CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT NO. 7
Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War
Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
(NOTE: THESE WERE THE ITEMS CLAUSEN CARRIED IN HIS BOMB POUCH.)
a. The first two documents are notes of two intercepts dated 6 December 1941 of radio messages from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo which were not included in Top Secret Exhibit “B” before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
b. The documents following those mentioned in a above are the intercepts which comprise Top Secret Exhibit “B” before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Certain of these have been initialed by witnesses before me and are referred to in their affidavits.
NOTE: THE PAGES THAT FOLLOW CONTAIN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. THE PUBLISHER HAS ATTEMPTED TO REPRODUCE THE ORIGINAL LANGUAGE AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.
From: Hon.
To: Tokyo
Dec. 6, 41
PA-KY
#253 release p5 ------123a.
1. On American continent in Oct. Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, N.C. 400, 500 balloons considering use in defense of Hawaii & Panama. So far as Hawaii concerned though investigations made, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected troops to man them. No training for maintenance balloons. No signs barrage balloon equipment. “In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any limits to barrage balloon defense.” I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage of a surprise attack against these places.
In my opinion battleships do not have torpedo nets. Details not known; will report results of investigation.
Army 7178 25877 2a Trans 12/8/41 (2-TT)
TOP SECRET
From: Hon
To: Tokyo
Dec. 6, 41
PA–K2
#254
1. On evening 5th, among battleships which entered port—one sub tender. The following ships observed at anchor on 6th.
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 sub tenders, 17 destroyers, in addition 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (heavy cruisers & airplane carriers all left.)
2. “It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.”
Army 7179 25874 trans 12/8/42 3 a.
To: Honolulu
September 24, 41
J-19
#83
Strictly secret.
Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible.
1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas. (We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C. East Loch.
Area D. Middle Loch.
Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.
2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharfs, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)
260 SECRET Trans. 10–9-41 (S)
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 14, 1941
Purple
#943 (Part 1 of 2)1 (To be handled in Government Code)
I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:
“What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal.”
He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.
ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 14, 41
Purple
#943 (Part 2 of 2)2
He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would after all be a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE3 told me that HUGH GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert for this possibility. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists. MOORE4 reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS that he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese–American negotiations, but he hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America’s part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 2nd. KIPLINGER5 reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and the United States are fifty-fifty.
ARMY 5854 23516 SECRET Trans. 10-15-41 (7)
From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#671
Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese–American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese–American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese–American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese–American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and you.
(Separate Wire)
The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.
ARMY 5901 23631 Secret
To: Tokyo
October 22, 1941
Purple (CA)
I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency’s instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don’t want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don’t want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don’t think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.
ARMY 6017 23859 Secret Trans. 10-23-41 (7)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 November 1941
(Purple - CA)
#736
(Of utmost secrecy)
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.
JD-1: 6254 Secret (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)
To: Hongkong
November 14, 1941
Purple
Cir. #2319 (To be handled in Government Code)
(Strictly secret outside the Department)
Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire’s foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:
a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.
c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.
In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a longtime scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied (2) territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from the unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).
In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are writing you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.
This message is directed to Nanso,6 Hokudai, 6 Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow, Canton, and Hongkong. Hokudai6 will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amov.
25322
JD 6801 Secret Trans. 11/26/41 (NR)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-19)
#111
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your “ships in harbor report” irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.
JD-1: 6991 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (Ca) (Urgent)
For your Honor’s own information:
1. I have read your #1090,7 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.
2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so, and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.8 Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,9 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.
Army 24878 JD-1: 6638 Secret Trans. 11/17/41
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 18, 1941
J-19
#113
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area “N”, Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,10 and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)
Army 25773 7063 Secret Trans 12/5/41 (S)
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
J-19
#222
1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #21911 on that day.
Area A12—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
Area C13—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks “KS”. 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D.14
3. At 10:00 A.M. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.
Relayed to ----.
Army 25817 7111 Secret Trans. 12/6/41
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting of our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:
(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan–U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
See Supplementary Information File
(Voice broadcasts)
SIS 25432 JD-1: 6875 Secret Navy Trans. 11-28-41
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2354
When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
(1) If it is Japan U.S. relations “HIGASHI”
(2) Japan Russia relations “KITA”
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) “NISHI”
The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B.A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.
SIS-25392 JD-1: 6850 Secret Navy Trans. 11-26-41
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
Re my #79715
The condition outlined by them namely “After the peaceful policies of Japan have been made more definite” we imagine would naturally have reference to the question of the three-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan will withdraw her troops from Southern Indo-China, and that then the U.S. will go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for the U.S. to bring up rather complicated terms.
On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up to the B16 proposal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance that you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent of the proposal in your message, then to push on for an understanding.
The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the proposal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instructions, (after reading our #797, 15 #80017 and #800118) will please present our B proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions can be made.
If the U.S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best efforts.
We note what you say in your #113319 and, #113419, but, in these negotiations consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this office. We would emphasize this.
S.I.S. #25040
JD-1: 6658
(F) Navy Trans. 11-20-41
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple CA (Urgent)
#812
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.20 You should know this however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese–American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple
#836. To be handled in Government Code.
The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:
Japanese |
English |
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai |
(Three-Power Treaty question) |
Nyuu Yooku |
(New York) |
Taignu Mondai |
(The question of non-discriminatory treatment) |
Shikago |
(Chicago) |
Shina Mondai |
(The China question) |
Sanfuranshisuko |
(San Francisco) |
Soori |
(Premier) |
Itoo Kun |
(Mr. Itoo) |
Gaimudaijin |
(Foreign Minister) |
Date Kun |
(Mr. Date) |
Rikugun |
(The Army) |
Tokugawa Kun |
(Mr. Tokugawa) |
Kaigun |
(The Navy) |
Maeda Kun |
(Mr. Maeda) |
Nichi-bei kooshoo |
(Japan-American negotiations) |
Endan |
(Marriage proposal) |
Daitooryoo |
(President) |
Kimiko San |
(Miss Kimiko) |
Haru |
(Hull) |
Fumeko San |
(Miss Fumeko) |
Kokunaijoosei |
(Internal situation) |
Shoobai |
(Trade) |
Jooho Sum |
(To yield) |
Yama Wo Uru |
(To sell the mountain) |
Jooho Sezu |
(Not to yield) |
Yama Wo Urenu |
(Not to sell the mountain) |
Keisei Kyuuten Sum |
(Situation taking critical turn) |
Kodomo Gaumarero |
(The child is born) |
For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:
Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO |
Setagaya 4617 |
Section Chief KASE |
Yotsuya 4793 |
The Minister’s residence |
Ginza 3614 |
The Vice-Minister’s residence |
Ginza 1022 |
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)
#1180. (Part 1 of 2)
From NOMURA and KURUSU.
As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our “B” proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple (Extremely urgent)
#1180. (Part 2 of 2)21
We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.
In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)
#1190. (Part 2 of 2)22
To be handled in Government Code.
The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumptions. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.
Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.
To: Tokyo
26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST)
(Telephone Code)23
Transpacific Telephone
To Kumaicho Yamamoto24 from Kurusu:
Kurusu: “I have made all efforts, but they will not yield.25 I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already,” he interrupted himself, “you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems.”
Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: “If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable.”
Yamamoto: “The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also.” After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: “The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult.”
Kurusu: “I believe it is of no avail.”
Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.
Kurusu: “I rather imagine you had expected this outcome.”
Yamamoto: “Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished.”
Kuruso: “I am unable to make any movement (i.e. progress?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation.”
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple. (CA)
#844
Re your #118926
Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #118027 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.
From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
29 November 1941
(J19)
#122
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you also report even when there are no movements.
JD-1: 7086 Secret (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
29 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#857
Re my #84428
We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:
The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.
However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.
With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U.S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.
(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)
JD-1: 6921 Secret (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
Telephone Code
TransPacific Radio Telephone
NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night.
Kurusu: “It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn’t we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn’t there? In any case, we are going to see him about the short one.” (i.e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo’s reply to Mr. Hull’s proposals.)
Yamamoto: “Yes. I see.”
Kurusu: “The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home.”
Y: “Is there any special significance to this?”
K: “The newspapers have made much of the Premier’s speech, and it is having strong repercussions here.”
Y: “Is that so?”
K: “Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving.”
(Pause)
“Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani.”
Y: “We are being careful.”
K: “We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this.” (i.e. Premier’s speech.)
JD-1: 6922 Secret (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497
(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)
K: “What about the internal situation?” (In Japan)
Y: “No particular—(one or two words faded out)—.”
K: “Are the Japanese–American negotiations to continue?”
Y: “Yes.”
K: “You were very urgent about them before, weren’t you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches. ! ! ! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion.”
Y: “When will you see them. The 2nd?”
K: “Let’s see … this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here.”
(Pause)
“Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don’t you?”
Y: “Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?”
K: “I don’t know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime.”
Y: “Well then—Goodbye.”
JD-1: 6922 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple (CA)
#985. (Part 1 of 3)29
Re my Circular #2387.30
1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #98631) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
25552 JD 6943 Secret Trans 12-1-41 (NR)
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple. (CA).
#985. (Part 3 of 3)
4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviets, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviets or that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.
5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.
6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as the date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.
Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.
25553 Secret Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple
#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department)
1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced in the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.
2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire’s existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.
Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany and Italy in Europe and the Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET TRANS. 12/1/41 (NR)
79716—46—Ex. 148—43
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple.
