnault, “France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957–1963,” Journal of Military History, 67, 4 (July 2003), pp. 1223–1248 at p. 1224–1226; Ambassade de France, White Paper, “France’s First Atomic Explosion,” p. 29.

20 Ambassade de France, White Paper, “France’s First Atomic Explosion,” p. 12; Regnault, “France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957–1963,” p. 1227; Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: A History of French Intelligence from the Dreyfus Affairs to the Gulf War (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1995), p. 396.

21 Ambassade de France, White Paper, “France’s First Atomic Explosion,” p. 13; Ambassade de France, Release No. 886, “France’s First Atomic Explosion,” February 13, 1960, p. 3.

22 Regnault, “France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957–1963,” pp. 1227–1228.

23 Ambassade de France, Release No. 886, “France’s First Atomic Explosion,” pp. 1, 4; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 205; W. Granger Blair, “DeGaulle Claims World Atom Role as Test Succeeds,” New York Times, February 14, 1960, pp. 1, 2; “Firing Is Climax of 8-Year Effort,” New York Times, February 14, 1960, p. 3; E. W. Kenworthy, “U.S. and Soviet Regret French Atomic Explosion,” New York Times, February 14, 1960, pp. 1, 3; “France Set to Try Real Bomb Now,” Washington Post and Times Herald, February 14, 1960, pp. A1, A7; “Ghana to Freeze Assets of French,” New York Times, February 14, 1960, pp. 1, 4.

24 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 205, 405; Porch, The French Secret Services, pp. 396–403.

25 Norris, Racing for the Bomb, p. 641 n. 62.

26 Lt. Col. S. M. Skinner to Col. W. R. Shuler, Subject: Atomic Experiments in France, February 18, 1946, RG 226, Entry 210, Box 431, Folder 2, NARA.

27 Col. W. R. Shuler, Corps of Engineers and D. C. G. Gattiker, Memorandum for the Period of 17 January 1946 to 28 February 1946, February 28, 1946, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 168, Folder: 202.3-1 (Combined Intelligence Reports), NARA.

28 Maj. Paul O. Languth to Lt. Col. Richard H. Free, Subject: Atomic Energy Research in France, August 29, 1946, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 173, NARA.

29 H. S. Lowenhaupt, Memo to File, Subject: France’s Atomic Energy Development, as Extracted from Joliot-Curie’s Speech to the Committee on Atomic Energy, 19 March 1946, November 14, 1946, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 173, NARA.

30 Division of Biographic Information to Special Assistant, Intelligence, Biographic Bulletin No. 25, “Francis Perrin, French High Commissioner of Atomic Energy,” April 24, 1951.

31 Garrison B. Coverdale, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Department of State, Subject: French AEC Personnel Changes and Appointments, December 23, 1952 w/att: French AEC Personnel Changes and Appointments.

32 Central Intelligence Agency, “French Position on Disarmament May Be Shifting,” Central Intelligence Bulletin, May 29, 1957, CREST, NARA.

33 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 100-6-57, Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences, June 18, 1957, pp. 3, 5.

34 Director of Central Intelligence, Annex to National Intelligence Estimate No. 100-2-58, Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences, July 1, 1958, p. 1; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 100-2-58, Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences, July 1, 1958, p. 4.

35 Central Intelligence Agency, “French Nuclear Weapons Program,” Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, September 18, 1958, page number unknown.

36 Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971), pp. 210, 213; Central Intelligence Agency, The French Nuclear Weapons Program, November 13, 1959, p. 1; Interview with a former CIA official.

37 Central Intelligence Agency, The French Nuclear Weapons Program, p. 3.

38 Ibid., pp. 1, 3, 6.

39 Ibid., pp. 4, 6.

40 Ibid., p. 6.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 7.

43 Ibid., pp. 6–7.

44 Central Intelligence Agency, “The French Nuclear Energy Program,” Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, January 28, 1960.

45 Central Intelligence Agency, “French Nuclear Test Plans,” Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, February 25, 1960.

46 Regnault, “France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957–1963,” p. 1232; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 205, 406.

47 Regnault, “France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957–1963,” pp. 1235, 1242.

48 Ibid., pp. 1233, 1239, 1242–1243; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 205–206. The local traditional name for the island Moruroa, which in the Maohi language of Polynesia means “Place of the Great Secret.” The French military changed the name to Mururoa in the 1960s.

49 Regnault, “France’s Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 1957–1963,” p. 1244; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 206; International Atomic Energy Agency, Study of the Radiological Situation at the Atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa (Vienna, Austria: IAEA, 1998), Attachment 1, p. 1.

50 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 206.

51 Ibid., p. 407; Tillman Durdin, “‘Tactical’ French A-Bomb Exploded at Pacific Atoll: Test Series Begins,” New York Times, July 3, 1966, pp. 1, 13.

52 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 407.

53 Pierre Billaud, “The Incredible Story of the French H-bomb: A Chaotic Process and a Scandalous Historical Falsification,” p. 2, http://perso.club-internet.fr/pbillaud/hla.html, accessed February 9, 2004; Jean Lacoutre, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945–1970 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), p. 419.

54 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 206, 407.

55 Billaud, “The Incredible Story of the French H-bomb,” pp. 3–4.

56 Ibid., p. 5; “Did UK Scientist Give France Vital Clues About H-bomb?” Nature, December 5, 1996, p. 392; Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 33.

57 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 206, 408; John L. Hess, “France Explodes Her First H-Bomb in South Pacific,” New York Times, August 25, 1968, pp. 1, 5.

58 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, pp. 206, 407–408; “Debré, Michel,” www.britannica.com, accessed December 17, 2004.

59 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, p. 409.

