On December 19, 1943, Allied Force Headquarters sent a telegram to Seventh Army Headquarters in Palermo. It read: “An estimate is required as a matter of urgency as to the accommodations which you would require for your planning staffs should you be asked to undertake the planning of an operation of a similar size to Husky…”
Since the end of the Sicilian campaign, the Seventh Army had been cut from a tactical force of six divisions to a headquarters, with a few remaining service units manned by skeleton staffs. The invasion of Italy had begun on August 17, and by the end of 1943 speculation had reached fever pitch as to the date of an Allied landing in northern Europe. Now, after months of relative inactivity, the Seventh Army knew that it was to take part in an operation comparable to the Sicilian landings, and in the last week of December preparations were made to organize a planning staff for it at a point just outside Algiers.
On December 29, Allied Force HQ revealed some details of the proposed operation, which was to be known under the codename of Anvil, to senior Seventh Army Officers. It involved a series of landings on the south coast of France, to be launched in conjunction with Operation Overlord – the assault on northwest Europe – and was designed to create a Mediterranean bridgehead. Two early objectives of the invasion were Lyons and Vichy, the seat of the French Government, and the operation was to be undertaken by American and Free French forces.
On January 1, 1944, Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark replaced General Patton as commander of the Seventh Army, and under his direction planning for Anvil went ahead rapidly. In mid-January, while the planners were selecting target beaches in southern France, the Allied landings were launched at Anzio in Italy – a bold move which, had it progressed successfully, would have meant the release of large Allied forces for future operation in the Mediterranean. It was soon apparent, however, that the Allies at Anzio were in serious trouble, and that consequently there was little likelihood of substantial forces from that quarter becoming available in time for Anvil. It was, at this stage, thought improbable that more than two divisions – with two more in reserve – could be allocated.
On February 10, 1944, D-Day for Operation Overlord was postponed by about three weeks. The shipping requirements for this operation were also proving so enormous that the Mediterranean Theatre had to return to Britain all landing craft not vitally need. As February passed and the Italian campaign began to get bogged down in the face of stiff enemy resistance, it was realized that General Clark could not cope with the planning of Anvil as well as the growing strain of the Fifth Army’s war in Italy, so on March 2 he was succeeded in command of the Seventh Army by Lieutenant General Alexander M. Patch.
Time was now getting drastically short, and, as the target date for the launching of Anvil was still early June, Patch requested the immediate designation of the American divisions which were to take part in the invasion. Shortly afterwards, because of projected offensives in Italy and the wholesale transfer of landing craft to Overlord, it was decided that Anvil could not possibly be launched before late July.
On April 29, the outline plans for Anvil were presented to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. They called for a parachute force of at least three battalions to support an initial two-division assault, while Commandos and Rangers were to be assigned special missions to neutralize offshore islands, block roads, and protect the flanks of the main assault. The proposed target area was east of Toulon, between Cape Cavalaire and the Bay of Agay. The Air Force was to provide close tactical support throughout, and was also to initiate a program of preinvasion bombing from Spain to the Italian border. The Navy would cooperate in reducing enemy coastal defenses.
On May 13, three alternative plans were drawn up, each dictated by an assumption of the enemy’s reaction to the landings. Plan A envisaged a partial German withdrawal, Plan B a complete evacuation of southern France, and Plan C total surrender and the cessation of all organized resistance. The likeliest of the three, Plan A, allowed for a two-divisional assault in the area east of Toulon, with a target date early in August. The capture of Toulon and Marseilles was its main objective, followed by an exploitation northward towards Lyon and Vichy. The assumption was that the enemy would offer resistance on the beaches, but would withdraw the greater part of his forces from the coastal areas, fighting heavy delaying actions in the lower Rhône Valley.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff clearly took the view that France would be the decisive theatre of operations during 1944, and the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, recommended that Anvil should be launched no later than August 30, preferably by August 15. The final go-ahead reached Seventh Army HQ on June 23, and marked the beginning of the most intense phase of the planning and training.
