WHEN the Luftwaffe went to war in September, 1939, it was generally considered to be an extremely modem and powerful air force, technically and numerically superior to every other major air arm in the world, including those of the United States and Japan. In fact, the experience of the Legion Kondor in Spain had brought to light various deficiencies in the latest German aircraft when used under operational conditions, and in any case Spain was a far from realistic testing ground. One of the few men qualified to select the wheat from the chaff in the Legion Kondor’s battle experience was Wolfram von Richthofen, a cousin of the famous Manfred, and himself once a member of the Richthofen Geschwader. As Chief of Staff to Hugo von Sperrle, and afterwards in command of the Legion Kondor from 1938 until its disbandment, von Richthofen had tested Hitler’s Blitzkrieg technique in the field, and was responsible for developing an efficient system of R/T liaison between ground troops and supporting aircraft that later proved to be of inestimable value in Poland and France. The Heinkel He 51s of Adolf Galland, soon replaced in Spain by Messerschmitt Bf 109s, and, during 1938, backed by Junkers Ju 87As, were thus able to pinpoint targets of opportunity with remarkable success under von Richthofen’s active supervision—but always operating under a strong protective fighter umbrella. During 1938 and 1939, von Richthofen’s Stukas brought dive-bombing to a fine art by wreaking fearful havoc in the port areas of Valencia and Barcelona, and the Legion Kondor commander’s reports were studied with enthusiasm by Udet and his supporters, who failed to realise that no experience had been gained of dive-bombing against heavy fighter and anti-aircraft opposition.
In large numbers for operational use against Poland the Luftwaffe therefore possessed the highly praised Junkers Ju 87 dive-bomber, the Heinkel He 111 and Dornier Do 17 medium bombers and the Messerschmitt Bf 109 single-seater fighter. All these types had seen active service in Spain, and their deficiencies had to some extent been overcome, although certain problems, particularly in armament, still had to be ironed out. However, two entirely new machines, the Junkers Ju 88 dive-bomber and the Messerschmitt Me 110 two-seater escort fighter, were in squadron service by 1939, and great faith was placed in the capabilities of both these aircraft. The Ju 88—Erhard Milch’s “wonder bomber”—did, in fact, eventually become the true backbone of the Luftwaffe, being produced in greater numbers than all other German bombers combined, and successfully performing literally hundreds of tasks for which it was never originally intended.
A very fast, slim, twin-engined aircraft, the Ju 88 was conceived in 1935 in response to a Reichluftfahrtministerium requirement for a high-speed medium bomber, and then fitted with dive brakes to satisfy Ernst Udet’s desire to incorporate a twin-engined dive bomber in the Luftwaffe. Surprisingly, it also proved suitable in a variety of other roles, including those of heavy fighter, close support and reconnaissance, and was destined to operate in various forms during the entire period of the war in Europe. Ubiquitous to the end, the Ju-88 has been acknowledged one of the few truly outstanding aircraft to enter service with the Luftwaffe.
The Messerschmitt Bf (later Me) 110 was to have an entirely different history. During the expansion of the Luftwaffe, Willy Messerschmitt had emerged as one of Germany’s most successful aircraft designers, becoming so established by 1938 that the shareholders of the Bayerische Flugzeugwerke decided it was time to rename the company Messerschmitt A.G., with Messerschmitt to hold the joint post of General Director and Chairman of the Management Committee. The remarkable successes achieved by the Bf 108 and Bf 109 types had inspired the brilliant young designer to attempt a repetition in the twin-engined field, and thus in due course the prototype Me 110 appeared on the aviation scene.
Designed in order to meet the need for a heavy two-seater fighter capable of escorting bomber formations deep into enemy territory, the attractive twin-engined Me 110 was seriously under-powered and lacking in armament from the beginning, and soon proved so useless as an escort fighter that during the Battle of Britain Me 110s had no chance in action unless they were themselves escorted by Bf 109s. However, Goering, who recalled the achievements of two-seater fighters in 1918, was captivated by the idea of the Me 110, and in 1939 he formed special Zestorerstaffeln, or destroyer units, indicating that these would now be the strategic fighter élite of the Luftwaffe. The Me 110 was soon found to be unsatisfactory in many respects, but basically it was simply not a good airframe, and various attempts to adapt it for specialised roles met with little success. Goering’s faith in the type came to a very abrupt end when the Me 110 formations were cut to pieces by the Hurricanes and Spitfires of the Royal Air Force in 1940, and he soon lost interest in his Zerstorerstaffeln, yet somehow, with typical German persistence, the Me 110 managed to remain in production until 1945.