60 Richard St. F. Post to William Witman II, “Coverage of French Underground Tests,” August 4, 1961, RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to Secretary for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Subject and Country Files, 1950–1962, Box 5, Folder: 1961-France-Testing, NARA; Letter, Howard Furnas to General Rodenhauser, August 15, 1961, RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to Secretary for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, Subject and Country Files, 1950-1962, Box 5, Folder: 1961-France-Testing, NARA.

61 Post to Witman, “Coverage of French Underground Tests.”

62 Ibid.

63 Letter, Furnas to Rodenhauser.

64 Central Intelligence Agency, “France May Reassess Nuclear Force,” Current Intelligence Weekly Summary, April 12, 1963, p. 16; McGeorge Bundy, National Security Action Memorandum No. 241, Subject: Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant, May 7, 1963, w/att: “France”; Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Bulletin, July 25, 1963, p. 8.

65 Central Intelligence Agency, The French Nuclear Strike Force Program, May 31, 1963, p. 1, www.cia.foia.gov; Glenn. T. Seaborg, “Forward,” to Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals, p. xi.

66 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 22-2-63, The French Nuclear Weapons Program, July 24, 1963, pp. i, 4-5.

67 Central Intelligence Agency, The French Nuclear Weapon Program, March 27, 1964.

68 E-mail, Tim Brown to author, March 7, 2004; Interview.

69 Interview with Brig. Gen. Jack Ledford, Arlington, Va., October 7, 1999; Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), pp. 247–248; James A. Cunningham Jr., Memorandum for: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Proposed Operation of U-2 Aircraft from Aircraft Carrier, July 23, 1963, CREST, NARA; James A. Cunningham Jr., Memorandum for: Deputy for Field Activities, Office of Special Activities, Subject: Carrier Training Exercise with USS Kitty Hawk (Unclassified Codename WHALE TALE), July 23, 1963, CREST, NARA.

70 Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1989), pp. 107–109; Interview with a former CIA official; Central Intelligence Agency, The French Pacific Nuclear Test Center, August 6, 1965; Central Intelligence Agency, U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: Project “WHALE TALE,” December 1969, CREST, NARA; Chris Pocock, 50 Years of the U-2: The Complete Illustrated History of the “Dragon Lady” (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer, 2005), p. 204.

71 National Imagery and Mapping Agency, America’s Eyes: What We Were Seeing (Reston, Va.: NIMA, 2002), p. 3; Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 359–360. The numbers and dates for KH-4A, KH-4B, and KH-7 missions are based on examination of the U.S. Geological Survey Earth Explorer data base as well as viewing of some of the imagery.

72 Interview with Dino Brugioni, January 23, 2003.

73 Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, pp. 105–121; Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001), p. 158.

74 U.S. Army Security Agency (ASA), Historical Summary of United States Army Security Agency and Subordinate Units, Fiscal Years 1968–1970 (Arlington, Va.: ASA, 1972), p. 135; E-mail, Matthew Aid to author, February 18, 2004.

75 Strategic Air Command, SAC Reconnaissance History, January 1968–June 1971 (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: SAC, 1973), p. 93; Strategic Air Command, Operations Order 60-71-05, Burning Light, May 1, 1971; Strategic Air Command, SAC Reconnaissance History, FY 74 (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: SAC, 1975), p. 73.

76 Strategic Air Command, SAC Reconnaissance History, January 1968–June 1971, p. 93; Nicky Hager, Secret Power: New Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network (Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potton, 1996), pp. 63, 102.

77 U.S. Pacific Command, CINCPAC Command History, 1970, Volume I, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii: PACOM, n.d.), pp. 142–143; U.S. Pacific Command, CINCPAC Command History 1973, Volume I (Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii: PACOM, n.d.), p. 246; “T-AGM-8 Wheeling,” www.navsource.org/archives, accessed February 23, 2004.

78 Strategic Air Command, History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 72 (Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.: SAC, 1974), p. 59; U.S. Pacific Command, CINCPAC Command History 1973, Volume I, pp. 246–248; Strategic Air Command, History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 74, pp. 73–75; Stewart Firth, Nuclear Playground: Fight for an Independent and Nuclear Free Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 99.

79 U.S. Pacific Command, CINCPAC Command History 1973, Volume I, pp. 247–248; Durdin, “‘Tactical’ French A-Bomb Exploded at Pacific Atoll.”

80 U.S. Pacific Command, CINCPAC Command History 1973, Volume I, p. 246; Strategic Air Command, History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 74, pp. 73, 75.

81 Strategic Air Command, History of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 74, p. 77.

82 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection: The Creation, Development, and Operation of the United States Atomic Energy Detection System (Satellite Beach, Fla.: SAIC, 1997), pp. 113–115; Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999), pp. 231–235.

83 Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), pp. 66–69.

84 Ibid., p. 65.

85 Science Applications International Corporation, Fifty Year Commemorative History of Long Range Detection, pp. 124–125; Ellis Lapin, “Surveillance by Satellite,” Journal of Defense Research, 8, 2 (Summer 1976), pp. 169–186. The satellites also carried another set of nuclear detection sensors, designed to focus on explosions above 1,240 miles: an omnidirectional X-ray spectrometer, a neutron detector (which would measure the neutron flux from a detonation), and a gamma ray detector (which would detect the gamma radiation associated with the detonation).

86 Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels, pp. 68–69; Barkley G. Sprague, Evolution of the Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS), 1955–1982 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1985), pp. 29–30.

87 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 1; “Location of Rajasthan in India,” www.rajasthan.gov.in/location.SHTM, accessed February 28, 2004.

88 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 1.