The Mediterranean coast of France consists of three main mountain masses separated by two corridors: the Pyrenees along the Spanish border, the Massif Central in the middle, and the French Alps in the east towards the Italian-Swiss border. The latter two masses are separated by the valley of the Rhône River, which flows through a series of defiles and broad basins. Below Avignon, the Rhône Valley widens into an excessive delta, which becomes a long section of marshy coast stretching from the base of the Pyrenees to Marseilles. The general bogginess of this area ruled it out for a landing; so Anvil had to aim farther east, where the coast was rugged and irregular with mountains reaching down to the sea, leaving only narrow sandy beaches and small plains. Passage into the interior was possible through only a few narrow river valleys such as the Argens, which formed the best approach to the Rhône Valley from the south. It was this stretch of coast, from the Bay of Cavalaire to the Rade d’Agay, that was chosen as the target for Operation Anvil.
To defend the south coast of France, the Nineteenth German Army had at its disposal nine divisions, spread thinly along the Mediterranean and at various strategic points in the interior. German naval power in the Mediterranean at this stage of the war was almost non-existent, amounting only to ten U-boats and a handful of small surface vessels. First-line aircraft numbered about 1,500, including 200 in the area of the projected Allied landings. The Germans were aware of the possibility of an invasion on the French Mediterranean coast, but they had no way of knowing when and where it would fall. Their defensive policy, therefore, consisted mainly of laying mines in strips along the coast, off-shore defenses being largely restricted to areas of the big ports. For coastal defense they relied on artillery of every description: railway guns, field pieces, old French and Italian equipment, and naval guns transferred from French warships scuttled in Toulon harbor. Local defenses along the coast did not run very deep; they were based on a system of strong-points comprising concrete pillboxes, barbed-wire, and minefields, in most cases expertly camouflaged. The Allies could also expect to encounter roadblocks and antitank obstacles, as well as minefields in road beds from the beaches to the main lateral highway.
The main Allied assault zone extended some 45 miles along to the Riviera coast and included 16 target beaches. These were numbered in series from west to east and were grouped into three principal assault areas knows as Alpha, Delta, and Camel. On August 1, 1944, the codename of the operation was changed from Anvil to Dragoon. The final outline plans for the assault were as follows:
General mission: to establish a beachhead east of Toulon as a base for the assault, to capture Toulon and then Marseilles and exploit towards Lyons and Vichy. To carry out this task, the following forces were available.
KODAK FORCE, consisting of VI Corps Headquarters and its assigned units: the 3rd, 45th, and 36th Infantry Divisions, plus one French Armored Combat Command and supporting troops. Kodak’s mission was to land three reinforced infantry divisions at H-Hour on the beaches between Cape Cavalaire and Agay. A rapid advance was to be made inland to contact the Airborne Task Force. As soon as the beaches were cleared, the French Armored Combat Command would land. The beachhead was to be extended to the Blue Line, the D-Day+2 objective, and airfield sites secured in the Argens Valley between Fréjus and Le Muy. Further advances to the west and northwest would protect the right flank of the Army; after the French II Corps was established ashore, contact was to be maintained. Kodak would be prepared to release the French Armored Combat Command, the French Groupe de Commandos, and all airborne forces to Army control on demand.
The French commitment, knows as GARBO FORCE, consisted of a detachment of HQ French Army B, the French II Corps with the 1st French Motorized, 3rd Algerian, and 9th Colonial Infantry Divisions plus the 1st French Armored Division – less one Combat Command – and support troops. Landing in the St Tropez–Cavalaire area on D-Day+1, the French were to pass through the left of the US IV Corps and capture Toulon. By D-Day+9, the French Colonial Division was to be landed in the Le Lavandou–Hyères area; the remainder of the 1st French Armored Division was to be shore by D-Day+25. After the capture of Toulon, the attack was to be continued in the direction of Marseilles and to the northwest, the French maintaining contact on the right with the US VI Corps.
