SAIGON
BY THE TIME GENERAL BIG Minh learned the president of South Vietnam had been in St. Francis Xavier, the yellow facade was dazzling in the morning sunlight. Mike Dunn was convinced that when Lodge excused himself during his final talk with Ngo Dinh Diem, the American ambassador informed the coup leaders where Diem was. Instead, it was Diem’s personal military aide who first called coup headquarters. After Lodge refused to rescue him, Diem decided to take his diminishing chances with the soldier who paved the way to his presidency nine years earlier. Father Jean had recommended seeking asylum in the French or Chinese embassy or just in the sanctuary of St. Francis Xavier. Instead, Diem ordered Captain Do Tho to call coup headquarters. Big Minh was out, probably searching Gia Long Palace for Diem. But General Don told Captain Tho a convoy would soon be en route for the Ngo brothers. A growing number of parishioners coming to a later Mass watched the spectacle of the convoy arrival.
An M113, the green-colored armored personnel carrier, pulled into the church courtyard following three jeeps commanded by General Mai Huu Xuan. But it was Major Duong Hieu Nghia who did most of the talking. Inside the church, he approached Diem and Nhu. “My president,” Nghia said, standing at attention and saluting. After the morning’s communion service, Diem was spiritually ready for anything.
The brothers followed Nghia from the church. Outside, soldiers with rifles flanked the church door. Diem walked down the steps. An aide passed Nhu’s suitcase of gold and cash to General Xuan. An arrest warrant was read. Initially, Diem and Nhu balked at orders to get into the armored carrier, knowing it was a death trap. When one soldier threatened him, Nhu flicked a half-smoked cigarette in his face. Another pulled a pistol. But Diem scowled until the soldier put his gun back into its holster. Unless they got in, harsh measures would be used, said another officer. Once the rear door of the carrier was opened, the inside was a mess of pots, pans, and clothing. Nhu complained. “Why have you come for the president in a vehicle like this?” he demanded.
“There is no more president,” Nghia replied.
Nhu struggled, but Diem said, “That’s enough. Let’s go.” Nghia made sure they bowed their heads as they got in to avoid the oval metal doorway. Their hands were tied behind their backs. The door closed and Captain Nuyen Van Nhung jumped on top as the vehicle pulled away. Nhung stood in the opening for the vehicle’s machine gunner. In a scabbard on his belt, Nhung wore a Poignard-Baïonnette Lebel. The French-designed trench knife had notches on the handle. Some represented Viet Cong guerrillas. Others were victims of Big Minh’s orders. When the convoy left coup headquarters, Nghia saw Big Minh flash two fingers of his right hand to Nhung. He learned later that was Big Minh’s order to kill both Diem and Nhu. At Nhung’s feet, Diem began to pray. Nhu began a noisy argument with Nhung and the second soldier. “I don’t know what it was about,” said Nghia, who heard their shouts. He was in one of three jeeps following the M113.
A few minutes later—Nghia put the time at seven A.M.—the convoy was halted at a railroad crossing by a barrier for the passing train. Although muffled by the train noise, Nghia heard pistol shots. One bullet went into the back of Diem’s head. Nhu also got the coup de grace with a bullet in the base of his skull. In addition, Nhung pulled his poignard from its scabbard and stabbed Nhu again and again. General Xuan, the convoy commander, did not hear the shots or realize the brothers had been murdered until they returned to coup headquarters and the M113’s rear door was open. Nhung raced up to Big Minh and saluted. “Mission accomplished,” he said in French.
Later, Nhung showed up at the rue Pasteur office of the Associated Press. It had been wrecked by the fighting and Malcolm Browne was clearing out the debris. “[He] tried to sell me a picture of Diem’s body,” Browne said. “I turned him down partly because I could not be sure the photograph was real but mostly because I was revolted by the prospect of rewarding anyone for hawking such carrion.”
Someone flashed word to Lodge from coup headquarters. It was not Conein. When he thought Big Minh would be bringing Diem and Nhu back from the palace for a power transfer at coup headquarters, Conein did not want to be there when the press arrived. He went home for a shower. “I smelled like a she-goat in heat,” Conein said. He missed Big Minh’s angry return from the empty palace and the vote on killing Diem.
So it may have been Big Minh or General Don—the liaison between the plotters and the U.S. embassy—who called Lodge. “I knew it very soon,” Lodge said. “I mean, within minutes after he was killed I got the word. I was horrified. I was absolutely horrified. Terrible. Particularly as I had friendly feelings towards him.”
If Lodge knew by eight A.M. on November 2—eight P.M. on November 1 in Washington—that Diem was dead, the cable traffic indicated he delayed telling Washington for more than four hours. From Washington at 8:47 P.M.—a day behind Saigon—Rusk cabled Lodge that Kennedy would review the situation at a morning meeting. Shortly, Rusk said, the administration would spin events for the press. “We expect to background the press this evening that this is not a coup … but that Diem has yielded to virtually unanimous determination of military and civilian leadership,” Rusk said. “This last point is of particular importance in underlining the absurdity that this national decision could have been merely a foreigner’s trick.” In reply at noon in Saigon—midnight in Washington—Lodge gave no hint that Diem was dead. Instead, he said Kennedy should stress the popular outpouring for the coup. “Every Vietnamese has a grin on his face today,” Lodge cabled.
Conein was home when his CIA boss called saying the “highest authority”—that meant Kennedy—wanted to know about the whereabouts of Diem and Nhu. There were telephone communications between Saigon and Washington. Perhaps Lodge telephoned Rusk or the White House when coup leaders told him Diem was dead. In turn, the CIA was ordered to find out and called Conein at home. He raced back to coup headquarters. Big Minh told Conein that the Ngo brothers had committed suicide. Conein, a Catholic, knew the Catholic brothers would never commit suicide, a prohibition of the church. He filed the first report on the assassination that arrived in Washington at 12:24 A.M.—the start of November 2. “Best estimate this time is that Diem and Nhu are dead,” said the CIA cable based on Conein’s report. At 2:55 A.M., Harriman sent Lodge a cable asking for confirmation of suicides. “Generals must preserve to extent possible good reputation for their actions have thus far created,” Harriman said. “Therefore, important to establish publicly beyond question that deaths actually suicide if this true and not by violence.” Kennedy was in bed when Conein’s first report arrived. McGeorge Bundy decided not to wake him.
Kennedy began November 2 with an off-the-record meeting at 9:35 A.M. Waiting for the president when he arrived were Harriman, Hilsman, and Forrestal. They had laid the foundation for Kennedy’s decision to oust Diem. The leading opponents of the coup—McNamara, Taylor, McCone, and Bobby—were also there. Lodge had replied to Harriman’s request for confirmation. It arrived at seven A.M. “Very reliable sources give following story about the death of Diem and Nhu,” the Lodge cable began. Forrestal took a copy and handed it to Kennedy. The president read it and the color left his face. Pale, without a word, he stood and rushed from the Cabinet Room. To see their leader so shaken rattled the assembled advisers. Thoughts raced through their minds. General Taylor thought Kennedy should not have been surprised.
“What did he expect,” Taylor said to himself.