89 Ibid., p. 16; Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India’s Quest to Be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), p. 74; Robert P. Crease and Charles C. Mann, The Second Creation: Makers of the Revolution in Twentieth-Century Physics (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1996), p. 407; Helge Kragh, Quantum Generations: A History of Physics in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 196, 202, 292.

90 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 16; Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 77–78; George Greenstein, “A Gentleman of the Old School: Homi Bhabha and the Development of Science in India,” American Scholar, Summer 1992, pp. 409–419 at pp. 411–412.

91 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 17–18; Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, p. 71.

92 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 20; Rajesh Kochhar, “S. S. Bhatnagar: Life and Times,” Resonance, April 2002, pp. 82–89 at p. 82; E. S. Raja Gopal, “K. S. Krishnan–An Outstanding Scientist, 1898–1961,” Resonance, December 2002, pp. 2–4.

93 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 21–22; “Department of Atomic Energy: Milestones,” www.barc.enet.in, accessed February 28, 2004.

94 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 26.

95 Ibid., pp. 17, 27–28, 33; Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York: Times Books, 1981), p. 130.

96 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 34–35; Weissman and Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, p. 131.

97 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 35, 37, 52, 56.

98 Ibid., pp. 60–61, 63–64.

99 Ibid., pp. 64–65, 67; Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 93–94.

100 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 74, 81–82.

101 Ibid., pp. 83–84.

102 Ibid., pp. 90–95, 113; Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 97–98; “Mont Blanc,” http://lynx.uio.no/mbl/html, accessed February 28, 2004; “Plane Crashes,” www.montblanc.to/uk/glacier/texte4.html, accessed February 29, 2004.

103 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 112–114; Raja Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage: An Autobiography (New Delhi: Praguin Books, 1991), p. 75.

104 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 125–126; Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, p. 111.

105 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 140–141; Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, p. 118; “Department of Atomic Energy: Milestones.”

106 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 141; “India’s First Bomb, 1967–1974,” www.nuclearweaponarchive.org., accessed February 28, 2004.

107 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 141–142.

108 Ibid., p. 149; Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 121–122, 180.

109 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 171; “India’s First Bomb, 1967–1974”; Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 117, 154; Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, p. 76. Chengappa reports (p. 117) that Ramanna recalls Gandhi not saying yes or no, which “for us meant an approval.”

110 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 172–173; “Smiling Buddha: 1974,” pp. 1–3, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaSmiling.html, accessed February 27, 2004.

111 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 172; Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 185, 187.

112 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 188–191.

113 Ibid., pp. 194–195; “Smiling Buddha: 1974, p. 4.”

114 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 196–197.

115 Central Intelligence Agency, Indian Nuclear Energy Program, March 18, 1958, p. 7.

116 Department of State Instruction, CA-11378, Subject: Indian Capability and Likelihood to Produce Atomic Energy, June 29, 1961, in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6: India and Pakistan—On the Threshold, Document 1, www.nsarchive.org.

117 Department of State Instruction, CA-11378, Subject: Indian Capability and Likelihood to Produce Atomic Energy, June 29, 1961; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 4-3-61, Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other Than the US and UK, September 21, 1961, pp. 2, 9.

118 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 4-63, Likelihood and Consequence of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems, June 28, 1963, p. 2.

119 Amconsul Bombay to Department of State, Subject: Inauguration of Indian Plutonium Separation Plant, April 29, 1964, w/att: Department of Atomic Energy, “Plutonium Plant at Trombay,” n.d.

120 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 4-2-64, Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons over the Next Decade, October 21, 1964, in David S. Patterson (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume X, National Security Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), pp. 168–170.

121 Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Information Cable, TDCS DB-315/01148-64, “Indian Government Policy on Development of Nuclear Weapons,” October 22, 1964.

122 Amembassy, New Delhi to Sec State, Cable No. 1323, Washington, D.C., October 29, 1964.

123 Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Indian Nuclear Energy Program, November 6, 1964, pp. 1–5.

124 H. S. Rowen, “The Indian Nuclear Problem,” December 24, 1964, in National Security Archive, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945–1990 (Alexandria, Va.: Chadwyck-Healey, 1991), Document No. 01086, pp. 1, 5.

125 Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), p. 240; “Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay,” www.globalsecurity.org, accessed February 28, 2004; Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, p. 358.

126 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 31-1-65, India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy, October 21, 1965, pp. 2–3. Much of the information in the SNIE was conveyed in a separate OSI memo on October 18 to a National Security Council staff member in response to Johnson’s verbal request. See Donald F. Chamberlain, Director of Scientific Intelligence, Memorandum for: Charles E. Johnson, Subject: Indian Nuclear Weapons Capability, October 18, 1965.

127 Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 31-1-65, India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy, p. 2.

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid., p. 6.

130 Department of State to Amembassy, New Delhi, Subject: Possible Indian Nuclear Weapons Development, March 29, 1966, in India and Pakistan—On the Nuclear Threshold, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6, Document 8.

131 W. W. Rostow, National Security Action Memorandum 351, Subject: Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, June 9, 1966.

132 Secretary of State, Report to the President in Response to NSAM No. 351: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, July 25, 1966, pp. 5–6.

133 Ibid., pp. 17, 21; W. W. Rostow, National Security Action Memorandum No. 355, Subject: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem, further to NSAM 351, August 1, 1966.

134 “Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay,” www.globalsecurity.org, accessed February 28, 2004; K. Srimivasan, “Nuclear Material Control in a Reprocessing Plant,” n.d., p. 7; Brown e-mail.

135 Amembassy, New Delhi to Department of State, Subject: Uranium Exploration, Development and Exploitation in India, May 9, 1968, p. 1.

136 Amconsul Madras to Department of State, Subject: Atomic Power Project at Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu, April 21, 1969; Amconsul Madras to Department of State, Subject: The Madras Atomic Power Project, July 12, 1971; Amembassy New Delhi to Department of State, Subject: India’s Second Atomic Power Station, August 19, 1972; Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 249.