A glance at the effective strength of the Luftwaffe in September, 1939—some 4,300 aircraft—shows that German air power still depended entirely on the nucleus of a few aircraft types that had either been in production with very few modifications since 1936 or were only just off the drawing-board and therefore still suffering acute teething troubles. While imposing in numbers, the Luftwaffe was technically by no means the formidable force it appeared to be, not only to the outside world, but also to Goering and his air staff, who believed that German air superiority was so firmly established in 1939 that it would be maintained for many years.
Let the figures speak for themselves. The official report of the Quartermaster-General of the Luftwaffe at the outbreak of war gives the following distribution of aircraft:
Thirty Bomber Wings—1,180 medium bombers.
18 equipped with Heinkel He 111 F and He 111 P aircraft;
11 equipped with Dornier Do 17M aircraft;
1 equipped with Junkers Ju 86G aircraft.
Thirteen Day Fighter Wings—771 single-seater fighters.
12 equipped with Messerschmitt Bf 109E aircraft;
1 equipped with Arado Ar 68 aircraft.
Nine Dive-Bomber Wings—336 dive-bombers.
9 equipped with Junkers Ju 87A and Ju 87B aircraft.
Ten Attack Wings—408 escort fighters or “destroyers”.
10 equipped with Messerschmitt Me 110 C and a few Bf 109D aircraft.
One Army Support Wing—40 dive-bombers.
1 equipped with Henschel Hs 123B aircraft.
Two Transport Wings—552 transport aircraft.
2 equipped with Junkers Ju 52 aircraft.
Twenty-three Reconnaissance Squadrons—379 reconnaissance aircraft.
23 equipped with Dornier Do 17 aircraft.
Thirty Army Reconnaissance Squadrons—342 scouting aircraft.
25 equipped with Henschel Hs 126B aircraft;
5 equipped with Heinkel He 45 and He 46 aircraft.
Eighteen Naval Squadrons—240 aircraft.
14 equipped with Dornier Do 18, Heinkel He 115, Blohm und Voss Bv 138 and Arado Ar 196 aircraft.
2 equipped with Arado Ar 196 aircraft only;
2 equipped with Heinkel He 59 and He 60 aircraft.
Sundry Units—55 aircraft.
Of the above machines, only the Junkers Ju 87, Dornier Do 17 and Messerschmitt Bf 109 types had to some extent fulfilled the hopes of Hermann Goering and his staff. The Junkers Ju 86 was obsolete by September, 1939, and the Henschel Hs 123, Arado Ar 68 and Heinkel He 45 and 46 biplanes dated back to the earliest days of the Luftwaffe.
The actual framework of the German Air Force remained not unlike that of the old Imperial German Air Force Service in 1918, the basic operational unit being a squadron, or Staffel, comprising ten to a dozen aircraft. Three Staffeln made up a wing, or Gruppe, and three or occasionally more Gruppen completed a Geschwader, roughly 100 aircraft, and usually of the same type. Above these field formations were the groups of machines intended for different functions, but working together in close co-operation, mixed forces of 250 to 500 bombers, fighters, reconnaissance machines, etc. These were classified as Fliegerkorps, and for administrative purposes were controlled by Luftgaue, or Air Districts.
The highest Luftwaffe headquarters in the field were the Air Fleets (Luftflotten), each commanded by a General. In 1939, four Luftflotten were in existence, all directly subordinate to the O.K.L. (Oberkommando Der Luftwaffe) or, in other words, to Goering, Milch and, later, Jeschonnek. These four Luftflotten controlled eight Fliegerkorps, though not necessarily in the exact proportion of two Korps to each Air Fleet, and the strength in aircraft varied considerably according to the situation.
