STAND A N D FIGHT

vides a typical example of the 'poor man's'war the German army was obliged to fightat this time. Its formation and early opera-tions provide a glimpse of what wasexpected from such small units hastilyformed on the eve of operation MARKET-GARDEN.On 12 September a few tanks of theBritish Guards Armoured Division stormedthe bridge over the Maas-Scheldt canal westof Neerpelt. This was the last water barrierseparating Belgium from Holland. FirstFallschirmjäger Army Headquartersreceived the news around 0800, anddespatched motorised reconnaissance ele-ments to investigate. Light enemy resistancewas encountered at the Dutch-Belgian bor-der astride the Valkenswaard to Hechtelroad. Thereupon, Fallschirmjäger Reg-iment 'Hoffmann', which had just arrivedin the vicinity of Goirle south of Tilburg,was alerted. The sequence of events leadingto the creation of the KampfgruppeWalther were now set in motion. Existingfor only one month, the battle group was toplay a leading part in subsequentMARKET-GARDEN operations. Com-prising elements of all three services of theWehrmacht, its composition was to changecontinuously, governed as ever by oper-ational necessity.Colonel von Hoffmann, the RegimentalCommander, was given the task of contain-ing any further enemy advances along theHechtel-Valkenswaard Road. There wassufficient motor transport to move twocompanies up immediately, until theremainder of the regiment arrived. Whenthis happened, the bridgehead was to beeliminated.Formed a mere three weeks before atHalberstadt, the Regiment von Hoffmannwas a personnel-holding reinforcement unit- a training depot. It was organised into aregimental headquarters, three battalionsand an anti-tank company with eight 75mmanti-tank guns. Lieutenant Heinz Volz was

the adjutant of the 1st battalion commandedby Major Helmut Kerutt. Commenting onthe readiness of the battalion six days priorto committal, he wrote:

'The Regiment at this point in timehad no uniform issue of parachutesmocks and practically no weapons.'

These it received two days later on the wayto its initial assembly area near Tilburg. Notime had been available for individual orcollective training, nor had weapons beenzeroed. The regimental commander, two ofthe acting battalion commanders, as well asthe majority of the company commanders,had no combat experience. Of the non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, 90per cent came from Luftwaffe ground units.Volz commented further upon arrival inUdenhout on 10 September that his battal-ion during the previous period . . .

'. . . had done everything possible inthe three available days to equipourselves appropriately for thecoming operations. Above all we triedto get at least the majority of soldiersequipped with bicycles in order tomake the unit more mobile. There wasinsufficient fuel for the fewmotorcycles at our disposal. Thisimproved when considerablequantities of petrol were discovered. . . at an abandoned airfield.'

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At the same time, Fallschirmjäger Regi-ment 6, commanded by a newly-promotedLieutenant-Colonel von der Heydte, hadincurred casualties occupying a blockingposition north-west of Beverloo. He was tofall back northward across the Meuse-Scheldt canal. Although badly mauled inthe Normandy fighting, the regiment hadalready been reconstituted and reinsertedinto combat. Despite being bulked out withuntrained replacements, its combat effect-

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