IT NEVER S N O W S IN SEPTEMBER

Lindemann was in charge of one of themortar sections. Heavy fire power was pro-vided by some 20mm cannon. Despite itssize, and using the leadership resourcesavailable, the N C O school had the poten-tial to be rapidly expanded to regimentalsize. Colonel Lippert, Lindemann remem-bers, was 'a father-type, admired andrespected by the soldiers'. The latter hadbeen selected from the best recruit intakes,served at the front and then been referred tothe N C O school. As SS they were aggres-sive, proud of their elite arm, but not asLindemann recalls 'necessarily fanaticalNational Socialists - Himmler was notloved at all by the Waffen SS'. In additionto sweeping up stragglers, the school wasconstructing field defences along the Waalat Gorinchen.In Arnhem, the SS Panzer-grenadierDepot and Reserve Battalion 16, comman-ded by SS-Captain Sepp Krafft, was anotherpotentially effective unit. Originally takenfrom positions on the coast, it had beenbrought under von Tettau's control as a'Divisional Reserve' in the Oosterbeek areawest of Arnhem. Consisting of two infan-try and a third heavy weapons company, itwas supplemented by trench mortar, anti-tank, flak, flame-thrower and heavy mortarsections. With its 12 officers, 65 NCOs and229 soldiers, it represented a w e l l -integrated and balanced force on paper.However, it was still under training. Of theforce, forty per cent were graded 'not yet fitfor action'. Nevertheless, they were reason-ably fit 17- to 19-year-olds. Krafft himself,although a committed National Socialist,was a professional and capable officer.Luftwaffe ground staffs that had beenpicked up by the reception screens weregrouped into 'Fliegerhorst' battalions.These men had provided the ground per-sonnel for the abandoned airfields inFrance, and the majority had no combatexperience whatsoever, and only a rudi-mentary knowledge of infantry weapons

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and training. A large number had also beendrafted into the newly-raised regiments ofStudent's First Fallschirmjäger Army. Allthese units were now undergoing training,scattered in various rear locations through-out Holland.German naval personnel were similarlygrouped into Schiffstammabteilung (navalmanning divisions) and trained as infantry.Outflanked by the Allied armies as theyhad manned the 'Atlantic Wall' they com-prised the non-seagoing older navy classesand garrison artillery units. An injection ofinfantry-trained NCOs was required if theywere to function effectively in combat.Some skills were, however, inter-operable.Heavy weapons could sometimes be crewedby these ex-'sailors', and a number were alsowell-trained artillery observers.In Holland there were a number oflocally-raised forces, mainly consisting ofDutch-German nationals that could also beemployed in an emergency. An SS-Dutchsurveillance battalion, 'Wach Battalion 3',was stationed in Amersfoort north ofArnhem. Four companies strong, with somelimited support weapons, it had originallybeen formed to guard the concentrationcamp established near the same town. Apartfrom some German nationals, the rest of itssoldiers had been recruited from Dutchmenwishing to avoid Arbeitsatz in Germany, orpetty criminals from a detention camp.There were, of course, a few genuinelycommitted National Socialists in its ranks,but like everyone else, they were becomingincreasingly aware of the proximity of theAllied armies, and the likely retribution'liberation' would bring. Thus far its oper-ational experience had merely been to pro-vide quick-reaction forces Alarmeinheiten, which were sent out in requisitioned lorriesto track down shot-down Allied air crews.The battalion commander, 46-year-old SS-Captain Paul Anton Helle, possessed nocombat experience, being totally reliantupon his adjutant SS-Lieutenant Albert

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