RUGBY FORCE was the name allocated to the Seventh Army Provisional Airborne Division, composed of the 2nd British Independent Parachute Brigade, one Parachute RCT, two Parachute Battalions, one infantry Glider Battalion, and supporting troops. This force was to land on the high ground north and east of Le Muy and on the high ground north of Grimaud. The primary mission was to prevent the movement of enemy forces into the assault area from the west and northwest. Le Muy was to be cleared of enemy forces before dark on D-Day and the area secured for subsequent glider landings. Rugby Force’s task was to assault enemy positions from the rear and assist the advance of the seaborne forces by neutralizing as many enemy installations as possible. Bridges in the Airborne Division area were to be prepared for demolition, but none were to be blow except on the orders of the Task Force Commander. As soon as contact with the seaborne force was established, Rugby Force was to revert to US VI Corps control.
SITKA FORCE, comprising the 1st Special Service Force, was to land under cover of darkness prior to H-Hour and neutralize all enemy defenses on the Islands of Port Cros and Levant. It would subsequently be prepared to withdraw to the mainland and reorganize under the name of SATAN FORCE for the capture of the Island of Porquerolles.
ROMEO FORCE, the French Groupe de Commandos, was to land under cover of darkness before H-Hour and destroy enemy defenses on Cap Nègre. The coastal highway in the vicinity of the Cape was to be blocked and the high ground 2 miles to the north seized. Romeo Force would protect the left flank of the assault and would eventually come under control of VI Corps.
The last assault unit, ROSIE FORCE, consisted of the French Naval Assault Group, a demolition party which was to land in the vicinity of the Pointe de Trayas on the night before D-Day. Its mission was to carry out demolition work on the Cannes–St Raphaël and Cannes–Fréjus highways, and then fall back on the Army’s right flank.
The mission of the Eighth Fleet was to establish the Seventh Army firmly ashore and to support its advance westward for the capture of Toulon and Marseilles. The fleet was responsible for the Army build-up on the beach and its maintenance, until the capture of the ports simplified the logistics task. To carry out its mission the Navy was subdivided into six forces, each with a specific task.
The CONTROL FORCE was to provide naval beach control and establish and operate naval fuel facilities on shore in the assault area. Navigational markers and air beacon markers were to be established, and the diversionary operations were carried out. The Control Force would protect the assault convoys from hostile surface or submarine units, and would provide convoy control and escort for shipping outside the assault area.
ALPAH ATTACK FORCE was to establish the 3rd US Infantry Division on selected beaches in the Pampelonne–Cavalaire area, beginning at H-Hour on D-Day. On D-Day+1, it would begin landing advance units of French Army B. It was to position five pontoon causeways on Beach 261 and five on Beach 259, and at the earliest opportunity unload special Air Force equipment on the Island of Port Cros. Its naval guns would eliminate enemy batteries threatening transports, landing craft, or the beaches themselves.
The task of DELTA ATTACK FORCE was to establish the 45th Infantry Division on selected beaches in the St Tropez–Bougnon area at H-Hour; it was also to deliver five pontoon causeways to Beach 261 and exploit the port facilities of St Tropez. On D-Day+1, Delta Force was to assist Alpha Force in landing elements of French Army B.
The fourth Naval Attack Force, CAMEL, was to establish the US 36th Infantry Division and one Combat Command of the 1st French Armored Division on the St Raphael–Anthéor beaches beginning at H-Hour. As soon as the beaches were cleared, it was to prepare to land another French Combat Command. The Force was to ensure that platoon causeways were delivered to Beach 259 for unloading French armored equipment.
A SUPPORT FORCE, meanwhile, was to establish the 1st Special Service Force (Sitka) on the Islands of Levant and Port Cros, and the French Groupe de Commandos (Romeo) in the vicinity of Cape Nègre. Its bombardment would support the military operations, and after the initial assault phases the Force would continue to support the Army’s westward advance.
The sixth of the naval subdivisions, the AIRCRAFT CARRIER FORCE, was to provide fighter cover, reconnaissance, and close support and was to be prepared to transfer combat units to captured airfields.