#986. (Part 2 of 2)
3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time, the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.
ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans 12-1-41 (NR)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1227
Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders’ meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.
We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.
We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.
We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal conditions, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.
Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.
25727 JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans 12-4-41 (1)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
1 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2436
When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attache’s office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand for this purpose. The Attache should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.
25545 JD-1: 6939 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)
From: Tokyo
To: London
1 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2443
Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.
In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.
As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions wire the one word HASSO in plain language.
Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and YU GO NO. 26 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)
(NOTE: THIS MESSAGE CARRIED A NOTATION ON THE BOTTOM AS A RESULT OF MY AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN LAYTON SAYING:
Message not seen but—British reported that Japs had destroyed their purple machine in London, 26 April 1945. [signed] E. J. Layton.)
25787 JD-1: 7091 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L)
From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#893
------ In the event that Manchuria participates in the war ------ in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.
A summary follows:
1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.
2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.
3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.
However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.
Codes Manchoukuo, etc.
JD-1: 7092 SIS 25783 Secret (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR)
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple-CA)
#865
Re my #85732
1. The date set in my message #81233 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is only for your information.)
2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #112434. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.
3. There are reports here that the President’s sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo’s statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.
JD-1: 6983 Secret (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)
Completed Translation
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple
#1232 (Part 1 of 2)
Re my #1231
Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #123335. Thereupon we said: “Since we haven’t been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th.” The Under-Secretary then said: “I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world.” Thereupon we replied: “The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven’t the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes.36 We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.
[1] From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#1232. (Part 2 of 2)
Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny. Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: “I am well aware of that.” I continued: “We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give a thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese Incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve.” The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: “The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here.” [2] Then he continued: “In regard to the opinions you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary.”
I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.
Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #123337.
25660 ARMY Trans. 12-3-41 (7)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Washington
December 2, 1941.
Purple.
#867 (Strictly Secret)
(CORRECTED TRANSLATION)
1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of “O” code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)
2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.
3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word “haruna.”
4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.
5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #89038 is no longer recognized.)
#25640 Translated 12-3-41 (X) Corrected 12-4-41
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941
J-19
#123 (Secret outside the department)
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.
NOTE: This message was received here on December 23.
ARMY 8007 27065 (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1223
Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.
25785 JD-1: 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)
From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 4, 1941.
Purple (CA)
#1410
In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary Matsui of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.
ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941
(Purple)
#1268 Re your #86739
From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication Section:
We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.
25836 JD-1: 7136 (M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#901 Re my #84440
1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).
2. This separate message is a very long one. I will sent it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.
3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.
ARMY 7149 25838 Secret Trans 12-6-41 (S)
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1272
In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:
(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan “A” dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese–American war and urged him to do the “introducing” at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.
(2) Those carrying on Plan “B” included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States’ proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us ------ (MESSAGE INCOMPLETE) -------.
ARMY 25846 7176 Secret Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 1 of 14) Separate telegram
MEMORANDUM
1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese–American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.
The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.
2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYBR place in the world.
Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan’s true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 2 of 14)
However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan’s constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan’s aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 3 of 14)
Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavored strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 4 of 14)
Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese–American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:
(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern-Pacific area.
(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.
(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 5 of 14)
As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as “Introducer” of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.
The American government not only rejected to above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called “Introducer” of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 6 of 14)
4. From the beginning of the present negotiation, the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.
As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.
As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.
Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 7 of 14)
It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.
On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard to realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:
1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another’s position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one’s selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
7143 Secret 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 8 of 14)
Of the various principles put forth by the American government as a basis of the Japanese–American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept on principle, but in view of the world’s actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.
Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: “Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.” It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 9 of 14)
The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.
3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.
JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 10 of 14)
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr---(45 letters garbled or missing)---been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the---es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.
JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 11 of 14)
The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n--- (50 letters missing) ---sible for the present predicament of East Asia.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 12 of 14)
5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan’s position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 13 of 14)
5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan’s sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire’s existence itself and disparages its honor and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.
6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese–American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND41 presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL CYLOKMMTT42 be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan’s position.
JD-1: 7143 Secret Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S) 25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple-Eng)
#902 (Part 14 of 14)
(NOTE: IN THE FORWARDING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE RADIO STATION HANDLING THIS PART APPEARED THE PLAIN ENGLISH PHRASE “VERY IMPORTANT.”)
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan’s efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asian, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese–American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
JD-1: 7143 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 7 Dec. 1941
(S-TT) 25843
(NOTE: THE TIME THE ENTIRE MESSAGE #25843 WAS TRANSLATED AND AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONTROVERSY FOR FIFTY YEARS. ARMY WITNESSES CLAIM THEY HAD COPIES OF THE ENTIRE FOURTEEN-PART MESSAGE AROUND MIDNIGHT DECEMBER 6. IT WAS THE ENTIRE 25843 SERIES OF MESSAGES THAT COLONEL DUSENBURY FAILED TO DELIVER TO GENERAL MARSHALL THAT NIGHT.)
To: Honolulu
December 6, 1941
PA–K2
#128
Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #12343 the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.
ARMY 7381 26158 Secret (Japanese) Trans. 12/12/41 (5)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
#907. To be handled in government code.
Re my #90244
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.
ARMY 7145 25850 Secret Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#910
After deciphering part 14 of my #90245 and also #90746, #90847, and #90948, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.
25854 Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
To: Tokyo
December 7, 1941
LA
#104
Re my #10349
On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.
ARMY 25866 7184 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2)
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION EXHIBIT NO. 8
Investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War Supplementary to Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
The following documents comprise intercepts obtained by Colonel Clausen from British sources (i.e., Bletchley Park).
They consist of 41 documents extending over the period 21 November 1941 to 22 December 1941.
MOST SECRET
To be kept under lock and key: never to be removed from the office.
Japanese Consul, Singapore, Requests Issue of Code Words
No. 097975
Date: 21st November 1941
From: Japanese Consul-General, SINGAPORE
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO
No.: 717
Date: 17th November 1941.
Immediate:
Some day the British authorities will prohibit the use of cypher telegrams by this office. To prepare for this eventuality please draw up secret code words and send them by Consul-General OKAMOTO as diplomatic correspondence. Please include in this secret code, words necessary for military intelligence, evacuation of residents, the closing down of this office, etc. Please see the Naval Secret Code which I have received recently.
Director. F.O. (3). F.I.D. Admiralty. Colonial Office. M.I.5.
Japanese Code Phrases for Broadcasting in Event of Emergency.
No. 09127
Date: 25th November 1941
From: The Foreign Minister. TOKYO
To: The Japanese Chargé, LONDON.
No: 2363 Circular
Date: 19th November, 1941
To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.
The international situation is tense and we cannot tell when the worst may happen. In such an event, communications between the Empire and the enemy countries will immediately cease. Therefore when our diplomatic relations are on the point of being severed, we shall broadcast, as the weather report, the following phrases in the middle and at the end of the news in Japanese in our overseas broadcast service:
(1) If Japanese–American relations are in question: “Higashi no kaze ame” (Easterly wind, rain).
(2) If JAPAN and the SOVIET are concerned: “Kita no kaze kumori” (Northerly wind, cloudy).
(3) In the case of JAPAN and BRITAIN (including the invasion of THAILAND or an attack on MALAYA): “Nishi no kaze hare” (Westerly wind, fine).
The appropriate phrase will each time be broadcast twice in a resolute voice and you should act accordingly [group corrupt: destroy by fire] codes documents etc.
The above is to be treated as strictly confidential.
From: The Japanese Chargé
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 700 Urgent of 21st November 1941.
Reference your circular telegram No. 2353. (above).
Director. F.O. (3). F.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5.
Sir E. BRIDGES
Dominions Office.
Japanese Foreign Office View of Conversations With America
No: 998151
Date: 25th November 1941
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO
To: The Japanese Diplomatic Representatives, ANGORA, &C.
No: 2364 Circular.
Date: 20th November 1941.
Confidential.
1. Since the formation of the new Cabinet the Government has started a conference in daily contact with Imperial Headquarters and has been able to debate a fundamental national policy to cope with the pressing situation of the day. At the morning session on the 5th instant, a decision was taken on the policy to be adopted for adjusting Japanese–American diplomatic relations.
2. The Japanese–American negotiations are to be pursued by considering the adjustment of diplomatic relations on an equitable basis. These have been in progress since the 7th, but there is a considerable difference of opinion between the two parties, and in view of the progress made so far there is some doubt as to whether a compromise will be reached. For our part, we are doing our utmost to reach a compromise, but we cannot make any further concessions, and the outlook is not bright. Should the negotiations break down, that part of the situation in which the Japanese Empire is involved will be critical.
The foregoing is for your exclusive information.
This telegram is addressed to BERNE, ANGORA and VLADIVOSTOK.
BERNE will repeat to VICHY, MADRID, LISBON, STOCKHOLM, HELSINGFORS and PRETORIA.
ANGORA will repeat to BUCHAREST, SOFIA and BUDAPEST.
TOGO.
Director (3) P.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges.
At this post there is nothing for it but to use the Navy’s wireless. Details have been telegraphed by the Naval Attaché to the Admiralty. Please refer to them and make the necessary arrangements.
Japanese Broadcasts: Reception in Rome.