137 National Security Agency, “Capital Projects Planned in India,” August 31, 1972.

138 Interview with Leonard Spector, Washington, D.C., March 5, 2003; Interview with Myron Kratzer, September 2, 2003.

139 Henry A. Kissinger, National Security Study Memorandum 156, Indian Nuclear Development, May 18, 1972; NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia, National Security Study Memorandum 156: Indian Nuclear Developments, September 1, 1972, p. 1.

140 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 197–198.

141 Ibid., pp. 3, 198–199. According to Chengappa (p. 3) there is substantial dispute about who said what and when.

142 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 201, 203–204.

143 Bernard Weinraub, “India Becomes 6th Nation to Set Off Nuclear Device,” New York Times, May 19, 1974, pp. 1, 18; Lewis M. Simons, “India Explodes A-Device, Cites ‘Peaceful Use’,” Washington Post, May 19, 1974, pp. A1, A12.

144 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, p. 56; Central Intelligence Agency, “The 18 May 1974 Indian Nuclear Test,” September 1974, p. 21.

145 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, p. 126; Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 173–175; Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage, p. 92.

146 Central Intelligence Agency, “India: [Deleted],” Central Intelligence Bulletin, May 20, 1974, pp. 1–3.

147 Milo D. Nordyke, Lawrence Livermore Natural Library, Subject: The Indian Explosion, May 29, 1974; Memorandum, Milo D. Nordyke to Roger E. Batzel, Subject: More on the Indian Explosion, October 1, 1974.

148 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “India: Uncertainty over Nuclear Policy,” June 13, 1974, in India and Pakistan—On the Threshold, Document 19.

149 Daniel O. Graham, Memorandum, Subject: Forthcoming Community Post-Mortem Report Concerning the Indian Nuclear Detonation, May 24, 1974.

150 Intelligence Community Staff, Post-Mortem Report: An Examination of the Intelligence Community’s Performance Before the Indian Nuclear Test of May 1974, July 1974, p. i.

151 Ibid.; Daniel O. Graham, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Indian Post-Mortem Report, July 18, 1974.

152 Chief PRD/IC, Memorandum for: [deleted] Subject: IC Responses to Post-Mortem Recommendations, January 15, 1975, w/att: Analysis of Community Responses to Recommendations in ICS Post-Mortems, CREST, NARA.

CHAPTER 6: “PARIAHS”

1 For one treatment of the subject, see Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why (New York: Pantheon, 1987), pp. 208–224.

2 Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 10, 15; Michael Bar-Zohar, The Armed Prophet: A Biography of Ben Gurion (London: Arthur Barker, 1967), p. 1.

3 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 15.

4 Ibid., pp. 21, 30–31; Peter Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), p. 5.

5 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 32–33.

6 Ibid., p. 33.

7 Ibid., pp. 41–42.

8 Ibid., p. 43.

9 James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984), p. 146; Shimon Peres, Battling for Peace: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 116.

10 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 53; Shimon Peres, David’s Sling (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp. 31–65; Peres, Battling for Peace, p. 105.

11 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 53.

12 Ibid., pp. 54–55; Bertrand Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy (La Grange Park, Ill.: American Nuclear Society, 1982), p. 185; Bar-Zohar, The Armed Prophet, p. 251.

13 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 58.

14 Ibid., p. 59.

15 Ibid., p. 62; Leonard Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989–1990 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 153. According to Spector (p. 153), Norway would conduct only one inspection.

16 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 68; Peres, Battling for Peace, p. 118.

17 “Israel’s Negev Desert,” www.negev.org, accessed March 8, 2004; “Dimona, Negev Nuclear Research Center,” www.globalsecurity.org, accessed March 8, 2004; Peres, Battling for Peace, p. 119.

18 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 73.

19 Ibid., pp. 73–74; Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 147; Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex, p. 186; Peres, Battling for Peace, pp. 122–124; Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1971), p. 266.

20 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 75; Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 148; Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, The Imperfect Spies: The History of Israeli Intelligence (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1990), p. 103.

21 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 75; Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 148.

22 Spector with Smith, Nuclear Ambitions, pp. 172–173; “Atoms for Israel,” Architectural Forum, April 1961, pp. 121–122.

23 George Johnson, Strange Beauty: Murray Gell-Mann and the Revolution in Twentieth Century Physics (New York: Knopf, 1999), pp. 199–201, 208, 386 no. 20; Robert P. Crease and Charles C. Mann, The Second Creation: Makers of the Revolution in Twentieth-Century Physics (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1996), pp. 269–272; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 437; Condensed Vita, Professor Yuval Ne’eman, Chairman of the Techniya Party in Israel, n.d.

24 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 229, 442; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 301; “Soreq,” www.globalsecurity.org, accessed March 9, 2004; “The Beginning: Dr. Chaim Weizmann,” http://80.70.129.78, accessed March 9, 2004.

25 Quoted in Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 232.

26 Burrows and Windrem, Critical Mass, p. 302; Cohen, “The Last Nuclear Moment,” New York Times, October 6, 2003, p. A17.

27 Melman and Raviv, The Imperfect Spies, pp. 107–108; Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 158–161.

28 Hannes Steyn, Richardt van der Walt, and Jan van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (Pretoria: Network Publishers, 2003), p. 31.

29 Steyn, van der Walt, and van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, pp. 31–32; Waldo Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement,” Arms Control Today, December 1995/January 1996, pp. 3–8 at p. 3; David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, pp. 39–40.

30 Leonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1984 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), pp. 282–283.

31 Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” pp. 40–41.