The Commanding General of the XII Tactical Air Command, Brigadier General Gordon P. Saville, was designated the Air Task Force Commander and charged with all detailed air planning for Operation Dragoon. From the point of view of time, air operations were broken down into four phases. Phase I covered offensive air operations before D-Day-5; Phase II covered D-Day-5 to 0350 on D-Day; Phase III, 0350 on D-Day to H-Hour at 0800; and Phase IV at the period after H-Hour.
PHASE I air operations began as far back as April 28, 1944, when heavy bombers attacked Toulon. Between then and August 10, the Allied Air Forces had dropped more than 12,500 tons of bombs on southern France.
PHASE II, known as Operation Nutmeg – beginning on August 10 – was to consist primarily of attacks on the coastal defenses and radar stations, at the same time isolating the target area by destroying highway bridges across the Rhône River. In order not to jeopardize tactical surprise, this phase was to be carried out in conjunction with feint attacks on similar targets between Via Reggio in Italy and Béziers, near the Franco-Spanish border. The intensity of the attacks along such a broad front would, it was hoped, conceal the true Allied objectives until at least 1800 on D-Day-1.
PHASE III (Operation Yokum) was to begin one hour after the conclusion of Nutmeg and last until H-Hour. Its main task was to inflict maximum destruction on enemy coastal and beach defenses, using all available forces. These included 12 heavy bomber groups, plus medium and fighter-bombers. The latter were to attack coastal batteries, while the heavy bombers were to strike at the assault beaches to flatten underwater obstacles and enemy strong points.
PHASE IV (Operation Durcot), beginning after H-Hour, would interdict enemy communications by completing the destruction of bridges over the Rhône and Isère Rivers, as well as giving tactical close support to ground forces.
The task of airlifting the Seventh Army Airborne Division, which consisted of both parachute and gliderborne troops, was assigned to the Provisional Troop Carrier Air Division. From bases in Italy, they were to employ 32 squadrons of transport aircraft – 415 in all, escorted by Spitfires and Beaufighters. The first drops were to be made just before daylight on D-Day, and the first resupply mission was to be flown in the late afternoon.
The total troop list, revised on July 30, stood at 155,419 men and 20,031 vehicles. The subsequent build-up would put 366,833 men and 56,051 vehicles ashore by D-Day+20, and 576,833 men and 91,341 vehicles by D-Day+65. Since no units were assigned to the Seventh Army until the middle of June, 1944 – after the Normandy landings – their period of training was necessarily brief. Nevertheless, the two months before D-Day gave sufficient time for the main combat elements of each of the three American sub-task forces to undergo a refresher course in amphibious assault. The 36th and 45th Divisions received their instruction at the Invasion Training Center at Salerno, while the 3rd Division went to Pozzuoli.
At the end of the landing exercise, the three American assault divisions moved up to Naples for mounting; the French force was to be embarked at Taranto, Corsica, and Oran. On August 9, General Lucian K. Truscott, the VI Corps Commander, briefed his staff, and two days later General Patch conducted his final briefing at Seventh Army HQ in Naples.
On the afternoon of August 11, the Chief of Staff and other personnel boarded the USS Henrico in the Bay of Naples. Here the Seventh Army set up its command while the vast amphibious force prepared for the assault. The various elements of the Seventh Army were waiting at embarkation ports in Italy, Corsica, and North Africa. The 3rd Infantry Division under Major General John W. O’Daniel, the 36th Division commanded by Major General John E. Dahlquist, and the 45th Division under William W. Eagles were all assembled in the Naples–Salerno area; the French II Corps lay in harbors on the heel of Italy, the 1st Special Service Force was off Corsica, and near Oran in Algeria were minor elements of II Corps and Combat Command One of the 1st French Armored Division.
The approach corridor for the assault was the stretch of water between the northwest coast of Corsica and the beaches, and the Dragoon convoys were to converge on it via ten separate routes. The Western Task Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Hewitt, consisted of 853 vessels: 505 US ships, 252 British, 19 French, six Greek, and 263 merchant vessels. There were 370 large landing ships, escorted by five battleships, four heavy cruisers, 18 light cruisers, nine aircraft carriers, and 85 destroyers. Deck-loaded on the transports were 1,276 small landing craft.