No: 098232
Date: 27th November 1941
From: The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 740
Date: 20th November 1941
In regard to the general news broadcasts, not only JUO but JAP (which was changed on the 20th) were generally impossible to receive. This was due to unstable weather conditions at this time of year which made the note weak, in addition to which there was much interference from miscellaneous noises.
In view of the recent international situation the demand for [group corrupt: ? news ? information] is steadily increasing. We foresee no difficulty about reception arrangements at this end but in present weather conditions good reception will not be possible on one wavelength only. It is essential that simultaneous broadcasts be sent on two or three wavelengths. I understand that the recently changed DOMEI broadcasts in English have begun simultaneous broadcasts, and I ask that every effort be made for these simultaneous broadcasts to be carried out.
For your information I will, till further notice, telegraph reception efficiency every three days.
HORIKIRI.
Director. F.O. (3). P.I.D. M.I.5.
Japanese Cypher Machines: Security Measures.
No. 098313
Date: 29th November 1941
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
TO: BERNE, WASHINGTON, etc.
No: 2398 (Circular telegram).
Date: 25th November 1941
Most Secret:
Recently our cypher machines (the printing portion of “A” and the shift key of “B”) have been designated as a State Secret. Any leakage of information connected therewith will incur the application of the National Defense Peace Preservation Law. As regards the machine in your keeping, you are strictly enjoined to take every precaution for safe and secret custody.
On the right hand side of the number plate affixed to the printing portion and shift key, please write the words “Kokka Kimitsu” [State Secret] in red enamel.
This telegram is to be relayed, as the Foreign Minister’s instructions, in the following manner: From WASHINGTON to MEXICO, RIO DE JANEIRO and BUENOS AIRES. By cable.
BERNE to LONDON, VICHY, BERLIN, ROME and ANGORA. By cable.
VICHY to MADRID. By safe hand.
HANOI to SAIGON. By safe hand.
Director. F.O. (3). M.I.5.
Japanese Ambassador, Hanoi, Asks for Instruction in Event of Emergency.
No: 098400
Date: 1st December 1941.
From: Japanese [? Ambassador] HANOI.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 118.
Date: 26th November, 1941.
[In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].
(Secret.)
To judge from what I hear from the Military, the American answer reached us [? on the 24th]. If this is so the Cabinet Council will no doubt finally reach a decision in a day or two and determine whether it is to be peace or war. If Japanese–American negotiations are to be held we shall of course take in hand progressively the various undertakings previously planned; but if the negotiations break down, as preparations for military operations are nearing completion, an advance would be possible within ten days or so. In that event considerable modifications would be necessary in the programme of undertakings to be carried out under our present policy, and it will be necessary to initiate measures and negotiations in keeping with our military operations. What causes me most concern and [? anxiety] is whether, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, it is the policy of the Government and Imperial Headquarters to carry on military operations leaving the status of the Government of INDOCHINA as it is at present, and on this point I require to be informed in advance: and not only so but I want to make necessary preparations with all speed. If, therefore, you have any views on the development of the Japanese–American negotiations and the prospects I alluded to I beg that you will telegraph them at once. Moreover, while it goes without saying that secrecy must be preserved, nevertheless, according to newspaper reports, AMERICA has been consulting with BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, the NETHERLANDS and the Chinese in WASHINGTON, and these Governments are aware of the purport of the Japanese–American negotiations. And what is more, the Military here, as the result of comings and goings between here and TOKYO, are aware of the nature of your instructions and of the ins and outs of the negotiations: in fact I have the impression that the only people who are left in the dark are Foreign Office officials. Seeing that the situation is as tense as is indicated in your circular telegram No. 2383 [our No. 098127], should be glad to receive your instructions on these points as soon as possible, either by telegram, messenger or some other method.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.O. Admiralty War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.B. Major Morton. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
From: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
To: Japanese [? Ambassador], HANOI.
No: 93 of 26th November, 1941.
(Also in Chef de Mission cypher recyphered).
Reference your No. 118 (above).
My circular telegram *No. 2414 gives the course of the Japanese–American negotiations and my circular telegram *No. 2416 tells of their present continuation. Even in the event of the worst happening the Imperial Government has not taken any special decision to make a change in the status of the Government of INDO-CHINA. You may therefore take it that for the present our policy is to maintain the status quo. Please do your best on this understanding.
Repeated to Paris and Berlin.
TOGO.
[Dept. Note *Not yet decyphered].
Japan and the Axis: Plans in Event of Breakdown of Washington Conversations
No: 098413.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassadors, BERLIN and ROME.
No: 2387 Circular.
Date: 24th November, 1941.
[Very corrupt text. In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].
For your own information only.
The Japanese–American negotiations [?] are [seem to be] approaching their final stage … [two lines corrupt]. In the event of the breakdown of the negotiations we shall be face to face with a rupture of relations with BRITAIN and AMERICA, and the necessity is likely to arise for the sudden tightening up of the relations which have hitherto prevailed for cooperation between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY. My idea is that [? you] should then propose [two groups] action to be taken: but [two groups] I shall ask Your Excellency to be active during this month. It is possible that circumstances may necessitate your having a special interview with Führer HITLER (Premier MUSSOLINI), so please bear this in mind. [Two groups] until you approach them you should refrain absolutely from saying anything to the Germans (Italians). This for your information and in haste.
At the moment the time is not ripe for a detailed report on the Japanese–American negotiations. Please note, however, that we have taken every precaution to obviate any obstacle to the maintenance of the Three Power Pact.
This telegram is addressed to BERLIN and ROME.
TOGO.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Communications by Naval Wireless in Event of Emergency
No. 098414.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
From: Japanese Chargé, London.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
No: 778.
Date: 29th November, 1941.
In the present circumstances it may happen that the despatch and delivery of telegrams may be purposely delayed or completely held up and that we shall not be able to depend on the reliability of communications. I therefore request you to take steps to [? make simultaneous use of] the Naval wireless, as in my No. 760 [our No. 098127].
[Dept: Note: Cyphered in “X” and recyphered on the machine.]
Director. F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Plans: Instructions to Ambassador at Berlin
BJ/35.
No: 098452.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No: 935 Very urgent.
Date: 30th November, 1941.
[In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].
Reference my circular telegram No. 2387. [Our No. 098413]
1. The Japanese–American negotiations begun in April of this year under the former Cabinet have now reached a stage at which a breakdown is inevitable, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government. The Empire, faced with this situation, has to take the most serious decisions. You should therefore see Führer HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP at once and give them an outline of developments in confidence. At the same time you should tell them in confidence that the attitude of BRITAIN and AMERICA has recently been provocative and they have continued to move troops into all parts of Eastern ASIA. TO meet this we too have been compelled to move troops, and it is greatly to be feared that an armed collision will occur and we shall find ourselves in a state of war with BRITAIN and AMERICA. You should add that this may happen sooner than is expected.
[Here Part II is missing. It will be sent in later if received].
4. If when you make this communication questions are asked by the Germans and Italians as to our attitude towards RUSSIA, you should tell them that our attitude towards the SOVIET is as explained to them on 2nd July of this year, that we will of course not relax our restraint on the SOVIET as the result of our action in the south; but that if the SOVIET, acting in cooperation with BRITAIN and AMERICA, take hostile action against us, we are prepared to resist it resolutely; that it is on the South, however, that we lay most emphasis, and that we propose to refrain from deliberately taking positive action in the North.
5. As all this concerns our plan of campaign it of course requires the utmost secrecy, and you should make a point of impressing this strongly on the Germans and Italians.
6. With regard to telling the Italians, immediately after our Ambassador in BERLIN has told the Germans, Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO should be informed. As soon as the dates for the German and Italian interviews are fixed please telegraph.
Please repeat to Rome as my instructions.
TOGO.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2) Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese orders for destruction of cypher machine in London Embassy
Date: 3rd December, 1941.
No: 698509
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO
To: Japanese Ambassador, LONDON.
No: [? 2443] Circular.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
Secret and Urgent.
Please take steps for the immediate disuse of the cypher machine at your Embassy.
With regard to the steps to be taken, these should conform to the instructions sent previously. Please exercise the greatest care and, in particular, with regard to the methods of dismantling and breaking up the essential parts, carry them out strictly in accordance with instructions.
On receipt of this, please telegraph immediately the one word “SETSUJU”* (Received) en clair, and, having carried out these instructions, telegraph the word “HASSO”* (Despatched) also en clair.
With regard to the cypher connected with the machine, you are, of course, also to burn your copy No. 26 of the YU code (machine code) (the settings for use on the machine for communication between this Department and the Embassy in LONDON).
79716 -- 46 -- Ex. 148 -- 44
(Dept. Note: *These messages received, dated 2nd December, 1941.) Director (3). F.C. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominion Office.
Japanese-Thai Relations: Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Care Thai Minister
No: 698525.
Date: 4th December, 1941.