32 Ibid., p. 40; Steyn, van der Walt, and van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 35; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Nations Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), pp. 7–8; Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 3; Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis: The Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa (New York: Times Books, 1978), p. 43; Roy E. Horton III, Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria’s Nuclear Weapons Experience (USAF Academy, Colo.: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 1999), p. 42 n. 11; Kenneth L. Adelman and Albion W. Knight, “Can South Africa Go Nuclear?” Orbis, 23, 3 (Fall 1979), pp. 633–647 at p. 637.

33 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 8; Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” p. 41; Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 4.

34 Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” p. 41; Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, “Nuclearisation and Denuclearisation in South Africa,” Survival, 35, 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 154–173 at p. 154.

35 Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” pp. 3–4; Howlett and Simpson, “Nuclearisation and Denuclearisation in South Africa,” p. 155.

36 Steyn, van der Walt, and van Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 41; Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 4.

37 David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1998, pp. 54–60 at p. 55; Amembassy Taipei to Sec State Wash DC, October 23, 1964; Amembassy Taipei to Sec State Wash DC, Subject: Effect of CCNE on GRC and Implications for US Policy, October 29, 1964.

38 Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,” p. 55.

39 Ibid., p. 56; “The Ramon Magsaysay Award for Government Service, Biography: Ta-You Wu,” pp. 3–4, 9, www.rmaf.org, accessed March 13, 2004; “Ta-You Wu Lecture,” www.physics.lsa.umich.edu, accessed March 13, 2004.

40 Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,” p. 56; Dr. Ta-you Wu, “A Historical Document—A Footnote to the History of Our Country’s ‘Nuclear Energy’ Policies,” pp. 2–3, 5, www.isis-online.org, accessed March 13, 2004.

41 Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,” p. 56; Ta-you Wu, “A Historical Document,” pp. 3, 5.

42 Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,” p. 56; Ta-you Wu, “A Historical Document,” p. 5.

43 Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,” pp. 56–57.

44 Ibid., p. 57.

45 Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Nuclear Activities of Foreign Nations, Volume IV, Asia and Africa, September 30, 1956, pp. 1–6. In January 1956 Israel was added to the Third Category Priority List, which contained the least important intelligence targets, but not apparently out of a specific concern with its nuclear activities.

46 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 81; Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 100-6-57, Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences, June 18, 1957, p. 4.

47 Director of Central Intelligence, Post-Mortem of SNIE 100-8-60: Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability, January 31, 1961, p. 9; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 82, 84.

48 Director of Central Intelligence, Post-Mortem of SNIE 100-8-60, pp. 10–11.

49 Ibid., p. 11.

50 Ibid., p. 2.

51 Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 33.

52 Seymour Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 52; Peres, Battling for Peace, pp. 119–120.

53 Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 52.

54 Ibid., pp. 52, 56.

55 Ibid., pp. 52–53.

56 Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 53–54; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 83; Interview with Dino Brugioni, February 21, 2003.

57 Director of Central Intelligence, Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60, pp. 4–5, 9.

58 Ibid., pp. 8, 11–12.

59 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 85.

60 Director of Central Intelligence, Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60, pp. 12–13.

61 Hersh, The Sampson Option, p. 57; Director of Central Intelligence, Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60, p. 13; Amembassy Paris to Sec State, Washington, D.C., Telegram No. G-766, November 22, 1960, in Avner Cohen (ed.), Israel and the Bomb, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, Dimona Revealed Section, Document 2, www.narchive.org.

62 Paris to Secretary of State, Telegram No. 2162, November 26, 1960, in Cohen (ed.), Israel and the Bomb, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, Dimona Revealed Section, Document 3; “History 205, History of Modern Science, Lecture 8: Energy & Nuclear Power,” pp. 3, 5, www.umich.edu, accessed March 18, 2004; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program, December 1, 1960, in Cohen (ed.), Israel and the Bomb, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, Dimona Revealed Section, Document 4; Director of Central Intelligence, Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60, p. 15.

63 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program.

64 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 87.

65 Director of Central Intelligence, Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60, pp. 1, 8; Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 87–88; National Security Council, “National Intelligence Estimates,” May 25, 1962. While the postmortem has been declassified, the SNIE has not.

66 Marion W. Boggs, “Memorandum of Discussion at 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 8, 1960,” in Suzanne E. Coffman and Charles S. Sampson (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 391–392.

67 “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel,” and Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, D.C., December 20, 1960, Subject: Israeli Atomic Energy Program, December 27, 1960, both in Coffman and Sampson (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIII, pp. 393–394, 396–398; John W. Finney, “U.S. Misled at First on Israeli Reactor,” New York Times, December 12, 1960, pp. 1, 15.

68 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 90; Finney, “U.S. Misled at First on Israeli Reactor”; Dana Adams Schmidt, “Israel Assures U.S. on Reactor,” New York Times, December 22, 1960, p. 5. A summary of the discussion at the December 19 meeting with the president is contained in Memorandum of Conference with the President—December 19, 1960, January 12, 1961, in Cohen (ed.), Israel and the Bomb, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, Dimona Revealed Section, Document 7.

69 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 92–94; Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, Telegram 577, December 24, 1960, in Cohen (ed.), Israel and the Bomb, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, Dimona Revealed Section, Document 8; “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel,” in Coffman and Sampson (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume XIII, pp. 399–400; Alvin Shuster, “Israel Satisfies U.S. on Use of Reactor,” New York Times, December 23, 1960, pp. 1, 6.

70 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 94–95.

71 Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), pp. 32–33. On the U.S.-Israeli confrontation over Dimona, also see Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 186–238.

72 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 101–102.