The Alpha, Delta, and Camel attack forces set sail from their respective harbors on August 11, 12, and 13, the slower vessels leaving first. Units had received maps in sealed packages 72 hours before embarking, together with the Seventh Army identification code and its key. These were to be opened four hours after sailing and all assault troops were carefully briefed. The Americans were issued with special shoulder patches and flag brassards, which they sewed on their uniforms.
The voyage passed peacefully, the great convoys edging northwards along the west coast of Italy and then negotiating the Straits of Bonifacio as planned. At about 1900 on August 14, off the west coast of Corsica, the Dragoon convoys made their rendezvous and turned towards their objectives on the French Riviera. Before the main assault on the Cogolin–St Tropez–Ste Maxime–St Raphaël coastline, plans to isolate the invasion areas by commando forces on the flanks went into operation. Ships of the Support Force slipped out of Propriano, Corsica at 1130 on August 14, and soon after dark the sharp silhouettes of the cliffs of Levant and Port Cros disappeared.
The weather was ideal, with a calm sea and a night dark enough yet with sufficient starlight for the assault forces to pick out prominent landmarks. The big transports stopped engines about 8,000 yards out, and at 2300 the troops embarked in ten-man rubber boards. Each LCI (Landing Craft, Infantry) towed nine of these boats to within 1,000 yards of the shore, as they paddled quietly on, scouts in kayaks and electric surf-floats went ahead to mark the landings spots with small lights. About 650 men landed on Port Cros and 1,300 on Levant at midnight. The planners had selected the southern side of the islands for the attack, where steep cliffs dropped straight into the sea, and the assault achieved complete surprise. The enemy had discounted all possibility of an attack from this direction, and the landings met no opposition. Scattered resistance broke out on Levant, but the enemy soon withdrew and by dawn the assault forces were landing supplies and evacuating their wounded. Mopping-up continued throughout D-Day, with only snipers and isolated pockets still resisting in the afternoon. At 2234, all opposition on Levant ceased. On Port Cros, an enemy garrison in an old fort on the western side of the island managed to hold out for 48 hours before the fight ended with the surrender of two German officers and 46 men.
Meanwhile, shortly after midnight, the Romeo Force of French commandos landed on Cape Nègre. Their mission was to destroy all enemy coastal defenses on the Cape, to set up a roadblock on the coastal highway and to seize the high ground 2 miles to the north. Seventy men scaled the steep banks at the base of the Cape, taking the Germans by surprise. They quickly destroyed the enemy gun emplacements and set up a tank-block in a pass along the road. The other detachment had as its objective a series of pillboxes believed to be east of the Cape. One section, however, landed too close to the Cape and was greeted by small-arms fire and grenades. The section was pinned down and several men killed and wounded, including Sergeant Noel Texier, its commander. This group of French commandos attracted the attention of most of the enemy defenses, with the result that when the main body of Romeo Force landed at 0100 they were almost unopposed. By morning, the Commandos had cleared the beaches and joined up with the others who were holding the tank-block; they then advanced inland to clear the towns of Le Rayol and La Mole, beating off several enemy counterattacks.
During the night, the Rosie Force of 67 French Marines was landed from four torpedo boats in seven rubber craft on the beach south of Théoule-sur-Mer. Rosie’s objectives were the roads from Cannes to St Raphaël and Fréjus, aiming at cutting enemy communications between Cannes and the right flank of the main assault. In the darkness, however, the Marines ran into barbed wire, then anti-personnel mines. The explosions alerted the enemy and the Germans immediately opened up a deadly fire over the flat beach. The Marines abandoned their demolition equipment and tried to pull back, but they were hopelessly trapped, and many were killed and wounded. The survivors eventually made contact with the Americans the next afternoon, and the 56th Medical Battalion evacuated their injured.