For economic reasons and in order to withhold as many reserves as possible, Germany’s main air assault against Poland had of necessity to be carried out by about twenty operational Kampfgeschwader of Heinkel He 111 and Dornier Do 17 medium bombers, some five Stukageschwader of Junkers Ju 87s and ten or twelve Jagdgeschwader of Messerschmitt Bf 109 (or Zerstorergeschwader of the Me 110 fighters). General Alexander Loehr, more keenly aware than Goering of the imperfections of these aircraft, wrote later: “At the outbreak of war we felt tense, torn between confidence in victory, and the torturing question whether we would employ the right methods at the outset, and how much we should have to pay in losses to learn our lesson.” Loehr’s doubts were, of course, to prove unjustified, but if the Luftwaffe had not been troubled with so many small, but important, weaknesses he would never have felt any qualms in the first place.
From the beginning, Erhard Milch and Ernst Udet had been convinced that light and medium bombers should provide the nucleus of the German Air Force, and these two men were largely responsible for the concentration on a few basic types produced in large numbers. After Generals Kesselring and Stumpf had in turn served as Chief of Staff, a successor was appointed by Goering in the person of Hans Jeschonnek, often known as “the youngster” because he was then not forty years of age. Like Udet, the new Chief of Staff believed that the dive-bomber was the most suitable weapon for the Luftwaffe, and soon after he took office the German aircraft industrialists received instructions that all new types under consideration must be able to dive. This curious idea, which delighted Goering and Udet, had little effect on the capabilities of the Junkers Ju 88, but proved highly impracticable when applied to the Dornier Do 217 and later delayed production of Germany’s one and only heavy bomber type, the ill-fated Heinkel He 177.
Yet Jeschonnek was a brilliant and enthusiastic young officer, unlike so many of Udet’s supporters, and he had definite reasons for favouring the dive-bomber and its tactical abilities. He was convinced that Germany lacked the resources to produce large numbers of heavy four-engined bombers, and felt that a twin-engined medium machine with dive-bombing capabilities such as the Ju 88 could, in a vertical dive, hit the target with the same effect as a squadron of heavy bombers “carpeting” the area in horizontal flight. Jeschonnek shrewdly realised that dive-bombers would be of use only in a strictly localised war, but he saw no reason to suppose that they would ever be needed outside their limited range of approximately 300 miles. His only weakness was his devotion to Hitler, who had already proved that Great Britain was unwilling to go to war over Austria or Czechoslovakia, and therefore unlikely to worry unduly about the fate of Poland. Why build multi-engined strategic bombers, reasoned Jeschonnek, when they would obviously never be needed?
As Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, Jeschonnek’s policy was simple in outline, and he never swerved away from it, even when faced with disaster. Whatever Hitler demanded of the Luftwaffe, Jeschonnek was determined it should be carried out; the bomber requirements, fantastic in numbers though they might be, must somehow be fulfilled. In 1939, dive-bombers were inexpensive and put into quantity production with very little trouble, thus satisfying not only Hitler, but also Goering, who was able to bask in the reflected glory of Jeschonnek’s achievement.
Nevertheless, even before the outbreak of war, the dive-bombers so dear to Ernst Udet and his supporters had shown themselves to be far from invincible in service. In August, 1939, two Staffeln of Junkers Ju 87s took part in manoeuvres over Neuhammer-am-Queis, using live bombs for the first time, the main event being a formation dive for the benefit of some of the most important staff officers in the Luftwaffe, including Wolfram von Richthofen, Hugo von Sperrle and Bruno Loerzer. Through their binoculars, the group of observers watched the squat, ugly machines climb slowly up into the early morning sky, bank gently over the target area and then begin the long, ear-piercing plunge to earth, the wail of their sirens rising and falling as they hurtled through the clouds. It was a perfect formation dive, with every aircraft exactly in position; it was also the last dive all but one of the Stukas ever made.
The court of enquiry established two days later heard the full story, although no finding was reached, and the whole affair quickly and conveniently came to an end in the dusty archives of the Luftwaffe. Thin ground mist, drifting over the target area that tragic morning, had thickened until it became a grey fog extending to over three thousand feet. The Stuka pilots, warned of heavy cloud at six thousand feet but expecting only a light mist directly over the target, hopelessly misjudged their dives and thundered at full speed into the ground, only one aircraft managing to pull out in time. As it tore through the branches of a dozen trees and struggled aloft to safety, explosion after explosion shook the forest, and smoke and flames erupted into the sky to mark the funeral pyre of thirteen dive-bombers and twenty-six men.