From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1347
Date: 20th November, 1941
I received a visit from the Thai Minister on the 20th. He opened his remarks by saying that he was also a soldier and would like to have a frank talk with me as between men who had known each other for many years. He then referred to a recent crop of rumours to the effect that JAPAN was to invade THAILAND, and to reports of large Japanese troop concentrations on the Thai frontier of French INDO-CHINA, and asked point blank whether there was any truth in them or not. I replied that I had had no news from my home Government on these matters but that my own belief was that JAPAN’S actions toward all Far Eastern races were aimed at applying the principle of live-and-let-live, the fact being that in cases such as that of the recent arbitration between THAILAND and French INDO-CHINA JAPAN had done her utmost for THAILAND for this very reason and would never invade THAILAND for the purpose of aggression. But the facts were that GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA had set up the so-called ABCD front in opposition to JAPAN’S establishment of a New Order, finally threatening the existence even of JAPAN herself. JAPAN of course would be compelled to continue her course brushing this aside, and that she wished to attain this and by peaceful means was obvious from the mere fact of her having sent Mr. KURUSU to AMERICA. However if the worst came to the worst and it was unavoidable, JAPAN would have to take the necessary steps for her own existence—not that there would be any question of this happening if THAILAND soon understood JAPAN’S ultimate purpose and displayed an attitude of cooperation with JAPAN; she would have to invade THAILAND only if that country should blindly follow the lead of GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA and take up an attitude of opposition.
The Minister interposed by describing the position in which THAILAND was placed and by stating emphatically that THAILAND would never oppose JAPAN as an Anglo-American cat’s-paw.
When suggesting his visit the Minister said that he wished to see me urgently, and OMMINISI’S view that he probably came on instructions from his home Government.
The Germans are also extremely interested in Thai problems and I should be glad if you would inform me at once as to the latest situation.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Chargé, London, Submits Plans for Withdrawal of Embassy, etc. Staffs
Date: 4th December, 1941.
No: 098539.
From: The Japanese Chargé d’Affaires, LONDON.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 781.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
It is feared that in the event of the situation becoming critical the exchange of telegrams may become impossible. I therefore submit the following points for your consideration and request instructions.
1. In view of conditions at this post, countries suitable for protecting our interests after the withdrawal of this Embassy are BRAZIL or SWITZERLAND. I suggest that the matter be discussed in TOKYO with the country concerned, so that instructions may be sent by that Government to its Ambassador (Minister) in LONDON.
2. Is there any objection to burning the consular exequaturs at present held in custody, viz: LIVERPOOL, DUBLIN, RANGOON, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, BATAVIA, MACASSAR and VANCOUVER?
3. The stipulations for withdrawal of the Embassy etc. staffs and of resident Japanese should be made with the British on a strictly reciprocal basis. If this could be done it would be necessary to effect the exchange at a stipulated place, each side providing a ship. An agreement would have to be drawn up regarding the dates of departure, etc. to prevent anything going amiss.
(In the case of GERMANY the exchange took place in HOLLAND, in ITALY’S case it was LISBON. If hostages are taken there is the danger that our nationals will not be able to leave the country.) The evacuees to be exchanged are:
1st party: Embassy and Consular staff
2nd party: Newspaper correspondents
3rd party: Japanese Staff of banks and companies who were sent out from JAPAN (the 2nd and 3rd parties are not necessarily in order of precedence). Exchange for each party will be arranged separately. As a principle I do not wish to include employees locally engaged and Japanese residing here of their own wish. Concerning the above negotiations should be undertaken both here and in TOKYO and, if necessary, instructions can be given via the countries who will protect our interests.
In round figures the number of persons is:
(a) Officials—34 (including the Chargé d’Affaires, secretaries, military and naval attachés, advisory consuls, telegraphic attaché’s, chancellors, special employees and their families).
(b) Newspaper correspondents—6.
(c) Bank and Company employees—30.
Director (3). F.O. (13). F.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.S. Sir R. Hopkins. M.E.W. (2). Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc. in Washington Embassy
Date: 4th December, 1941.
No: 098540
BJ/87
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, WASHINGTON.
No: 867 Secret.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.
[Dept: Note: Compare our No. 098509].
Of all telegraphic cyphers with which your Embassy is provided you are to burn all (including the cyphers of other Ministers in your charge) except one copy each of the machine cypher now in use, cypher “O” and cypher “L”.
2. You are also to discard* one complete cypher machine.
3. As soon as this is done you should telegraph one word “HARUNO”.
4. You should deal with files of in and out telegrams and other secret documents in an approporiate and suitable manner at your discretion.
5. The cyphers brought by Cypher Officer KOSAKA [? should all be burnt]. (Consequently the need to get in touch with MEXICO referred to in my telegram No. 860 [not received] [last word corrupt]).
[Dept: Note: *The word used, “haiki”, can mean “cease to use”, “abolish”, “discard”. It is not the normal word for “destroy”].
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. War Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Reports Ribbentrop’s Statement on German War Plans
No: 098541
Date: 4th December, 1941.
From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1393.
Date: 29th November, 1941.
(Chef de Mission Cypher).
I was to have had an evening meeting yesterday, the 28th, with RIBBENTROP at his request, but he suddenly asked me to postpone it, and it was ten at night before we met.
The reason for the postponement was that GOERING and leading Government and Forces personalities met at the Fuehrer’s official residence and held an important conference lasting for many hours. Now that the objects of the Russian campaign have for the most part been achieved, and the results of interviews with the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the European countries collated, they discussed the direction and policy of next year’s campaign, and I have no doubt that at this conference JAPAN’S action was also discussed.
1. First of all RIBBENTROP again asked if I had received any news about the Japanese–American negotiations. I replied that I had not yet received any official news. RIBBENTROP said JAPAN must not lose this opportunity of achieving the establishment of the New Order in East ASIA, and never had there been a time when close cooperation between the three Allies was more imperative. If JAPAN hesitated and GERMANY carried through the New Order in EUROPE alone, BRITAIN and AMERICA would turn the brunt of their attack against JAPAN. He insisted that, as the Fuehrer had said that day, the existence of JAPAN and GERMANY on the one hand and of AMERICA on the other was fundamentally incompatible, and the Germans were in receipt of reports that, owing to the stiff attitude of the Americans, there was practically no possibility of the Japanese–American negotiations being successful. If this was so, and if JAPAN determined on war against BRITAIN and AMERICA, not only would this be to the common advantage of JAPAN and GERMANY, but he believed it would be to JAPAN’S advantage also.
I said I know nothing of JAPAN’S plans and therefore could not answer; but I asked whether His Excellency really thought a state of war would arise between GERMANY and AMERICA. He replied that Roosevelt was diseased, and there was no knowing what he would do.
Considering that hitherto RIBBENTROP has always answered that AMERICA would avoid war, and in view of recent speeches by HITLER and RIBBENTROP, it seems to me that GERMANY’S attitude towards AMERICA is gradually stiffening, and that she has reached the stage where she would not shun even war with AMERICA.
2. I enquired about the future of the war against RUSSIA. RIBBENTROP replied that the Fuehrer had said that it was now his inflexible determination to sweep away and crush the SOVIET once and for all. The most important military operations had been concluded, and a large part of the army would be withdraw to GERMANY. They would, however, continue operations in the CAUCASUS, and next Spring with a part of it they would make an attack on and beyond the URALS and chase STALIN into SIBERIA. I asked when approximately this was to be, and he said it was intended that the attack should start in about May of next year.
I next observed that I gathered from what he said that they were quite determined on attacking the SOVIET, and the thing I should like done as soon as possible was the creation of air communications between MANCHURIA and GERMANY. He replied that the Germans had been thinking of this for some time past, and he thought that next Summer it would not be impossible to fly in one hop from somewhere near the URALS to MANCHURIA.
3. I asked about plans for an attack on BRITAIN. He said that before the landing in BRITAIN they would chase British influence clean out of the NEAR EAST, AFRICA, GIBRALTAR and the MEDITERRANEAN. I gather from this statement by RIBBENTROP that they attach even more importance than before to this area. I asked if they intended to carry on without, attacking the BRITISH ISLES, RIBBENTROP said that GERMANY was of course making preparations for this: but according to reports reaching GERMANY the internal situation in BRITAIN was not any too good. For instance the split in the Conservative Party, the lack of confidence in CHURCHILL and the revolutionary ideas of BEVIN, the Labour leader, were making internal conditions quite difficult. There were of course some people who did not believe this: but the Fuehrer believed that conditions in BRITAIN were bad and thought that as a result of GERMANY’S future operations, even, it might be, without an invasion, BRITAIN would be beaten.
In any case, however, GERMANY for her part had no intention whatever of making peace with ENGLAND, and the plan was to drive British influence out of EUROPE entirely. After the War, therefore, BRITAIN would be left absolutely powerless, and although the BRITISH ISLES would remain, all other British territory would be split up into three under GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN. In AFRICA, GERMANY would, generally speaking, be satisfied with her old colonies and would give a great part to ITALY. It was, he said, to obtaining (group corrupt) that GERMANY attached the most importance.
4. Remarking in conclusion that the very satisfactory progress of the War under Germany leadership was fully recognised and that GERMANY naturally had to extend the area of operations by regarding as enemies not only BRITAIN but also countries under British influence and those helping BRITAIN, I asked him when he thought the War would end. To this he replied that, although he hoped it would be brought to a conclusion in the course of next year, it might possibly continue till the following year.
He also said that if JAPAN were to go to war with AMERICA, GERMANY would, of course, join in immediately, and HITLER’S intention was that there should be absolutely no question of GERMANY making a separate peace with ENGLAND.
At the end of this talk RIBBENTROP asked that the substance of it should be kept strictly secret, so please pay special attention to its handling.
This telegram has been given to the Naval and Military Attachés and to Vice-Admiral NOMURA and Major-General ABE. Please have it shown to the Army and Navy.
OSHIMA.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Instructions Regarding Cypher Machines and Codes
BJ/88.
No.: 098563
Date: 5th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister. TOKYO.
To: Japanese (? Ambassador), HANOI, etc.