73 Ibid., p. 102.

74 Director of Central Intelligence, Post-Mortem on SNIE 100-8-60, pp. 1–2.

75 Ibid., pp. 2–3; Central Intelligence Agency, Information Report No. OO-B-3,174,835, Subject: Nuclear Engineering Training/Large Nuclear and Electric Power Plant near Beerhseba/French Nuclear Assistance to Israel/Israeli Attitudes Towards the Announcement of Its Large-Scale Nuclear Effort/Opportunity for US Participation in Nuclear Powered Water Conversion, February 9, 1961, in Cohen (ed.), Israel and the Bomb, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, Dimona Revealed Section, Document 5.

76 “France-Israeli Nuclear Collaboration,” Central Intelligence Bulletin, April 27, 1961, pp. 5–6, NSF Country File, Box 119A, Folder: Israel, Subjects: Ben Gurion Visit, 5/20/61-6/2/61, JFKL.

77 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 102–104.

78 U. M. Staebler and J. W. Croach Jr., “Notes on Visit to Israel,” May 23, 1961, p. 1; Biographical Sketch Information: Jesse William Croach Jr., n.d., and Biographical Sketch Information: Ulysses Merriam Staebler, n.d., in Cohen (ed.), Israel and the Bomb, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, First Look Section, Documents 12 and 13.

79 Staebler and Croach, “Notes on Visit to Israel,” p. 1.

80 Ibid., pp. 11–15.

81 Lucius Battle, Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House, Subject: U.S. Scientists’ Visits to Israel’s Dimona Reactor,” May 26, 1961, in Cohen (ed.), Israel and the Bomb, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, First Look Section, Document 14.

82 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 110–111; Merriman Smith, “Kennedy on Peace Mission: Boards Jet After Talk in New York,” Washington Post and Times Herald, May 31, 1961, pp. A1, A6; Irving Spiegel, “Kennedy and Ben-Gurion Hold “Fruitful’ Talk Here,” New York Times, May 31, 1961, pp. 1, 6.

83 Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 4-3-61, Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other Than the US and UK, September 21, 1961, pp. 2, 7.

84 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 111–112; Bass, Support Any Friend, p. 206; Dean Rusk, CA-4726, Circular Airgram from the Department of State to Certain Posts, Subject: Israel’s Dimona Reactor, October 31, 1962; Hersh, The Samson Option, pp. 107, 196.

85 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 112, 116.

86 Sherman Kent, Office of National Estimates, Memorandum for the Director. Subject: Consequences of Israeli Acquisition of Nuclear Capability, March 6, 1963.

87 McGeorge Bundy, NSAM 231, Middle Eastern Nuclear Capabilities, March 26, 1963.

88 E-mail, Tim Brown to author, March 16, 2004.

89 Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 164.

90 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 118–119.

91 Ibid., pp. 128–131.

92 Ibid., p. 133; Bass, Support Any Friend, p. 218.

93 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 134–135, 154–155; Bass, Support Any Friend, pp. 220–222; John F. Kennedy, Letter to Levi Eshkol, July 5, 1963, in Cohen (ed.), Israel and the Bomb, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, Exchange Section, Document 1.

94 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 177–179.

95 Ibid., pp. 179–180; “Summary of Findings of Dimona Inspection Team,” in Harriet Dashiell Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXVIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), pp. 30–31.

96 “Summary of Findings of Dimona Inspection Team,” p. 31 n. 7.

97 E-mail, Tim Brown to author, March 16, 2004. All KH-7 imagery has been declassified, except that of Israel. As a result the identification of KH-7 missions that might have photographed Dimona is based on inference.

98 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 180–183.

99 Ibid., p. 183.

100 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Davies) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot), Subject: Observations of H. Earle Russell During His Recent Trip to Israel Based on Conversations with Embassy Officers, March 5, 1965, in Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXVIII, pp. 382–384; Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 164.

101 William N. Dale, Charge d’Affairs a.i., to Department of State, Subject: Current Status of Dimona Reactor, April 9, 1965, p. 2.

102 Dale to Department of State, Subject: Current Status of Dimona Reactor, pp. 2–6.

103 Nicholas Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State, to President Lyndon Johnson, Subject: The Arab-Israeli Arms Race and Status of U.S. Arms Control Efforts, May 1, 1967, in Schwar (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XXVIII, pp. 814–817.

104 “Taiwan Nuclear Research Facility—overview,” www.fas.org, accessed September 16, 2002; Jonathan McDowell, “Launch Listings,” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), p. 240; Amembassy Tel Aviv to Department of State, Subject: Nationalist Chinese Atomic Experts Visit Israel, March 19, 1966, and Amembassy Tel Aviv to Department of State, Subject: More on Nationalist Chinese Atomic Experts Visit to Israel, March 24, 1966—both in William Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 19, October 13, 1999, www.nsarchive.org.

105 Amembassy Bonn to Sec State, Subject: German Nuclear Reactor for Taiwan, March 26, 1966, and Amembassy Taipei to Department of State, Subject: GRC Request to IAEA Team for Advice on Location of Reactor for Possible Use by Military Research Institute, April 8, 1966, both in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

106 Amembassy Taipei to Department of State, Subject: Indications GRC Continue to Pursue Atomic Weaponry, June 20, 1966, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

107 McDowell, “Launch Listings,” pp. 242, 244; Amembassy Taipei to Department of State, Subject: GRC Plans for Purchase of 50 Megawatt Water Nuclear Power Plant, February 21, 1967, and Amembassy Bonn to Sec State Washington DC, Subject: GRC Plans to Purchase 50 Megawatt Heavy Water Nuclear Power Plant, March 15, 1967, both in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

108 Brown e-mail; McDowell, “Launch Listings,” pp. 242, 244; Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 359–360.

109 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, pp. 186, 331–332.