Ernst Udet was aghast when he heard the news from Neuhammer, but a fortnight later Germany was at war and he had no time to ponder on any other weaknesses that might soon come to light in the aircraft he had introduced to the Luftwaffe. As it happened, the nine Gruppen equipped with the Junkers Ju 87, some 330 aircraft of that type, more than lived up to their inflated and undeserved reputation when used in Poland, for the very good reason that once again they encountered no effective air opposition. Wolfram von Richthofen, then in command of Fliegerkorps VIII, operated his aircraft in perfectly co-ordinated liaison with the advancing Wehrmacht, employing much the same tactics that he had used with such success in Spain. Always a man who liked to hurl everything he commanded into action regardless of losses, von Richthofen now had at his disposal three Geschwader of Junkers Ju 87s and a Gruppe of Henschel Hs 123s, with Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters for protection, and he seldom spared them. With clockwork precision, Polish factories, lines of communication and aerodromes were systematically dive-bombed into smoking rubble, while beyond the Stukas’ limited range Dornier Do 17s and Heinkel He 111s were on hand to harass the retreating armies. Within two days, the Polish campaign had become an excellent example of the new German strategy, Hitler’s famous Blitzkrieg technique no longer merely a theoretical possibility, but carried to its ultimate conclusion.
However, despite the strength of the German onslaught, and contrary to popular belief, the Polish Air Force was not destroyed on the ground within three days. To oppose the Luftwaffe it possessed some 800 aircraft, of which roughly 430 could be considered as first-line operational machines, and these fought valiantly against impossible odds, shooting down 126 German aircraft during the eighteen days of the campaign. The backbone of the Polish fighter force, the sturdy but outdated little PZL P-11 and the obsolete P-7A, were responsible for interception of most of the German bombers attacked, and never failed to enter into battle, regardless of the fact that they stood no chance whatsoever against the Bf 109 fighters of the Luftwaffe, while almost all the two hundred P-23 Karas bombers of the Polish Air Force were destroyed in vain attempts to halt the advancing German armoured columns. From the first day it was an unequal struggle, but Poland was determined to go down fighting, and for the Luftwaffe it proved to be a hard and exhausting campaign.
Cracow fell on 6th September, and a fortnight later Warsaw was encircled. Hitler, worried that the campaign might deteriorate into a long siege of the Polish capital, requested a supreme effort by the Luftwaffe, and Goering in turn ordered Kesselring to use all the forces at his command to bomb the city into submission. The resulting large-scale attack, conducted on a far greater scale than the raid on Guernica in 1937, was supposedly directed at the Okecie airfield and the main Warsaw railway stations, but civilian casualties were very heavy in such a densely populated area. Kesselring was charged at Nuremberg in 1946 with various war crimes, including the deliberate and unnecessary bombing of Warsaw, and stated then and afterwards that only the military targets were destroyed and artillery fire was responsible for most of the damage in the city centre; his aircraft had never at any time been used to terrorise helpless women and children. Nevertheless, the raid was a splendid opportunity for the German propaganda machine to remind the Allies that the Luftwaffe was the most powerful air arm in Europe, and with victory assured it did not matter very much to Dr. Goebbels how many civilians had been killed. Consequently, the German documentary films of the Warsaw bombardment shocked not only the Allies, but the whole world, depicting as they did the fearful devastation that could be wrought by the same “carpet” bombing considered to be of so little importance by Goering, Udet and Jeschonnek.
On 27th September, 1939, Warsaw finally surrendered, and the campaign in Poland was at an end. To Goering and his air staff, it seemed that the Luftwaffe had lived up to its formidable reputation, encountering few mechanical difficulties and suffering negligible losses, but it was acknowledged that perfect flying conditions—“Goering weather”—and the scattered, if intense, opposition had made the outcome an inconclusive victory. The new Junkers Ju 88s were still largely untried in action, the Messerschmitt Me 110 twin-engined fighters had been used only in a limited supporting role, and the Heinkel He 111 and Dornier Do 17 bombers had yet to show their worth when battling through to attack a heavily defended target. The important question still remained to be answered; how would the Luftwaffe stand up to the supreme test when pitted against the air forces of Great Britain and France?