No: 2444 Circular. Secret.
Date: 1st December, 1941.
Instructions have been sent to LONDON, HONGKONG, SINGAPORE and MANILA to discard the cypher machine, and BATAVIA’S machine has been returned to JAPAN.
Notwithstanding my circular telegram No. 2447 (see below), WASHINGTON is retaining its machine and machine code.
BERNE to repeat to VICHY, BERLIN, ROME and NAGORA. WASHINGTON to repeat to BRAZIL, ARGENTINA and MEXICO.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, ROME etc.
No: 2447 Circular of 2nd December, 1941.
Instructions have been sent to the following to burn all telegraphic codes except one copy each of OITE and L:
North AMERICA (including HONOLULU, CANADA, PANAMA, (one group corrupt), South Seas (including one group:? Portuguese) TIMOR), SINGORA, CHIENMAI, British possessions (including Embassy in LONDON), and Dutch possessions.
TOGO.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers etc.
BJ/89.
No: 098577
Date: 5th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Consul, MOMBASA [and other posts unspecified].
No: 2446. Circular.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.
(Secret).
Immediately on receipt of this telegram you are to carry out the following instructions with the greatest care and as inconspicuously as possible.
(A) Burn all cyphers except one copy each of “O” and “L”. As soon as you have done this immediately telegraph the one word HARUNA en clair.
(B) Burn all files of in and out telegrams and all secret and confidential documents.
These are precautions envisaging an emergency, and you should therefore redouble [rest of text corrupt:? precautions in the discharge of your duties].
Director (3). F.O. (3) P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Code Words for Telegraphing to Notify Critical Condition of Situation.
No: 098602.
Date: 6th December, 1941.
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.
No: 2409 Circular.
Date: 27th November, 1941.
To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.
The following is the method of telegraphing secret code words to notify the critical condition of the situation.
Using the names on the first column a plain language text will be made up on some ordinary subject. The second column will contain the information which it is desired to send. (Example:
“Collision between the Japanese and Soviet Armies” will appear in the text under date [? 15th] as “Junior Secretaries HIJIKATA and KUBOTA are ordered for duty at your post. STOP”).
Further telegrams sent by this method will all end with the word “STOP” to distinguish them from other communications. The word “OWARI” [—“end”] will therefore not be used.
Arimura: |
cypher communications prohibited. |
Asai: |
communicate by wireless broadcast. |
Asakura: |
listen carefully for wireless communication by broadcast. |
Asikaga: |
jamming by overseas broadcasts reception impossible. |
Azuma: |
pressure on JAPAN becoming greater. |
Edoguti: |
prepare for evacuation. |
Hanabusa: |
evacuation preparations made. |
Hanazono: |
proceed with preparations for requesting suitable foreign envoy (consulate) to protect Japanese interests. |
Hatakeyama: |
diplomatic relations severed between Japan and … |
Hattori: |
relations between JAPAN and … are extremely critical. |
Hijikata: |
collision between Japanese and … armies. |
Hosino: |
JAPAN is engaged with … on the whole front. |
Ibaragi: |
telegraph time at which rupture of diplomatic relations between JAPAN and country to which you are accredited anticipated. |
Inagaki: |
has telegram been received on the matter of …? |
Ishikawa: |
telegram received on the matter of … |
Kashiwagi: |
positive action has begun against … |
Kobayakawa: |
stop granting Japanese entry and transit visas to … nationals. |
Kodama: |
Japan. |
Komiyama: |
China. |
Koyanagi: |
Great Britain. |
U.S.S.R. | |
Kuribara: |
France. |
Kusunoki: |
Germany. |
Matsutani: |
Italy. |
Minami: |
United States of America. |
Miwata: |
Canada. |
Miyazaki: |
Mexico. |
Morokoshi: |
[? Brazil]. |
Motizuki: |
Panama. |
Nagamine: |
Argentine. |
Nakazato: |
Thailand. |
Nango: |
England and America. |
Teigi: |
Dutch East Indies. |
Ogawa: |
Burma. |
Okamoto: |
Malaya. |
Okumura: |
Australia. |
Onizuka: |
Union of [? South Africa]. |
Nodera: |
enemy country. |
Otani: |
[? the individual in question]. |
Onishi: |
year. |
Sibuya: |
next year. |
Simanaka: |
this year. |
Sakakibara: |
month. |
Sigeno I: |
[? day]. |
San Zyo: |
time. |
Itiro: |
one. |
Nisaku: |
2 |
Santaro: |
3 |
Yoiti: |
4 |
Goro: |
5 |
[? Ma] Sa |
|
Roku: |
6 |
Simetaro: |
7 |
Yasokiti: |
8 |
Hisamatu: |
9 |
Atumi: |
0 (zero). |
TOGO.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Consul-General, Singapore [and other posts unspecified].
No: 2461 Circular of 3rd December, 1941.
Secret:
Duplicates of secret code words (including those for use in broadcasting*) are to be kept until the last moment. If anyone has already burnt them he should inform me by telegram and they will be telegraphed again.
TOGO.
[Dept: Note: *These are presumably those given in our No. 098127].
Japanese Orders for Destruction of Cyphers, etc.
BJ/90
No: 098603
Date: 6th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, LONDON.
No: 2445 Circular. (Secret).
Date: 2nd December, 1941.
Please take the following action without delay and see to it that no word of it leaks to outsiders.
1. Except for one copy each of the O, E, H, P, G, and L codes and the Character Code, all telegraphic codes (including the cypher books for intercommunications between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War, and Marine) to be burnt.
2. When this has been done, the one word “HARUNA” to be telegraphed.
3. The files of all incoming and outgoing telegrams and all other confidential documents to be burnt.
4. Taking all possible care not to arouse outside suspicion, all secret documents to be treated in the same way.
As these are precautions envisaging an emergency, you should communicate this to no one but members of your staff and you should redouble your attention to your duties and maintain your calmness and self-respect.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
From: Japanese Chargé, London.
To: Foreign Minister, Tokyo.
No: 790 of 3rd December, 1941.
HARUNA [see paragraph 2 of telegram above].
Japanese code words for telegraphic to notify critical condition of situation
No: 098604
Date: 6th December, 1941.
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Representatives, LONDON, etc.
No: 2421 Circular.
Date: 29th November, 1941.
Additions to list given in my circular No. 2409 [our No. 098602].
(To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher).
Kasima: |
Have residents been interned? |
Kanoo: |
All residents are safe. |
Kikuti: |
All residents have been interned. |
Katuno: |
Some residents have been interned. |
Kawasimo: |
General Information. Wave-length changed to … k/cs from … [month] … [day]. |
Kakao: |
General Information. Sensitivity bad; please change wave-length. |
Tujikita: |
General Information. Please change to shorter wave-length. |
Tabuse: |
General Information. Please change to longer wave-length. |
Saitoo: |
General Information. Time of broadcast changing on … [day] from … [time] to … [time]. |
Isezaki: |
Hundred. |
Wanami: |
Thousand. |
Yasu [?RYO]: |
0,000. |
Uno: |
00,000. |
Itimata: |
000,000. |
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. War Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese code words for telegraphing to notify critical condition of situation
No: 098608
Date: 6th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, RIO etc.
No: 2432. Circular.
Date: 29th November, 1941.
As the following additions have been made for use in connection with your area only, please add them to the list already sent to you. (See our Nos. 098602 and 098604).
Asahima: |
The supplying of fuel to Japanese ships putting into Port has been stopped from … (date). |
Date: |
Please telegraph what quantity of … can be bought. |
Kawahara: |
It is thought that about … tons of … can be bought. |
Niwaii Quiti: |
Purchase of … impossible. |
Makamuta: |
Negotiations for purchase of … in progress. |
Mukakata: |
(?Please) communicate via … (name of country.) |
Kazama: |
Communications (? to be carried out) via diplomatic mission in … (name of country). |
Tokusima: |
Japanese ship due … (name of country) on … (month) … (day). |
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. War Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Takemouti: |
Can a Japanese ship visit … (name of country). |
Tonagi: |
Japanese ship can be sent to … (name of country). |
Takagi: |
Metal. |
Sawamura: |
Lead. |
Hasumi: |
Mercury. |
Iwasaki: |
Coal. |
Mikokata: |
Diamonds for industrial use. |
Iyami: |
Platinum. |
Kada: |
Copper. |
Carat. | |
Makhata: |
PERU. |
Masuko: |
CHILE. |
Hakada: |
COLOMBIA. |
Takekaka: |
(? URUGUAY). |
Simazu: |
(? PARAGUAY). |
Ihazawa: |
VENEZUELA. |
Fujikaka: |
SAN (?DOMINGO). |
Hasimoto: |
(?ECUADOR). |
Simeo: |
HAVANA. |
Taii Ki: |
(? RIO). |
Tokawa: |
(? BOLIVIA). |
Hasegawa: |
River PLATE. |
Iri—Ine: |
SANTOS. |
Ksomoto: |
(Bauru, sic.? PAULO). |
Bappu: |
CURITIBA. |
Tekamatu: |
(? BELEM). |
Suatugu: |
BUENOS AIRES. |
Suzuki: |
SANTIAGO. |
Yamato: |
LIMA. |
Uskgawa: |
BOGOTA. |
Hara: |
CARACAS. |
Isono: |
? |
Fukamati: |
ASUNCION. |
Japanese—American negotiations account sent to Japanese Ambassador, Berlin.
No: 098633.
Date: 7th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No. 986.