110 Brown e-mail.

111 Hedrick Smith, “U.S. Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or Its Parts,” New York Times, July 18, 1970, pp. 1, 8.

112 Smith, “U.S. Assumes the Israelis Have A-Bomb or Its Parts.” In 1978 Carl Duckett, who served as the CIA’s deputy director of science and technology from 1966 until 1976, claimed that in 1968 the CIA produced a national estimate concluding that Israel did have nuclear weapons, and was told by director of central intelligence Richard Helms not to publish it, and then President Johnson informed Helms not to inform secretary of state Dean Rusk or secretary of defense Robert McNamara. A search for such an estimate during preparation of an official history of U.S. foreign relations proved unsuccessful. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Inquiry into Testimony of the Executive Director for Operations, Volume III, Interview, February 1978, p. 178; David S. Patterson (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–68, Volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute 1967–1968 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), pp. 257–258. It is possible that Duckett was actually referring to an OSI study. It is difficult to understand how a national estimate would be produced without individuals in the State and Defense Departments being aware of its existence.

113 DS&T/CIA, “South Africa Seeks Uranium Hexafluoride Technology,” Weekly Surveyor, May 4, 1970, pp. 1–2; DS&T/CIA, “South Africans Release Further Information on Their Isotope Separation Process,” Weekly Surveyor, October 12, 1970, p. 1.

114 OSI/CIA, Atomic Energy Activities in the Republic of South Africa, March 1971, p. 1. 115 Ibid., pp. 2–8.

116 DS&T/CIA, “South Africans to Fund Preparatory Work for Full Scale Uranium Enrichment Plant,” Weekly Surveyor, June 11, 1973, pp. 1–2; DS&T/CIA, “South African Uranium Isotope Enrichment Process Probably Aerodynamic,” Weekly Surveyor, February 11, 1974, p. 1; DS&T/CIA, “South Africa to Stockpile Large Quantities of Uranium,” Weekly Surveyor, February 11, 1974, pp. 2–3; Amconsul Johannesburg to Department of State, Subject: Uranium Enrichment in South Africa, July 22, 1974.

117 OSI-OWI/CIA, “South Africa Not Currently in Position to Produce Nuclear Weapons,” Weekly Surveyor, July 22, 1974, p. 1.

118 EA/ROC, Leo J. Moser to EA—Mr. Green, Department of State, Subject: Nuclear Materials Reprocessing Plan for ROC—Information Memorandum, December 14, 1972, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

119 State Department to Amembassies Bonn, Brussels, Taipei, Subject: Proposed Reprocessing Plant for Republic of China, January 4, 1973, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

120 State Department to Embassies in Bonn, Brussels, and Taipei, Subject: Proposed Reprocessing Plant for Republic of China, January 20, 1973, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

121 Amembassy Taipei to Sec State Wash DC, Subject: Proposed Reprocessing Plant, January 31, 1973, and Amembassy Taipei to Sec State Wash DC, Subject: ROC Decides Against Purchase of Nuclear Reprocessing Plant, February 8, 1973, both in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

122 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Nuclear Programs in Republic of China, February 9, 1973, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976. The memorandum also notes that the British representatives indicated the United States might already have seen the British reports.

123 Amembassy Taipei to Sec State Wash DC, Subject: Chung Shan Nuclear Research Institute, February 24, 1973, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

124 Ibid.

125 Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: ROC Nuclear Intentions, April 5, 1973, w/att: INR, Nuclear Weapon Intentions of the Republic of China, March 30, 1973, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

126 INR, Nuclear Weapon Intentions of the Republic of China.

127 Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Reported ROC Nuclear Weapons Development Program, April 7, 1973, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

128 Ibid.; Fm Sec State Wash DC to Amembassy Taipei, Subject: ROC Nuclear Intentions, April 17, 1973, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

129 Sec State Wash DC to Amembassy Taipei, Subj: Atomic Energy Study Team Visit to Taiwan, October 1, 1973; Letter, William H. Gleysteen Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission to Thomas Bleha, Deputy Director, Republic of China Affairs, Department of State, November 23, 1973; Amembassy Taipei to Sec State Wash DC, Subject: FORMIN Reaffirms ROC Decision to Refrain from Acquiring Nuclear Reprocessing Plant, November 23, 1973.

130 James G. Poor, Atomic Energy Commission, to Chairman Ray, Commissioner Kriegsman, Commissioner Anders, “Prospect for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” October 2, 1974; Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum, “Prospect for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” September 4, 1974, p. 1.

131 Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum, “Prospect for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” pp. 2–3.

132 Ibid, p. 3.

133 Ibid.

134 “Taipei Denies Work on Atomic Weapons,” New York Times, July 8, 1975, p. 8.

135 From CS To: C, SADF, “The Jericho Weapon System,” March 31, 1975, p. 1.

136 Ibid, pp. 1–2.

137 William Beecher, “Israel Seen Holding 10 Nuclear Weapons,” Washington Post, July 31, 1975, p. A34.

138 DS&T/CIA, “Further Evidence That the South African Uranium Enrichment Process Is Probably Similar to the Becker Nozzle Principle,” Weekly Surveyor, March 24, 1975, p. 9.

139 DS&T/CIA, “South African Uranium Enrichment Plant in Operation,” Weekly Surveyor, April 21, 1975, pp. 1–2.

140 DS&T/CIA, “Some Aspects of South African Uranium Enrichment Process Revealed,” Weekly Surveyor, May 5, 1975, pp. 1–2.

141 Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 239; Arthur Kranish, “CIA: Israel Has 10-20 A-Weapons,” Washington Post, March 15, 1976, p. A2; David Binder, “C.I.A. Says Israel Has 10-20 A-Bombs,” New York Times, March 16, 1976, pp. 1, 5. The author of the Post article did not name Duckett as the source of the revelation but there were plenty of witnesses. Not long afterward, Duckett, who had an alcohol problem, which may have contributed to his indiscretion, retired from the agency. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001), pp. 192–193.