Even after enjoying such overwhelming success in Poland, many of the German generals felt that neither the Wehrmacht or the Luftwaffe were ready to undertake an immediate offensive in the west. On the other hand, Hider was eager to attack at once, and on 9th October, 1939, he issued one of his famous Fuehrer Directives for the Conduct of the War, ordering preparations for: “… an attacking operation on the northern wing of the western front, through the areas of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out with as much strength and at as early a date as possible…” The generals, particularly Halder and von Brauchitsch, pointed out that such an autumn offensive, probably reaching its height in the depths of winter, was fraught with dangers, but Hitler remained adamant; and the arguments raged on without respite for over a month.
Finally, von Brauchitsch threw in what he hoped would be his trump card. He stated that after being driven so hard in Poland the Wehrmacht would not be ready to undertake any large-scale offensive before 26th November, seeking to gain, if nothing else, more time for discussion with the other senior commanders. Hitler retaliated by angrily issuing a revised military directive for the western offensive, now code named Fall Gelb, or Case Yellow, and deliberately settling the date for the initial thrust as 12th November—and not a day later. Temporarily defeated by the Fuehrer’s insistence, Brauchitsch sought the combined support of the other leading German generals, including the commander of Army Group A on the western front, Generaloberst. Gerd von Runstedt.
General von Runstedt was an outstanding officer and a brilliant tactician, but he had a reputation for carefully avoiding what he considered to be political problems outside his sphere. His cautiously worded arguments in support of Brauchitsch were vague and of little assistance, with the result that once again Hitler refused to be persuaded. The question of unfavourable weather he dismissed at once with the brisk comment that the spring weather might be no better; the need for more training he considered to be of no importance. In a raging temper before the interview came to an end, he thundered at last, “The Army does not want to fight!” and would hear no more.
Fortunately for the uneasy professional soldiers, the Fuehrer’s plans had to be postponed on 7th November owing to even worse weather than anyone had anticipated. During the winter of 1939, Hitler spoke frequently and at length about his proposed offensive in the west, but he no longer seemed inclined to specify any definite date, and not until the January of 1940 did he make up his mind and order the attack to commence; on the 17th of that month, at dawn. The literally heaven-sent excuse—unfavourable weather—that had been used by the generals to delay the offensive for over three months was no longer of any avail, and reluctantly they settled down to direct the troop movements that would be the opening stages of the campaign.
Then, a week before the fateful day, everything had abruptly to be postponed again. On the morning of 10th January a Messerschmitt Bf 108 Taifun courier aircraft took off from Loddenheide airfield, near Munster, carrying two Luftwaffe staff officers, Majors Reinberger and Hoenmanns, on a special mission to Cologne. The day was fine, but fairly cloudy, and Hoenmanns, the pilot, who had little experience of blind flying in this type of machine, soon realised he was off course in the clouds. Confused by the unexpected turn of events, Hoenmanns apparently set his course to south-south-west, and then lost height in an attempt to locate the Rhine. In his excitement, he accidentally cut off the petrol supply of the Bf 108, which immediately stalled and abruptly dived to the ground, tearing away the wings as it hurtled between two trees. Shaken but unhurt, Hoenmanns and his companion climbed out of the wrecked aircraft, Reinberger holding his bulging leather briefcase in both hands.
Unfortunately, the river which Hoenmanns had spotted just before the machine crashed was not the Rhine, but the Meuse; they had landed on Belgium soil, not far from Maastrict, and frontier guards were already hurrying to the scene. Particularly unfortunate for Reinberger was the fact that his brief-case contained the general outline of the forthcoming German offensive in the west, and detailed information regarding the airborne landings, with a timetable of the campaign. He made two reckless attempts to destroy the secret documents after being arrested by the Belgium soldiers, but sufficient papers were salvaged to reveal most of the plans, and within a few hours the Allies had been informed. Soon afterwards, the Belgiums began to strengthen their scanty defences in the Maas area and the Ardennes.
For the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the loss of the plans amounted to a catastrophe. Hitler, in a towering rage, could do nothing about Reinberger and Hoenmanns, who were now prisoners of war, but he sacked their immediate superiors, General Felmay, the commander of Luftflotte 2, and his chief of staff, Kammhuber, on the spot and treated all his generals to a lecture on security and the care of secret documents. Then, after some thought and indecision, he decided to revise the plans for the offensive completely: “in order to ensure secrecy and surprise.” Thus, in due course, he presented the generals with Fall Gelb in its final form, the plan that would turn the full might of the German armed forces simultaneously against Belgium, Holland and France on 10th May, 1940.