Date: 30th November, 1941.
(Dept. Note: First paragraph missing).
2. The present Cabinet has therefore continued the negotiations (with AMERICA) hitherto on an equitable basis though at the same time exercising every care to safeguard JAPAN’S authority and existence.
Amongst the most knotty points in these negotiations has been the conflict in the respective opinions regarding the question of withdrawing troops from CHINA and INDO-CHINA (was demanded) etc., but to judge by circumstances in the negotiations hitherto, the fundamental obstacle has been the traditional policy of AMERICA with regard to the conduct of international relations, that is to say her adherence to the same fundamental principles as were expressed in the recent Anglo-American talks at sea (? i.e., the Atlantic Charter). In short, AMERICA’S real intention is to veto and obstruct the establishment of the New Order in EUROPE and ASIA by JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY (i.e. the purpose of the Tripartite Pact), their view being that Japanese–American relations cannot be maintained on a friendly basis so long as JAPAN makes common cause with GERMANY and ITALY, and, acting on this view, they have to all intents and purposes demanded JAPAN’S renunciation of the Tripartite Pact. This has brought the negotiations to their final stage, and, as the talks of the last few days have made this matter still more clear, JAPAN has been compelled to realize that to continue the negotiations any longer cannot be expected to serve any useful purpose.
3. Again, the proposals presented by the American Government on the 26th made the above attitude even clearer, the clause affecting the Tripartite Pact being worded: “It is agreed that any treaty which either of the two Governments may have concluded with a third country shall not be construed as conflicting with the principles of this treaty, in other words, with the maintenance of peace in all regions of the PACIFIC …” It is apparent that this was planned with the object of restricting the interpretation of JAPAN’S obligations under the Tripartite Pact, and thereby making JAPAN refrain from giving support to GERMANY and ITALY in the event of American participation in the (group corrupt. !European) war, and to judge this by clause alone it has been realized that, quite apart from all other questions, it would be impossible for the American proposals to be made (group corrupt: ! the subject of) negotiations. Moreover the fact is that the American Government held constant discussions with GREAT BRITAIN, CHINA, AUSTRALIA, and the Dutch before presenting their proposals, and hence it can be seen that AMERICA is at present (? acting in common) with these countries and regards JAPAN as an enemy together with GERMANY and ITALY.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Major Norton. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Ambassador, Rome, reports interview with Mussolini
No: 098650
Date: 7th December, 1941.
From: Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
Date: 3rd December, 1941.
(Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine).
Reference your No. 988 to BERLIN (our No. 098452).
Accompanied by ANDO I saw the Duce, MUSSOLINI (CIANO also was present) at 11 a.m. on the 3rd. I first gave him an outline of the Japanese–American negotiations as set forth in your No. 988 to BERLIN (our No. 098633). MUSSOLINI said he had been following the negotiations from their inception until to-day with the greatest attention, and my communication had caused him no surprise. There was no doubt that the present situation was the natural result of the (? obstinacy) of the American Government and of President ROOSEVELT’S policy of intervention. The plutocrats of AMERICA aimed at the economic exploitation of Eastern ASIA for their own benefit, and wanted to detach JAPAN from the Axis and intervene in the European war. He had always known from the beginning that JAPAN, who was faithful and loyal, would not respond to such an attitude on AMERICA’S part, negotiations or no negotiations. As I and my predecessor knew, he was a whole-hearted supporter of JAPAN’S fundamental policy for the establishment of a New Order in East ASIA, and as it was in the past, so it was in the present and would be in the future. He firmly believed that JAPAN, as a natural right, would be the leader of Great East ASIA.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Major Norton. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
I then spoke on the lines of your telegram under reference ([This passage in brackets is not clear. The sense seems to be: “With regard to paragraph 3 of your telegram, it was to be done as one copy between our Ambassador in BERLIN and RIBBENTROP and talks of some sort were in progress. I should like him to ask the German Ambassador about it.”]). With regard to paragraph 2 in your telegram MUSSOLINI said that if war broke out ITALY would give military support to the best of her power; that is to say she would do her best to keep the British Navy in the MEDITERRANEAN. Moreover GERMANY and ITALY together had recently established an air blockade and were trying to put further pressure on Britain in the MEDITERRANEAN. Also with regard to [? 2? 3], he was ready to sign to-day. I therefore asked further with regard to 2 if ITALY would do this at once if JAPAN declared war on BRITAIN and AMERICA. He replied that in accordance with the Three Power Pact naturally she would. As, however, it would be necessary to do it simultaneously with GERMANY, they would have to go through the formality of consulting with GERMANY. With regard to 3, I submitted the [one group] translation in your telegram No. 237 [not received], and asked which procedure he preferred, a single copy or separate copies. He replied that it should be done simultaneously with GERMANY, but he did not mind what form it took. If it were possible a single copy would give a greater impression of strength. He would at once consult MACKENSEN on this point.
At this meeting MUSSOLINI asked me questions about the Russian question, and I therefore did not refer to it.
Repeated to BERLIN.
HORIKIRI.
Japan and the Axis, Proposed Three-Power Pact
No: 098651
Date: 7th December, 1941.
From: The Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 782.
Date: 5th December, 1941.
Reference my telegram No. 775. [Not received].
Accompanied by ARDO I had an interview with Foreign Minister CIANO on the 5th at his request.
CIANO showed me the Italian text of the draft of a Three-Power Pact to which GERMANY and ITALY have agreed. (BERLIN will have telegraphed this to you, I imagine), regarding participation in the war and not making an independent armistice or independent peace. He said that if the Japanese would agree to this it could be signed at any time. The procedure could be arranged by conversations between BERLIN and TOKYO and then all parties could sign. Repeated by telegram to BERLIN.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Foreign Minister’s View of Washington Conversations
No: 098671.
Date: 8th December 1941
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN, etc.
No: 2416 Circular.
Date: 28th November, 1941.
[Dept: Note: Very corrupt text].
(Chef de Mission cypher).
With regard to the Japanese–American negotiations, the counter proposal made by the the Americans on the 27th ignores the position of Japan and cannot be considered for a moment. It seems, therefore, that there is nothing for it but to discontinue the negotiations. The situation is that it is impossible to guarantee that within a few days from now there will be no [? change in] the relations of JAPAN with BRITAIN and AMERICA.
This is for your personal information only.
TOGO.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D.
Japanese Broadcasting
No: 098673
Date: 8th December 1941.
From: The Japanese Ambassador, RIO DE JANEIRO
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 482.
Date: 30th November, 1941.
Recently at this post, we have been testing general news reception.
At present it is quite impossible [group corrupt:? to hear] the 10:30 p.m. Tokyo time, broadcast and, for the time being, please note that we are only listening to JVJ’s [group corrupt:? JZJ’s] broadcast directed to American states at 6:30 p.m. Tokyo time. The same, I understand, applies to Argentina.
Actually, reception conditions here are considered best between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m. Tokyo time, and I consider it would be most advantageous to use this period for South American broadcasts. Two wave-lengths [of frequencies] between 10 and 15 megacycles [group corrupt:? are suggested].
Director. F.O. (3). P.I.D. M.I.5.
Japanese Ambassador, Bangkok, Wishes to Burn Codes
No: 098674
Date: 8th December 1941
From: The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 883.
Date: 30th November, 1941.
In view of the state of emergency, I should like to burn all telegraphic codes except those set out below. Please wire at once whether you have any objection.
YO, KA < OITE, TO, TSU, FUJI, x. [Group corrupt]. MATSU with No. 1 rules for use, directions for using “B” machine (KO-OTSU [(a) - (b)]) and the machine code—one of each of the above.
L, YAKKO [—NU]—two of each.
Further, I should like to burn all shipping codes, naval codes and codes for use between the three Ministries. Please negotiate with the Departments concerned and telegraph instructions.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.
No: 098693
Date: 8th December 1941
From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1416
Date: 5th December, 1941.
[Dept: Note: See our No. 088851].
(Chef de Mission Cypher).
Reference my No. 1407 [not received].
I called on RIBBENTROP at his request at 3 a.m. on the 5th. he made a formal reply that they accepted the two points put forward by us. My following telegram gives the draft Treaty which he gave me in this connection.
OSHIMA
No: 1417 of 5th December, 1941.
(Chef de Mission Cypher).
(1. The last part of the Agreement is in the same form as the Three Power Treaty.
2. The place of signature is BERLIN.)
[Dept: Note: Translation follows at end of text].
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
(Part of German text in original illegible.)
Artikel 1.
Falls zwischen Deutschland und Italien einersits und den Verinigten Staaten con Amerika andererseits der Kriegszustand einritt, wird sich Japan sofort auch seinerseits als im Kriegszustand mit den Vereinigten Staaten befindlich betrachten und diesen Krieg mit allem ihm zur Verfügung stehenden Machtmittein führen.
Artikel 2.
Deutschland, Italien und Japan verpflichten sich, im Falle eines gemäss Artikel 1 dieses Abkommens von den drei Mächten geminsam gegen die Verienigten Staaten von Amerika geführten Krieges ohne voiles [gegen] seitiges Einverständnis keinen Waffenstillstand oder Frieden mit den Vereinigten Staaten zu schliessen.
Sie übernemen die gleiche Verpflichtung auch hinsichtlich eines Waffenstillstands oder Friedens mit England für den Fall, das zwischen Japn und Egland der Kriegzustand eintritt.
Artikel 3.