142 DS&T/CIA, “South African Discusses Delay in Uranium Enrichment Operations,” Weekly Surveyor, June 28, 1976, p. 1; DS&T/CIA, “South Africa Reportedly Is Developing a Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Capability,” Weekly Surveyor, July 19, 1976, pp. 3–4.

143 DS&T/CIA, “South Africa Again Rumored to Be Working on Nuclear Weapons,” Weekly Surveyor, September 13, 1976, pp. 1–2.

144 DS&T/CIA, “South Africa Probably Will Greatly Improve Its Uranium Enrichment Technology by Using Axial Compressors,” Weekly Surveyor, September 27, 1976, pp. 1–2; DS&T/CIA, “South African Pilot Plant May Enrich Uranium to More Than 20% U-235,” Weekly Surveyor, November 29, 1976, pp. 1–2.

145 National Security Decision Memorandum 248, Subject: Changes in U.S. Force Levels on Taiwan, March 14, 1974; Jack Anderson, “Secret Report Sees Taiwan near A-Bomb,” Washington Post, January 25, 1982, p. C14.

146 Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,” p. 58; Eduard Schumacher, “Taiwan Seen Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel,” Washington Post, August 29, 1976, pp. A1, A8.

147 Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,” p. 58.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.; David Binder, “U.S. Finds Taiwan Develops A-Fuel,” New York Times, August 30, 1976, pp. 1, 4; Schumacher, “Taiwan Seen Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel.” According to Albright and Gay, U.S. officials later denied having evidence that reprocessing had occurred.

152 Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p. 170.

153 Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, Prospects for Arms Production and Development in Republic of China, May 1976, pp. 8–9.

154 Binder, “U.S. Finds Taiwan Develops A-Fuel”; Fox Butterfield, “Taiwan Denying Atomic Operation,” New York Times, September 5, 1976, p. 5; Schumacher, “Taiwan Seen Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel.”

155 Amembassy Taipei to Sec State Wash DC, Subject: ROC’s Nuclear Intentions: Conversation with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, September 15, 1976; Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,” p. 58; Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), p. 76; Leonard Unger, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: ROC Nuclear Intentions, November 18, 1976, in Burr (ed.), New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese “Nuclear Intentions,” 1966–1976.

156 Unger, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: ROC Nuclear Intentions.

157 Albright and Gay, “Taiwan,” p. 58.

158 Ibid., pp. 58–59.

159 Ibid., p. 59.

160 Ibid.

161 Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 5; Steyn, van der Walt, and Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 40.

162 Steyn, van der Walt, and Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 41; Howlett and Simpson, “Nuclearisaton and Denuclearisation in South Africa,” p. 157.

163 Steyn, van der Walt, and Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 41.

164 Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 183.

165 Robin Wright, “Vorster Urges Americans to Oppose Carter’s Pressure on South Africa,” Washington Post, August 7, 1977, p. A18.

166 Sec State Wash DC to Amembassy Tel Aviv, Subject: Israeli-South African Nuclear Cooperation Nuclear Cooperation, August 17, 1977; Graham Hovey, “South Africa Tells U.S. It Doesn’t Plan Any Nuclear Testing,” New York Times, August 24, 1977, pp. A1, A9; Murrey Marder and Don Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviet Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test,” Washington Post, August 28, 1977, pp. A1, A16–A17.

167 Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 182.

168 David Binder, “U.S. Asserts It Headed Off A-Test by Pretoria After Warning,” New York Times, August 28, 1977, pp. 1, 6; Marder and Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviet Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test.”

169 Steyn, van der Walt, and Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, p. 41.

170 Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space, pp. 360–362.

171 Marder and Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviet Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test”; Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 267; Binder, “U.S. Asserts It Headed Off A-Test.”

172 Marder and Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviet Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test.”

173 William Parmenter, National Intelligence Officer for Africa, Memorandum for: The National Foreign Intelligence Board, Subject: Interagency Assessment: South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test, August 18, 1977; William Parmenter, NIO for Africa, Memorandum for: Representatives of the National Foreign Intelligence Board, Subject: Oral Contributions Meeting on Political Aspects of South Africa’s Consideration of a Nuclear Device Test, August 12, 1977, CREST, NARA; [deleted] Chief, Clearance Division, Memorandum for: Chief Receptionist, Subject: South Africa, August 15, 1977, CREST, NARA.

174 Parmenter, Memorandum for: The National Foreign Intelligence Board, Subject: Interagency Assessment: South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test, w/att: Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Assessment: South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test, August 18, 1977, passim. The quote is from p. iii.

175 Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Assessment: South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test, pp. i, 2.

176 Ibid., p. i.

177 Steyn, van der Walt, and Loggerenberg, Armament and Disarmament, pp. 41–42; Marder and Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviet Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test”; Fm. Amembassy Pretoria to Sec State Wash DC, Subject: Soviet Demarche on Nuclear Weapons Development by SAG, August 10, 1977, in Kenneth Mokoena (ed.), South Africa and the United States: The Declassified History (New York: New Press, 1993), p. 124.

178 Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, p. 292; Marder and Oberdorfer, “How West, Soviet Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test”; “Around the World,” Washington Post, June 1, 1976, p. A10.

179 Hovey, “South Africa Tells U.S. It Doesn’t Plan Any Nuclear Testing”; Murrey Marder, “Carter Says South Africa Has Pledged It Will Not Develop Nuclear Explosives,” Washington Post, August 24, 1977, pp. A1, A3.

180 Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Assessment: South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test, p. ii.