The main pre-invasion operation was the airborne assault. To isolate the entire landing area, the coastal highway had to be cut at each end of the beachhead and enemy movements blocked from the rear. The 1st Airborne Task Force, known as Rugby, had the mission of landing from 0430 near Le Muy and Le Luc to set up roadblocks and so help reduce the enemy defenses in the beach area itself.
The Airborne Task Force had been created specifically for this assault. Activated on July 15, under the command of General Robert T. Frederick, it comprised the 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade (British), the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 551st Parachute Infantry Regiment, the 460th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, the 463rd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion, and the 602nd Glider Pack Howitzer Battalion. There were also gliderborne supporting troops such as two chemical mortar companies and an antitank company. The total strength was 9,732 men, who were all to be transported in 535 transport aircraft and 465 gliders.
Aerial routes marked by beacon ships were set up east of the assault corridor from Corsica. The three drop zones were designated O, A, and C; two of them, O and A, consisted of flat cultivated fields or gently undulating ground suitable for both paratroop and glider operations, but C was a less desirable broken, rocky area.
On D-Day, the drop zones were shrouded in fog, and in the murk many of the parachute elements fell a long way from their objective. The first to jump was the 509th Battalion Combat Team at 0430, followed by 517th Regiment Combat Team five minutes later. Part of Lieutenant Colonel William P. Yarborough’s 509th Battalion came down on the bank of the Nartuby River near La Motte, while Colonel William J. Boyle and 40 men of the 517th, cut off from the rest of their 1st Battalion, were met by heavy machine-gun fire as they landed in hamlets and vineyards near Les Arcs. Boyle and his men returned the fire and deployed over the area, precipitating the first pitched battle of the campaign.
At 0510, detachments of the British 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade landed more or less on target in the hills of Le Rouet, east of Le Mitan, and the 2nd Battalion of the 517th Regiment under Colonel Richard J. Seitz pushed rapidly towards Les Arcs to relieve Boyle’s force. Although his part of the drop was fairly successful, however, it took some of the airborne units 24 hours – and in some cases several days – to reach their assembly areas. Some, including parts of the 509th Parachute Battalion and the 463rd Parachute Artillery Battalion, never made it at all. Nevertheless, most units of the First Airborne Task Force were able to go into action as soon as they landed and carry out their basic tasks. That the 463rd Battalion was dropped in the wrong place, in fact, turned out to be unexpectedly useful. The battalion was scheduled to land in Zone C, but in the foggy conditions one serial of 29 aircraft got lost and dropped their loads a long way off target. Two full batteries and sections of two more dropped in the 3rd Infantry Division’s area about 3 miles south of St Tropez, close to formidable enemy costal installations and right in the target area of Allied bombers and warships. The paratroops managed to weather the bombardment by their own ships and aircraft, and although shaken up they suffered no casualties. Somehow they managed to assemble in the strange surroundings and thick dawn fog, put five of their own guns into action, and capture intact an enemy antiaircraft battery, two coastal batteries, and a garrison of 240 German soldiers. Part of one American battery, along with elements of the 509th Parachute Battalion, entered St Tropez and occupied the town. When the forward troops of the 15th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Division, eventually reached St Tropez in the wake of the seaborne landings, they found the paratroops attacking the last German defenders in a local strongpoint known as the Citadel.
Back at Le Muy, the British 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade blocked the highway there, but were unable to take the town. This task was subsequently assigned to the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion, which landed later and in greater strength. By the end of the D-Day+1, the First Airborne Task Force had destroyed all enemy resistance in its various zones and had taken 493 prisoners. During the entire airborne operation, no gliders or aircraft were lost through enemy action, although at least 148 gliders were wrecked or damaged in landing accidents. During the airborne assault, 987 sorties were flown, 407 gliders towed, 221 jeeps and 213 artillery pieces carried, in addition to ammunition and supplies.
The immediate mission of the airborne assault had gone well despite some initial confusion. Prior to H-Hour, the rear of the invasion beaches had been successfully secured. It was now up to the Seventh Army’s seaborne assault.