Die drei Regierungen sind darüber einig, dass dieses Abkommen auf das strengste gehim gehalten wird. Sie werden jedoch die von ihnen in Artikel 2 übernommene Verpflichtung in einer noch zu verabrenden Form bekanntgeben, sobald sich Deutschland, Italien und Japan gemeinsam im Kriegzustand mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika oder England oder mit diesen beiden Mächen befinden.
Artikel 4.
Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzeichnung in Kraft und bleibt ebenso lange wie der am 27. September 1940 abgeschlossene Dreimächtpakt in Geltung.
OSHIMA.
Translation
In view of the increasingly obvious desire of the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND to bring to naught a just New Order with all the armed forces at their disposal and to cut off the means of existence of the German, Italian and Japanese peoples, the German Government, the Italian Government and the Japanese Government have, in order to ward off these grave threats to the existence of their peoples, jointly resolved on the following:
Article (1).
Should a state of war arise between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES, GERMANY and ITALY for their part shall also consider themselves to be at war with the UNITED STATES, and shall conduct this war with all the armed forces at her disposal.
Article (2).
GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN bind themselves in the event of a war waged jointly by the Three Powers against the UNITED STATES according to Article (1) of this Treaty, not to conclude any armistice or peace with the UNITED STATES without full mutual agreement.
They undertake a similar obligation regarding an armistice or peace with ENGLAND, should a state of war arise between JAPAN and ENGLAND.
Article (3).
The three Governments are in full agreement that this agreement shall be kept most strictly secret. They shall, however, announce in a form yet to be decided, the undertakings assumed in Article (2), as soon as GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN find themselves jointly at war with the UNITED STATES of AMERICA or with ENGLAND or with both these Powers.
Article (4).
This agreement comes into force immediately on signature and remains in force as long as the Three Power Pact concluded on 27th September 1940.
Japanese Notification of “Extremely Critical” Relations with Great Britain and United States
BJ/91
No: 098694
Date: 8th December 1941
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Embassy, LONDON, etc.
No. 2494 Circular.
Date: 7th December, 1941
Relations between JAPAN and GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES are extremely critical.
JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER.
[Dept. Note: This telegram was sent in plain language with the special code words inserted given in our No. 098602. It was despatched from TOKYO at 1150 hours OMT on 7th December 1941, i.e. Japan time 8:50 p.m. on 7th December 1941].
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.S. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japan and the Axis: Proposed Three-Power Pact.
No: 098696
Date: 8th December 1941
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No: 1004. Most immediate.
Date: 7th December, 1941.
[Dept: Note: In Chef de Mission cypher recyphered on the machine].
Reference your Nos. 1418 and 1419 [these telegrams were received in corrupt and fragmentary form. The former appears to deal with Russian supplies and the latter with the draft treaty].
We are in complete agreement with GERMANY’S counter-proposals. Accordingly there is no objection to initialling right away and formally signing as soon as the [group corrupt:? necessary] procedure has been completed. However, the situation may take a sudden turn and we cannot tell whether a [group corrupt] collision may not occur in the interval before the formal signing is performed. Thus, supposing we initial now, it must be understood that for the actual signing, the text proposed by Germany may not apply to the existing circumstances [for example, clauses like No. 1 will be unnecessary if GERMANY and ITALY join in the war without delay).
[Two groups] I wish you to see RIBBENTROP immediately and explain the above particulars confidentially to him. Also make clear that it is the expectation of the Imperial Government that if war breaks out between JAPAN and AMERICA before the formal signature of the agreement, GERMANY and ITALY will immediately participate.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.L.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.S. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
As regards the text of the agreement, [group corrupt:? please negotiate] only for the stipulation concerning the non-conclusion of a separate peace. Respecting GERMANY, please refer to the text in my No. 997 (not received). Further, discuss with GERMANY whether the formal signing should be made public after GERMANY and ITALY have joined in the war and telegraph the reply.
Please repeat to ROME.
Far Eastern War: Question of German and Italian Participation
RJ/92.
No: 098722
Date: 9th December 1941
From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1432. Most immediate.
Date: 7th December, 1941.
(Chef de Mission cypher).
At 11 p.m. to-day, the 7th, I received a radio report that hostilities had broken out betwen JAPAN and AMERICA, and at once called RIBBENTROP. He said that from reports which he too had received he thought this was true, and that, therefore, although he had not yet secured HITLER’S sanction, the immediate participation in the war by GERMANY and ITALY was a matter of course. The secret agreement had in consequence already become -----? -----, and [? they had decided] to drop it * * * [a portion is lost here] * * * Form of German and Italian participation. RIBBENTROP said he would discuss with me to-morrow, the 8th, about the time of publication of this declaration and so on.
RIBBENTROP rang up CIANO then and there and notified him of the foregoing.
Director (23). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Far Eastern War: Text of Japanese-German-Italian Agreement
BJ/98
No: 098760
Date: 10th December 1941
From: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No. 1440. Most immediate.
Date: 8th December, 1941.
To be treated as Chef de Mission Cypher.
Reference my No. 1432. (Our no 088722).
The text of the agreement, after consultation with GERMANY, is given below. An explanation follows in my separate telegram.
In dem unerschütterlichen Entschluss, die Waffen nicht niederzulegen, bis der gemainsame Krieg gegen die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und England zum erfolgreichen Ende geführt worden ist, haben sich die Deutsch Regierung, die Italienische Regierung und die Japanische Regierung über folgende Bestimungen geeinigt:
Artikel 1.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan werden den ihnen von der Verienigten Staaten von Amerika und England aufgezwungenen Krieg mit allen ihnen zu Geboted stehenden Machmittelm gemeinsam bis zum siegreichen Ende führen.
Artikel 2.—Deutschland, Italien, und Japan verpflichten sich, ohne volles gegen seitiges Enverständnis weder mit den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika not mit England Waffenstillstand oder Frieden zu schliessen.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Artikel 3.—Deutschland, Italien und Japan werden nack siegreicher Beendigung des Krieges zum Zwecke der Herbeiführung einer gerechten Neuordnung auf das engste zusammenarbeiten.
Artikel 4.—Dieses Abkommen tritt sofort mit seiner Unterzichnung in Kraft.
Zu Urkunde dessen haben die Unterzeichneten, von ihren Regierungen gehörig. bevollmächtigt, dieses Abkommen unterzeichnet und mit ihren Siegelm versehen.
Ausgefertigt in dreifacher Urschrift in deutscher, intalienischer und japanischer Sprache, in Berlin am … Dezember 1941 in 20ten Jahre der Faschistischen Ära—entsprechend dem Tage des 12ten Monats des 16ten Jahres der Ära Syowa.
No. 1441 of 8th December, 1941.
With reference to my telegram No. 1440 [see above].
From 5 p.m. to-day myself, RIBBENTROP, KASE, USHIDA, and GAUSS put our heads together on this matter of the declaration of the non-conclusion of a separate peace with a view to imparting to this declaration the loftiest possible significance, and produced the text of the agreement contained in my telegram under reference. This goes beyond the adoption of our proposal in regard to a promise of nonconclusion of a separate peace (Clause II) to the following extent:
(a) The Three Powers’ firm intention to fight together against Anglo-American aggression until final victory is expressed in Clause II.
(b) Cooperation with a view to the establishment of a new order after the war is promised in Clause III.
Thereby the significance of this war is elucidated, while at the same time Clause III has an advantage from the point of view of obtaining German and Italian cooperation when the Great East Asia co-prosperity sphere is established after the war, this, I believe, being in accord with the views of the Japanese Government. I hope therefore that the above text will be adopted unless there are any serious objections, and that the formalities for signature may be completed promptly. I would add that in the meantime the Germans have notified me that the Italian Government is in complete agreement with this proposal.
2. Ribbentrop said that he would like the publication of this agreement to take place on the 10th and immediately afterwards hoped to stage a big demonstration. He was unable at the moment to say what kind of demonstration this would be but it was sure to be something distinctly favourable to JAPAN, and he was most anxious that signature should be on the 10th. I therefore told him that this could not be undertaken in view of formalities in JAPAN, but as it is likely to be helpful to us if we play our part in falling in with GERMANY’S intention I would suggest that you push on with the formalities as fast as possible with a view to prompt signature. Should signature on the 10th not be possible please reply immediately by telegram on what date it can be accomplished.
3. Just as this very talk was in progress RIBBENTROP received the Imperial Headquarters report of the victory in which the American battleships were sunk, and was greatly delighted and praised highly the daring of our Navy.
No: 1442 of 8th December, 1941.
Most immediate. Secret.
Reference my No. 1440. [See above].
As the matter is urgent, I have tentatively compiled the Japanese text given below. If you have no objections I should like to take this as the (Japanese) text of the agreement. Please telegraph your reply at once.
The Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government with the inflexible determination not to lay down their arms in the joint war against the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE until final victory is achieved have made the following agreement.
1. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY will conjointly prosecute the war forced upon them by the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE with all the means at their disposal until victory is attained.
2. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, except by mutual consent, undertake not to conclude a separate [Dept. Note: the Japanese word used means literally “arbitrary” “self-willed”] armistice and/or peace with the UNITED STATES and the BRITISH EMPIRE or with either of them.
3. JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY, after victory is attained, will cooperate closely in the establishment of an equitable New Order.
5. This agreement will come into force simultaneously with its signature. In witness whereof, the undermentioned, having received competent authority from their respective countries, have set their seals this—day of the 12th month of the 16th year of the Showa Bra Era i.e.—December 1941 or the—day of December of the 20th year of the Fascist Era, in BERLIN, the said agreement having been drawn up in Japanese, German and Italian.
Japanese Instructions to Embassy, Rio, etc. to burn cyphers, etc.
BJ/97
No: 098786
Date: 10th December 1941
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, Rio de Janeiro, etc.
No. 2318 Circular.
Date: 8th December, 1941.
Immediate and Confidential
1. On receipt of this telegram, please burn the following, leaving one copy of each, NU, CITE, TSU, L and x. Depending on the situation, it will also be all right to burn the remaining codes, but please keep TSU as long as possible and leave CITE and L to the last.
2. Please leave one copy each of HIMOKI and the Machine Code in current use following the rules for use between our Embassy in England (sic) and us—only MEXICO does not possess these). But if in view of the situation you wish at any time to destroy them please telegraph me.
3. With regard to the files of my telegrams and other secret documents please watch developments and adopt suitable means of destroying them.
4. In the event of your completing the above, telegraph me the one word JURYO. If you have destroyed TSU the word SHOTI, if CITE and L have been destroyed the word ANZEN.
5. If you have in your care telegraphic codes of other Posts please destroy them all.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office. M.I.5.
Japanese Codes to be Destroyed at Bangkok
No: 098831
Date: 11th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
No: 881. Confidential.
Date: 2nd December, 1941.
In reply to your telegram No. 863. [Our No. 098674]. I agree with your request, to which there is no objection. But please transfer one copy of OITZ to SINGORA for safe keeping. Please destroy the codes for use between the active Ministries; also all the naval code books. The codes remaining after consultation with the posts concerned and the cypher machine[s] please deposit in the special safe. Please be sure that this is carried out.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Broadcasting: Reception in Bangkok
No: 098801
Date: 11th December, 1941.
From: The Japanese Ambassador, BANGKOK.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 902
Date: 4th December, 1941.
At 10:30 p.m. J.A.P.’s selectivity is gradually improving.
We look for broadcasts at this hour and also for JUP at 6:30 p.m.
Director (3). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. Air Ministry. M.I.5. Dominions Office.
Japanese Consul, Dublin, Reports—Destruction of Cyphers
No: 098831
Date: 12th December 1941
From: The Japanese Vice-Consul, DUBLIN.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
Date: 7th December, 1941. 1040 hours.
*HARUNA
Japanese Consul.
[Dept. Note: *See paragraph 2 of TOKYO circular telegram No. 2445 of 2nd December, 1941, our No. 098803].
Director. F.O. (3). Dominions Office.
79716—46—Ex. 148—45
Japanese Vice-Consul, Ouritiba, Reports—Destruction of Cyphers, etc.
No: 098832
Date: 12th December 1941.
From: The Japanese Vice-Consul, OURITIBA.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
Date: 10th December, 1941. 2040 hours.
*JURYO,
Komine.
[Dept. Note: *See Tokyo circular telegram No. 2318 of 8th December, 1941. paragraph 4, our No. 098786].
Director. F.O. (3). M.I.5.
Japan and the Axis: Signature of Treaty
BJ/101.
No: 098833
Date: 12th December, 1941
From: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No. 1451.
Date: 10th December, 1941.
(Dept: Note: See our No. 098760, BJ/98).
Reference your telegram No. 1013. (Not received).
I have received the whole of the Japanese text. I called on the Foreign Minister at noon to-day, 10th, and arranged for signature on the 1lth at 1100 hours Berlin time and for publication at 1600 hours. Accordingly please publish at 2300 hours in JAPAN.
OSHIMA.
Director (-). F.O. (3). P.I.D. Admiralty. War Office (3). India Office (2). Colonial Office. ---- Ministry. Sir E. Bridges. Dominions Office.
Japanese Ambassador, Berlin, Authorized to Sign Three-Power Treaty
No: 098846
Date: 12th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No: 1016.
Date: 10th December, 1941.
(Dept: Note: See our No. 098760).
Most immediate.
To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.
My telegram No. 1013. (Not received).
For your information, the following is a translation into German of the document giving you the power and authority to sign:
(Übersetzung).
TOKYO, den … Dezember des schzehnten Jahres von Showa.
(Amtliches Insiegel).
Der Minister des Auswärtigen Amtes, Shigenori TOGO.
An den Ausserorderntlichen und Bevollmächtigt—Botschafter in BERLIN, Herrn OSHIMA.
Seine Majestät de kaiser haben nachdem die Beratung des kaisserlichen geheimen Staatrates abgeschlossen ist, mit dem heutigan Datum den
Abschluss
Director.
F.--. (3).
P.I.D.
Abschluss des Abkommens zwischen JAPAN, DEUTSCHLAND und ITALIEN zu bewilligen geruht.
Sie sind bevollmächtigt, das oben genannte Abkommen zu unterzeichen und zu siegelu.
(Translation of German given below is as follows:—
(Translation).
TOKYO, the—th December, in the 16th year of the Showa Era.
(Official Seal).
Foreign Minister Shigenori TOGO,
To Mr. OSHIMA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at BERLIN.
The advice of the Imperial Privy Council, His Majesty the Emperor is pleased to agree to the conclusion of a Pact, dated to-day, between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY.
(You are empowered to sign and seal the aforesaid Pact).
Japan and the Axis: Text of Three-Power Treaty
Date: 12th December, 1941.
From: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
No:
Date: 9th December, 1941.
To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher.
At 9:00 p.m. to-day the German Ambassador called on me and we had a second interview when he submitted the new draft of the text. You will already have received this, I expect.
In regard to this text I said that this involved the 1st paragraph of Article 3 of the Three-Power Treaty, and suggested the removal of Article 3. At the same time, I said, if GERMANY stuck to the retention of this Article, after the words “an equitable New Order” in that same Article should be added “in the Three-Power Treaty concluded on 27th September, 1940”.
The Japanese text is given in my immediately following telegram. (See below.)
[The remainder of the telegram gives instructions for telegraphing the texts in the three languages to enable the formalities in JAPAN to be concluded. See Dept. Note: at the end of TOKYO–BERLIN no. 1011 of 9th December, 1941. (See below)].
TOGO.
Director (3).
F.O. (3).
P.I.D.
Admiralty.
War Office (3).
India Office (2). [Continued overleaf]
Colonial Office.
Air Ministry.
Sir E. Bridges.
Dominion Office.
No. 1011 of the 9th December, 1941.
Reference my immediately preceding telegram No. 1010. (See above).
(To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher).
Pact between JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY.
In the inflexible resolve not to lay down their arms till the joint war against the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND has been successfully concluded, the Japanese, German, and Italian Governments have jointly agreed as follows:
Article 1.
JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will fight together with all the resources at their command until victory is achieved over the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND.
Article 2.
JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY undertake not to make a separate armistice or separate peace with the UNITED STATES or ENGLAND without full mutual understanding.
Article 3.
JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will after the victorious conclusion of the war collaborate closely in establishing an equitable new Order in the spirit of the Three-Power Treaty signed on 27th September, 1940.
This pact shall come into force at the time of signature.
As witness whereof the undermentioned plenipotentiaries etc.
Signed in triplicate in Japanese, German and Italian at BERLIN (dates).
TOGO.
(Dept. Note: The German and Italian versions of the above were cabled to TOKYO from BERLIN as Nos. 1450 and 1453 respectively, dated 10th December, 1941.)Most Secret.
Japanese Broadcasts of General Information Reports.
No. 098971
Date: 16th December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, ANGORA, etc.
No: 2548 Circular. Secret.
Date: 11th December, 1941.
From 10:30 p.m. 11th December, general information reports will be sent on the 9450 wavelength [? with the call sign] JUO.
TOGO.
Director
P.O. (3).
P.I.D.
Admiralty.
War Office (3).
Air Ministry. M.I.5.
Sir E. Bridges.
Japanese Naval Plans in South Atlantic and Pacific.
No. 099199
Date: 22nd December, 1941.
From: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
To: Japanese Ambassador, Buenos Aires.
No. 288.
Date: 9th December, 1941.
[The first part of this telegram recounts the events that led up to the outbreak of war from the Japanese point of view—Japanese patience and A.B.C.D. encirclement. Part II follows].
2. The Imperial Japanese forces, however, right at the outset and in one heavy attack, have achieved to following: two battleships sunk, four severely damaged, four heavy cruisers severely damaged (three are confirmed), one aircraft-carrier sunk and over one hundred aircraft destroyed. It may be said that the main strength of the American Pacific Fleet has been practically annihilated.
From now on the Imperial (Japanese) Navy will be able to extend the scope of its (? activities) little by little to the South Atlantic and South Pacific and it is clear at least that we shall obtain command of the seas in the South Pacific before long. Even, therefore, if economic intercourse between JAPAN and the South American States bordering the Pacific be cut off for the time being, it will not be long before communication is restored. Not only so, but intercourse with ARGENTINA and BRAZIL by merchant ships in convoy will be urged upon these two countries, while sea communication with BRITAIN, AMERICA, and Latin AMERICA will, on the other hand, be severed (? shortly) by the Imperial (Japanese) Navy.
Director (3).
F.O. (3). (Dept. Note: Part III of this telegram missing.)
P.I.D.
Admiralty.
War Office (3).
India Office (2).
Colonial Office.
Air Ministry.
M.E.W. (2)
Sir E. Bridges.
Dominions Office.